| Author | Albert J. Jongman |
| Publication | Conflict Prevention Newsletter |
| Year | vol.1, no.1 (March 1998), pp. 8-9 |
Keywords
conflict preventionTowards More Successful Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Solutions[1]
In the current phase of world politics, which is characterized by instability and a changing security environment, decision-makers, whether they represent international/regional organizations, governments or NGOs, are faced with situations that force them to transcend bureaucratic paralysis and rivalry, and take action in a more timely manner. In the increasingly rich literature on conflict prevention a whole range of useful proposals have been presented that can contribute to the closing of the Response-Knowledge gap and the Warning-Response gap.
New tools and approaches adapted to the early stages of conflict before hostilities break out have not yet been fully exploited. Their application will have a greater chance of success if they are applied in flexible, non-hierarchical processes, whereby the intervening actors work closely on the ground in direct contact with the parties in the conflict. 'Coalitions of the Willing' can serve as enlightening examples to others who still have doubts about the effectiveness of conflict prevention. Hopefully, in this way a multilateral conflict prevention regime will evolve in the near future. In this process, the role of scientists and professionals ought to be to provide policy-makers with continuous information, analysis and risk assessments of emerging crisis situations, drawing attentions to successes and failures in analogous situations in the recent past and suggesting timely and appropriate responses to signals of impending violent conflicts. From the growing body of literature on conflict prevention at least seven obstacles to more effective conflict prevention and resolution can be deduced. Some are related to the methods, others to the actors and the timing. For each of these obstacles a possible solution, as reflected in recent literature on the subject, is provided.
1. Distinction between late and early prevention
The crisis orientation of the Security Council and the slowness of multilateral decision-making continue to result in an approach which provides 'too little, too late' and therefore fails to prevent disputes from escalating out of control. It is essential to make a distinction between late prevention and early prevention, which have different time perspectives and different goals. The goal of late prevention is oriented primarily towards containing a dispute just before it crosses the threshold into crisis and armed hostilities. Early prevention is aimed at the provision of skilled Third Party assistance through good offices and mediation, as early as possible in a dispute, when the opportunity for resolution is at its 'ripest'. If we wish to change the present situation in which many disputes are not submitted to the Security Council until it is too late for their peaceful resolution, we must give higher priority to early prevention - which has organizational consequences.
2. More effective early warning
Policy-makers are often not inclined to take early warning seriously or to act upon it in situations that pose the possibility of severe ethnic and religious conflicts, humanitarian disasters or gross human rights violations. Analysts concerned with the warning problem have focused attention primarily upon the danger of a surprise all-out military attack. Lesser types of threats and crises associated with the broader, and in many ways, more complex tasks of preventive diplomacy and preventive actions have not yet received as much systematic attention in efforts to develop warning-response systems. In recent years checklists have been developed that allow policy-makers to improve their anticipation of crisis situations. Warnings generated on the basis of these checklists provide an opportunity to avert the expected crisis, to modify it or to redirect it in some less dangerous and less costly direction.
3. Case-studies and tools assessment
A major reason for the failure to respond effectively to early signs of major upheavals is a lack of knowledge about what can actually be done. Perhaps there would be more political will if decision-makers knew what they can actually do. To bridge the knowledge gap two types of research have been suggested: comparative case-studies (studying recent instances when deliberate preventive interventions were made into brewing domestic disputes, both when these succeeded and when they failed to prevent escalation) and tools assessment (evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of individual generic policy tools of intervention used or possibly useful in many places). The assessment of tools has already resulted in a matrix of possible intervention instruments. What is still lacking is an assessment of their performance in terms of such criteria as: implementability, political feasibility, interactive effects with other tools and impact under differing conditions, such as different stages of conflict. It is assumed that an optimal form of conflict prevention can be achieved by inserting conflict prevention and preventive peace-building elements into existing diplomacy, development, trade and other ongoing relations.
