Author	Bram Posthumus
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Casamance is the name given to the southern part of Senegal which is separated from the rest of the country by the river and the mini-state of the Gambia. It differs in a number of respects from the rest of Senegal: it gets more rain, its landscapes - including areas of rain forest - and beaches are a major tourist attraction, while, culturally, it leans more towards the south and Guinea, rather than the north and Senegal itself. The Diola people are the majority group in Casamance, but the ethnic mix is varied. Although the Casamance region has been Islamicised like the rest of the country, there are a significant number of people who practice Christianity and/or traditional beliefs. Their egalitarian political system and rejection of any central authority has, from a government point of view, made the Diola difficult to govern.
The Casamance was a Portuguese colony until 1866, when the Portuguese gave it to the French while keeping a slice of Guinea for themselves. Diola resistance against the French was quick to emerge and as late as 1943, the French sent the traditional Diola ruler, Queen Diatta into exile.
In 1947, well before national independence, the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) was set up and immediately declared the territory independent. When Senegal became a nation state in 1960, the calls for independence continued. This occasionally resulted in violence between local protestors and the police. As far as the Casamançais were concerned, Senegalese national independence simply meant a change of the force occupying their territory: first the Portuguese, then the French, now 'immigrants' from the north of the country.
Whether real of imagined, there has been a perception that the region has been short-changed by the government in Dakar, both in terms of political under-representation and in economic underdevelopment. 'Outsiders' are perceived as dominating the economy: the area does not receive sufficient benefit from the revenues from tourism and income from fish exports it generates. These feelings, and the right to self-determination were eloquently expressed by a Catholic priest, Father Augustin Diamancoune Senghor, in a lecture given in the Dakar Chamber of Commerce in the early 1980s, entitled Message de la Reine Alinsiitowe Diatta ou hommage à la resistance Casamançaise (Message from Queen Diatta, or in praise of the Casamance resistance). Senghor was attempting to radicalise public opinion in Casamance, using a Diola cultural organisation as his vehicle, and he subsequently became the leader of the militarised MFDC.
A large demonstration in the provincial capital Ziguinchor on December 26, 1982, marked a turning point in the relationship between Senegal and Casamance. It was organised by the MFDC and started at the sacred groves near the town. According to anthropologists, sacred groves are an important institution in Diola society and the symbolism of the demonstration may be related to the fact that administrative reforms, introduced by the government at the time, ran counter to traditional structures of governance in the region. Protesters attempted to remove Senegalese flags from government buildings and replace them with their own. Police moved in and in the following days there were serious clashes between protestors and police. Tensions remained and surfaced again a year later. December 1983 began with more violent confrontations between the police and protesters and on the December 18 there was a battle between separatist demonstrators and the police, which left 25 people dead. The day came to be remembered as 'Red Sunday'. Opposition continued throughout the 1980s, characterised by, sometimes violent, demonstrations and more government repression, including, detentions, the banning of the MFDC and human rights violations.
The nature of the smouldering conflict changed radically, with the official declaration of the armed struggle for independence, issued by the MFDC in May 1990. Since then, the MFDC, a Diola-dominated rebel group, has waged a guerrilla-type struggle against the Senegalese police and security forces. Their stated aim was - and is - to achieve independence for Casamance. For the government in Dakar, this has never been an option. In the course of the 1990s, the movement split into a moderate and a radical faction; it is said to have fragmented even further in the late 1990s. Repeatedly, neighbouring countries, most notably Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea) have been dragged into the Casamance conflict by either side.

