Author	Maria Teresa Mauro, Dragan Lakicevic, Zoran Lutovac, and Danijel Pantic
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

Serbia is trying to recover from the disastrous Milosevic period. One of the most pressing internal-security problems for the republic is the situation in three ethnically heterogeneous regions: Sandzak, Vojvodina, and the southern part of the country. The region comprising southern Serbia, Kosovo, and the northwestern part of Macedonia probably represents the most delicate rim of ethnic and political instability in Europe today.This crisis can only be resolved gradually, applying the step-by-step approach. The conflict in southern Serbia is connected with the Kosovo crisis and unresolved major issues concerning the future of ethnic communities living in the region. The interest of the international community and NGOs is to defuse the ethnic tensions and create conditions for a normal life in all the communities. The first steps have been taken, but without intensive international support and goodwill from both sides this goal will be impossible to achieve.

The Republic of Serbia is formally a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which came into being on 27 April 1992 by an act of unification of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. This act had been preceded by the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In the period from 1991 to 2000, Serbia (both as a part of the SFRY and FRY) was involved in four large-scale violent conflicts: in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. This, coupled with the breakup of the SFRY, international sanctions, a major refugee crisis, the NATO bombing campaign, corruption, and mismanagement of the economy, have brought the Republic of Serbia into a disastrous economic situation. It is difficult to precisely determine how much each of these factors contributed to the economic collapse of the country. However, the direct costs caused by UN sanctions are estimated at US$36 billion and the losses caused by the NATO bombing at tens of billions. Under the minimum "consumer basket" criterion, the national standard for gauging poverty, 2.8 million people in central Serbia and Vojvodina lived below the poverty line in 1999.

During the past ten years, Serbia has been shaken by numerous financial frauds and scandals. According to research carried out by Transparency International, FRY occupies second place on the "world's most corrupt countries" list. After the fall of President Milosevic, the new authorities in Serbia have set as their primary task the establishment of a state of law and the fight against corruption.

During the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo there was a steady growth in the narcotics trade, as well as money laundering. Two large pyramidal banks were under the direct sponsorship of the people associated with the Milosevic regime. Several hundred thousand people have been defrauded by the banks. Paramilitary units, which were engaged in the war in ex-Yugoslavia, were organized by criminals and secret services. To what extent the secret services were involved in illegal activities is also evidenced by the recent discovery of large quantity of heroin (500 kilograms) found in the vault of Commercial Bank in Belgrade, which was rented by the Security Department of Serbia. One may speak of organized crime involving about 35,000 people. The extent of this mafia's influence, which was directly connected to Milosevic and other high state functionaries, could be seen in their attempts to assassinate leading political figures.

Generally speaking, the Balkans have a tradition of religious intolerance. There is a "powerful" presence of religion in politics and a dearth of modern theological concepts. The religious factor was decisive in the formation of most nations in this area—Catholicism in the case of Slovenes and Croats, Eastern Orthodoxy in the case of Serbs, and Islam in the case of Bosniaks. The apparent religious tolerance during the communist regime rested on the strong pressure exerted by the government, which was geared toward two goals: (1) suppressing latent nationalist passions and (2) precluding any alternative form of political action. With the breakup of the unity among national political oligarchies, religion became the key for national homogenization and thus an active factor in sociopolitical divisions. Thus, as of 1987 there was a growing rapprochement between the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) and the regime in Serbia. This link was also politicized: the SPC openly defended the idea of "Sacred Serbian Land" in Kosovo. Through public declarations, it took the side of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For quite some time now, the SPC has been in a canonic dispute regarding the capacity of Macedonian and Montenegrin churches to rule themselves. These disputes have a purely political connotation, because the activities of these nonrecognized churches evince anti-Serbian political sentiments and Montenegrin separatism.

There are two regions in Serbia that, due to their heterogeneous ethnic composition, manifest high sensitivity in intraethnic relations: Sandzak and Vojvodina.

Sandzak is the traditional name for the region encompassing the southwest of Serbia and northern Montenegro. It covers an area of 8,887 square kilometers, populated by 420,000 inhabitants, of which there are 257,000 in the Serbian part and 162,000 in the Montenegrin part. According to the 1991 census, 54 percent of them call themselves Muslim (this group lives in Montenegro) or Bosniaks (these are Muslims living in the Serbian part). In the early 1990s, some extremist statements were made by one Sulejman Ugljanin of the Democratic Action Party for Sandzak. He declared that Sandzak must have political autonomy within Serbia or else it would join Bosnia-Herzegovina, its "motherland." Statements such as these were used as arguments by Milosevic to conduct an aggressive policy during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, systematically intimidating the Bosniak population and applying other repressive measures, including political arrests and the deployment of paramilitary forces. There was a mass exodus from Sandzak to Bosnia, but estimates differ substantially (between 40,000 and 75,000). A certain number of Sandzak Muslims actively took part in the war in Bosnia against Bosnian Serbs. This has affected the strong intraethnic tensions in this region.

