Author	Judith Burdin Asuni
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

Nigeria has a population of about 120 million people, making it the largest country in black Africa. It also has approximately 350 different ethnic groups, although the Yoruba in the south-west, Igbo in the south-east and Hausa/Fulani in the north dominate the national scene. The Middle Belt, which runs west to east between the core north and the south contains numerous small ethnic groups. It has been marginalised politically and economically. Few people in other parts of the country even know where Taraba State and Wukari are located. Wukari is not of strategic importance to any government, hence the neglect which it has suffered.
Anthropologists tell us that in the past there was great movement of people around Africa. Indeed the Jukun, who are probably the older settlers in Wukari, state that they came from Yemen, along with the Kanuri, who settled in the Chad Basin. The Jukun established the far-flung Kwararafa Kingdom, which reached its peak in the seventeenth century. The Jukun state that they lived peacefully with their neighbours until the Tiv migrated from Cameroon into the Benue Valley in the eighteenth century. The Tiv and Jukun appear to have coexisted peacefully in pre-colonial times for several reasons: the Aku Uka (the Jukun king) was the only paramount ruler, whom everyone respected; there was plenty of land; the Tiv were mainly rural farmers who did not interfere with Jukun administration; and there were no party politics.
However, things began to change in the early twentieth century, as the Tiv continued to expand in population and the farmlands became more densely occupied. By the 1940s the Tiv were not only the largest ethnic group in the Middle Belt, but also three times more numerous than the Jukun in the Wukari Division, which the Jukun considered as their home. The British colonialists were worried about the influx of Tiv farmers into what they considered Jukun territory and tried to curtail it. An example is the establishment of the Wukari Federation Local Council, which included all the other main ethnic groups, but excluded the Tiv as they were considered immigrants.
The agitation for inclusion by the Tiv started in the 1940s and remains a source of conflict between the Jukun and the Tiv to this day. Nearly all of the Tiv and a section of the Jukun trace the conflict back to the introduction of party politics in Nigeria. In various elections since 1954, the Jukun and the Tiv have been in different political parties. Violent clashes, such as the Tiv riots of 1959-60, the 1964 'head breaking' during the First Republic and the Second Republic fights of 1979-83, ceased during the military periods of 1966-79 and 1983-87. Trouble resurfaced with the local government elections of 1987 when the Tiv gained powerful positions at the local and state levels. This of course made the Jukun uncomfortable. After the fracas of 1990-92 in which most Tiv were chased out of Wukari, elections held in 1996 and 1997 were peaceful primarily because the Tiv were not there to voice dissent. However deep fears of political marginalisation remain a major cause of the Tiv-Jukun conflict.
The political dimensions of the conflict are two-fold: traditional and modern. The former concerned control of the local government council and political appointments and other resources. The latter centred around the Jukun's refusal to include any Tiv person on the Wukari Traditional Council, where decisions are made that affect them.
Land is another issue which is frequently named as a cause of the conflict. However, while land is frequently mentioned, it is in reality only a vent for political and other forms of conflict. Although it is often said that the Tiv are encroaching on the farmlands owned by the Jukun, it turned out that the real issue is that the Tiv do not follow the traditional laws of land administration, which require them to obtain permission from the village head, ward head, district head and paramount ruler before starting to farm on a piece of land. Instead the Tiv would not accept that they are settlers and did not recognise the Jukun as the original indigenes. Thus land is not only a pragmatic need but also a symbol of prestige.
Another factor in the conflict is the high population growth of the Tiv, which creates a need for more and more farmland. The Tiv also often invite relatives from neighbouring Benue State, which increases the demand for land, as well as the numerical strength of the Tiv. The Jukun feel that their culture, of which they are extremely proud, is being undermined by this influx of Tiv and have embarked upon a 'rejukunisation' process.
These various causes led to an extremely violent confrontation between the Tiv and the Jukun in 1990-92. No one, including the government or the groups involved, can give exact figures of casualties. However there was massive burning of houses, business premises, and schools, accompanied by looting of property. The methods of killing people were extremely brutal and included beheading, setting victims ablaze, the killing of pregnant women and children. The government has failed to assist the victims in rebuilding their property and eight years later, the destruction is still visible.

Conflict Dynamics

When Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW) began working on the Tiv-Jukun conflict in 1997, the two groups were clearly separated, both physically and psychologically. Most of the Tiv had been chased out of Wukari; indeed few Tiv felt comfortable about even spending the night in the town. At AAPW's workshop for Wukari elders in January 1998, the Tiv elders refused to stay together in the hotel, as they believed they would be an easy target for attack. The Jukun were fairly happy with the situation, as they now had undisputed control of both traditional and modern political power. However the economy was sluggish, as the Jukun had fewer customers for their wares as well as limited sources of food, which had previously been supplied by Tiv farmers.
In 1997, many Jukun were reluctant to follow a peace process, as they did not want the Tiv to return to Wukari and re-establish their numerical strength. The Jukun were also reluctant to negotiate a peace, as they felt that the government had betrayed them in previous negotiations and would allow high-ranking Tiv military officers to manipulate government decisions in their favour. Many Tiv had been displaced from the lands on which they had lived for decades or even centuries, and had no place to go. The Jukun had vowed not to let themselves be encircled by Tiv farmlands, as was the case in the pre-1990 era. Therefore the Tiv were forced to camp in distant, undesirable areas. Their schools, churches and health facilities had also remained closed since 1990. There was a graveyard peace. The military had stopped the fighting, but underlying issues had not been addressed. Most residents knew little about conflict management and felt that only the government could find solutions to the conflict. Each side felt that the other side was extremely stubborn and difficult, and felt that the people themselves could never sort out their own problems.
In the past two years, things have improved considerably. Some of the Tiv have moved back into Wukari town, tension has reduced, and parties on both sides have resumed interaction. Of course there are still hard-liners who would like to derail the peace process, but there is now a Wukari Peace Committee which tries to prevent future outbreaks of conflict.

Official Conflict Management

The Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari was the most violent dispute since the Nigerian Civil War, yet there was no international intervention and virtually nothing was done by the government, apart from using state power and force to stop the violence, without addressing the underlying issues, according to the traditional authoritarian model. Steps taken up to 1997 included:

1. A peace committee set up by the Wukari Local Government Council in 1990, which consisted of half Jukun and half Tiv. The members attempted to calm the situation but these efforts ended after a renewal of violence connected with the 1991 elections.
   
2. The Gongola State Government (Gongola was later divided into Taraba and Adamawa States) promised to set up a commission of inquiry, but nothing was done. Such commissions are often established, submit a report to government and nothing further is heard.
   
3. The sultan of Sokoto and other top traditional rulers visited the area and appealed for calm. This helped to stop the violence but did not address the underlying issues
   
4. The two civilian governors of Benue and Taraba States in the Third Republic reported the conflict to the presidency. Top Jukun and Tiv leaders were called to Lagos, where they met with the vice-president and discussed some of the issues. However the effort was not sustained and no resolution was reached.
   
5. The Taraba State house of assembly set up an ad-hoc committee to look into the conflict. However, a coup soon ended the government and the investigation died there.
   
6. The police, then the mobile police and finally the army were called in and brought the fighting to a halt. However the army remained in Wukari long after the end of the fighting and only served to exacerbate the problem by demanding bribes from the local citizens.

Multi Track Diplomacy

According to reports from local citizens, Academic Associates PeaceWorks is the only NGO to have made an intervention in Wukari. AAPW has been working there for the past two years, using a multi-prong approach which includes:

1. Peace education in secondary schools. This training was conducted in June 1997 and involved teachers, principals and students from fifteen schools in Wukari and neighbouring areas. Peace education is a constructive, non-controversial way of entering the community, gaining cooperation and getting people to start thinking about the possibility of peace.
   
2. Case study of the Jukun-Tiv conflict. This was conducted in July-August 1997 by a team from AAPW which included a neutral team leader, one Tiv scholar and one Jukun scholar. By using this team make-up AAPW was able to gain good cooperation from both parties and neutral members of the community. The case study was thoroughly analysed in September by a group of AAPW staff and members of the Corps of Mediators to determine the issues and possible points of entry .
   
3. The National Corps of Mediators, established in 1997 by AAPW, is a group of senior and very respected persons from all parts of Nigeria, who were trained in conflict management and mediation in particular. Two members were selected to work on the Wukari conflict: chief Ason Bur, a Tiv from Benue State who is a former deputy governor and federal director general, and George Maiangwa, a Chamba (a group aligned with the Jukun) from neighbouring Takum who is an education specialist and former chairman of Takum local government. These two gentlemen made extensive conciliation and shuttle mediation efforts. At first each worked with his own ethnic group and later they worked together. They continue to monitor any budding conflicts in Wukari and support the local peace committee in dealing with these issues.
   
