| Author | Bram Posthumus, free-lance journalist |
| Publication | Conflict Prevention Newsletter |
| Year | vol. 2, no. 3 (October 1999), pp. 2-7 |
Keywords
conflict preventionTowards a Code of Conduct for Conflict Practitioners : 'In a State of Creative Conceptual Confusion'
The field of conflict resolution has developed rapidly over the last few years. As with other emerging fields, it has been subject to critical analysis from both those engaged in the field and those operating in the related fields of humanitarian aid and development. What are the aims of conflict resolution? What should be the relation between conflict resolution workers and parties to the conflict? What is their impact on conflict situations? Such questions point to a need for a framework of common rules or guidelines which would make the field more open and transparent and would provide guidance to those working in conflict situations. In order to take the discussion forward, between April 25 and 27, a small group of practitioners and thinkers in the field of violent conflict prevention and transformation came together in the Netherlands to discuss some of the issues that surround their work. Issues like communication, the gap between theory and practice, addressing the policy gap, impartiality, culture and gender, multi-track approaches and coordination and cooperation. The following article attempts to capture those discussions.
Now the Cold War has ended, the true dynamics of local conflicts have become visible. At the same time, other players in the field of managing, preventing or even resolving violent conflicts have emerged. NGOs and others have moved into the field and violent conflict prevention/transformation has become better known. But work in this area has not become any easier. Names like Rwanda, Southern Sudan and Kosovo say a lot about what can go wrong in violent conflict prevention/ transformation, and valid criticism has been directed at the field. Norbert Ropers, director of the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management in Berlin, listed the major critical statements1. In summary, the field has been accused of:
- ignoring issues of power and justice;
- adopting a therapeutic approach and psychologising violent conflicts;
- over-concentrating on the activities of the civil society and thereby endangering the necessary strengthening of the state as an effective monopoly of power as well as of its legal control;
- 'feeding the war' (an accusation that will sound familiar for anyone who has ever worked in emergency aid and has found the time to read Humanitarianism Unbound? by Alex de Waal of African Rights, Nov. 1994);
- lacking legitimacy, compounded by the fact that the notion and the practice of violent conflict prevention/transformation seems to be a Western idea that is in need of exportation;
- lacking coordination (Ropers coined the pun of the 'interblocking' institutions) and lacking professionalism. Another issue raised by the critics is a theoretical one, as Tom Woodhouse of Bradford University pointed out: 'Critics say that conflict resolution was tested in the conflict zones and failed because it lacks concepts which can be readily operationalised.' Two broad responses have been formulated in reply to these critiques. The first one is a defence of the field. Hugh Miall of the Richardson Institute at Lancaster University is among those who reject the argument that psychology is over-emphasised and issues of power and justice are forgotten. Practitioners and theorists know full well that they are dealing with power and have developed a theory of power. In reply to the developers, who see conflict prevention/ transformation as a trendy fad, Guus Meijer of Conciliation Resources argued that 'for most people in poor countries development means disruption, chaos and displacement. In many African languages, 'development' has acquired negative connotations.' The second response involves self-reflection. According to Kevin Clements, Secretary General of International Alert, 'it is good to have a kind of framework, to see whether we are actually doing some good.' Both lines of response may assume the shape of a code of conduct or a firmer theoretical framework, enabling practitioners to better explain what they do and how, and why. Equally importantly, the exercise also serves as a record of 'best practices'.