With the new democratic government in Belgrade, these tensions have greatly subsided, especially with the appointment of Rasim Ljajic (born in Sandzak) as federal minister of intraethnic relations. New conflicts and tensions in the Sandzak region could arise from a possible separation of Montenegro from the Yugoslav Federation. If this happens, Sandzak would become split between two new states. The more or less homogenous Bosniak population would be divided: Bosniaks would become an tiny ethnic minority, accounting for 2.5 percent of the population in Serbia (in Montenegro they consist of 14.5 percent of the population and are actively supporting an independent Montenegro). This could mean that Bosniaks would be marginalized even more: becoming citizens of two sovereign states could substantially reduce their possibility of expressing and preserving their own national identity and culture, and of communicating with their families who would find themselves living in another state.

The region of Vojvodina covers an area of 21,506 square kilometers. It extends mostly on the plains in the north of Serbia. Vojvodina has slightly over 2 million inhabitants (according to the 1991 census), 56.8 percent of whom are Serbs, 16.9 percent Hungarians, 8.7 percent Yugoslavs, 3.2 percent Slovaks, 2.2 percent Montenegrins, 1.9 percent Romanians, 1.2 percent Roma, 0.9 percent Ruthenians, and 0.9 percent Macedonians. This variegated ethnic structure is the result of large waves of colonization that took place during several centuries. Each of these peoples developed their linguistic, religious, and cultural individuality, but they communicated and cooperated among themselves. Until the breakup of Yugoslavia, Vojvodina used to be one of the most tolerant and ethnically mixed areas in Europe. During the recent wars in ex-Yugoslavia, there was an influx of a large number of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and an exodus of Croats and Hungarians. As a result, the present intraethnic structure is considerably changed. Back in 1988, Milosevic forced the provincial government leaders to resign by using Serbian national discontent and manipulating mass rallies. A year later, amendments to the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia reduced Vojvodina's legislative, administrative, and judiciary powers. A national homogenization of the Serbian population mediated by Belgrade aggravated intraethnic relations to some extent, further exacerbated by the war with Croatia. A few NGOs took to defending those who refused to participate in the war. These were primarily ethnic Hungarians.

The decade of war and the isolationist policy of the Milosevic regime was experienced by the majority of Vojvodina citizens as economically devastating, breeding corruption and crowding out any understanding for the position of minorities. No wonder that in the post-Milosevic era sharp tensions remain between the demands of Vojvodina's political parties for an ever greater autonomy than the one that was abolished, and the absence of any readiness on the part of the new parties in power in Belgrade to meet those demands. The problem in Vojvodina today is of a social nature (although recently some interethnic incidents have been reported). Poverty, slow and insufficient reforms, unchecked corruption and theft, bankrupt factories, and diminished agricultural production make Vojvodina a vulnerable area. If there is no fast economic recovery, it is only a matter of time before another form of general discontent will manifest itself—ethnic, territorial, or otherwise. The recent decision of the Hungarian government to allow ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries (Romania, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia) to enjoy the same sociopolitical benefits as its own citizens can easily lead to an increasing homogenization of Hungarians in Vojvodina and their possible demands for a new status. That might imply the deterioration of the traditionally tolerant intraethnic relations in this province.

In Serbia, there is the unresolved question of the province of Kosovo and the armed conflict in southern Serbia. After the NATO intervention and the withdrawal of the federal army and the Serbian police from Kosovo in June 1999, the former province became a sort of protectorate under the administration of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO force KFOR. They represented the international community, which could do little to prevent ethnic cleansing and acts of violence. Although the Kosovo issue is not the main subject of this chapter, it must be said that the unstable political situation in that region, revenge of former National Liberation Army (UCK) personnel toward Serbian and other communities, and the uncertain future political status of Kosovo may be seen as relevant factors contributing to making Serbia unstable.

Conflict Dynamics

The secession of the Republic of Slovenia led to the first armed conflict on the soil of ex-Yugoslavia between the federal army and the territorial defense units of Slovenia in June 1991. (It is useful to note here that there is virtual unanimity that the federal army represented exclusively the interests of the regime in Serbia.) This conflict took place exclusively on the territory of Slovenia and it ended after a couple of weeks with relatively little material damage and about sixty dead, mostly soldiers of the federal army.

The war between Serbs and Croats affected one-third of Croatia and lasted from 1991 to 1995. The dispute arose when the Croatian parliament declared an independent and sovereign Croat state (25 June 1991). Subsequently, the Serbian population in the region of Kninska Krajina and in parts of Slavonia, who wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, organized an armed rebellion. The conflict in Croatia led to mass expulsions of people, large-scale destruction, and human casualties. It ended with a blitzkrieg and the expulsion of Serbs from said areas. Neither Serbia nor FRY officially took part in these conflicts, although they provided ideological, military, and material support.

The multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 resulted in the division of power between three nationalistic parties: the Bosnian Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). When on 15 October 1991 the SDA and the HDZ delegates in parliament adopted a memorandum declaring Bosnia and Herzegovina a sovereign state, the SDS took the decision to hold a plebiscite. The Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina voted to remain in Yugoslavia. Then, on 6 April 1992, the European Community (which mediated in the dispute) recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. In response, the assembly of the Serbian people in Banja Luka declared the independence of the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That resulted in violent armed clashes between Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. With the Dayton Accords of 21 November 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared a federation, consisting of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (RS). Again, FRY did not take part in this war in an official capacity. It did provide major military, diplomatic, and material aid to the Serbs. Soldiers and officers of the army of the FRY fought in Bosnia with Republika Srpska military symbols on their uniforms.

Internal Conflicts
From 1991 to 2001, Serbia was characterized by parallel violent conflicts and tensions developing on two mutually interwoven levels. On one hand, there was a conflict between the regime and the democratic opposition. On the other, there was a conflict with the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo, which took various forms and phases. The Milosevic regime used and abused interethnic tensions and conflicts to maintain its power. It projected discontent toward other ethnic groups and it told the Serbian people that they were being threatened by a "hostile environment."

The accumulated discontent of the citizens of Serbia with the foreign and internal policy of Slobodan Milosevic and his party became manifest in mass protests that on a few occasions brought the country to the brink of civil war. On 9 March 1991 in Belgrade, Vuk Draskovic, the leader of the largest opposition party, organized a rally against the information monopoly of the ruling party. Tens of thousands of people clashed with the police. After Draskovic was arrested, the regime sent Yugoslav army tanks into the streets. Students and citizens protested for several days, but the regime managed to contain the protests. Two people were killed.

Although the protests continued from year to year and the number of protesters grew steadily, the disunity among the Serbian opposition, coupled with the charisma of Slobodan Milosevic, the media blockade, and systematic election fraud committed by the regime, frustrated democratic change. When after the November elections for local self-government in 1996 the regime tried to annul the results in the districts in which the opposition had won, mass demonstrations of 1 million people and more were staged all over Serbia. The demonstrations lasted three months, shaking all structures of society to the core and turning the majority of public permanently against the regime. This crisis was mediated by the former prime minister of Spain, Felipe Gonzales, on behalf of OSCE. He pressurized the regime in Belgrade to acknowledge the election results. In this way, the opposition in Serbia for the first time had a chance to manage finance and the local media, which was to be of crucial importance for its victory at the elections in September 2000.
The crucial reasons for the collapse of the Milosevic regime are the following:

• Military and diplomatic defeat in all wars that he waged (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo)
  
• Economic devastation of the country resulting from the war policy, sanctions, and the failure to introduce economic reforms
  
• Unification of the opposition parties, proper organization of the election campaign, and effective election monitoring
  
• Readiness of Serbia's citizens to push through their electoral will even at the cost of confrontation with the police and the army

Kosovo and Southern Serbia
The conflict in Kosovo erupted in the middle of the 1990s and culminated in 1998–1999. Several international organizations and governments (Contact Group—France, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—the EU, and the OSCE) tried to mediate, but after Yugoslavia refused to sign the Rambouillet Agreement, which allowed the deployment of 28,000 NATO soldiers in Kosovo and made FRY withdraw its military and police forces, NATO launched a bombing campaign. The bombing of FRY lasted from 24 March to 10 June 1999. This action was terminated by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the deployment of a multinational force led by NATO.

The Presevo Valley area in southeast Serbia is composed of the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja, which border the provinces of Kosovo and Macedonia. The majority is Albanian, but there are also Serbs as well as Montenegrins and Roma living in the municipalities. The crisis in the south of Serbia revealed itself in conjunction with and in the aftermath of the NATO campaign, when a significant number of Yugoslav/Serb forces were concentrated there. The first publicly known series of attacks on the Serbian police forces started after the NATO campaign. Albanians linked the escalating violence to the redeployment of Yugoslav/Serb security forces, engaged in the Kosovo war until June 1999. Serbs are prone to associate the violence with the result of local elections in Kosovo, which were held under UNMIK auspices. The results showed that Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo still held an unassailable majority and that various UCK leaders had not won much confidence among the Kosovo Albanians. The violent actions and other armed incidents could therefore be explained in two ways: as an expression of the desire of Albanian extremists to draw the attention of the international community to the Kosovo problem, and as a demonstration before both the international community and fellow countrymen that the UCK was still in charge, regardless of the Kosovo election results.

The low-intensity conflict lasted till spring 2001. After the fall of Milosevic's regime, the West started to change its views on Serbia and Yugoslavia, which pushed the Kosovo problem largely into the background.

In the meantime, the armed clashes along the administrative border with Kosovo were not favorable for Belgrade, either at the international or the domestic level. The new government was concerned that such incidents could harm its newly found popularity at home and abroad. However, this government reacted in a manner that set it immediately apart from Milosevic's regime. It did not use excessive force, but tried to eliminate the causes of the conflict in cooperation with the international community and involve the Albanians in the process.

