Author	Katarina Kruhonja, Milan Ivanovic, and Ivan Stanic
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

The war in Croatia was comparatively short but fierce. It took several years following the climax of the conflict before a postconflict normalization and reconciliation process could begin—the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peace agreement with local Serbs on peaceful integration of Eastern Slavonia. Croatian society is still facing difficulties related to the transition from communism to a pluriform democracy, and to unresolved postwar issues including the prosecution of war criminals, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the return of Serb refugees, the protection of minority rights, and trust building and reconciliation.

Before war broke out in Croatia, it was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the country established under Tito. The population consisted of the following nationalities: 78 percent Croats, 12 percent Serbs, 10 percent others (Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Italians, Muslims, etc.).

Ever since the Middle Ages, Croatia, situated along the buffer zone that separated the Austrian-Hungarian Empire from the Ottoman Empire, has struggled to maintain its cultural, national, and political identity. Its history of instability and struggle is reflected in the comment of an old man from a village in the eastern part of Croatia, who pointed out that in his whole life he had never moved from his birthplace, but he had lived in six different states. First he lived in the Kingdom of Slovenians, Croatians, and Serbs (1918–1929), founded after the fall of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, and then he became a citizen of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1941), a parliamentary kingdom that evolved into a dictatorship under the Serbian royal family Karadjordjevic. After that, he lived in the Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945) under a Croatian fascist government, the Ustasha regime, followed by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945–1992), the socialist regime established by Tito. In the last decade of the twentieth century, his country was the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (1992–1996), the self-proclaimed Serbian autonomous region within the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Since 1996 he is an inhabitant of the Republic of Croatia, a multiparty democratic state, internationally recognized since 1992 following the disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The recent war in the former Yugoslavia is perceived as being related to unresolved disputes of World War II and conflicts of interest between world superpowers. Part of the Croatian political elite struggling against the dictatorship of the Karadjordjevic family in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia took advantage of the momentum following a military defeat of the Yugoslav kingdom by Germany in 1941 to establish an independent state. Nazi Germany supported the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), also known as the fascist Ustasha regime. The majority of the Croatian population did support independence, but not the actual regime of the NDH, which adopted a fascist ideology and persecuted Jews, Serbs, Roma, and its political opponents, the communists.

An antifascist movement led by Marshall Tito fought against German occupation and the fascist regime of the NDH, as well as against the Chetniks, armed Serbian nationalists aiming to restore the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. At the same time, Tito's movement had a political agenda of its own—to take power and build a communist regime. These overlapping agendas were never worked out and even today cause different interpretations of history within Croatian society.

At the end of World War II, the Allies tried to resolve these conflicts by forming a new state, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Within this state Croats were granted the right to establish their own republic, Serbs the right to continue to live in Yugoslavia, and the communists to take political power. Tito's regime, espousing a so-called socialism with a human face, was built on the principle of "Brotherhood and Unity," but remaining tensions between different political approaches were actually kept under control by political repression. In the late 1980s, the political and economic instability of post-Tito Yugoslavia, followed by the collapse of the communist power bloc, led to political change and, eventually, to the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The disintegration of the republic did not happen peacefully for a number of reasons. The Milosevic regime in Serbia stirred up nationalism, fueled by an identity crisis resulting from the collapse of a collective communist identity, painful memories from World War II, and the influence of political emigration. There was a lack of democratic structures and a democratic tradition, and no clear, authoritative voice opposing war. Churches abstained from trying to contribute to a nonviolent transition of society, independent media were virtually nonexistent, and last but not least, there is a perception that the attitude of the international community in the early stage of the conflict led to the parties opting for war.

The primary cause of the war was the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, coinciding with the declaration of Croatian independence, and set against the background of Serbian policy. For Milosevic's regime, the only way to transform the federation was by pushing for a "Greater Serbia," which meant reestablishing the borders and adopting a policy of ethnic homogenity, achieved by carrying out, in various ways, ethnic cleansing.