| Twelve Principles of Multi-Track Diplomacy from the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy 1. Relationship - building strong interpersonal and intergroup relations throughout the fabric of society. 2. Long-term commitment - making an ongoing commitment to people and to processes that may take years to come to fruition. 3. Cultural synergy - respecting the cultural wisdom of all the parties and welcoming the creative interaction of different cultural ways. 4. Partnership - modelling collaborative process by partnering with local parties and with other institutions and coalitions. 5. Multiple technologies - utilising a variety of technologies, as appropriate, and creating new methods, as needed, to meet the unique needs of each situation. 6. Facilitation - assisting parties in taking responsibility for their own dreams and destiny. 7. Empowerment - helping people become empowered agents of change and transformation within their societies. 8. Action research - learning from all that we do and sharing that learning with others. 9. Invitation - entering the system where there is an invitation and an open door. 10. Trust - building relationships of mutual trust and caring within the system. 11. Engagement - acknowledging that once we enter a system, we become a unique part of it, an engaged, caring, and accountable partner. 12. Transformation - catalysing changes at the deepest level of beliefs, assumptions, and values, as well as behaviours and structures. |
Codes of conduct
The analogies with relief and development work are striking. Attempts have been made in both fields to formulate codes of conduct, varying in scope and comprehensiveness. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a code, which bolsters its almost universally praised mode of operations. In the Netherlands, an attempt was made to draft a code of conduct for development workers. In the violent conflict prevention/ transformation field, for example International Alert (IA), the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) and the International Institute of Applied Negotiation have drafted guidelines (see Boxes for IA and IMTD guidelines). The reasons for drafting a code of conduct can be summed up in one word: professionalism. Ben Hoffman, President of the Canadian International Institute for Applied Negotiation was deeply involved in drafting a code and explained its emergence. 'The mediation movement in Canada was layman-driven. It is a life-science. Now, if you decide to do a code of conduct, you introduce standards, certificates and all the rest of it. You would, in effect, create an elite. But the reality is that sooner or later lawyers or legislators will write a code anyway. So you'd better do it yourself.' The various codes have a number of things in common. All have a strong human rights agenda. All reflect a strong desire to let local initiatives prevail. All share a very well-developed ambition to be - or be seen to be - neutral, impartial, inclusive and accountable. The majority also have key passages devoted to the importance of women in peace making and development. Finally, a good number of them want to be seen as 'dynamic' documents, vehicles for discussion, in addition to being guidelines for behaviour. A code is a reflection of the station where the train of thought in a particular discipline is resting at a given time. 'Our area is in a state of creative conceptual confusion,' Oliver Ramsbotham of the University of Bradford declared at the conference. Searching questions are asked about the proportional balance between means and end, about when to come in and when to leave. The answers to these and other questions appear to be simultaneously theoretical and practical.
A vision of society
Violent conflict prevention/ transformation is about violence - not conflict. Or, quoting Diana Francis, an independent consultant, 'The end to conflict is not the issue, the issue is waging conflicts non-violently.' Conflict in itself is an agent of change, but the presence or absence of violence decides whether it will be a positive or a negative force. South Africa offers a case in point. When the country was teetering on the brink of civil war, no one talked about social change. Transformation only became possible after the elections had passed off peacefully. This sheds useful light on the nature of the work: it is about creating space for change in a non-violent way. The central notion appears to be power. The term 'power' in itself does not carry any normative weight, so the distinction between 'threat power' and 'integrative power' as made by Ramsbotham, is a useful one. He distinguished between, on the one hand, a society which is anarchic and based on this threat power and, on the other, a community which pulls the variety of existing social forces together in order to advance. Power thus unleashed can make for a virtuous cycle, as can be seen in so many countries who have emerged from war or turmoil: Western Europe 1945, Zimbabwe 1980, the Philippines 1980s, Mozambique 1992, and so on. Further developing the notion of power, Ramsbotham distinguished various types of international collectivities: an international anarchy (referred to by some as the natural order where power and force prevail), an international society (a world in which a state-centred, pluralist and non-interventionist order holds sway but where there also exists an atmosphere of legitimacy and solidarity) and a world community (where a realm of justice exists based on universal values), in which the United Nations is an indispensable player. In a similar vein, Clements called this a 'culture and community of peace'. It can be argued that we find ourselves in a world society. The work done by conflict prevention/transformation workers and many others aspires to contribute to a movement towards a world community, while globalisation and the politics of power in which the UN is studiously ignored or actively sidelined take us in the opposite direction. The policy gap: 'PR for CR' 'Our bag of tricks is very limited,' observed Woodhouse. This may apply most poignantly to the gap between field experience and decision-making circles. As became apparent from reading the codes, the question 'How do we relate what we do to what others do?' is frequently posed. 'Perhaps it is just my disappointment in the UK,' Woodhouse continued, 'but we have not succeeded in convincing the government agencies that [our] ideas are policy-making material.' He was referring to attempts to convey the message to London that in the Kosovo crisis, alternatives to bombing Belgrade were available. It is frequently said that the military are always fighting 'the last war', in the case of Yugoslavia that war was clearly Iraq. This raises the question whether those who work in violent conflict prevention/ transformation are always trying to win the last peace. The evidence suggests not - but then there is a case to be made for what Christopher Marthaler of the European Centre for Conflict Prevention dubbed 'PR for CR'. 'You must really confront the politicians who make stupid decisions. Make yourself un-ignorable!', as Southern African peace-negotiator Jan van Eck has urged.