The newly elected authorities in Yugoslavia set up the Federal/Republican Coordination Body led by Serbian deputy prime minister Nebojsa Covic and comprising the federal minister of national and ethnic communities, Rasim Ljajic, as well as representatives of the Yugoslav army and the Serbian Ministry of Interior. To promote stability, the Coordination Body drafted and circulated the "Program for the Solution of the Crises" created by the activities of the Albanian extremists groups in southern Serbia. The program envisaged what might be termed a "gradual and conditional" approach. The Albanians presented their platform: "Platform for the Prevention of the Armed Conflicts and Crises Solutions in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medevedja Region." The Albanian platform insisted on the "demilitarization of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medevedja by withdrawing Serbian forces and placing the region under International supervision."

The international community welcomed Belgrade's attitude in seeking a peaceful solution to the crises and condemned the behavior of armed Albanians.

The damage resulting from the events in the south of Serbia is both indirect and direct. First of all, there is the misery of human casualties, destruction of properties, and people fleeing their homes. Also the obstruction of traffic on the international motorway Belgrade-Nis-Sofia-Salonika was a big problem: this highway is of an exceptional importance not only for Serbia but for the neighboring countries as well, particularly Greece, Macedonia, and Bulgaria.

The indirect damage refers to spreading political instability, thus creating an obstacle for the authorities to tackle economic issues, and particularly to attract foreign investments.

A cursory glance into the official Serb and Albanian platforms shows gaps between them. The Albanian side sees the resolution of the conflict through obtaining a "special status" of the area under international supervision. They recommend the withdrawal of Serbian police and the federal army as a condition for a peaceful settlement. In newspaper interviews, local Albanian political leaders have advocated their right for a referendum to be held to shape their own future. The Serbian government also advocates the assistance of the international community, expecting from it a guarantee of the sovereignty of the existing state (UNSC Resolution 1244) and the keeping in check of Albanian extremists who endanger the peace. It offers integration of the Albanian community into the common state, guaranteeing human rights according to the highest international standards, and its integration into security and municipal structures.

Official Conflict Management

The Republic of Serbia, first as a part of the SFRY, and then of the FRY, has been one of the key factors in the development of the Yugoslav crisis right from the beginning. That is why the international community (in particular, the EU, OSCE, UN, and United States) directed the bulk of its activities toward Serbia. However, the regime in Serbia interpreted these activities as interference in the internal affairs of the (already disintegrated) Yugoslav state. In that sense, the Serbian regime reluctantly accepted the mediation of leading international organizations and governments in the conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On the other hand, FRY/Serbia was one of the signatories of all relevant documents (Dayton Accords, Military and Technical Agreement, etc.) foreseeing the inclusion of international organizations in the resolution of the crises in the area, notably NATO and the UN.

The UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP have maintained an international presence in the FRY throughout the crisis affecting Yugoslavia. The UN provided diplomatic, information, and humanitarian assistance. The OSCE was allowed to set up a mission in Serbia covering Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina, from September 1992 to June 1993. Its basic objectives were to promote dialogue among ethnic communities, to collect information on the infringement of human rights, and to protect minority rights. Following the overthrow of the Milosevic regime, additional international organizations have been allowed to open their offices and operate throughout the territory of Yugoslavia. UNMIK has established a liaison office; OSCE has a mission; and the Council of Europe, NATO, the European Union Monitoring Mission, the European Agency for Reconstruction, the UNDP, World Bank, the IMF, and a number of international humanitarian organizations, all have offices in FRY.

Conflict Management in Southern Serbia
The case of southern Serbia reveals how a concerted effort of international and national actors including national NGOs can bring about a peaceful resolution, fragile as it still is.

To tackle the low-intensity conflict in southern Serbia was of paramount importance given the detrimental consequences an extended crisis would have created for the Serbian opposition, which had just replaced the Milosevic establishment, and the international actors that could have suffered retaliations and further instability in Kosovo. The UN, through its specialized agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WPF), and several international NGOs were present in the area throughout the conflict, but their intervention was ad hoc and purely humanitarian. Their main tasks were to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees, displaced persons from Kosovo, and social cases. Although their presence contributed to the containment of a certain degree of sociopolitical tension, it was clear that the solution should also be pursued on the political/security terrain. In this context and with a view to raise awareness, the UN special envoy for the Balkans, Carl Bildt, visited the area and met with local officials. The first significant diplomatic/political initiatives were initiated following the victory of the democratic forces in September 2000.

In November 2000 the European Union deployed monitors in the area. Their task was to monitor political and security developments and facilitate contacts among the parties. In mid-December of the same year, UNHCR deployed staff in Vranje. In March 2001 the U.S. State Department also established a presence there. However, NATO, in conjunction with the EU, took the lead in facilitating a solution to the crises and conducted shuttle diplomacy between Serbian authorities and Albanian officials to engineer and facilitate a peaceful end to the extremists' armed actions and a dialogue between the parties. As a result, a cease-fire agreement was signed that entered into force on 12 March 2001. Despite a number of reported incidents, the cease-fire is still holding (as of this writing).

Meanwhile, as of 13 March the Yugoslav army has been allowed to gradually and conditionally redeploy in the area. The redeployment was concluded on 31 May. No major incidents were reported and on all accounts both the army and the Serbian police acted professionally.

The deteriorated situation in Macedonia is a source of concern. At the moment of this writing, some 6,000 Albanian refugees from the country have taken refugee in southern Serbia. Though they have been absorbed by the local population, given the strong ties between Albanians in the Presevo Valley and in Macedonia, they represent an additional burden to the already precarious socioeconomic situation in southern Serbia, considered one of the poorest areas in the whole of Serbia.

In February 2001 the UN deployed an assessment mission to southern Serbia. Fifteen UN agencies and other international organizations participated. The mission found that the legacy of past systematic human-rights discrimination, coupled with economic disparities, is still prominent. The structural underdevelopment and inadequate institutional capacities further complicate the situation. The mission has suggested that confidence-building measures should be promoted immediately to help consolidate the peace process. Since June 2001 the UN has established an Inter-Agency Southern Serbia Support Office in Vranje. It focuses on developing a common strategic framework to include human-rights monitoring, promoting and supporting confidence-building measures (i.e., disarmament, demobilization, etc.), capacity building and quick-impact projects for employment, economic recovery, and development of the area. Priority is given to the municipalities of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja, with a view to extend the geographical coverage. The OSCE has established a multiethnic police academy where Serbs, Albanians, and members of other communities are jointly trained. As of November 2001, the OSCE has also established a "contact office" in Bujanovac. Furthermore, the Council of Europe is in the process of locating an international staff member in the office of the Federal Ministry of National and Ethnic Communities. In July 2001, the ministry opened an office in Bujanovac with the task of collecting information on human-rights violations.

Albanian representation in governing institutions remains one of the most problematic aspects of today's situation in southern Serbia. This is especially the case in the Bujanovac and Medevedja municipalities. However, the results of the election held in Kosovo in November 2001—where Serbs took part and moderate Albanian political parties were victorious—may indicate that ethnic communities are developing an allegiance with democratic values rather than exclusively with their own ethnic group.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Until 1990 there were around 19,000 different nonprofit organizations in Yugoslavia, but they were neither independent nor served as promoters of civil society. Their main aim was to promote the communist regime and to organize the society according to the prevailing ideology. They worked under direct state control and, among other things, assisted the state in molding human activities according to prescribed shapes. In that sense, the real civil society with a network of genuine independent nongovernment organizations started in 1990, when the free association and organization of citizens was legalized. In FRY in the last ten years, 1,344 new NGOs have been registered. A major increase in the number of NGOs occurred after the mass civil protests, when most of the students and youth organizations were established. After 1997, improvements in the NGO sector could be perceived: there was more coherence in their actions, strengthening of their financial status, and expansion of their networks and their influence on broader public opinion. Besides major cities, where most NGOs have been concentrated, new NGOs appeared in the majority of the towns all over the country, especially in those where the opposition came to power after the 1996 local elections in Serbia.

It is necessary to point out that the development of civil society in FRY was anything but normal because of the policies emanating from the Milosevic regime, most of the population suffered under the UN, U.S., and EU economic, diplomatic, and cultural sanctions. These circumstances were highly unfavorable for the spreading of universal ideas of free society, independence, freedom of thought, and reform in line with a modern Europe.

The policy of the Milosevic regime had been based on the concept of the total mobilization of the masses and the manipulation of nationalistic feelings. From the very beginning, it was inimical to all independent organizations that promoted universal values and nonviolent policies. The NGOs that directed their activities to opening the channels of communication with the representatives of ethnic communities and the West, with whom the Serbian state was virtually at war, were constantly accused of being traitors, foreign spies, or agents. The state expressed its displeasure with their work not only through official media and constant accusations, but also by imposing administrative difficulties in the process of their registration, and sometimes by threats to their members.

NGOs were playing a double role. They were involved in peace initiatives concerning ethnic communities, against whom the regime waged a war (Croats, Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albanians in Kosovo). They were also engaged in the fight against Milosevic. In the first case, there have been dozens of initiatives serving as a bridge between different ethnic groups. Important to mention here are the Soros Foundation, Center for Anti-War Action, Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, Group 484, Humanitarian Law Center, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Women in Black, and the Belgrade Circle. Since their establishment, women's NGOs have most actively participated in antiwar campaigns and set the general tone of protests. Women in Black developed a network of organizations covering most of Serbia that in addition to antiwar actions were working on general education and the promotion of women's rights. Although they were not in a position to stop the conflicts, such NGOs played a very important role in showing alternative policies, in contrast to the policies of the ruling parties. This served the purpose of dismantling the prejudice that there is no need for communication and open talk with one's enemies. NGOs helped in the process of reintroducing the feelings of universal solidarity toward all innocent people who had been suffering as victims of ethnic wars.