The independence of Croatia, based on the political program of a single nation-state, raised the issue of the political rights of Serbs in Croatia. In addition, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), as the leading exponent of Croatian nationalism, tried to implement a nationalist program with the goal of building an ethnically homogenous state, and asserting hegemony in Bosnia. As a result, the rights of minorities in Croatia, and the division of Bosnia along ethnic lines, also became points of contention.

Parties to the conflict in Croatia were the Croatian police and military and, at the beginning of the conflict, some paramilitary groups on one side, opposed by the Yugoslav army, local rebel Serbs, and paramilitary troops from Serbia.

The war between Croatia and Serbia or the Former Republic of Yugoslavia was never officially proclaimed, and Milosovic's regime never formally annexed the self-proclaimed republic of the Serbian Krajina, but because of the involvement of the Yugoslav army, from the Croatian point of view the war had an international dimension.

At the beginning of 1992, when an unconditional cease-fire was signed, 30 percent of Croatian territory was under Serbian control, with the Yugoslav army serving to enforce Serb authority, causing massive, forced migrations of the population. This led to polarization and mutual intolerance between the Croats and Serbs within the part of Croatia still under the control of the Croatian government, and frequent human-rights violations against Serbs including, in particular, illegal evictions, firings, harassment, and physical assaults.

Conflict Dynamics

After the disintegration of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1990 and the establishment of new political parties, the first multiparty elections in Croatia (then still a federal republic within Yugoslavia) took place on 22 April and 6 May 1990. The HDZ of Franjo Tudjman won the elections, partly because of its nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Milosevic and anti-Serb rhetoric.

The rather substantial Serbian minority in Croatia expressed deep concern after the victory of HDZ. It refused to participate in the new government and announced a referendum for the autonomy not only for the predominantly Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia (northern Dalmatia and the eastern part of Lika), but also for those areas where Serbs were not a majority such as eastern and western Slavonia. In August 1991 Serbs put up roadblocks around Knin, a small town in northern Dalmatia. The Croatian government responded by sending two police helicopters, which were intercepted by Yugoslav army planes and forced back. The Yugoslav army now surfaced as a third party in the conflict. It captured all the weapons that were in Croatian possession and started to arm Serbian civilians. Consequently, Croatia intensified its efforts to obtain weapons for its police and military forces. Simultaneously, civilians, particularly members of HDZ, started purchasing weapons for themselves illegally.

Meanwhile, on the political level, there were numerous meetings of the republics' presidents to discuss the future of the federal Yugoslav Republic. Croatia and Slovenia shared a goal of complete decentralization. Serbia and Montenegro insisted on elections that would be conducted according to the principle of one-person one-vote, which would assure centralization. Macedonia and Bosnia tried to push models for themselves that would strike a balance between the two extremes. In addition to official meetings of the republics' presidents, Milosevic and Tudjman held a secret meeting with a secret agenda in Karadjordjevo in 1991.

Despite the meetings, the tensions in Croatia intensified. After the first road blockades in Knin, similar actions were taken in other regions where Serbs were dominant. The situation deteriorated when Slovenia and Croatia decided to hold referendums on independence. The Croatian referendum took place on 19 May 1991, with 94 percent of the votes cast favoring independence. The Croatian parliament proclaimed the independence of Croatia on 25 June 1991, the same day as Slovenia. Two days later the Yugoslav army made a show of force by launching a military operation in Slovenia. The conflict in Slovenia ended within a week, with the Yugoslav army retreating. Soon after that, the international community called a meeting in Brioni, attended by three European representatives and all of the Yugoslav republics' presidents except for Milosevic. The participants adopted a resolution that Croatia and Slovenia would put the implementation of their independence declarations on hold for three months. But instead of bringing peace, this delay resulted in increased violence, followed by all-out war in Croatia.

In late 1991 the war zones were still restricted to those areas in Banija, northern Dalmatia, and eastern Slavonia where Serbs constituted the overwhelming majority. Until the end of 1992, all parts of Croatia (except for the northern and western regions) as well as the big towns of Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar, Karlovac, and Dubrovnik were subjected to heavy attacks by the Yugoslav army, which had intervened under the pretext that it wanted to create a buffer zone between the two parties.