'Principled partiality'?
Impartiality is extremely difficult to apply in practice as is being seen to be impartial. It is a characteristic that workers in this field share with others concerned with intervention, notably humanitarian and developmental agencies. The accusation levelled at all three is that of 'feeding the war'. Agencies and their staff (consciously or unwittingly) effectively divert resources away from the intended beneficiaries to the warring forces: armies get food aid, warlords get money through bribes, a faction is hired to guard a convoy, an office, and so on. Workers in violent conflict prevention/transformation do not have the resources to achieve this but their presence and commitment to impartiality (sometimes translated into willingness to talk to all sides) may lend credibility and status to warring parties. How can one navigate these rapids and stay afloat? 'I know we are supposed to be impartial - well I am not. I am partial to peace and I have some idea of what that looks like.' Ben Hoffman's remark offers a pointer. A code of conduct might, according to Diana Francis, Mark Salter and others help to make clear from the outset what violent conflict prevention/ transformation workers stand for. The basis of this kind of partiality is formed by such universal guidelines as the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various Geneva Conventions supposedly governing war and the right to asylum. International Alert calls this 'principled impartiality...a position that is bound to international standards of human rights and humanitarian law while maintaining an inclusive and even-handed approach with regard to the parties to the conflict.' A fine balancing act indeed. There are three problems here. First, can one achieve impartiality on the basis of very public adherence to international standards that are presumed to be universal? Second is the very practical question, whether following international standards and being very vocal about this are sufficiently convincing. Perception is more important than reality. Moreover, accusations of bias are often politically motivated attempts to prolong the violence. A high level of creativity is required to tackle this issue, while success cannot be guaranteed. Jan van Eck expressed the third problem thus: 'I have a problem with foreigners coming in, doing their thing, and then leaving.' This is shorthand for saying that intervening in a situation on the basis of principled impartiality where universal values are either not recognised or have been suspended for the time being, puts a violent conflict prevention/transformation worker immediately in the position of an advocate. On behalf of the minimum standards of human rights, women's rights, indigenous peoples' rights, you may find yourself empowering people to liberate themselves from those who threaten to cut off their limbs, burn their houses or deny their very existence. If that is the case then Van Eck's remark implies that one has to be with them all the way, in order not to avoid doing what George Bush did to the Kurds in Northern Iraq. There is a stringent demand, recognised by all: the need to study in depth actual or potential conflicts, the parties that are involved and their power relations before any intervention is made, even at the invitation of one or more of the parties involved in that conflict. Based on such a thorough and ongoing analysis, principled partiality may not be such a bad thing if it helps level the playing field. Again, the Balkans were cited as an example: both the non-violent struggle for more independence for Kosovo and the mass demonstrations against President Milosevich were largely ignored by the West. It would probably have prevented a great deal of damage if these forces for non-violent change had been given more help to become better partisans. According to Hugh Miall, 'Impartiality does not imply neutrality, but a commitment to building a creative space for dialogue and movement, respect for all individuals concerned and seeking the truth in the conflict situation.'
