Author	Mohammed Haneef Atmar & Jonathan Goodhand
Publication	Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia
Year	2002

Summary

Before the events of 11 September 2001, Afghanistan was one of the world's "orphaned" conflicts in terms of the priorities of the international community. The overriding response since the end of the Cold War had been one of strategic withdrawal or containment. After more than twenty years of fighting, up to 1.5 million deaths, mass displacement, and the breakdown of the institutions of the state and civil society, Afghanistan appeared to be stuck in a no-exit cycle of chronic political instability. However the military and political landscape has changed dramatically following the U.S.-led military intervention and renewed diplomatic engagement. This has led to the fall of the Taliban, the signing of the "Provisional Arrangements" in Bonn, Germany, on 5 December 2001, and the promise of a major reconstruction package for Afghanistan. While some of the immediate objectives of the "war on terrorism" have been achieved, it is clear that the longer-term challenge yet to be addressed is "winning the peace." This can only be secured through robust and sustained international action at a regional level.

Present-day Afghanistan originated when the great powers drew its borders to create a buffer between the British and Russian empires. Its identity reflected the relations of force and strategic needs of the imperial powers rather than the political or social structures within its borders.² The weak centralized Afghan state that developed in the first half of the twentieth century was dependent on external resources. Its power was circumscribed by the traditionalist power structures in rural areas; indeed, conflict between rural and urban elites is a recurring feature of Afghan history. The contradictions inherent in the process of state formation produced a growing radicalism, which by the early 1970s had resulted in the emergence of the socialist and Islamist movements. These became the contending forces in the Afghan conflict.
Of the leftist groups emerging in the 1970s, the Soviet-supported People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became preeminent. In April 1978 the PDPA came to power through a coup (the Saur Revolution) and initiated a reform program. This drew violent resistance from the Islamists and the population of the countryside and mujahedeen groups set up training camps in Pakistan. In September 1979 a second coup took place as opposing groups within the PDPA (the Khalq and Parcham factions) fought for power. Growing revolt and increased instability led to the Soviet invasion in December 1979.
The Afghan war can be viewed as having five main periods since 1979.³

1. 1979–1988: Jihad in a Cold War context. The Afghan rural resistance fights the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. The Sunni resistance parties receive military and financial support from Pakistan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia. More than 5 million Afghans become refugees in Iran and Pakistan. The Geneva agreements of 1988 pave the way for the Soviet withdrawal. An interim government, composed of the Sunni parties and excluding the Shia parties, is set up under the aegis of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
   
2. 1989–1992: Jihad among Afghans. After the Soviet withdrawal an internal war between the Soviet-supported government of President Najibullah and the various Afghan factions ensues with continued support from Russia and the United States. However, the collapse of the USSR and the ending of U.S. aid alters the balance of power. The Najibullah regime collapses when Dostam and his Uzbek militia switch allegiance from the Kabul regime to the mujahedeen, who enter the capital.
   
3. 1993–1996: Factional war among Afghans. The mujahedeen government is fractured by internal power battles and shifting alliances among the major party leaders. As superpower influence declines, regional power interests reassert themselves and the conflict assumes the characteristics of both a regional proxy war and a civil war. In late 1994 the Taliban emerge, with a stated objective of restoring stability. In September 1996 they take Kabul.
   
4. 1996–2001: Talibanization. Fighting continues between the primarily Pashtun Taliban, backed by Pakistan, and the primarily non-Pashtun United Front⁴ (UF), backed by Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and India. The Taliban control roughly 90 percent of the territory, and the UF occupy the remaining pockets of land. Both sides have access to external aid and international markets, and continue to pursue their objectives through military means.
   The presence of radical Islamic groups in Taliban-controlled territory (and in neighboring countries) including Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaida network and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) adds an additional layer of complexity to international involvement in Afghanistan. Increased concern from both the United States and Russian about bin Laden's support for international terrorist activities contributes to the imposition in 1999 of international sanctions. More stringent sanctions are subsequently introduced in 2000.⁵
   