The fall of Vukovar in November 1992 and the attack on Dubrovnik marked important turning points in the conflict, as they led to the active intervention of the international community. In January 1992, the Republic of Croatia achieved international recognition, and a cease-fire was signed. At that time, 30 percent of Croatian territory was under Serbian control, with the support of the Yugoslav army. Forced migrations were imposed on the civilians in these areas, with some 300,000 internally displaced persons, predominantly Croats and other non-Serbian inhabitants.

Official Conflict Management

There were several aspects to the involvement of the international community in the Croatian conflict. The European Union became involved on the official level in summer 1991 when three European representatives participated in Brioni, along with the presidents of Croatia and Slovenia and the Yugoslav presidency. The meeting ended with the so-called Brijuni declaration, which demanded an immediate end to the war in Slovenia and asked for a three-month delay enacting the Slovenian and Croatian independence proclamations. Two months later, while the fighting continued, the European Council of Ministers appointed Lord Carrington as the coordinator of a Yugoslavia peace conference, which first met on 7 September 1991. On 15 January 1992, the EU recognized Croatia as an independent state. The EU also contributed to monitoring operations—the so-called Monitoring Missions in the Republic of Croatia—as did the OSCE.

UN involvement included the deployment of peacekeeping units. On 25 September 1991, the UN imposed an arms embargo against Yugoslavia, and shortly afterward, on 8 October 1991 appointed Cyrus Vance as the Secretary-General's personal envoy for Yugoslavia. After the fall of Vukovar, he called a meeting in Geneva, attended by Tudjman, Milosevic, and the Yugoslav defense minister, Kadijevic. An immediate cease-fire was agreed to, but it was not implemented. However, all warring sides expressed a wish for a quick beginning to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, and in January 1992, in Sarajevo, Vance supervised the signing of a successful cease-fire.

On 21 February 1992, in accordance with the Vance Peace Plan, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 743, which established UNPROFOR, the UN force in Croatia. It was deployed in four so-called UN Protected Areas (UNPAs), which included the 30 percent of Croatian territory controlled by the Serbs.

The main aims of UNPROFOR were to end the fighting in Croatia, to ensure the peace and security needed for negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis, to monitor and protect human rights, and to create the conditions for the peaceful return of displaced persons. Nonetheless, Croats and non-Serbs living in the UNPROFOR zone were subject to human-rights abuses, and in 1993 there were several incidents of cease-fire violations by Croatian military forces.

During UNPROFOR's mandate, the Croatian government continued its military buildup, preparing for a new round of fighting. On 12 January 1995, President Tudjman announced that the UNPROFOR mandate would not be restored after its expiration date of 30 March, arguing that UNPROFOR had failed to restore Croatian authority in Serb-controlled territories.

Subsequently, on 31 March 1995, the UN Security Council created terms for deployment of a transformed peacekeeping operation—the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation—to facilitate implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Only a month later, on 1 May 1995, Croatia launched a sudden military operation under the code name "Flash," followed by the "Storm" offensive, and recaptured the Serb-controlled areas in the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska Krajina, except for the Eastern Sector (eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Sirmium).

Negotiations on the status of this Eastern Sector led to the signing of the Basic Agreement on the region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Sirmium in November 1995. The Basic Agreement stated that the region would be reintegrated into the Republic of Croatia. To implement this agreement, a new UN mandate was created—the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). The UNTAES was deployed from January 1996 until January 1998, and has been widely regarded as one of the most successful, comprehensive peace-support missions in Croatia over the past decade, and one of the most successful of its kind in the world.

Multi Track Diplomacy

In 1990, Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch were the first international organizations to warn of the increasing nationalism of the Milosevic regime. Unfortunately, their early warnings had no effect, and had no impact on civil society.