| International Alert's Principles The core of conflict transformation work is the building of sustainable peace. This involves a process of profound change, transforming situations characterised by violence and fear, thereby creating an environment in which reconciliation, social justice and participatory democracy can take root. The principles outlined here are designed to help guide this process. Principles 1. Primacy of People in Transforming Conflicts We believe that genuine conflict transformation is only possible with the participation and involvement of those most affected by the conflict. 2. Humanitarian Concern Our primary motivation is the alleviation of human suffering and our engagement in situations of violent conflict is driven principally by concern for the societies and peoples at risk from such conflicts. 3. Human Rights and Humanitarian Law & Principles We are committed to the principle and practice of promoting human rights in our work in situations of violent internal conflict. We urge compliance with humanitarian law & principles and respect for human rights amongst all parties to the conflict. 4. Respect for Gender and Cultural Diversity We respect the dignity and cultural diversity of all peoples and we make no discrimination on grounds of nationality, race, class or gender or religious, cultural or political beliefs. We recognise and endeavour to build upon the capacities of people to resolve their own conflicts and we support the distinctive peacemaking roles of women in societies affected by violent conflict. 5. Impartiality We endeavour to be inclusive in our work, seeking access to the relevant parties to the conflict. We do not take sides in conflicts and we derive guidance from our adherence to the principles outlined in this Code which we strive to advance in appropriate ways at all times. 6. Independence We are an independent organisation, free to formulate policies and operational strategies in accordance with our legally registered aims and the principles expressed in this Code. 7. Accountability We are morally responsible to those whom we seek to assist and accountable to those with whom we work. We are bound by UK Charity Law through our trustees and accountable through regular reporting mechanisms to our donors. As a means of enhancing accountability, we endeavour to be open and transparent in our work. 8. Confidentiality Whilst endeavouring to be open and transparent, we are committed to maintaining confidentiality in situations where the effectiveness of our programmes or the security of our staff and partners may be at risk. Furthermore, we believe that, in most cases, conflict transformation work is best done discreetly. 9. Partnerships We are committed to working in collaboration and complementarity with individuals, organisations, governments and other institutions which can contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict. In particular, we believe sustainable conflict transformation is dependent upon effective cooperation with individuals and organisations within conflict-affected societies. 10. Institutional Learning We are committed to building up our collective pool of knowledge, institutional memory and experience through undertaking regular reviews and evaluations of our work and developing the skills of all our staff. Furthermore, we endeavour to share the lessons we learn with relevant individuals and organisations who may benefit from them and, in turn, learn from the experiences and knowledge of others. |
Trust and clarity
The key to helping others solve their conflict is trust. Violent conflicts occur because that commodity has ceased to exist. In Burundi, Van Eck found 'a complete breakdown in trust and no faith in negotiations towards finding durable solutions. These two things made peace building impossible.' In such an extreme case, the focus shifts from outcome to process. 'The process is trying to agree on building towards a possible negotiated outcome.' For this most minimal of results, trust is indispensable. Willingness to listen, putting a lot of effort into understanding the conflict, understanding the point at which a mediator enters the conflict, all this and more may prepare the ground for a relationship of trust. Before trust comes clarity. This means, in Clements' words, 'clarifying to the people who ask you to work with them what they are letting themselves in for.' It means being clear about the organisation you represent, in all aspects, including financial expectations and financial management. And it means being transparent in terms of the decision-making process that has led to the practitioner being there in the first place. In the IMTD shortlist of principles this is called Engagement. It means: 'Acknowledging that once we enter a system, we become a unique part of it, an engaged, caring and accountable partner.' A very practical suggestion to bring about engagement and clarity came from Ropers. 'Design projects in collaboration.' It probably takes longer but it enables all sides to negotiate their relationship as they go along, which is, according to Ropers an absolute necessity. It will, in all probability, also make it easier to identify and negotiate a point at which the intervening organisation can leave the conflict, leaving behind a sufficiently autonomous and independent insider NGO, which can access financial resources under its own steam. Under all these circumstances, the onus is on both parties to explain either their absence or their presence.
