Author	Jos van Beurden
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

A British protectorate since 1895, Kenya became independent in late 1963. Its first president, Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978 and was succeeded by Daniel Arap Moi. The transition was relatively smooth, but after an attempted coup d'état in 1982, Moi has become increasingly jealous of his power. He and his Kenyan African National Union (KANU) party began to build a strong power base around a coalition of politicians and businessmen most of whom belong to Moi's own ethnic group, the Kalenjin. For many years supporters of the president have own a majority of Kenya's media, transport, banking and tourism businesses.
The Kalenjin are one of the five major ethnic communities in Kenya. According to the 1989 census, the Kikuyu are the largest group with 21 per cent of the population, followed by the Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kamba (11%), and Kalenjin (11%). The latter, although usually considered one group, are in fact an amalgamation of ten peoples. There are over fourty smaller ethnic groups, including the Boran, Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Kuria, Gusii, Somali and Taita. Most of the population adhere to traditional religions. A quarter of the population is Christian, while in the coastal areas there are many Muslims to be found as a result of the Arab influence.
President Moi is not averse to using ethnicity as a tool of government, and has played the ethnic card with particularly devastating effect in the Rift Valley province. When, after the end of the Cold War, Moi was confronted with the demand for multi-partyism, his answer was majimboism. According to the government, majimboism is a form of Kenyan regionalism. According to its opponents it is nothing less than a form of ethnic cleansing which has encouraged discrimination against Kikuyu in the Rift Valley province.
So the Kikuyu - and the Luo - have been excluded from the President's cabinet, while numerous smaller peoples have cabinet representation. The state has explicitly called for the expulsion of all non-Kalenjin, non-Maasai, non-Samburu, and non-Turkana from land in the Rift Valley. Many observers agree that majimboism has played a pivotal role in inciting the ethnic violence which has prevailed in the Rift Valley since 1992 and as a result of which hundreds of Kikuyu have been killed while 250,000 others have been forced to leave their villages. Interviews with the victims of these clashes and other evidence suggest that groups aligned with Moi assisted the Maasai and Kalenjin KANU militants by providing training, transport, and sometimes payment. Underlying these conflicts is a life and death struggle for natural resources, especially land.
Since president Moi and his KANU party held onto power in the 1997 National Assembly elections - albeit with a smaller majority than in 1992 - the situation has further deteriorated. Ethnic tensions have sharpened and the leadership's rhetoric of hatred is finding a ready audience throughout the country. Political unrest has led to a spectacular drop in the number of tourists visiting the country. Unemployment has skyrocketed and basic government services, such as education and health care, have deteriorated. Corruption is endemic, foreign and domestic investment has stopped, while bi- and multilateral donors have found it difficult to support Moi's administration. The jostling of position in the struggle to succeed Moi, who will resign after the 2002 general elections, is expected to add to instability. Government agents are actively intent on undermining the opposition forces.
Outbreaks of violence are common. For example, after the 1997 elections in the Rift Valley province more than 120 people were killed, thousands displaced and hundreds of homes destroyed when members of the Kalenjin, Samburu and Pokot attacked the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu had voted overwhelmingly for the opposition in the multi-ethnic districts of Laikipia and Nakuru where they gained 90 per cent of the seats in the two districts. The well-armed murderers operated systematically with the security forces allegedly being instructed to turn a blind eye to the violence. A year passed before the government attempted to regulate land ownership for the displaced Kikuyu.
The Northeast province is another trouble spot. Here three major clans including the Kenyan Somali share the territory with a number of smaller groups. Eighty per cent of the people derive their income from herding camels, sheep and goats, and they are regularly involved in disputes over grassland, water and cattle. The continued presence of Somali refugees has exacerbated the problems faced by Kenyan Somalis. Somali bandits (shiftas) have been active in the area since the 1970s when a pan-Somali movement was defeated. Highway robberies, cattle rustling, rape, and occasional murders are unexceptional. The government has no control of the situation.
In a further outbreak of ethnic violence at least 69 people were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced in the coastal region around Mombassa in August and September 1997. The victims were again 'up country' Kikuyu from Western, Eastern and Central province, who had come to the area in search of employment or business opportunities. Leaflets warned 'non-native' families to return to their 'ancestral homes,' and gangs destroyed their houses and businesses. According to African Rights, the government feared that these migrants would vote for the opposition in the December elections, and consequently decided they had to be chased away.
Kenya has also been affected by conflicts in neighbouring countries which have created significant refugee problems. Although the total number of refugees is in decline, many have still not returned to their homes and remain displaced in Kenya's urban areas.
Attempting to explain why these numerous smaller conflicts, including the increasing violence in Nairobi and other urban centres, have as yet failed to escalate into civil war, Colin K. Kahl points to Kenyan class interests which cut across ethnic lines in urban areas. Kenya's upper class includes large landowners and urban professionals, businessmen, physicians, high-ranking politicians and civil servants, and senior Kenyan associates in residential multinational corporations. One level below is an emerging and increasingly cohesive urban middle class which includes small businessmen, lower ranked government employees, nurses, teachers, artisans, mechanics, plant supervisors, and skilled factory workers. Kikuyus, the main victims in the ethnic clashes, still dominate Kenya's economy, making up the largest proportion of prominent Africans in business and agriculture. Along with Luos, Kikuyus also make up the largest segment of Kenya's middle class.
Despite the fact that their kinsmen have been murdered in the countryside, the interests of the Kikuyu and Luo members of the upper and middle classes are best served by pushing for political reform that would increase their access to the state on policy matters, not by escalating ethnic violence. Political reform would increase access for Kikuyu and Luo members of the middle class to state funds, civil service positions, etc., while violence would only bring destruction. Most Kikuyu and Luo see the problem as one of bad government and corruption, rather than evil intent.

Conflict Dynamics

In the Rift Valley province the authorities often seem to side with the perpetrators of violence. Machira Apollos of the Centre for Conflict Resolution has analysed several cases. He reports that ethnic violence frequently flares up in areas where there had previously been no serious frictions between the different communities. This is usually preceded by cattle rustling and theft by the instigators of the violence. A spiral effect is then set in motion and incidents of violence and rape, suspicion, accusation and counter-accusation increase.
The government at first denies the problem, but is forced to change its stance when local groups, the churches and media continue to publicise the situation. Finally the police are instructed to act but they arrive too late and fail to impress the victims thereby 'confirming the fear that they are state sponsored'. One witness said that 'we informed the police immediately the raiders stole our animals... but instead of following the route the raiders had taken the police went in the opposite direction despite our protestations.'
The pastoralist Pokot and Marakwet communities have shared the same region in north-west Kenya for a long time and have sometimes fought with each other. In April 1998, 500 Marakwet attacked a police post in West Pokot's Lelan Division, about 200 miles north-west of Nairobi. Two policemen were killed and three injured. This was the first attack in which security forces had been directly targeted. Hundreds of cattle were stolen or maimed. A few weeks later the violence spilled over into an area of northeastern Uganda, inhabited by the Karamajong, a people closely related to the Pokots. In July 1998 the Pokot and Uganda's Karamojong clashed over cattle. At least 84 people were killed. North-east Kenya is equally unstable.
In early 1998, the government moved forcefully to prevent a mass wave of refugees fleeing drought in Somalia from crossing the border. Once this flow of potential refugees was halted, the government invited the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations to provide assistance to these individuals.
Armed raids by bandits and guerrilla activity have been reported from the Ethiopian border. In October 1998, a large group, comprising mainly Borana, raided several settlements inhabited by the ethnic Somali Degodia clan, killing at least 142 and abducting around fifty people. An estimated 17,500 cattle were stolen. Government officials said that the majority of the attackers came from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an Ethiopian rebel group. Survivors and witnesses, however, maintained that the attackers were Borana acting with Ethiopian backing. Following a new incident in January 1999 Kenya lodged a formal protest with the Ethiopian government, claiming that Ethiopian army troops had entered the country searching for fleeing OLF-rebels. At that time the OLF claimed to have carried out a successful attack on a garrison in Ethiopia. In late 1999 the northern part of Kenya was struck by drought and famine.
The inability of the Kenyan authorities to guarantee the safety of foreign officials adds to the overall feeling of danger. In February 1999, Kurdish rebel leader Ocalan was first allowed into the country, but then captured and flown to Turkey. In May 1998, former Rwandan Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga was assassinated along with his driver in a Nairobi suburb. Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) leader John Garang was the target of a further assassination attempt in November 1998. This lack of sufficient security measures and the presence of a Muslim community to provide cover, has made Kenya a target of international terrorism. On August 7, 1998, 253 people were killed and several thousand people injured in a bomb attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi. The government provoked the 1.7 million-strong Muslim community by banning five Muslim NGOs. This was not the first occasion President Moi had challenged the Muslim community: in the 1997 elections the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) remained unregistered.

Official Conflict Management

Since most conflicts are domestic, no outside interference by the UN, OAU, IGAD or other international bodies has taken place. While the Kenyan government is sometimes accused of having an interest in the continuation of violent conflicts in the Rift Valley province, it has mediated in several cross-border conflicts. For example, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia discussed the attacks by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in early 1999.
In addition, several high level government officials and politicians organised meetings with the Ugandan authorities to try and resolve the conflict between Kenyan pastoral groups and the Ugandan Karamojong. In June 1996, the first -ever such meeting was held at Kakuma county headquarters in Kenya's Turkana district. As a result the Dodoth and the Turkana handed over stolen animals. A second (four-day) meeting was held in November 1996 to bring peace to the southern common border pastoralists in Kenya and Uganda. It was attended by Pokot from Uganda and Kenya, Sabiny, and Turkana. The high-level meeting was intended to develop the basis for regular meetings and to coordinate regional planning in these areas. One of the recommendations was the establishment of a Regional Peace Secretariat to address peace and security issues in the border areas.
However, government policy for managing violent conflicts is often a source of confusion. In May 1998, an armed gang disrupted a peace rally near the farming centre of Kitale. The rally was being held to protest against interethnic violence in the area. A grenade was thrown into the crowd and two people were subsequently wounded by arrows. Police officers did not attempt to stop the armed gang but did intervene when the crowd pursued the gang. There were over 5,000 persons in attendance.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Democracy and good government are still remote prospects for Kenya, and Amnesty International places Kenya high on its list of countries with poor human rights records. The ill-treatment and torture of opposition activists is the norm. Although the media are relatively powerful in Kenya, criticism of President Moi, his administration and the KANU party is muted by a set of unwritten conventions. Licenses for radio and television stations or the written press can be revoked at any time. With trade unions being poorly organised, most of the criticism of the Moi regime originates among students and intellectuals. Because many people trust the church or mosque to which they belong, church and mosque-related, NGOs play an important role.

Domestic
Kenya has a surprisingly wide range of NGOs. These include many 'briefcase'-organisations, although others take their work more seriously. Kenyan NGOs tend to operate in the fields of development and advocacy, and the Moi administration has accused some advocacy outfits of supporting the opposition and engaging in covert activities. There are even questions raised about the patriotism of NGOs who receive foreign funding.
President Moi also attacked the NGOs' concept of civic education which he claims is unnecessary in Kenya. In a circular distributed in early 1998, the government indicated that NGOs sponsoring civic education are 'a threat to the security of the state and their activities must be curtailed.' President Moi has threatened to annul the registration of so-called 'political NGOs'. However, the Government NGO Co-ordination Board has refused (!) to cooperate with the president and has withheld information indicating which NGOs are 'political'. Nevertheless, NGOs involved in civic education and advocacy are in a precarious position. Prominent civilian pressure groups include local groups churches, legal associations, university students, and private voluntary organisations advocating environmental and development causes, women's interests, and civil liberties. These groups were, and remain, the main domestic proponents of political reform. Nevertheless, although many are strongly representative of Kenya's larger ethnic clusters, their analyses of the causes and effects of the various conflicts have become deeper and more complex while the issues they raise tend to be class-based rather than communal.
Kenya has a growing number of human rights organisations. These include the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (KHRC), the Kenya Anti-rape Organization, the Legal Advice Centre, the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), the Release Political Prisoners pressure group, and the Centre for Governance and development (CGD). Legal organisations concerned with human rights include the Public Law Institute, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ/Kenya) and the International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA/Kenya). NGOs and some opposition parties maintain comprehensive files on human rights abuses. In addition to special reports, the KHRC produces a 'Quarterly Repression Report' cataloguing the human rights situation in the country. The Government Standing Committee on Human Rights, established in May 1996, has maintained a low profile and kept away from most pressing human rights problems.
These organisations can sometime respond quickly to crisis situations. After the ethnic cleansing in the early 1990s in the Rift Valley, some thirty NGOs affiliated to the Non-Governmental Council of Kenya organised a NGO Council Ethnic Clashes network alongside the provision of relief assistance. Later renamed the Peace and Development Network or Peace Net, this network sought to find solutions to societal problems which, experience elsewhere in Africa showed, if ignored were likely explode with disastrous consequences. Peace Net focuses on capacity building, with local peace committees of nine to fifteen people each in ten areas in Kenya.
The influential Protestant National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) - staff, 300; membership, six million) - and its Peace and Rehabilitation Programme (initially called 'Land Clashes Project') also deserve special mention. The Programme was started in 1992 to help resolve several devastating conflicts in Kenya. These were initially political in nature but soon turned different ethnic communities against each other. The Programme allows the NCCK to cooperate closely with other NGOs, including Muslim organisations, and with officials at district and local level. The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) has been a frequent partner in the training and workshops for members of parliament and others.
As Rose Barmasai and Greetje Witte-Rang have shown in separate papers, the Programme has a strong base in Kenyan society. It has evolved through three phases. During phase I (1992-1993) emergency relief was central to its activities. In phase II (1993-1996) rehabilitation and reconciliation activities were added. During phase III (1996-1999) Good Neighbourliness Workshops have been held, two hundred village level Peace Committees have been created and Peace Facilitators have been identified and trained. For the communities bazaras (public gatherings) have been organised in consultation with the local administration. On many occasions local government officials have been made moderators of meetings encouraging them to listen to the debate. President Moi has frequently accused the NCCK of fuelling tensions in the country and on one occasion he almost banned the NCCK's Peace and Reconciliation Programme. In 1998, a slander campaign against an NCCK official was started by a pro-government magazine. In the next phase, the NCCK will, in cooperation with its national and regional partners and its own country-wide network, publish a national agenda for peace. In the nine areas where the Programme has worked, only one has remained 'hot'.
There are a number of other groups active, albeit with a smaller impact than the NCCK. The Centre for Conflict Resolution, based in Nakuru (between Nairobi and Eldoret), promotes constructive, creative and cooperative approaches to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It carries out public education and awareness campaigns, undertakes situational analysis of the state and the nature of social conflicts in Kenya, and acts as an advocacy liaison centre for the improvement of dialogue, negotiation and mediation services.
Theatre is also used in peace promotion and conflict handling. An example is the Amani People's Theatre in Nairobi. Amani is Kiswahili for 'peace'. The Theatre group encourages people in four areas of the country, at youth conferences and at peace festivals in Kenya and countries of the Great Lakes Region to respond pro-actively to conflict. The group is particularly interested in Afro-centric models of peace-making using participatory methods of research. Recently it transformed its research and documentation division into the Institute of Interactive Arts and Peacebuilding. It has also begun an intermediate level training programme in leadership and conflict transformation for grassroots leader and people in positions of authority. So far the Amani People's Theatre has been involved in some potentially violent conflicts.
Communities threatened by violent conflicts use internal mechanisms to deal with these conflicts far more frequently than is recognised by the outside world.
Frequently unrecognised too are the few NGOs focused on conflict prevention and management which operate far from the capital at regional and local level. A good example is the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, set up in 1994 in Kenya's North-eastern District. It is a multi-ethnic network of 27 governmental and non-governmental organisations representing a variety of people including businesswomen, elders and religious leaders, both Muslim and Christian. Its mandate is conflict prevention and resolution. Women play an important role. They are often better equipped than men to get meetings organised with people from all clans. They were rather instrumental in interesting local police officials in peace work. The peace group combines both traditional and modern mechanisms and conducts community training for leaders, aimed at capacity building and the creation of structures. Mediation is part of its mandate, while it also has a Rapid Response Team for conflicts, run by elders religious leaders, women and government security officials.
Muslim NGOs have felt the fullest weight of government censure. The ban on five Muslim NGOs following the bomb attack on the US Embassy in August 1998, enraged the Islamic community. The NGOs vehemently denied any complicity in the attack and representatives of the community threatened to desert the KANU and join other parties. National demonstrations were organised to protest against the government's action.
At present some NGOs are still under investigation in connection with the bombing. One of these was never properly registered and consequently had been operating illegally. While it is not clear what, if any ties, these aid organisations had with the Embassy bombing, Islamic terrorist groups - including those affiliated with Osama bin Laden - have a history of using aid groups to carry out both legitimate aid work and fund terrorist operations.

International
To date there have been no conflict resolution initiatives from international sponsors, largely because Kenyan conflicts tend to be regarded as internal affairs which are relatively insignificant in comparison to conflicts in nearby countries. The fact that the elections of 1992 and 1997, although criticised by political groups inside Kenya, were judged as relatively free and honest by international monitors has also contributed to this neglect. The regime is regarded as legitimate. The government denies any involvement in the conflicts which makes it hard to identify the conflicting parties and to bring them to the negotiating table. There is no organised, armed resistance against the government. There is no acceptable alternative to President Moi.
Kenya's various conflicts have aroused little attention in the foreign media. The Rift Valley has been practically closed to foreign journalists in the belief that international intervention in domestic conflicts is directly linked to the amount of media coverage they receive. The North-Eastern Province is remote from the capital, and for unaccompanied UN-officials, other aid-workers and travellers it is a no-go area.
President Moi's consistent denial of any government involvement in the political violence, however, is becoming less and less credible. Kenya's foreign donors have supported international human rights organisations in their criticism of the Moi regime. What little public awareness exists of the conflicts in Kenya, has been generated largely by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and African Rights.
At present, government policies benefit certain ethnic groups and discriminate against others and the government does not do enough to solve conflicts. Foreign organisations have emphasised that economic reform and political democratisation are the most important means of ending corruption and improving standards of government. With the present economic crisis and Kenya's continuing dependency upon foreign financial support, the Moi government has come under increasing international pressure to submit to the demands of the international community. The IMF's decision in July 2000 to resume aid to Kenya was presented by the Government as a victory but the new (anti-corruption) conditions have also been called a humiliation for the country.
Developments in Kenya are closely linked to developments in neighbouring countries. Any deterioration or improvement of the situation in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Somalia or the Great Lake Region has an immediate impact on Kenya. Recognising this sensitivity, ActionAid has set up an information centre in Nairobi to monitor political events and conflicts in eastern and central Africa. In 1996, it organised an international conference in Nairobi on the crisis in the Great Lakes region. ActionAid supports the basic needs and rights of the poor, in particular pastoralist and squatter communities. Its projects are intended to improve pastoralist's and squatter's access to services, and it lobbies government and others to change policies and practices that affect their lives.
Several organisations which focus on conflict resolution in regions of Africa or parts of the continent, are based in Nairobi, Kenya. Although we are not aware of activities/projects specifically oriented towards the Kenyan situation, they could be useful because of their extensive networks, knowledge and experience. Among these are the Life & Peace Institute Nairobi, and the International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa.

Prospects

Ten years ago only few groups were working on peace in Kenya. That has changed. Today a much more interwoven group of organisations exists. They are committed and self-confident, and they have a clear vision. Some peace builders are willing to pay a great personal price. In 1999 three of them died in the course of their work. In 2000 an American catholic priest and human rights defender was murdered. Some peace initiatives have been successful - the end to the conflict between the Karamojong and Kenyan pastoralists, for example. In spite of this, most initiatives remain fragile insofar as they depend largely on the willingness to uphold agreements. In Kenya, as in many other African countries, the possession of small arms has shifted political and economic authority from clan elders to those who command the warriors' respect and these are not necessarily the elders.
In order to stop the spiral of violence, Kenyan Church leaders have urged Washington and London to put pressure on the government to commit itself to an all-party constitutional conference and draft a new constitution for Kenya. They have indicated - with the full support of human rights organisations - that if the constitution is not amended, Kenya might be gradually sucked into a cycle of civil strife similar to those in Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia.
According to Colin Kahl, the overlapping and intermingled group affiliations and interests in urban areas have helped Kenya avoid all-out civil war. Most directly, they have served to dampen the possibility of ethnic violence in urban areas, without which full-scale escalation is unlikely.
To date, Kenya's urban population has maintained substantial ties with and influence over kinsmen in the countryside. Consequently their strong preference for peaceful change over ethnic warfare may have helped limit the expansion of rural conflict. Yet even if this violence is kept below the level of a civil war, it will affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
In a more pessimistic scenario, the violence could escalate into civil war before the elections of 2002. The number of violent incidents, the number of victims and the amount of damage has already increased significantly. Despite the chaos Moi's position remains unchallenged and his divide-and-rule policy is still effective. There is currently no figure in the opposition or even within KANU who could be accepted as president by the majority of Kenyans. KANU is divided, and although Moi has managed to keep the two sides together, it remains to be seen whether this fragile unity will survive to the end of his term.
Most of the land is now in Kalenjin hands and the majority of the displaced people are Kikuyu. Moi looks likely to succeed in changing the Rift Valley into an exclusively KANU/ Kalenjin zone. He is likely to act on the demands of the international community for economic and political reform only with the greatest reluctance.

Recommendations

The fact that most violent confrontations in Kenya are low-intensity and are not immediately visible to outsiders, does not relieve the international community of its duty to intervene in favour of the forces of peace. There is a pressing need to find structures which facilitate a smooth transition at the end of Moi's term in office.
Most experts have stressed the need to more thoroughly and consistently address the primary problem of competition for scarce resources such as (grass)land and water. The problems of the pastoralists and their warrior-like cultures are one dimension of this competition with most governments in this region of Africa, including Kenya, tend to promote policies favouring the non-pastoral sectors of their predominantly agrarian economies at the expense of pastoral communities. Pastoralists face marginalisation and underdevelopment.
One condition for the effectiveness of continued negotiations involving local, district or national authorities and increased government presence is an effective gun control policy.
Those forces in Kenyan society which are trying to build a culture of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence in place of the current culture of division and exclusion should be recognised and encouraged. Foreign donors should seek a true partnership with these groups and respect and encourage their autonomy.
Greater recognition should be extended to the potential of women in the prevention and management of conflicts. Kenyan women could benefit greatly from the experiences of women peacemakers in other African countries, particularly in Kenya's neighbours and in South Africa.

Service Information

Newsletters and Periodicals:	Focus on the European Union and Peace-Building Efforts in the Horn of Africa (this newsletter - covering all IGAD countries, incl. Kenya) is published by Saferworld, Tel. +44 1 71 5808 886. Email: sworld@gn.apc.org;Quarterly Repression Report - Kenyan Human Rights Commission
Reports:	Institute for Security Studies: Tackling Small Arms in Eastern Africa and the Greater Horn. Pretoria, South Africa. Meeting Report, 2000; Centre for Development Research: Contestation over Political Space - The State and Demobilisation of Party Politics in Kenya, by Karuti Kanyinga. Copenhagen/Denmark. Working Paper 98.12, November 1998; Centre for Conflict Resolution: Ethnicity, Violence and Democracy - The Kenyan Experience, by Machira Appollos. Nairobi/Kenya, November 1998; Oikos: A Way out of Conflict - A Report on Reconciliation Activities in Projects of Partners of Dutch Church-related NGOs and the Dutch Government, by Greetje WitteRang. Oikos, Utrecht/the Netherlands, June 1998 (casestudy on the NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Project); Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism: Kenya - Prospects for Peace and Stability, by Simon Baynham. Conflict Studies 297. London/UK. March 1997; African Rights: Violence at the Coast - The Human Consequences of Kenya's Crumbling Political Institutions. London/UK, October 1997; National Council of Churches of Kenya: Clashes in Kenya and the Rough Road towards Democracy- Lessons and Challenges, ed. Barasa K. Nyukuri. Nairobi/Kenya. 1996 (Unpublished)
Other Publications:	Networking with a View to Promoting Peace: Conflict in the Horn of Africa: What can civil society do to bring about solidarity and cooperation in the Region, Conference Documentation, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Regional Office Horn of Africa, Addis Ababa, 1999; Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and StateSponsored Violence - The Case of Kenya, by Colin H. Kahl. In: International Security, 23(2), 1998; Conflicts in Africa - Analysis of Crisis and Prevention Measures. Dossier GRIP # 215/217. Brussels, 1997 (case-study on Kenya)
Selected Internet Sites:	http://www.africaonline.co.ke/AfricaOnline/coastwk (daily newspaper Coast Week); http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/Today/index.html (Daily Nation); http://www.africaonline.co.ke/AfricaOnline/ereview (Economic Review); http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/current/index.htm (The East African); http://www.kenyaweb.com/media/television/index.html (Kenya Television Stations) [Resource Contacts] Machira Appolos - Director Centre for Conflict Resolution, Kenya; George Wachira - Nairobi Peace Initiative, Kenya; Dekha Ibrahim Abdi - Wajir Peace and Development Committee;Sabalo Kizito - Africa Peace Forum; Tom Joseph - Director Action Aid Kenya
Organisations	Action Aid Kenya; PO Box 42814; Waiyaki Way, Nairobi;Tel. +254 2 440 444; Fax 254 2 445 843; Email: thomasj@actionaidkenya.org Action Aid Great Britain; Hamlyn House; Macdonald Rd; London N19 5PG; Tel. +44 1 71 5617 561/5617 614; Email mail@actionaid.org.uk; http://www.actionaid.org Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: NCCK Peace and Rehabilitation Project; International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa; Life and Peace Institute Nairobi; Amani People's Theatre; Centre of Conflict Resolution; Nairobi Peace Initiative; Wajir Peace and Development Committee

About the author

Jos van Beurden studied Law and Peace at the Universities of Utrecht, Amsterdam and Groningen in the Netherlands. He has studied Northeast Africa since 1977, paying regular visits to Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea since 1985. He has also visited Somalia and Djibouti. He is the author of country studies on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan for the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, and of an Ethiopia NGO Country Profile for the Dutch Co-Financing Agencies.