Together with the opposition political parties, NGOs organized a pro-election campaign and convinced the majority of the citizens of Serbia that it was possible to replace the dictatorship of Milosevic in a peaceful, democratic way, by getting people out to vote in the greatest possible number. This must rank among their biggest successes. The most prominent role was played by young activists from Otpor (Resistance) who persuaded the youth of the country to actively participate in political life. A coalition of NGOs encompassing Civic Initiatives and the European Movement in Serbia lead a broad "get out the vote" campaign, advocating that citizens (the young, women, peasants, men) could change politics for the better by casting their vote. CESID, supported by a number of other NGOs, organized the monitoring of the vote counting. In sum, NGOs have helped enormously in combatting Milosevic and his regime in a peaceful manner, preventing a very real possibility of a catastrophic civil war. And they have proven that they have significant capacity to mobilize citizens around important political issues.

Finally, a word on the media. The long duration of the Milosevic regime to a large extent relied on its full control over the media, especially of those exerting the greatest influence—the electronic media. That is why the role of a free media was of utmost importance: Radio B92 (later renamed Radio Free B92) and the city's TV channel, Studio B, for years were the only beacons of free expression and objective information.

Multi-Track Diplomacy in Southern Serbia
The UN office in Vranje serves as a focal point for southern Serbia. It works closely with other international NGOs that also have offices in the area, such as USAID/OTI, ICRC, Médecins Sans Frontières (Belgium, Switzerland and Greece), and with those that have ad hoc programs but not a permanent presence, such as Care International, Cooperazione e Sviluppo, Cooperazione Italiana, Catholic Relief Service, HELP, IFRC, Médecins du Monde (Greece), Oxfam, Save the Children, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation/Swiss Disaster Relief, and European Agency for Reconstruction, among others.

In the conflict zone itself, it is hard to establish proper institutional mechanisms capable of dealing with existing problems. For objective reporting, investigation, and resolution of human-rights problems, there are budding local institutions and NGOs. But they need strong and urgent support. The existing NGOs have little capacity and training, but they are in a learning process. For example, UNDP has launched and NGO capacity-building program.

The Council of Human Rights in Bujanovac regularly reports on the human-rights situation among the ethnic Albanian population to the established governmental coordination body and to relevant international organizations. Reportedly, the property rights of the Albanian population are challenged, since the Yugoslav army still occupies a school and a shoe factory. On the other hand, the coordination body has set up a fund to compensate those whose property had been looted or damaged during the conflict.

A parallel Initiative Board for Human Rights Protection operates for the Serb population, and was set up in Bujanovac in January 2001. It is concerned with the general insecurity of Serbs (especially those living in enclaves in Kosovo), kidnappings, and cultural heritage (i.e., churches, etc.).

The Multi-Ethnic Center in Medvedja was recently set up by a group of young Serbs, Gorans, Roma, and ethnic Albanians. They intend to work with the youth. As of 1 July 2001 and with the support of UNICEF, the center hoped to be publishing a newsletter in Serb, Albanian, and English.

The European Movement in Serbia organized a conference for political representatives and civil society delegates from both sides, as well as NGO representatives from Sandzak and experts from UN and UNMIK. The conference was held in Krusevac, on 2 and 3 February 2001. The conference was meant to be an initiative for multiethnic cooperation as a precondition for a better future. Both sides put on the agenda the unresolved problems that endanger the common lives of ordinary people. The result of the conference is the "Krusevac Declaration," which states that any political solution would be extremely complex and that any quick and efficient solution that would satisfy all sides concerned in the conflict can hardly be achieved.

Otpor has established a branch office. It is promoting actions to break ethnic-motivated barriers. It distributes humanitarian aid and provides legal advice. It plans to open an internet café. Like elsewhere in Serbia, it is focusing on young groups.

The Atmosphere and Potential for a Serbian Civil Society
Generally, in Serbia there is a distinction between urban and rural environments. In the major cities the values of a pluralistic society prevail. In that sense, urban areas are being included in dynamic changes proper to a modern society faster and easier. Individuals are left with a much larger maneuvering space for independent action and decisionmaking. Civil-society networks, branching out from these centers, are slowly covering ever larger areas.

Rural areas continue to be largely "closed societies": they are chronically enslaved to patriarchal values, customs, and prejudices, and their inhabitants are prone to subordination. No allowance is made for alternative ways of behavior. In this case, the activities of the NGOs sector in these areas are facing many obstacles and are often misunderstood; they are just taking the first steps in the process of establishing the rudimentary elements of a civil society. This requires patience and understanding the mentality of the local population. No wonder then that on the rims, such as southwest Serbia, the space for a civil society is very narrow and hard to develop.