Conflict Dynamics

From the beginning of the rebellion the government adopted a hard line. Senegal's second president Abdou Diouf made it clear that he intended to deal vigorously with 'the dangers of separatism and fundamentalism of all kind', as he put it. He was following a tradition, firmly established by his predecessor Leopold Senghor, of strict nation-building which made no allowance for regionalist tendencies let alone movements or political parties of that nature. The government defines the Casamance issue in terms of 'law and order' and prefers to refer to the separatists as 'bandes armées au Sud', armed bandits in the South. It sends varying numbers of security forces to Casamance, according to the situation. These consist of army personnel, the police (Gendarmes) and Customs Services.
The Senegalese army prides itself on its high standards of professionalism and its track-record of UN peace-keeping operations, carried out in various parts of the world, including Africa. It does suffer, however, from a lack of resources and, according to Amnesty International, self-discipline in dealing with citizens. Amnesty has repeatedly accused both sides of gross human rights violations, but former president Diouf repeatedly rejected calls for investigations into human rights abuses by the security forces.
As early as June 1991, news came of a peace agreement that had been signed in Guinea-Bissau between Diouf and the MFDC on May 31, leading to the release of hundreds of Casamançais who had been held without trial for periods up to months. But the ensuing negotiations in a peace commission, set up to bring violence to an end faltered, because the government was not prepared to discuss independence for Casamance and the MFDC was not prepared to give up that idea. The commission could not engineer a breakthrough. This pattern was to repeat itself: violence - calls for peace - cease-fire - talks - impasse - renewed violence.
In September 1992, reports started coming in of fresh clashes between the two sides, leaving dozens of guerrilla fighters, civilians and military personnel dead. Particularly bloody was an MFDC attack on Cap Skiring, a major tourist resort, where they killed 31 people. As of September 1992, the whole region had been sealed-off by security forces. Even the Red Cross was refused entry. Refugees left in their thousands, including MFDC leader, Father Diamacoune Senghor.
An important reason for the upsurge in violence lies in a split within the MFDC which occurred in August 1992. There were now a north front, led by Sidy Badji, and the south front, led by Senghor. Both wanted independence, both alternated between the negotiating table and the battle field. There were deep differences in opinion in terms of strategy - the political option favoured by the south versus the military option of the north. An additional explanation is that the north front feared Diola domination of the entire movement and decided to go its own way. The north front collapsed the same year but did not entirely disappear.
Fighting continued in 1993, despite calls for peace from Senghor, and violence was particularly heavy around the February presidential elections. After more than 250 people had been killed between February and July, another cease-fire was worked out. It came into force on July 8, 1993 and was signed by Senghor, now back in Senegal, and Madieng Khary Dieng, the minister of the armed forces of Senegal. Under its terms, the government and MFDC agreed to have an independent academic, French historian Jack Charpy, investigate the origins of the status of Casamance. He finished his work in November and confirmed that the region was Senegalese, a conclusion that was immediately rejected by the separatists.
By early 1995, it was quite clear that the cease-fire was moribund. In April, troops were ordered into Casamance, to search for four missing French tourists. They were never found but it provided the army with a pretext to launch a major cleanup operation in the border area with Guinea-Bissau. Senghor was placed under house-arrest on April 21, 1995. Other leaders were arrested too. In June, the MFDC annulled the cease-fire.
Serious clashes punctuated the year, but the creation, by the government, of the Commission Nationale pour la Paix en Casamance, in September 1995, combined with repeated calls for a cease-fire by Senghor led to new talks and the easing of tensions. The government even allowed consultation between MFDC personnel in Senegal and their office in France, in 1997.
However later in the same year, tensions began to inexplicably rise again. In January 1998 the ageing Senghor (he turned seventy that year) made one of his numerous appeals for peace which again fell on deaf ears. His influence was reported to have waned in the movement, which appeared to be further splintering into gangs of armed bandits, thus vindicating the government's original description of the rebels as bandes armées au Sud. But he still carried great symbolical value: his release remained an important MFDC condition for talks with the government. Meanwhile, tourism went into decline, deforestation became noticeable. According to Le Monde Diplomatique (October 1998) the ecological and economic collapse of the Casamance is only a matter of time. The various factions have reportedly resorted to deriving their income from extracting food from the villagers and the cultivation of cannabis for which there is a large market in Dakar, the Senegalese capital, and beyond.
Amnesty International contends that because both sides realise they cannot win the war militarily, they take it out on the civilian population, which has been subjected to arbitrary detention, murder, rape, extortion and intimidation from both sides. 1998 saw a rapid worsening of their plight with the rise in violent armed robberies, the introduction, by rebels, of landmines into the conflict and the Senegalese intervention in the civil war in Guinea-Bissau. Tens of thousands of Bissau Guineans and Casamançais found themselves trapped between two vicious conflicts.
From January 1999 onwards, two contradictory developments have taken place. First, there was a meeting between Senghor and Diouf, in which both men pledged to end the fighting and seek dialogue. But two months later, serious violence broke out once more, in which the authorities are said to have killed 22 rebels. One month later, fifteen rebels, four civilians and two soldiers died in clashes and a rocket attack on a house in Ziguinchor. The MFDC strongly condemned the rebel attacks on both the army and civilians, blaming it on 'uncontrolled elements'. Local traders quoted by the French news agency AFP said that the origins of the attack lay in the lucrative cashew nut harvest: whoever controls that trade has a secure income. The fighting coincided with talks in Banjul, the Gambian capital, among various rebel factions, principally the ones led by Senghor and Badji, aimed at arriving a common position during peace talks with the government, which had been brokered by the Gambian president Jammeh and the prime minister of Guinea-Bissau. In June 1999, the Senegalese government relocated a battle-hardened unit into the region, to flush out what it continued to call 'the bandits'. In spite of the increased military activity, the final declaration of the rebel movement, issued June 25 at the end of their Banjul meeting, was remarkable in that the demand for full independence was absent from the text. Senghor, who read the declaration, was confirmed as head of the rebels. The government expressed satisfaction with the fact that the rebels were speaking with one voice and were willing to negotiate.
The ambiguity has continued, in spite of the presidential change of the guard on March 19, 2000. While the presidential campaigns were going on with the main parts played by the incumbent Abdou Diouf and his long-standing rival Abdulaye Wade, peace talks were still going on in Banjul between an MFDC that was still insisting on independence (but late February 2000 appeared prepared to settle for special status for the time being) and a government which again declared that independence was 'not negotiable'. During his campaign, Wade had promised to end the conflict but on taking office the situation began once again to deteriorate rapidly and in spite of his announcement on May 1, 2000, that he would re-start the dialogue, the spate of deadly incidents has continued.

Regional dimension
The regional dimension has always been present in the Casamance conflict. The start of the armed rebellion coincided with the aftermath of the April 1989 massacres of an estimated 2,000 Senegalese in Mauritania and the massive tit-for-tat expulsions between the two countries. International agencies attempted to help with the resettlement of tens of thousands of refugees and deportees. The seeds of this tension had been sown in 1987 when African Mauritanians staged a failed coup against the country's Arab rulers. This occasion marked the birth of an organisation called the Forces of Liberation of the Africans in Mauritania (FLAM), which went on to operate from Senegalese soil (some 60,000 Mauritanian refugees remain in Senegal).
Not surprisingly then, the Senegalese government and the press were quick to suspect a Mauritanian hand behind the outbreak of open hostilities in its troubled southern province. It gave the conflict a regional dimension which from time to time came back to claim centre stage, with accusations levelled against Mauritania, the Gambia - both countries allegedly transship Libyan arms to the MFDC - and military action in Guinea-Bissau. Relations with this last neighbour were tense at first, during a very uneasy period after Guinea-Bissau's independence (1975) under a strict Marxist government which Senegal had actively opposed. However, after a brief conflict over oil resources in 1989 which was amicably settled and the softening of Bissau's Marxist position, there have been improvements in Bissau Guinean-Senegalese relations, resulting in close military co-operation against the MFDC as of 1995. Even before that time, Senegalese planes were bombing the São Domingos region inside Guinea-Bissau in December 1992, claiming it was destroying rebel bases there. The Senegalese had sufficient ground for their claim: because of cultural and kinship ties, the MFDC insurgents were able to operate from northern Guinea Bissau, although it is not entirely clear whether this has been the case from the very beginning of the conflict. Following Wade's election as new president, the situation sharply deteriorated, as it had done in the Casamance itself. Senegalese warplanes once again bombed villages inside Guinea-Bissau . Later this was followed by a rather lame apology on the part of the Dakar authorities: they had made a mistake. Fortunately, there has been a great reduction in tension since. The new president of Guinea-Bissau, Kumba Yala, visited Senegal in August and offered his country's role as mediator between the rebels and the Senegalese government. Wade and Yala also agreed on joint border patrols to prevent illegal cross-border military traffic and smuggling.
In fact, the direct cause for civil war in Guinea-Bissau had its roots in Casamance. The government of President Joao Bernardo Vieira, which had a standing agreement with Senegal not to support the rebels, accused the military of aiding the MFDC. This accusation was answered by counter-accusations and a military uprising. On the basis of a secret mutual assistance agreement, Senegal intervened within a day to combat the rebellious army and rout the rebels from their suspected bases in Guinea-Bissau. The rebels quickly aligned themselves with the mutinous military of Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of General Ansumane Mané, which made sweeping gains in the countryside and ousted Vieira from power. Elections in January 2000 brought Kumba Yala to power, ending a long period of uncertainty.

Official Conflict Management

Although the United Nations has not been directly involved in managing the conflict, it is dealing with a closely related issue: the extreme proliferation of small arms in the region. In 1993, it set up an Advisory Mission on arms proliferation, at the request of President Konaré of Mali. The mission reported its findings to the Secretary-General in 1996. It identified a variety of causes for the unfettered flow of arms, including political instability, poverty, unemployment, ethnic and religious differences and the spill-over of intra-state conflicts into other states. This was said to apply to most of the states visited during the mission, including Senegal.
There have been various intergovernmental meetings in the West African region, in which means of curbing the flow of arms were discussed. A conference on the subject held in Banjul in 1994 even produced an accord on the matter. It is unclear whether any tangible action has been undertaken to implement this accord.
Individual governments have tried to mediate, most notably Guinea-Bissau, which resulted in the signing of the 1991 peace accord and acted as a guarantor. It also mediated in the establishment of the Peace Commission in 1992 and was involved in the preparations for the short-lived 1993 peace accord, which the Bissau Guinean Minister of Defence, Lamine Mane, also signed. Guinea-Bissau hosts 24,000 refugees from Casamance. In 2000, the new president has again offered his good offices.
In 1998, the Gambian president Jammeh declared himself willing to mediate. Although a Diola himself, the Gambian leader has remained neutral in the conflict, despite occasional accusations in the Senegalese press.
France also offered to mediate, in 1997. This was announced by prime minister Lionel Jospin when he visited Senegal, who stressed his role was mediation, not interference. The French ambassador was successful in facilitating the meeting between MFDC cadres in Casamance and the foreign representatives of the organisation, in France itself.
The Senegalese government has been a partner in the various peace negotiations but has always balked at even beginning to discuss the fundamental demands of independence. Nevertheless, some attempts at increasing Casamance incorporation in the national political process have been undertaken. Following the 1982-83 disturbances, some Casamançais were appointed as ministers and proposals for administrative reform were floated. While attempting to address some of the concerns among the Casamançais, the moves have also carried the element of isolating and de-legitimising the separatists of the MDFC. (For its part, the MDFC has pronounced Casamançais officials in the central government as traitors to the cause.) From its responses to outside allegations of human rights abuses, it remains clear that as far as the Senegalese leadership is concerned, the Casamance situation represents an unpleasant but manageable law and order problem, not a politically-motivated movement. The preference for the military option has therefore remained. Whether this road will be continued under the Wade presidency is too early to say.
On the recommendations following the UN special mission mentioned above, Senegal has put in place a National Committee on Light Weapons, which has attempted to detail the circulation of arms in and out of the country. Arms flows originate in civil war areas in the vicinity of Senegal - mainly in Liberia and Sierra Leone - and pass through the neighbouring countries into the Casamance conflict. They also fuel criminal activities in Senegal itself, most notably poaching and drugs trafficking. A few dozen weapons have been confiscated but tangible action to stem the circulation of arms has clearly not yet moved beyond the stage of preparing legislation concerning possession, importation, licensing and registration of arms, which was going on in 1996. Whether the Commission has any influence other than providing the opportunities for meetings, remains unclear.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
The MFDC has been as intransigent a partner in the peace negotiations as the Senegalese government. Most notably, the frequent calls for cease-fires by one of its most radical leaders -Senghor - have in the earlier stages of the conflict led to negotiations that were never fully concluded. There are signs, however, that his influence is diminishing, leaving the man who almost single-handedly radicalised the Casamance increasingly isolated.
There have also been reports of the local clergy getting involved in mediation, most notably the bishop of Saint-Louis, who is a Casamançais himself. According to the independent local daily, Sud Quotidien, there were meetings between Senghor and Senegalese bishops in the second half of 1997, even though the MFDC leader was still under house-arrest. Events on the ground have since superseded the Church's mediation efforts and the Senegalese government, having previously made no comments on these particular mediation efforts, denounced the bishops' activities early 1998, closing that avenue.
RADDHO (Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme), a Senegalese human rights organisation, has helped Amnesty International to compile its reports on human rights abuses in Casamance and has repeatedly asked the government to disclose the fate of people who have been arrested by the security forces and have never subsequently been seen. RADDHO forms part of the civil society body which was given observer status at the Banjul peace talks. Collectively the group is known as Groupe des Observateurs des Conflit Casamancais (Observer group of the Casamance Conflict).
There have been various popular calls for peace, starting in 1993 when the violence was at its worst. In March of that year, youth associations organised a major demonstration for peace in Ziguinchor. Two more demonstrations were held in 1995. The last, in December, was organised by the local civilian organisation, Association pour le Développement de la Casamance and ended with a huge concert in the Ziguinchor stadium in which all the big names of Senegal's show-business participated. (Senegalese superstar Youssou N'Dour has adapted the lyrics of one of his songs, to protest against the violence in Casamance.)

International
Although not involved in direct mediation, Amnesty International has made public a series of reports in which it has accused both sides in the conflict of serious human rights abuses and has asked for inquiries into these. In the course of its investigations, it did have the opportunity to discuss these matters both with president Diouf and Diamancoun Senghor, in January 1997.

Prospects

The outcome of the conflict in Casamance remains unclear. In the words of the UN Mission reports, it looks set to 'fester on', chiefly because of the hard-line stance taken by both sides, i.e. the unwillingness on the part of the government to define the conflict in any other terms than a 'law and order' problem, and the unwillingness on the side of the MDFC (or factions within it) to compromise its stance on independence. In the last years of the Diouf presidency, some windows to talks were opened yet again and the current president Wade has not indicated his intention to close them. But the situation on the ground is still marked by violence. Should peace prevail, then the regeneration of agriculture looks to be a priority, in order to diminish the region's dependence on illicit narcotics.

Recommendations

Service Information

REPORTS:	Amnesty International: Climate of Terror in Senegal. London, 1998; UN Research Institute for Social Development: Discours et réalités des politiques participatives de gestion de l'environnement: le cas du Sénégal, Genève, 1998; UN Advisory Mission on Arms Proliferation: Sahara-Sahel Advisory Mission report. New York, 1996.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Comprendre la Casamance: chronique d'une intégration contrastée, by Barbier-Wiesser, François George (ed.). Paris, 1994 (comprehensive set of essays concerning the conflict); Casamance et Sénégal au temps de la colonisation française, by Jacques Charpy; Intrastate Conflict and Options for Policy, by Pyt Douma, Georg Frerks, Luc vd Goor. Seminar document, Clingendael, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1998; Causes of the Casamance rebellion in Senegal, by Ferdinand de Jong. In: West Africa Regional Report, Clingendael, The Hague, The Netherlands (forthcoming); MFDC: Casamance - pays de refus. Réponse à Monsieur Jacques Charpy. Ziguinchor, 1995.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.lesoleil.sn (Le Soleil - government newspaper); http://www.ucad.sn/websen.html (excellent entry point to information pertaining to Senegal).
ORGANISATIONS:	Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO), tel. +221 8246 056, fax +221 8246 052, email raddho@telecomplus.sn. Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Amnesty International.

About the author

Bram Posthumus has worked as a freelance journalist since 1990. Before that he was a teacher of English language and literature in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. His work in journalism concentrates mainly on West and southern Africa and on the themes of conflict and post-conflict situations and migration. He has travelled extensively in both regions, visiting among others Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Zambia and Guinea, with Mali, Senegal and Chad planned for the near future. He publishes in a variety of international magazines (African Business, New African, EU-ACP Courier) and other monthlies and weeklies in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and South Africa.