In fact, civil society at that time was quite underdeveloped. Since the early 1980s, only a few environmental groups and feminists had been active. Those actors within civil society did not have sufficient influence to prevent the outbreak of war, but they did play a crucial role in the further development of civil society in an environment characterized by national homogenization, prewar euphoria, and the war itself. While almost all national forces were focused on state independence, these civil initiatives raised the question of the content of that project: What kind of society and state are going to be developed?

The Antiwar Campaign Croatia (ARK), founded in July 1991, had the primary role during this initial period. A handful of people, members of a local prewar social-movement organization, published a charter in which they declared themselves against war, and in favor of nonviolent conflict resolution and the preservation of lines of communication across ethnic and republic boundaries as a precondition for postconflict peacebuilding. They lobbied for passage of a conscientious-objector law as a basis for refusing military service. They focused on proactive long-term peace projects, direct involvement with war victims, peace education, voluntary work in refugee camps, among other things. Individuals and small groups were empowered and a network was built up. ARK has since grown into a national network of more than twenty civil groups active throughout Croatia, including the Volunteer Project Pakrac, the Centre for Direct Human Rights Protection, the "Small Step," the Centre for Peace Studies, the Centre for Women's Studies, and Women's Network. Through organic organizational development, without international pressures put on its structure or programming, ARK has become an example of indigenous development of civil society in Croatia, supported by continuity of the sort of activism exemplified by Marina Skrabalo during the previous decade.

The Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights (CPO) in Osijek is an organization playing a role in strengthening civil society in the war-torn area of eastern Slavonia. The center was founded in 1992, in an environment directly affected by war. The group joined ARK and also got support from numerous peace activists and groups throughout Europe. Based on permanent education and empowerment of its members, CPO developed a multifaceted, integrated approach to postwar peacebuilding and community recovery in ethnically divided local communities. The group combines psychosocial support to the injured population (displaced persons and refugees, women and children, ex-soldiers), cross-community activities, and peace education with direct opposition to human-rights violations against the remaining citizens of Serbian nationality. CPO also contributed to development of various NGOs in the region and to cross-border cooperation with peace initiatives and organizations operating in the area under Serbian control and in Serbia proper, such as the Association for Peace and Human Rights Baranja; the Centre for Peace Vukovar; Youth Peace group Danube, Vukovar; PRONI Centre for Youth Workers Education; the recently founded Institute for Peace Research; and Education Vukovar, Group 484, Belgrade, Association for Tolerance. The contributions of all these organizations to the peace and integrative processes in eastern Slavonia are significant and recognized by local communities, the wider community, local governments, and international organizations such as the OSCE and the UN.

Another important field of work for NGOs in Croatia has been the protection and promotion of human rights. In Split in 1992, the local organization Dalmatian Solidarity Committee (DOS) opposed the illegal evictions and other human-rights violations of Serbs living in parts of Croatia under the control of the Croatian government. Evictions were being carried out by state institutions such as the military housing committee and military and civil police. DOS in Split, CPO in Osijek, ARK in Zagreb, and a whole range of other organizations opposed these practices in Split, Osijek, Zagreb, Pula, and Karlovac. Shortly thereafter, the Civic Committee for Human Rights and the Croatian Helsinki Committee took over the central role in the campaign against human-rights violations in Croatia.

The Croatian Helsinki Committee (CHO) was founded in Zagreb at the end of March 1993 as a chapter of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. It became the most influential forum for the protection of human rights in Croatia. In cooperation with the International Helsinki Federation and other international organizations, CHO campaigns at the national and international level for adherence to international standards for human-rights protection in the Republic of Croatia, and specifically, for equal rights for all Croatian citizens without regard for ethnicity, religion, social status, or politics. CHO's program includes monitoring activities, the publishing of its findings, press releases, the organization of seminars and panel discussions, educational publications, and direct legal assistance in ten regional offices. The organization has also recorded crimes in those areas then accessible to CHO, especially after the "Flash" and "Storm" military operations.