4. Regional conflict prevention centers
The major responsibility for preventive diplomacy within the United Nations lies with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Its record shows that it is forced to adopt a reactive rather than proactive approach to preventive diplomacy. It responds primarily when countries ask for assistance or only at the late prevention stage, when armed conflict appears imminent. The department is still unable to fully carry out its mandate and has inadequate financial means. It has no staff in the field, which makes it impossible to know what is happening 'on the ground', and it has no full-time diplomacy staff. There is a lack of systematic analysis or overview and the department has not been able to create an institutional memory for fundamental issues. There are at least five alternative options to the present UN structure for dispute settlement, including 1) The UN Headquarters Model; 2) The On-Call Eminent Persons Model; 3) The OSCE Model; 4) The Foreign Service Model; 5) The regional UN Center Model. The fifth option has a number of advantages over the other four models and is widely discussed.
5. Multi-track diplomacy
An analysis of post-World War II conflicts shows that much official effort to control conflicts occurs too late. The number of preventive measures actually taken in these cases is in inverse proportion to those that, with the benefit of hindsight, might have been taken in pursuit of a purposeful conflict-control strategy. Preventive diplomactic activity was not greatest when there were realistic chances of influencing events in a positive direction. The effectiveness of preventive policies can be improved by increasing the number of actors that might contribute to conflict resolution. The term Multi-Track Diplomacy has been coined for a broad spectrum of synergetic peace-making efforts that distinguishes nine actor categories, or tracks: 1) governments, 2) professional organizations, 3) the business community, 4) churches, 5) media, 6) private citizens, 7) training and educational institutes, 8) activists and 9) funding organizations. By acting in unison they can increase their impact. Although this concept is still in its infancy, there are high expectations about this approach, particularly with regard to the role of NGOs and religious organizations. Their familiarity with the local situation and their close contacts with grass-roots movements are seen as major advantages in complex intra-state conflicts.
6. Flexible, non-hierarchical processes
An evaluation of the activities of international organizations in dealing with conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has shown that intervention is often too tentative, too little and too late. Major organizations that operate or seem to have potential to prevent conflict, including the OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO, WEU, ERBD and UN, have not yet developed effective procedures to address underlying tensions before these harden into intractable and violent conflict. Most of these organizations are highly centralized and slow-moving bureaucracies. Many are institutions in transition, trying to adapt to a radically changed environment. The states that comprise them have not provided clear direction, and for each of them it is problematical enough to reach consensus among their members without also trying to reach agreement with other international organizations. Success stories that have been identified indicated that these were the result of flexible, non-hierarchical processes, working close to the ground, in direct contact with the antagonistic parties. In these cases useful 'coordination' was reached ad hoc among particular missions - and NGOs as well - working in concrete situations.
7. Durable peace-building
In the field of dispute resolution three general approaches can be distinguished: 1) A Power-Based Approach: disputing parties attempt to determine who is most powerful through a power contest; 2) A Rights-Based Approach: parties try to determine who is right according to some normative legal standard. Arguments and evidence are presented to prove that one side or the other was in breach of some agreed-upon rule; 3) An Interest-Based Approach: parties attempt to reconcile their underlying interests by discovering solutions which will bridge their different needs, aspirations, fears or concerns in a manner that can be satisfactory to both. The three approaches are related, however. In the process of resolving a dispute, the focus may shift from interests to rights to power and back again. Power contests tend to be the most costly of the three to handle. Satisfaction with the outcome, or lack of it, has consequences for recurrence of the conflict. If the parties are content with the outcome, future conflict is less likely. If they are dissatisfied, renewed hostilities are more likely. Unaddressed grievances and dissatisfaction can make the resolution unstable and may result in a recurrence of the conflict once the losing side has regained sufficient strength to renew the struggle. The use of coercive or adversative, power-based tactics may damage or destroy the relationship between the parties, making resolution of the conflict more difficult and future tension more likely. Durable peace-building which gives adequate decision-making 'voice' to interest and identity groups involves the institutionalization of participatory processes at various levels of society. Only then may a constructive dialogue result in mechanisms for a durable resolution.
1 This piece is a summary of a fully sourced article 'Preventing Violent Conflict: Methods andÊActors in the Field of Preventive Diplomacy', which was published in: Schmid, A.P. (Ed.) Violent Crime & Conflicts. Courmayeur: ISPAC, 1997, pp. 85-107. A copy of this article is available on request. A.J.Jongman, PIOOM,Fax: 31-71 5273788, E-mail: jongman@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl.