Author	Jos Havermans
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Analysts have interpreted the turmoil in the Republic of Congo as a civil war fuelled by the struggle for control over the country's rich oil resources. According to this analysis rival factions within the country's elite have tried to grab the financial revenues for themselves and their dependants. The conflict has pitted three politicians, each with their own militia, against one another. These are: Pascal Lissouba, who has his stronghold in the south and exerts military and political pressure through his Cocoye, or Zulu, militia; Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has his stronghold in the north and depends on his Cobra militia; and Bernard Kolélas, whose power-base lies in the capital, Brazzaville, and who relies on the Ninja militia. The regional divisions coincide with different ethnic loyalties, giving the conflict an ethnic dimension.
When he came to power in 1992, after the first democratic elections in the history of Congo Brazzaville, Pascal Lissouba attempted to play oil companies off against each other, hoping to channel a bigger share of their profits into his own treasure-chest. He invited American companies such as Exxon, and Occidental, as well as British-Dutch Shell, to enter the long-term Congo Brazzaville oil-game.
By offering these relative newcomers the opportunity to exploit Congolese oil fields, Lissouba jeopardised the decades old privileges of the French oil company Elf Aquitaine. Elf's strong position in Congo Brazzaville had been built up under the rule of Lissouba's predecessor, Sassou Nguesso. Lissouba's moves were particularly disturbing for Elf since the French company's revenues relied heavily on Congo Brazzaville. According to Belgian and French press reports (see: De Standaard, October 18, 1997, and Le Monde, October 17, 1997), Elf hoped Nguesso would be victorious in the elections scheduled for July 1997 and decided to support his militia when the elections were aborted and fighting erupted in June 1997. Le Monde quotes 'sources in the French secret service' as saying that Elf helped the Cobra militia to get supplies from Europe through the financing circuits of the oil company. Sassou Nguesso is reported not only to have enjoyed the support of Elf Aquitaine, but also of a much larger informal group of French businessmen with economic interests in Africa.
Lissouba's sour relations with Elf seem to have weakened his position. Lissouba's presidency was further undermined by Angola's decision to support Sassou Nguesso. Angola favoured Sassou Nguesso's side because it maintains close ties with Elf, which is also the main company exploiting oil resources in Angola, and, more importantly because an intervention in Congo allowed it to deal with tough domestic problems. Its military presence in Congo Brazzaville enabled the government in Luanda to crush the remaining UNITA forces still operating from this country and to deal a blow to the Cabinda nationalist rebels (FLEC, Front de Libération du Cabinda) operating from Congo Brazzaville. Angola's troops are reported to have been crucial in ensuring Nguesso's victory in October 1997.
Shortly after his defeat, Lissouba began legal proceedings in France in which he accused Elf of complicity in the overthrow of his democratically elected administration.
Apart from being a new phase in the struggle for access to oil resources, the civil war that broke out in Congo Brazzaville in June 1997 also represented a new phase in the turbulent process of democratisation that had started in 1990. The introduction of a multiparty system and the reshuffle of power resulting from the 1992 elections increased tension among rival factions within the country's political elite. Due to mutual mistrust between the major political factions and their inability to form strong coalition governments the democratic mechanisms installed in 1992 never functioned properly.
The three major factions began to form their own militias. In late 1993, clashes occurred between Lissouba's Cocoye and Koléla's Ninjas causing the death of between 1,000 and 5,000 people. In 1994 President Lissouba and the two opposition leaders - Sassou Nguesso and Kolélas - signed an agreement providing for the disarmament of the militias and the formation of a coalition government. This reconciliatory process failed as Sassou Nguesso's political alliance refused to participate in the government. A similar peace pact signed in 1995 failed as Sassou Nguesso hindered the dissolution of his militia.
The civil war of June-October 1997 broke out despite the signing of a tentative cease-fire agreement on July 14, brokered by the International Mediation Committee headed by the president of Gabon, Omar Bongo, and the joint UN/OAU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mohammad Sahnoun. The war came weeks before a new round of elections scheduled for July 27 but which, due to violence, never took place. In October 1997 Sassou Nguesso's forces, assisted by Angolan government troops, won control of Brazzaville and the country's seaport city, Pointe Noire. Subsequently, Sassou Nguesso ousted Lissouba and was declared president.

Conflict Dynamics

After his military victory and inauguration as president, Sassou Nguesso installed a transitional government in November 1997. He declared himself committed to national reconciliation and revealed plans to secure peace and stability. In January 1998 he convened a forum consisting of 1,420 delegates representing most political parties, although Lissouba's political party (ERDDUN) refused to participate. The Forum approved the beginning of a three-year transition period, which should end in presidential and legislative elections in 2001. During this transition period, a new constitution should be written. A 75-member transitional council, elected by members of the Forum from lists compiled by the Forum and the government, would act as the transitional parliament.
The first stages of the plan seem to have been completed on schedule. In November 1998 President Sassou Nguesso inaugurated a constitutional commission charged with the preparation of a draft version of a new constitution. The final version was scheduled to be submitted to voters in a national referendum in 1999. However, the schedule extended over time, partly due to continued fighting. In August 2000, president Sassou-Nguesso announced plans to submit a draft constitution to the interim parliament by March 2001. Presidential and legislative elections seemed to have been postponed until after 2001.
In spite of reconciliatory efforts after the 1997 civil war, violence continued to erupt in Brazzaville and elsewhere in the country. During the autumn of 1998, Lissouba's and Kolélas' militias carried out guerrilla style sabotage attacks in southern Congo, mostly against civilians who were thought to be Sassou Nguesso loyalists from the north. Sassou Nguesso's security forces, for their part, carried out mopping-up operations in an effort to eliminate Lissouba loyalists. These actions reportedly lead to large-scale human rights violations. Human rights abuses led several international donors, including the European Union, to suspend all non-humanitarian aid in 1998.
Violence flared up again in December 1998 and early 1999, when the Cocoye militia of Lissouba seized control over the Moukoukoulou hydroelectric dam, cutting off power to Pointe-Noire. In the summer of 1999, when electricity supply to most regions had been recovered, the fighting concentrated on control of the railway connection between Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. Clashes in Brazzaville lead to heavy artillery attacks by the national army against militiamen and citizens supposedly loyal to Kolélas in the southern districts of the city and in the Pool region. Thousands of people were killed in these attacks, which were described by foreign observers as 'ethnic cleansing'.
Sassou Nguesso' security forces were reportedly assisted in carrying out the counter- attacks by Angolan and Chadian troops. Sassou Nguesso was also said to rely on members of the former Hutu-dominated army of Rwanda, who fled to Congo Brazzaville after 1996. These Hutu-militiamen are being paid as mercenaries. The Ninjas of Kolélas and the militia under control of Lissouba were said to enjoy active support of the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA. In fact, the conflict in Congo Brazzaville has a significant regional dimension, as other states in the region have their eyes on the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. Sassou Nguesso continues to be supported by the Angolan government, which not only backed him in the war of 1997, but still had troops deployed in the country in the spring of 2000.
The situation in Congo Brazzaville was further destabilised by the situation in neighbouring Congo DR (Congo-Kinshasa). Rebels who used to have their base in Congo-Kinshasa were forced to leave that country after the Kabila take-over, adding to the tension and increasing the number of armed people in Congo Brazzaville. Moreover, Rwandan and Ugandan troops were also said to be present in Kinshasa in June 1997, shortly after the Kabila take-over, and some of these troops reportedly joined the fighting in Brazzaville when clashes broke out there.
The regional involvement, therefore, follows the logic of economic interests, as well as of political manoeuvring on the international level. Rwandan forces were said to be intent on reducing French influence in Central Africa, resulting in a Rwandan tendency to support those rebel forces in Congo Brazzaville that were seen as anti-French. Informal alliances developed between certain governments and rebel groups in the region. As a consequence, a shift in the balance of power in neighbouring countries could have significant effect on events in Congo Brazzaville. For instance, Angola's support to Sassou Nguesso has been jeopardised by the weakening of the Angolan government's position following the escalation in the civil war against UNITA. In November 1999, a cease-fire was reached between the government and both the Ninja and Cocoye rebel militias. They signed an accord in the city of Pointe-Noire calling for the cessation of hostilities as of January 2000. The agreement, the result domestic negotiations details of which were not disclosed, was abided into 2000, enabling the return of thousands of refugees to their homes.
The people of Congo Brazzaville suffered severely from the devastating consequences of the civil war. The fierce fighting in the streets of Brazzaville, including indiscriminate bombing of crowded neighbourhoods, caused massive population displacements. During the June-October 1997 civil war, approximately 500,000 out of the 858,000 inhabitants of Brazzaville fled their homes. Humanitarian sources said clashes in January 1999 led to 30,000 displaced people in Brazzaville alone. At that time, large parts of the population were dependent on foreign humanitarian aid, including a WFP airlift, for food and medical supplies. Malnutrition and other emergency situations had dissipated in most parts of the country.
The infrastructure of the country was left in ruins by the civil war. Serious looting and the widespread destruction of shops, homes and offices left a large part of the economy in ruin. The conflict led to the dispersal of thousands of handguns among the youth of Brazzaville and other cities, causing a sharp increase in crime. After the signing of a cease-fire in November 1999, steps were taken towards reconstruction, partly through renewed talks with the IMF and other donors on international support for a national programme of reconciliation and reconstruction.

Official Conflict Management

Since the start of its turbulent democratisation process in 1990, the Republic of Congo has developed a tradition of domestic mediation on the official, political level. After he allowed the introduction of a multiparty system, president Sassou Nguesso convened a national conference to debate the country's future. This conference, which was established in February 1991, included opposition representatives and was chaired by the Roman Catholic bishop of Owando, Ernest N'Kombo. The bishop continued to play a key role in the process, as he also presided over a 153-member legislative higher council established by the conference to supervise the writing of a new constitution and prepare elections. This higher council adopted a draft constitution in December 1991, which was approved in a national referendum in March 1992.
In December 1994 the government and the opposition held reconciliation talks, resulting in the formation of a coordinating body which was to oversee the disarmament of opposition militias. In December 1995, parties from the Mouvance Présidentielle, the political coalition of Lissouba loyalists, and the opposition signed a new peace pact. It provided for the disarmament of militias and their members integration into the armed forces. Although approximately 4,000 militiamen were integrated into the national armed forces between late 1994 and early 1996, the process did not lead to stability and peace. Armed militias continued to be active.
Bernard Kolélas played an unexpectedly interesting role during the civil war in 1997, as he refrained from using force and appointed himself as mediator. However, his efforts bore no result and in a late stage of the civil war Kolélas aligned himself with Lissouba, thereby, as it turned out, choosing the losing side.
A few years before the 1997 clashes, in July and August 1993, growing ethnic tension had triggered a mediation effort by the OAU, France and President Bongo of Gabon. The foreign mediators urged the government and opposition to settle a dispute over the validity of elections held earlier that year giving president Lissouba's political group an absolute majority in parliament. An agreement was signed that an international committee of arbitrators would investigate the elections. The committee ruled in 1994 that the results in eight constituencies were unlawful. However, the external intervention did not divert the Congolese parties from their path toward violent conflict. These efforts may have had little relevance for the events of 1997, but they show that the country's political leaders can be made to yield to pressure of foreign mediators.
The involvement of the United Nations in efforts to stem the conflict in Congo Brazzaville for the most part consisted of monitoring human rights and providing humanitarian aid. UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, and OCHA were engaged in humanitarian relief and aid operations. A UN humanitarian report issued in January 1999 stated that efforts to promote reconciliation in the period after the 1997 five-month civil war were hampered by 'very poor donor response' to consolidated emergency appeals.
The UN has been criticised for not taking the lead in efforts in the political field to de-escalate the conflict. Some analysts said the UN Security Council's decision not to send peace-keeping forces to Brazzaville in the start-up phase of the 1997 civil war actually contributed to further escalation and internationalisation of the conflict, because it cleared the way for Angola to send in troops.
The most clear-cut, although unsuccessful, mediation initiative by the UN came from UN Special representative for the Great Lakes region, Mohammad Sahnoun. Acting as both UN and OAU representative, Sahnoun joined President Omar Bongo of Gabon in June 1997 in an effort to make peace through negotiation. As a result of these talks, numerous cease-fires were reached during the five-month civil war, but none of them lasted. Talks between Sassou Nguesso's and Lissouba's camps took place in Libreville, Gabon's capital, concurrently with the fighting in Congo. The talks came close to an agreement when Lissouba offered Sassou Nguesso five seats in the government. The offer, however, was refused. Shortly after the end of the civil war in 1997, UN secretary general Kofi Annan ordered the UN/OAU special representative to work for a process of national reconciliation, which should lead to 'the holding of free and fair elections with the participation of all parties'. By the summer of 1999, the elections had yet to be scheduled.
In February 1999, the US ambassador in Brazzaville called on the government and the militias of Nguesso and Kolélas to open a dialogue. President Ange-Félix Patassé of the neighbouring Central African Republic also offered his help in the resolution of the Congo Brazzaville crisis. Neither of these initiatives led to significant results.
Later in 1999, unconfirmed reports published by Africa Confidential and the UN information service IRIN said that secret talks were underway between Sassou-Nguesso and representatives of his rivals Kolelas and Lissouba, under brokerage of Nelson Mandela and Algeria's Ahmed Ben Bella. It was unclear if and to what extent this foreign involvement had any impact on reaching the cease-fire agreement later that year. The accord was signed in Pointe-Noire after four days of talks in which more than 200 representatives of the three parties took part.
The accord, apart from calling for a cessation of fighting, also called fort amnesty and rehabilitation for those rebels who would lay down their arms. The accords did not give a timetable for its implementation. Analysts suggested the ratio behind the agreement was that all three warring factions, including the government, concluded that their military campaigns were unsustainable financially.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Only a few initiatives have been taken by foreign and local NGOs to stem violence and boost reconciliation in the Congo Brazzaville. The Congolese NGO community maintains a strong focus on general developmental aims. Most NGOs are organised in a consortium which functions as a liaison point in contacts with international donors and UN agencies.