A closer look at the zone of armed conflict itself, i.e., at the towns and villages where incidents occur, would show not only local communities divided along ethnic lines, but also poor conditions for the development of a civil society. This is due to cultural and economic factors, as well as to the Kosovo crisis. Very few NGOs try to cope with the problems of the divided society and those that do hardly keep their positions nonpartisan. This is not surprising after so many years of one-sided propaganda. NGOs mostly promote the views of political parties of their own ethnic group and seldom make mutual contacts. This is due to all kinds of pressure, including threats to individuals by the local political authorities and widespread public opinion that it is best not to meddle with the "opposite side." The Albanian community is especially very homogenous traditionally, and has a rigid vertical structure; sometimes it threatens the lives of individuals who break common expectations and rules of conduct. This basically works like a parallel system of control and should not be overlooked.

In these closed societies, events such as those in Kosovo, the Presevo Valley, and northwest Macedonia breed ethnic homogenization and the rise of xenophobic feelings. These are areas where women do not play a significant role in public, social, or economic life. It is hard to expect any significant improvement in the future, as it has proved difficult to break old customs, especially in this delicate situation.

Therefore, it is difficult both for the international community and NGOs to rebuild bridges between sharply divided societies that in many ways breed opposing hopes. So there is a need for support of local NGOs by strengthening the networks that already exist in larger cities in southern Serbia. Some backing may be needed for the Albanian side from NGO networks in Kosovo. International NGOs should find a way to combine civic energies from both sides and work toward some common end. Only through such a cooperation there is a hope for strengthening the civil sector.

Prospects

If the situation in southern Serbia reescalates, it could represent a major obstacle to economic recovery and political stability, given the fact that the defeated extreme-nationalist forces in Serbia direct the blade of their criticism toward the incapability of the new authorities to cope with extremism and to find rapid solutions for socioeconomic problems. On the other hand, the international community, especially the United States, has made financial aid and investments conditional on a restrained attitude of the Yugoslav/Serb security forces and full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague.

There are indications that Albanian extremists living in southern Serbia, in coordination with the Albanians living in Kosovo and probably in Macedonia, want to impose a different status on the municipalities populated mainly by Albanians in southern Serbia, and to consider that territory as their own. On the other hand, by allowing the Yugoslav armed forces to return, the international community has clearly made it known that they are extending great trust to the new government in Serbia. Negotiations between the two parties remain the only rational possibility, but to accomplish this it is necessary for the two sides in the dialogue to see all positions regarding the key issues in the dispute.

Thanks to the truce signed by the Yugoslav/Serb authorities and Albanians living in southern Serbia, facilitated by NATO/EU representatives, peace is holding, but is still fragile.

Recommendations

The following are three main recommendations for facilitating peacebuilding in Serbia:

• Assistance of leading international legal and economic institutions in the readmission of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into their full membership
  
• Full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague and extradition of the indicted persons accused of crimes against humanity
  
• Active participation of international institutions in the resolution of all intraethnic relations/conflicts

Regarding the current crisis, it is necessary for both parties in the conflict to bear in mind the following facts. One of the causes of the present crisis in southern Serbia is certainly discrimination of Albanians during Milosevic's regime. Another cause of the crisis are the extreme political demands of some Albanian politicians in the Presovo Valley for a special status based on territorial claims that occurred even before 1999 when the Kosovo conflict exploded. Their aspirations are connected with the aspirations of Albanians in Kosovo, who call this territory "Eastern Kosovo" and who wish to annex it into the future "independent" state of Kosovo.

Some aspects of the crisis could be eliminated by the governments of FRY and Serbia. Others could be eliminated only with the help of the international community, which should exert pressure on some Albanians politicians to give up their territorial claims toward this area, and to curb the illegal flow of money, arms, and people.

If it is in the interest of the international community and Yugoslavia to promote peace, stability, and prosperity, decisive steps should be taken toward easing tensions between ethnic communities. It is of vital importance to create an institutional framework (law, police, public services, education system, media, etc.) which would be trusted by all. In that sense international, regional, and local NGOs might be of great help. The presence of interested agencies (UN, EU, etc.) and donor-funded programs might help in the recovery process in southern Serbia and elsewhere. Local NGOs need external experts and resources to become more successful in their efforts. Local administration needs urgent institutional reforms and decentralization at the municipal level. Without help both from the Serbian government and foreign agencies, it will be impossible to upgrade public services.