Culture & gender
Men discussing the war in Bosnia and deciding this was not the way forward, set up the Citizens Forum. Women trading across the lines dividing the government from Unita in Central Angola until Unita evicted them all in 1999. Women in Sudan getting together to find ways of stopping the war that has devastated their lives. Young men in Liberia handing in their guns because they feel it is much better to be in school. It looks logical, self-evident and easy. These and many other local capacities for peace have the first and preferably the last word in any peace-building effort anywhere. It is called local ownership, 'Do No Harm'. Do not by-pass local structures since these are, in all probability, the ones that remain once you, as an intervener, a mediator, have left. Strengthening these local capacities is difficult. There are serious tensions between indigenous practice and the agendas of the interveners. These are culture clashes and they are perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in the area of gender. According to Cordula Reimann of the Berghof Institute, 'conflict resolution does not address the issue of gender inequalities. This must be done in this context too.' The question is how? Not by forcing the issue, argued Van Eck. 'This is not the approach because it will polarise society along male-female lines. What counts are the analyses and agendas that are on the ground, where you work.' It requires, in Francis' experience, a good deal of self-effacement. 'I have a strongly feminist agenda, which must remain largely invisible because I work in somebody else's world.' Reimann added that conventional analysis 'highlights only one particular role in the diversity of roles that they play.' In other words, the portrayal of women as peace-makers short-changes them in their roles as politicians, providers, freedom fighters, or - indeed - war-mongers, witness Mrs Milosevich, Mrs Thatcher or the recently arrested Rwandan hate-radio journalist Bemeriki. It comes back to the need for rigorous analysis, of which gender roles form an integral part.
Universal values?
A related issue is the controversy over human rights between the West and certain Asian leaders. As Garcia explained, this had nothing to do with so-called Asian values. 'The leaders did not challenge the universality of human rights. They simply had different priorities.' We may not like these priorities but they are theirs - and they were ours too not so very long ago. Whether we like it or not, the debates that have been held in the past decades about the environment, women's rights, care work and all the rest of it are Western debates. 'Culture and gender', said Francis, 'say something about us. It also applies to this idea of a code of conduct: all this is terribly cultural. And we need to be aware of it.' They speak about where the West is coming from and what it is today: things to lose. Comfort. Luxury. Affluence. However this does not mean that no communication is possible. On the contrary, cross-cultural learning takes places all the time. The IMTD guidelines refer to 'cultural synergy: respecting the cultural wisdom of all the parties and welcoming the creative interaction of different cultural ways.' It is important that foreign interveners consider the question 'on whose terms is this taking place'. If NGOs are indeed to offer an alternative to official solutions to questions of violent conflict and development, then cultural sensitivity comes first. Clements noted the wider aim: 'It is vitally important that peace and conflict studies equip all peoples with ways and means of sharing wide varieties of experiences so that arbitrary rulers cannot distort and polarise to their own advantage.' The variety is vital, otherwise, non-governmental efforts may as well merge with the usual Track I work, where knowledge about other ways of doing business is - today at least - not considered an asset.