Because of their activities, CHO and other human-rights, peace, and women's organizations were marginalized or exposed to frequent attacks by state media and high-ranking officials. Although claims were made that civil society, multiparty democracy, and minority rights would be tolerated, those who attempted to put their principles into practice were accused of being enemies of the nation. But at the same time, as Marina Skrabalo claims, the government paradoxically welcomed various supranational (UN peacekeeping forces, UNHCR), regional (EU monitors, OSCE), international (various NGOs such as IRC), and other state (USAID, Norwegian People's Aid) and private (Open Society Institute) development enterprises, organizations, and programs. This enabled the development of a civil society and opposition.

Parallel with the end of the UNTAES mandate and the reintegration of the whole territory under the control of the Republic of Croatia, the influence of independent media increased. They took over the key role in "deconstruction" of the HDZ regime. After the parliamentary elections in 2000, the ten-year rule of the HDZ regime was ended and replaced by a broad opposition coalition. Civil society played a significant role in the election campaign. One hundred and forty NGOs participated in Coalition Glas '99, a group urging citizens to go to the polls. A women's network was especially efficient and well organized.

Paul Stubbs and some other researchers of the civil scene in Croatia also point to a negative aspect of interaction between international and local NGOs. Some of the negative consequences of donations and politics-driven interventionism include the uncontrolled influx of huge amounts of money for short-term projects, which has triggered rapid growth of local groups. These groups have been forced to professionalize too rapidly. When international assistance was reduced after 1995, many of the local NGOs, as well as local workers in international NGOs, struggled to reduce their size, identify new donors, or even reregister to suit the local environment better. In such circumstances, competition dominates and long-term planning and development of common strategies suffer. Investment into capacity building is insufficient.

During 1999, the government established the Government Office for Cooperation with NGOs. It has been active, in a very cooperative and supportive way, serving as a link between the government and NGOs.

In addition to those organizations described here that deal with the protection of human rights, peacebuilding, and the development of civil society, organizations that grew out of the war itself—such as war veterans, disabled people, and widows—played a role during and after the conflict. Most of them represent interests of war victims, but they were used by the HDZ government as an instrument of political manipulation. Today they represent an important part of a radical right-wing bloc that organizes demonstrations celebrating the "dignity" of the patriotic war. They are among the most formidable opponents to the new government.

The Role of NGOs in UN Peacekeeping Operations—UNTAES
The first experience from which important lessons were learned was the Volunteer Project in the then divided city of Pakrac, western Slavonia (UNPA zone). The project was initiated during 1993 by ARK jointly with MOST (Bridge) from Belgrade. It was a community-based peacebuilding project implemented by international volunteers in cooperation with different local and international organizations. Along the road, very good cooperation with UNPROFOR's civil service was cultivated, which contributed to the willingness of UNTAES to cooperate with international and local NGOs. Indeed, UNTAES has been widely regarded as one of the most successful UN peace-support missions. The operation was characterized by very good cooperation from the conflicting parties, a clear and time-limited mandate, sufficient resources, support from NATO and OSCE, and excellent cooperation with local and international NGOs.

In Eastern Slavonia and Baranja, NGOs have been cooperating since 1994 to boost cross-border communication and peaceful coexistence. Until 1995—until the ratification of the peace agreement and the beginning of the UNTAES mandate, that is—more than 1,100 persons from both sides met on neutral ground in Hungary. In order to use the political framework provided by UNTAES as efficiently as possible, ten organizations from Croatia and three organizations from Serbia joined to form the Coordination of Peace Organizations for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and West Sirmium. Around one hundred representatives from these organizations received UN accreditations, entered the region, worked with people, organized visits, engaged in dialogue, and provided people with information and legal help. A large number of international NGOs were also active in the region during that period.

After the end of the UNTAES mandate in 1998, in spite of all that had been achieved, the sustainability of the process remained an issue. The two-year mission helped mainly with the integration of the territory, institutions, and that part of the Serbian population that decided to stay in Croatia, but the Croat population did not return, and therefore the process of rebuilding trust could not be started. There was a danger that people's fear, mistrust, and anger, encouraged by nationalistic leaders, might lead to the completion of the process of ethnic division and, indeed, of ethnic cleansing. The situation demanded a proactive response. In the early post-UN period, many local organizations worked intensively in that area. Among other things, five more regional offices were opened to provide human-rights monitoring and legal assistance, ten INFO clubs and five youth clubs were also opened, and a network of peace teams was set up in five local communities with high risk of interethnic conflict.

An external impact assessment of the peace teams shows that such initiatives have helped the process of integration. Also, research done on the national level shows that citizens of eastern Slavonia, although most severely affected by the war, are still most open to the processes of reconciliation. Hopefully, this experience will contribute to even better cooperation in the future between international peacekeeping forces and local and international NGOs in postconflict peacebuilding.

Prospects

The end of the UNTAES mandate on 15 January 1998 was celebrated throughout Croatia as the end of the war and a definite victory. However, it took time to open a new chapter and to raise some other issues at the national level. The circumstances in which the parliamentary elections in January 2000 (and later the presidential elections) were held were colored by the illness and death of president Tudjman, a crisis for the HDZ regime, and an extremely difficult economic situation in the country. The great response of the voters in the elections and the victory of the opposition parties' coalition was an unmistakable signal that Croatian society desired change, particularly economic and social change, as well as an end to corruption and economic crime.

However, apart from the difficulties related to transition, Croatia still bears the burden of postwar hardships. The most important obstacles to the new practice related to protection of human and minority rights are obstruction of administration, local government, and the situation in judicature. Further, in order to proceed along the road to European integration, thus facilitating economic recovery, the new government could not avoid raising several issues that were not at all certain of popular support: the issue of processing war crimes, cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, and the return of the refugees currently residing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, these issues were not raised during the course of the election campaign. At present they serve to polarize a Croatian political and social scene that is highly unstable. But this polarization itself is indicative of an important change in the society as compared to the period of HDZ rule. At that time, the marginalized civil society and the independent media were the only and loudest opponents and critics of the notion of peace based on an ethnically and ideologically "clean" Croatia. But support within Croatian political culture for an ethnically pure nation has now practically vanished. At the same time, the extreme right has strengthened its positions "defending the dignity of the war," criticizing the government's economic and social policies, and using ideological confrontation as a strategy. The fear of the revival of communism is being fueled and the governing Social Democratic Party is often accused of being communist itself.

In the case of the war, the main argument is that none of the military actions that took place during this defensive war was illegitimate, i.e., that ethnic cleansing was not a goal; that war crimes per se could not be committed during a defensive war; that the International Criminal Tribunal and national "traitors" intend to discredit heroes as being war criminals. U.S. antiterrorist policies in the case of Afghanistan are used by the extreme right as an argument that the Western powers have double standards.

Unfortunately, the wide coalition that constitutes the Croatian government has shown itself to be very unstable. There are more discussions going on among coalition partners than efficient actions taking place. Unclear goals, restrictive social policies, and poor results in recovering the economy, as well as dealing with economic crimes, have seriously affected how the citizens perceive the competence of their rulers. The question of early (and untimely) elections is increasingly discussed.

According to assessments carried out by the international community, Serb refugees who fled to FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina have not returned to Croatia in sufficient numbers. Up to mid-2001, 80,000 of a total of 300,000 registered refugees had returned. The conditions necessary for the return of the refugees have not been met. Remaining issues include problems related to tenant rights (discriminatory legal provisions are still in effect), obstacles in realization of the rights to property and rebuilding, unresolved issues concerning immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, poor economic conditions, and social and emotional barriers including fear, anger, and revenge.

Unlike the rest of the former Krajina, the situation in eastern Slavonia and western Sirmium (former UNTAES regions) is somewhat better. Displaced persons have been gradually returning (although the process is rather slow and does not involve a significant number of young people) and there has not been further significant emigration of Serbs from the region. Grave interethnic incidents are rare, although the population in the region is burdened with unresolved traumas, tensions, and a lack of trust. People live beside each other under the strain of increasing economic hardship and unemployment.

Social tensions continue to increase throughout the country. The economic-stability program has caused a further increase in unemployment, the suspension of some benefits for ex-soldiers and special categories of citizens, and fear of falling wages in the public sector. In such circumstances, voter turnout was low for local elections, and consequently the ruling coalition achieved poorer results. A change in the local autonomy law resulted in a significant level of decentralization, but the new law did not decrease the number of local administration units. So existing human resources are inadequate to fill all positions with competent personnel in the local administrative units that do exist.

One year after the elections there is talk about the silence of the civil scene in Croatia. One of the reasons behind that is surely a certain degree of fatigue, but also the altered circumstances to which the Croatian population still must adapt. The new government has changed the rhetoric. NGOs are no longer seen as internal enemies of the state. However, institutional ways for NGOs and the government to cooperate are yet to be developed.

Further democratization of the society in Croatia will depend, among other things, on whether and in what way civil actors cooperate and coalitions develop within the civil scene, as well as on the nature of dialogue and cooperation that takes place between civil society and government. The intensity of cooperation at the subregional level among NGOs to build civil society, common security, and reconciliation will also play an important role.

With the victory of the opposition and the end of HDZ rule, Croatia came to be viewed as a partner of the international community contributing to stability in the region and encouraging positive change in the neighboring countries.

Recommendations

In order to build a sustainable, peaceful future, Croatian society has to deal with both the unresolved postwar issues and the postsocialist transition issues. It is important to understand the ways in which these two areas are interdependent and to build on that understanding.

The authors consider that priorities for building a sustainable peace include the following:

1. Securing the conditions for the return of refugees
   • a. Further improvements in legislation, speeding up of legal proceedings, and securing implementation of valid verdicts
   • b. Implementation of trust-building measures on the local community level
   • c. Use of community development as the main peacebuilding strategy in ethnically mixed communities—instrumental approach to reconciliation through joint community development projects
   
   
2. Dealing with war crimes—two parallel complementary processes
   Track I:
   a. Strengthen national judiciary in order to process persons suspected of war crimes
   b. Cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague
   Track II:
   a. Start a public discussion leading to the establishment of a truth commission by the parliament of the Republic of Croatia
   b. Establish links, even joint development of comparable concepts and methodologies, between Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in FRY, the soon-to-be-established commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, eventually a similar body in Croatia
3. Expanding the notion of security to embrace a concept of peacebuilding. In order to avoid conditions in which the concept of security extends only as far as joining the Partnership for Peace or NATO, the concept of peacebuilding has to be included in
   a. National Defense Strategy
   b. National Development Strategy
   
   
4. Political stabilization through
   a. Grouping and profiling of political parties
   b. Development of management capacties of local governments
   c. Securing participation of minorities in local government
   d. Strengthening civil society by improving managerial capacities and forming coalitions within the NGO scene
   
   
5. Development of a culture of tolerance, dialogue, and dealing with conflicts, particularly enhancing the role of churches in a social dialogue.
   
6. Protection of social rights (European Social Charter) has to be an important part of a strategy of transition of the economy.
   
7. Creating a basis for reconciliation and common security in the region (e.g., opening business channels, cooperation on missing persons, prosecuting suspected war criminals, fighting organized crime, creating a book and newspaper distribution network, cultural exchanges, cooperation among civil society organizations)