In order to ensure a viable multiethnic community, it is essential to begin a series of economic projects that would involve people from both ethnic communities and provide regional and local NGOs with logistical and technical help in upgrading their capacities.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Centers for Pluralism, newsletter; Europe Plus, newsletter of the European Movement in Srebia, Belgrade (monthly); New Balkan Politics (www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk); Policy Advocate, Center for Management (available on CD-ROM), Belgrade
REPORTS:	Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans, by Steven Rettner and Michael B.G. Froman, New York, 2000. International Crisis Group; Peace in Presovo: Quick Fix or Long Term Solution? Balkans Report 116, August 2001. Serbia's Transition: Reforms under Siege. Balkans Report 117, September 2001. Report of the UN Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Southern Serbia, March 2001. United States Institute of Peace, Whither the Bulldozer? Nonviolent Revolution and the Transition to Democracy in Serbia. Special Report, August 2001.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	A System for Post-War South-East Europe: Plan for Reconstruction, Openness, Development and Integration, by Michael Emerson. Brussels, Center for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 131, May 1999. EU Enlargement: Yugoslavia and Balkans, edited by European Movement in Serbia and Ekonomika Politica and Economski, Belgrade, 1998. Preparing Yugoslavia for European Integration, edited by Jelica Minic. Belgrade, European Movement in Serbia, November 2000. Serbia After Milosevic, by Nebojsa Covic. Belgrade, Liber-press, 2001. The Albanians, by Miranda Vicker. London-New York, I. B. Taurus, 1997. The Balkans, by Misha Glenny. Great Britain, Granta, 1999. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: Potential, Problems and Perspectives, by Rafael Biermann. Bonn, Center for European Integration Studies, C 56, 1999. War in the Balkans: Consequences of The Kosovo Conflict and Future Options for Kosovo and the Region, by International Crisis Group. Brussels, ICG Balkans Report No. 61, April 1999.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.balkan-info.com (Balkan Information Exchange) www.copri.dk (Copenhagen Peace Research Institute) www.emins.org (European Movement in Serbia) www.gov.yu (Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) www.kossovopress.com (Kosovo Press) www.mup.sr.gov.yu (Ministry of Interior of Serbia) www.southeasteurope.org (South-East Europe Online) www.transnational.org (Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research) www.unorg/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo.htm (UNMIK) www.yuembusa.org (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Sonja Biserko, president of Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, e-mail: bisrkos@EUnet.yu Igor Djoric, Multiethnic Center, Medvedja, e-mail: mecmedvedja@ptt.yu Fischer Gerard, adviser, UNMIK, Pristina, e-mail: gfis422800@aol.com Alija Halilovic, Civic Forum, Novi Pazar, e-mail margina@EUnet.yu Saip Kamberi, president, Committee for Human Rights, Bujanovac, e-mail: haipk@yahoo.com Dragan Lakicevic, project manager, Ethnic Relations Program, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, e-mail: lakicevi@EUnet.yu Goran Lapcevic, Local Council of EPUS, Krusevac, e-mail: lapac@ptt.yu Bratislav Lazarevic, CeSID, Bujanovac, e-mail: batabiro@ptt.yu Zoran Lutovac, M.A. Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, e-mail: lutovacz@net.yu Maria Teresa Mauro, political officer, UN Liaison Office, Belgrade, e-mail: mtmauro@EUNet Srdjan Milivojevic, Otpor Branch in Bujanovac, www.zivot.zajed/no.org.yu Zoran Milovanovic, City Home, Leskovac, e-mail: zojavid@ptt.yu Behlul Nasufi, president of the Center for Multicultural Education, e-mail: behlulnasufi@yahoo.com Shoko Noda, UNDP, Belgrade, e-mail: shoko.nodo@undp.org.yu Danijel Pantic, secretary-general, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade, e-mail: emins@eunet.yu Sead Skrijelj, Center for Multi-Ethnic Dialog, Novi Pazar, e-mail: cemed@infosky.net Biljana Vankovska, Transnational Foundation for Peace, Skopje, e-mail: biljanav@sonet.com.mk
ORGANIZATIONS:	Centre for Anti-War Action Macˇvanska 8 11 000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia Tel/Fax: +381 11 344 17 37 E-mail: caa@caa.org.yu Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Zmaj Jovina 7 11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia Tel.: +381 11 637 542: 637 116 E-mail: biserkos@EUnet.yu www.helsinki.org.yu/ Otpor (Resistance) K. Mihajlova 49 11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia Tel.: +381 11 637 500 www.otpor.com DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Belgrade Center for Human Rights; Center for Free Elections and Democracy; Center for Psychological Growth and Development Encouragement; European Movement in Serbia; Group MOST; Humanitarian Law Center; PROTECTA; TRAIL Association; URBAN-IN

About the author

Dragan Lakicevic is author of five books in the domain of political philosophy and current events in the Balkans, and numerous articles and papers in various journals. Danijel Pantic (M.A. in law) is secretary of the European Movement in Serbia. He is the author of numerous articles concerning the European Union and the transition to democracy. Zoran Lutovac (M.A. in political science) is employed at the Insititute for Social Science in Belgrade. He is an expert on ethnic relations and a distinquished member of several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Maria Teresa Mauro works as a political officer at the United Nations Labor Organization (UNLO) in Belgrade. She is temporarily concerned with the improvement of ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs in southern Serbia. The views expressed here are her own and not necessarily those of the UNLO.