4. Conflict Management and Leadership Workshop for youth leaders. From the case study and activities of the two mediators, AAPW identified the 'soldiers' from the conflict and brought them together in the neutral town of Jos, for a leadership workshop. After initial aggressive stances, members of the two sides remembered their boyhood ties and by the end of the three-day workshop, had sat down together to learn conflict management skills and analyse and find solutions to their own problems. Two youth leaders, one from each side, practiced mediation skills, using the Wukari conflict. They set up a Wukari Reconciliation Forum, which they implemented upon their return home.
   
5. Conflict Management Workshop for Elders. The next activity was a similar workshop for Tiv and Jukun elders, which was held in Wukari in January 1998. It had been scheduled for December, but had to be postponed due to interference by elites living outside Wukari who wanted to be present. By the end of the January workshop, the elders themselves had identified that the two groups had different and non-conflicting need and fears. The Tiv had pragmatic needs of land to farm, schools and health facilities reopened, certificates of indigenisation and inclusion in the modern political process. The Jukun on the other hand, had fears of loss of respect for their culture and authority. The group concluded that the problem could be reduced by the Tiv acknowledging and respecting the traditional Jukun authority, while the Jukun cooperate in reopening Tiv facilities and access to farmland.
   
6. Local peace efforts. After the AAPW workshops, the people formed the Wukari Peace Committee, which consisted of youths and elders from both the Jukun and Tiv. The youths were active and enthusiastic, while the elders were sluggish at first, perhaps due to a few but powerful sceptics among them.
   
7. Further Conciliation Efforts. Although the elders reached an agreement at the end of the workshop, certain issues which had not featured prominently in the sessions were later identified and discussed by the mediators and AAPW staff. The most important of these issues concerned a dispute over a piece of land, in which a rich Tiv farmer had taken the Jukun king to court (an abomination in itself), and to make matters worse, had won the case. It was agreed that this matter was capable of aborting the whole peace process. As a follow-up conciliation effort, chief Ason Bur visited the Tiv farmer and others, seeking a possible solution.
   
8. Follow-up Visits to Wukari. AAPW staff have made repeated visits to Wukari, to inject more life into the peace process and address issues that need attention. A visit in June 1998 resulted in progress finally being made on the issue of the farmer and the king.
   
9. Efforts of the Wukari Peace Committee. After the AAPW visit in June 1998, the peace committee finally took action on the issue of the king's land. Between June and September 1998, two members of the committee made frequent visits to the parties in the dispute. They were the chairman, who is a senior Jukun retired civil servant, and the secretary, a Tiv youth leader who happens to come from the community in dispute. These two met with other Tiv village heads from surrounding villages, who put pressure on the wealthy farmer to drop the court case and give the land back to the king, thereby making it possible for the king to in turn give the Tiv what they wanted. This was a face-saving solution for both the king and the farmer.
   
10. Further Conciliation Efforts. In early 1999, more analysis of the peace process and visits to Wukari and the Jukun king were made. It was discovered that in spite of settlement of the land issue, the Jukun had not yet reopened the Tiv schools and health facilities, nor had many Tiv been given the promised indigenisation certificates. Visits were made to key leaders, to ensure that the peace process continued successfully.

The methods used in this intervention include fact-finding, facilitation, consensus-building, use of good offices and informal contacts to facilitate communication among parties, conciliation, negotiation and mediation. It is our hope that the Wukari conflict can be not only managed but also transformed. In the process of finding a win-win solution, both sides have become aware of the conditions from which the conflict has arisen and now know what must be changed in order to prevent violence from reoccurring. Many of the youths and elders have also gone through a cathartic exercise, which has allowed them to go beyond their own resentments and anger, to a point of being able to work together to build a future peace for Wukari.
The Wukari Intervention by Academic Associates PeaceWorks can be considered successful in that it has not only dealt with some of the underlying causes of the Tiv-Jukun problem, but also empowered local citizens with skills of conflict analysis and management which will help them deal with other problems as they arise. The peace process will rely mainly on local action, with support from AAPW only when necessary. Five representatives from Wukari are members of the national Peace Support Network, which was formed in February 1999, bringing together people from six communities which have experienced violent conflict but where some degree of peace has been established. These representatives sat down and drew up an action plan for furthering the peace process in Wukari, reflecting our belief that peace is long-lasting only when the people themselves own the process.
An interesting side-effect of this intervention is that some of the people trained in Wukari have been active in helping to solve the conflict in Takum, a town an hour's drive from Wukari, where fighting between the Chamba/Jukun and Kuteb ethnic groups resulted in US$100 million destruction. It is important that, in the absence of positive government or international intervention, members of the civil society can take the initiative in managing conflicts which affect them. Indeed in the past the government has been an active party in creating community conflicts, often as part of a divide and rule strategy. While there was no government interference in Wukari, our peace activities in nearby Takum have been terminated twice by government, seemingly because some highly placed people do not want to change the status quo. At this point, the people themselves must determine what is their goal and not let anyone or anything divert them from it.