Domestic
Since the turmoil of 1993, local groups have taken initiatives in a number of cases to try to contain the conflict and work for a peaceful solution. One of these groups was the Association Congolaise pour la Nonviolence, led by Jean Makoundou. In October 1998, a committee was set up by the Ecumenical Council of Churches of Congo to restore peace and security in the south-western Pool region. The committee consisted of about fifty religious leaders, parliamentarians, top army officials and other dignitaries. Its goal was to establish a dialogue between the committee and militias in the Pool region as well as to encourage police to stop harassing civilians and to obtain the release of people detained illegally. The group also planned to distribute food to the poor.
Although the establishment of the committee was a hopeful sign for the peace process, its status remained unclear and doubts arose about its independence, The government is said to have financially supported the committee with CFA francs 38 million. The army's close involvement in setting up the committee also disqualified it in the eyes of many opposition members.
Two weeks after the committee's inauguration, six members, all priests, were killed in an attack by an armed militia on a multi-denominational gathering in a church in the western town of Mindouli. A foreign news agency attributed the attack to the Ninja militia, the rebel group loyal to Bernard Kolélas, but later most observers judged the Cobra militia to have been responsible. The attack dealt the deathblow to the committee's possible reconciliatory role.
Another religious organisation Lavico, which stands for 'Laissez vivre le Congo', played an active role in efforts to create a reconciliatory atmosphere during the aftermath of the 1997 civil war. Lavico is a broad evangelical movement with roots in the Evangelical Church. The organisation held mass rallies with up to 50,000 people advocating peace and reconciliation in the country. Due to the recurring violence in the country, Lavico's activities have become increasingly focused on relief aid.
The Congolese Observatory of Human Rights (Observatoire Congolais des Droits de l'Homme - OCDH), is a human rights organisation based in Port Noire and Brazzaville which monitors and criticises human rights violations of both rebel militias and government security forces. Apart from its human rights work, OCDH issues reports containing analyses of the current situation in Congo Brazzaville and advocates political moves toward reconciliation and democracy. OCDH maintains contacts with similar organisations abroad and received financial support from a Swedish human rights foundation, giving the organisation some degree of credibility and protection at home. OCDH has been accused by government officials of being an organisation which 'encourages banditry' and the government has threatened to arrest its members.
The Fondation NIOSI, a small NGO based in Brazzaville, has been working at the middle and upper levels of decision making since the mid- 1990s in an effort to close the gap between protagonist groups in Congo Brazzaville. Under extremely difficult circumstances, the organisation, led by S. N'Sikabaka, tries to facilitate dialogue between opposing factions.

International
During the spring of 1997, the parties in the conflict had shown signs of being susceptible for mediation by a neutral, non-governmental foreign actor. Steps were taken by Responding to Conflict in the UK to launch a mediating initiative. However, due to lack of funding, the organisation did not manage to start the mediation process in time before war broke out in June 1997 and had to call off its intervention.
The Association Solidarité Internationale (ASI) is a support group based in northern France which collects medical supplies and educational material for the population of Congo. ASI, which was established shortly before civil war broke out in Congo in June 1997, adheres to its non-political position. It sends its aid in containers to Pointe Noire, is familiar with developments at the local level in several regions and has some good contacts in the country.
Shortly after the civil war started in June 1997, Congolese living in the French city of Rennes took the initiative of establishing an aid organisation that seeks to contribute to building peace in Congo. The Collectif SOS Congo Brazzaville, which now comprises Congolese and other sympathetic individuals living all over France, sends medical aid to Congo Brazzaville and tries to induce the Congolese and French governments to increase peace-building and preventive activities 'in order to prevent repetition of the tragedies that happened in Congo'. It organised rallies, including a peace manifestation at the Place de Brazzaville in Paris. Collectif SOS Congo Brazzaville is also interested in launching reconstruction programmes in Congo.

Prospects

The cease-fire reached in November 1999 and the factions' compliance with during 2000 gave hope for recovery and reconciliation in Congo Brazzaville. More than 600,000 of 800,000 people displaced by the war had returned home by August 2000. However, there was still lack of transparency as to how the peace process would work and if there were chances for moves towards democracy and the rule of law. The UN said it regretted the donors' response - both foreign governments and NGOs - to its appeal for supporting the country's process of recovery.