Service Information

REPORTS:	Article 19, Forging War—Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Mark Thompson. 1994. Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia, by A. B. Fetherston, Working Paper 4, April 2001. Centre for Transition and Civil Society Research/Agency Argument, Media & War, edited by Nena Skopljanac Brunner, Stjepan Gredelj, Alija Hodzic, Branimir Kristofic, Zagreb/Beograd, 2000. UNHCR I Choose Life: Post-War Peace Building in Eastern Croatia, edited by Katarina Kruhonja, Osijek, 2001. Provisional Statistics on Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR for the Year 2000, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Towards Reconciliation—Impact Assessment, by Jessica Jordan, Marina Skrabalo, Jasenka Pregrad, Osijek, 2000. Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, Washington, DC, Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights, 1996.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, by Susan Woodward. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1995. East Central Europe: Paradoxes and Perspectives, by Jody Jensen and Ferenc Miszlivetz. Szombathely, Savaria University Press, 1998.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/trae-zag.htm (Alternative Information Network created in 1992 by independent journalists) www.bosnia.org.uk (The Bosnian Institute in London) www.crisisweb.org (International Crisis Group) www.gewi.kfunigraz.ac.at/csbsc/guide/Croatia.htm (Centre for the Study of Balkan Societies and Cultures at the Department for Southeast European History University of Graz, Austria) www.incore.ulst.ac.uk (INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict and ethnicity in Croatia) www.iwpr.net (Institute for war and Peace Reporting) www.nacional.hr/Default.en.asp (Croatian weekly) www.uzuvrh.hr (Government's Office for Cooperation with NGOs)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Biserka Milosevic, Program for Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Osijek Centre for Peace, e-mail: czmos@zamir.net Vesna Terselic, Centre for Peace Study, Zagreb, e-mail: cms@zamir.net Nenad Zakosek, professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, e-mail: nzakosek@zamir.net
ORGANIZATIONS:	Centre for Peace, Legal Advices and Psycho-Social Assistance Sunducˇic´eva 22 32000 Vukovar, Croatia Tel.: + 385 32 441 417 Fax: + 385 32 441 416 E-mail: centar-za-mir@vk.tel.hr www.members.nbci.com/cfpeace/ Civic Committee for Human Rights Ulica grada Vukovara 35, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel.: + 385 1 6171 530 Fax: + 385 1 6171 530 E-mail: goljp@zamir.net Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (CHC) Trg Drage Iblera 9/5 10000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel.: + 385 1 4812 322 Fax: + 385 1 4812 324 E-mail: glas@open.hr www.open.hr/com/hho/ Dalmatian Solidarity Committee Sˇetaliste Bacˇvice 10 PO BOX 248, 21000 Split, Croatia Tel.: + 385 21 345 966 Fax: + 385 21 361 655 E-mail: dos.st@st.tel.hr www.tel.hr/dalmatinski-odbor-solidarnosti/index.htm HOMO—Association for Protection of Human Rights and Civil Liberties Josepine Martinuzzi 23, 52100 Pula, Croatia Tel.: + 385 52 505 976 Fax: + 385 52 505 976 E-mail: homo@pu.tel.hr www.zenskestranice.hr/nevladi/homo.htm Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF) Berislavic´eva 10/2 10000 Zagreb, Croatia Tel.: + 385 1 4872483 Fax: + 385 1 3777032 E-mail: zagreb-sdf@sdf.hr www.sdf.hr DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: B.a.B.e.; Center for Education and Counseling of Women; Center for Peace Studies; Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights–Osijek; MIRamiDA Centar–Regional Peace Building Exchange; Vukovar Institute for Peace Research and Education

About the author

The authors are associated with the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights–Osijek, which was founded in May 1992 by a number of intellectuals in response to the war experience, and as a way to help preserve a nucleus of civil society resistant to the ethnic, religious, political, or ideological divisions imposed by the war. Today it has more than one hundred members and a number of local and international volunteers working on protection and promotion of human rights, peace education, and community recovery and peacebuilding in multiethnic local communities in war-torn areas of Croatia. Katarina Kruhonja is a medical doctor and one of the founders of the center. She currently serves as the center's president, and is a member of the Executive Board of Pax Christi International. In 1998, she was awarded The Right Livelihood Award, also known as "The Alternative Nobel Prize." Milan Ivanovic, an economist and sociologist, has been a member of the center for many years and has been involved in projects on democratization and civil society. Ivan Stanic is a medical doctor and a volunteer at the Centre for Peace.