Prospects

As stated earlier, there has been tension between the Tiv and Jukun for a hundred years. It is unrealistic to expect the tension to completely disappear within a few years. However, a start has been made in helping the two groups to understand the others' positions, interests and needs. Efforts have also been made to turn it from a win-lose confrontation into a win-win story. These efforts will have to be continued and supported by the Wukari people themselves.

Recommendations

Based on the experience of the Wukari intervention, several actions can be recommended:

1. Use a multi-pronged approach, which incorporates many sectors of the community in the peace process.
   
2. Gain the cooperation and support of the top people, be they traditional rulers, elites, religious leaders, or government officials if possible.
   
3. Use the right person or group: neutral outsiders as mediators, insiders from the right ethnic group or religion or age category who can gain entry and accurate information.
   
4. Anticipate the role of spoilers. Decide whether to include them in the peace process or purposefully marginalise them.
5. Be flexible, in time schedules and budgets. The peace process seldom follows a tight timetable.
   
6. Continuously monitor and support the peace process, to prevent backsliding.

Miscellaneous

Adda, Samuel For Posterity: The Roles of Governor Nyame, Others and Myself in the Tiv-Jukun Conflict. Jos: Target Publicity, 1993
Adi, Atohinko Jukun-Tiv Communal Clashes: A Reconsideration, Adi Atohinko, Wukari, 1993
Atoshi, Grace The Story of the Jukun-Tiv Crisis: Why and How They Happened, Amune Printing Press, 1992
Best, Shedrack Gaya, Alamveabee Efhiaim Idyorough, and Zainab Bayero Shehu, in: Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation. Ed. Onigu Otite and Isaac Olawale Albert, Academic Associates PeaceWorks, Ibadan, Spectrum Press, 1999
Dent, M. A Minority Party: The United Middle Belt Congress. In J.P. Mackintosh (ed.), Nigerian Government and Politics, London, Allen and Unwin, 1992
Hogben, S.J. and Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. The Emirates of Northern Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press, 1996
Takaya, Bala and Tyoden, Sonny (eds.) The Kaduna Mafia: The Rise and Consolidation of a Nigerian Power Elite', Jos, Jos University Press, 1987

Service Information

REPORTS:	Amnesty International: Nigeria - Release of Political Prisoners. March 1999; Human Rights Watch: Nigeria - Crackdown in the Niger Delta. June 1999; The Price of Oil - Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Niger Delta. Febr. 1999; Transition or travesty - Nigeria's Endless Process of Return to Civilian Rule. October 1997.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Stabilizing Nigeria - Sanctions, Incentives, and the Support for Civil Society, by Peter M. Lewis, Pearl T. Robinson, and Barnett R. Rubin. Center for Preventive Action, New York, 1998.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.ndirect.co.uk/~n.today/mirror.htm (weekly newspaper Abuja Mirror); http://www.kilima.com/mediamonitor/ (weekly publication Nigeria Media Monitor, edited by the Independent Journalism Centre in Lagos); http://www.postexpresswired.com/ (daily newspaper The Post Express); http://www.ndirect.co.uk/~n.today/today.htm (weekly newapper Today); http://tribeca.ios.com/~n123/nigerldr (Federal Republic); http://www.FreeNigeria.org (Free Nigeria Movement, grassroots based global mass movement); http://www.igc.org/kind/fon5.htm (Friends of Nigeria); http://www.nigeria.net/nigeria.nsf (General news and information); http://www.odili.net/nigeria.html (NigeriaWeb); http://www.cldc.howard.edu/~ndmorg/ndmpage.html (Nigerian Democratic Movement).
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Judith Burdin Asuni - director Academic Associates PeaceWorks;Barnett R. Rubin - Director Center for Preventive Action. Email BRubin@cfr.org.
ORGANISATIONS:	Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 13 Agudama Avenue, D-line, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria;E-mail: disera@infoweb.abs.net. Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Academic Associates PeaceWorks (AAPW); International Women Communication Centre (IWCC); Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace Advocacy (CCRPA); Committee for the Protection of Peoples Dignity (COPPED).

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