Multi-Track Diplomacy
Can Track I and Track II be complementary? On the face of it, the evidence suggests an affirmative answer to this question. According to Van Eck 'the role of Track I of European origin in Africa has been absolutely disastrous'. Clements asked a question at the beginning of the conference: 'What are acceptable and unacceptable roads to sustainable peace?', which he immediately translated into 'How can we develop, in a sense, a critique of the diplomatic process.' The question remains and is joined by another: how can we make Track I and Track II more compatible and complementary? To get at the answer to this question, the tensions between Track I and II must first be laid bare and this entails a severe critique of Track I work by Track II practitioners. Van Eck laid out the difficulties with Track I diplomacy. He based his remarks on his experiences in Burundi. In short: Track I diplomats came with prepared solutions, they had already identified the good guys and the bad guys and they were in a hurry to have the parties sign an agreement regardless of the fact that there was minimal trust, and irrespective of whether there was a genuine desire to negotiate. Track I diplomacy is by its nature confined to official circles: the government, the politicians, the regional organisations and the UN systems. Politicians are often part of the problem and often their greatest contribution to a solution of violent conflict would be to leave. NGOs or Track II organisations in general have some relative advantages, as Ropers summed up. They can bring in fresh resources and insights for peace - provided they are properly mandated, accountable, culturally sensitive and transparent about their motives. They can help to end the feeling of isolation, especially among those who want to step clear from war hysteria. They can instil a sense of hope, however dim and unrealistic, and create an outreach of human rights activities. They are more flexible than Track I players because they have more freedom, since they are not restrained by the interests of their country or international organisation, which they need to uphold. They also have more time - need to have more time - because they look for durable solutions to violent conflict. By their very nature, they are not given to bullying, but to persuasion. The confrontation between Track I and Track II players that Van Eck sees as imminent, may well be a necessary step. It refers back to the policy gap and therefore reinforces the need to look for ways towards listening and talking to one another. Francis remarked that 'we should talk to governments - if dialogue is good enough for other people, it is good enough for us.' Reimann added that there could well be a role for academics in narrowing the gap between the two tracks, i.e. maximising the impact that NGOs could have on Track I. Students of conflict prevention/ transformation work are in a position to systematise experience. Reimann offered a few pointers: 'How can we incorporate various tracks into an NGO project? Which tracks - there are more than two - are best equipped in a given context? How do we help broaden local peace constituencies?' The arrival of NGOs as 'news agencies and diplomats', as De Waal puts it in Humanitarianism Unbound?, is not universally welcomed. De Waal argues quite strongly that these NGOs are filling the void that has been left by (sub-)contracting governments that have been absolved from their responsibilities to protect their citizens and help resolve conflicts through lawful means. Indeed, there should be no confusion about who is doing what. There is no room for Track II players who start acting like official diplomats and governments are not excused from carrying out their duties. Van Eck foresees a mutual enhancement of roles and he suggests further dialogue by having experienced Track II workers draft 'an appropriate conflict intervention process for the specific country in conflict...this would provide Track I interveners with the basic framework within which they can apply their strengths (even force when needed)... to assist the conflicting parties in finding a durable, negotiated settlement.'
Next steps
The seminar participants agreed that more effective and efficient cooperation between different networks inside and outside Europe is needed. A more coherent approach from different (conflict resolution, development and humanitarian) NGOs to policy recommendations was emphasised. In particular two 'gaps' were identified; a gap between theory and practice on one hand, and a 'policy gap' on the other.
1. The gap between theory and practice
It was suggested a seminar be held in order to begin addressing some of the gaps between conflict resolution theory and practice, and to foster links between the two communities. The seminar would include both academics and practitioners and facilitate a sharing of ideas and experience, enabling theory to feed into practice and practice into theory. The Department of Peace Studies from Bradford University agreed to take the lead in exploring options and opportunities for this seminar.
2. Addressing the policy gap
More attention should be paid to the question of how to influence and interface with policy makers. Thus an event is proposed to discuss ways of clarifying and strengthening strategies and activities on conflict resolution policy, advocacy and lobbying. This might include lessons learned from the field, critiques of conflict resolution work and influencing policy makers. The European Platform, together with International Alert, and perhaps Saferworld, will take the lead in organising this event.
Recommendations
1. (Im)partiality - communicate intentions and methodology to all relevant actors
2. Accountability - ensure transparency in decision making
3. Culture and Gender - use a culture and gender sensitive approach
4. Mandate - clarify and communicate your mandate
5. Holistic/strategic planning - include all stakeholders in planning and analysis
6. Multi-track approaches - make use of conventional and non-conventional methods; work to improve coordination and collaboration
7. Long term processes vs. short term means - strive to convince donors of the need for long term funding
8. Misunderstanding of the field - work to promote and improve understanding of the field
9. Dealing with manifest evil - understand the modest contribution NGOs can make
10. Confidentiality - strive to build trust with all concerned
Notes
1 The full list of nine major critical statements can be found in Roper's contribution to the 1998 edition of the International Direcory 'Prevention and Management of Violent Conflict', European Platform 1998, called 'Towards an Hippocratic Oath of Conflict Management?'