Recommendations

The Congolese human rights organisation OCDH urges the government in Brazzaville to adopt a realistic strategy to create mutual confidence among the different ethnic and regional groups. In particular, the organisation calls for the disarmament of all militias and the establishment of social programmes to enable reintegration of militia members in civil society.
OCDH urges all foreign governments and international organisations to include a clause concerning the protection of human rights and democracy in all aid and cooperation agreements with the government in Brazzaville. OCDH also urges governments to channel humanitarian aid to the Congolese people through non-governmental organisations specialising in health-care and education.
Contributing to building a culture of peaceful coexistence of ethnic, regional and political groups seems to be most efficient at the level of the political and professional echelons because most violence seems to be instigated by political and military leaders, both at local and national levels.
According to Sue Williams, an consultant who is closely acquainted with the civil war in Congo Brazzaville, at the grassroots level religious communities may be found suitable to work with. While individual churches are often perceived as being aligned with one of the parties in conflict, ecumenical reconciliatory initiatives could bear fruit since they may be seen as genuinely non-partisan.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Le Chemin - Newsletter of the Evangelical Church in France, contains information on activities of the Evangelical Church in Congo Brazzaville on a regular basis; Lumière - Information bulletin of the Congolese human rights organisation OCDH; L'Autre Afrique - Paris-based weekly with excellent coverage of sub-Saharan Africa;
REPORTS:	Amnesty International: Entry on Republic of the Congo in annual report 2000 at: http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf/africa; OCDH: Entre Arbitraire et Impunité: Les Droits de l'Homme Au Congo Brazzaville, April 1998
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Ethnic war and ethnic cleansing in Brazzaville, by Kasja Ekholm Friedman and Anne Sundberg. In: From post-traditional to post-modern? Interpreting the meaning of modernity in Third World urban societies, by Preben Kaarsholm (ed.) - Roskilde, International Development Studies, Roskilde University, 1995; Du processus démocratique au Congo, by Eric Dibas-Franck. In: Revue juridique et politique (1997), annee 51, no 2; La Françafrique: le plus long scandale de la République, by François Xavier Verschave. Paris, Stock, 1998 (critical analysis of French Africa policy); La Sécurité au Sommet, l'insécurité à la base. Agir ici et Survie. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1998. (Contains chapter on French-Congolese relations)
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/congo.html (Information on economy and political developments from the US government Energy Information Administration); http://www.congoweb.net (site claiming to be independent of government and opposition with links to several Congolese political and news organisations); http://www.multimania.com/jecmaus/congo.html (links to numerous oppositional Congolese organisations, including political parties); http://espacenordsud.free.fr (website of Espace Nord-Sud, an organisation representing three French development NGOs with extensive relations in Africa)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	François Xavier Verschave - French researcher and president of NGO SURVIE (specializes in arms trade and role of French foreign policy in Central Africa), tel. +33 1 4327 0325; Sue Williams - staff member of INCORE, UK (familiar with developments in the Republic of Congo, including mediation and reconciliation efforts), tel. +44 1504 375525
ORGANISATIONS:	Lavico (Laissez Vivre le Congo, Group with close ties to Eglise Evangélique du Congo working for reconciliation), BP 3205 Bacongo, Brazzaville, République du Congo, Tel. +242 814 364; Fondation NIOSI, B.P. 1063 Brazzaville, République du Congo, Contact S. N'Sikabaka, secretary general, Tel. +242 412 138 or 810 346, Fax +242 811 909; Observatoire Congolais des Droits de l'Homme (OCDH), Bureau National (Head Office), 23, Rue Soumba - OCH, B.P. 4255 Pointe Noire, République du Congo, Contact Christian Mounzeo, secretary general, Tel. +242 949 623/9052, Fax +242 941 915; Bureau de Brazzaville (Field office), 32, Avenue des 3 Martyrs, Station de Bus Jane-Vialle, B.P. 4021 Brazzaville, Republique du Congo, Tel +242 814 130, Email ocdh@mygale.org, http://www.multimania.com/ocdh; Collectif SOS Congo Brazzaville, 25 rue de Vouziers, 35000 Rennes, France, Tel. +33 299 504 237, Fax +33 299 417 962/332 528; Data on the following organisation can be found in the Directory section: Responding To Conflict (RTC)

About the author

Jos Havermans is an historian and freelance journalist covering international developments for several Dutch and international magazines. He has written extensively on Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years his coverage of Africa has included reports on peace efforts and conflict prevention in Burundi, the decay of the central government in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the democratisation process in Malawi.