5. 2001–present: Post-Taliban? On 9 September 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a leading military commander of the UF is assassinated by suicide bombers in northeastern Afghanistan. Attacks two days later on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, allegedly by Al-Qaida, focus world attention on Afghanistan. A U.S.-led coalition simultaneously applies diplomatic pressure on Pakistan and the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, while preparing for military strikes. The Afghan-Pakistan border is closed and the coalition presses Pakistan to cut financial and military support for the Taliban. Military strikes begin on 7 October with the twin objectives of destroying Al-Qaida's networks and undermining the Taliban's military capability. Shortly afterwards, Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf reshuffles his military command with the aim of marginalizing Islamist generals.⁶
   On 9 November, Mazar-i-Sharrif falls to the United Front, quickly followed by Kabul, the capital, and the main provincial cities. The Taliban heartland of Kandahar falls in early December, marking the military and political defeat of the Taliban. The security situation, however, remains fluid and uncertain. At the time of this writing Osama bin Laden, many of his foreign fighters, and the Taliban leadership including the leader Mullah Omar have not been captured. Warlords from the pre-Taliban years have reemerged and established themselves as de facto power holders in many areas. Tensions between Pakistan and India have increased following an attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December by radical Islamic groups thought to have bases in Pakistan. Furthermore, there is uncertainty over whether the "war on terrorism" will be extended to other "rogue states" such as Iraq and Somalia. In addition to the security and political crisis there is a profound humanitarian crisis. The World Food Program has estimated that between 5 and 7 million people are in danger of starvation during the winter months of 2001–2002. This crisis is due to a combination of factors, including a three-year-old drought and internal displacement as a result of military activity, which has in turn prevented effective aid delivery.
   On the positive side, following talks in Bonn, an Interim Authority, led by Hamed Karzai, has assumed power. This will be in place until mid-2002, when a loya jirga (grand council) will determine composition of a Transitional Authority, which will hold power until elections take place within two years. Discussions are also taking place, led by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, with the aim of developing a long-term reconstruction plan for Afghanistan.

Conflict Dynamics

The Afghan conflict been constantly evolving over time. It is not currently clear whether this latest phase represents the beginning of a transition from war to peace or a return to the warlordism and chronic instability of the early 1990s. While there may be some room for cautious optimism, it is important to note that the Afghan war did not start with the Taliban, nor is it likely to finish simply by removing them. Stopping the fighting and securing a peace agreement are essential starting points, but peacebuilding must involve tackling the underlying causes and dynamics of the Afghan conflict. In the following section we examine conflict dynamics at the global/regional, national, and local levels.

The Global/Regional Level
Afghanistan is part of a multilayered and interdependent regional conflict system, characterized by great volatility and constantly shifting alliances that have a ripple effect on the whole system.⁸ Conflicts and civil unrest in Kashmir, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are all, in various ways, part of this regional conflict formation.⁹
There are multiple state and nonstate interests in Afghanistan. In recent times the interests of the United States and Russia have converged around the issues of drugs, antiterrorism, and regional stability. Pakistan had provided support to the Taliban in the belief that a stable and pliant regime in Afghanistan would give Pakistan "strategic depth" in its confrontation with India over Kashmir,¹⁰ and also facilitate the opening up of land routes (and potentially oil pipelines) to Central Asia. To counter the influence of Pakistan and the Taliban, a Russia-Iran-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-India axis has developed, with Russia and Iran in particular providing significant military and financial support to the United Front.¹¹
The states in the region compete with nonstate entities such as religious networks, long-distance trading leagues (contraband and otherwise), transborder diasporas or military groups, rogue agencies, and local solidarity networks of various types.¹² Afghanistan has become both a "safe haven" and a "training field" for Islamic groups connected to transnational networks. A "dynamic of jihad" drives a wider process of "Talibanization" within the region¹³—perhaps most dangerously in Pakistan where the government (in particular the military) have been tolerant of, if not actively supportive of, proto-Taliban forces.¹⁴ This dynamic of jihad could well persist or even accelerate with the defeat of the Taliban.
This regional conflict system had proved relatively impervious to external attempts to bring peace. The international community has had only limited influence on the competing state and nonstate entities.¹⁵ It has also been argued that the West lacked the necessary political resolve to address the underlying causes of the conflict. International policy from 1992 focused more on containment than resolution, and humanitarian aid became a substitute for state-led political action. There has clearly been a shift in recent months toward reengagement. However, the region-wide, interconnected security problems remain. The clear lesson for future intervention is that peacebuilding must take place within a regional framework and balance the competing interests of neighboring powers.

The National Level: The Afghan State and the War Economy
Most of the institutions of the nation-state have collapsed. This power vacuum has been filled by regionally based nonstate entities. With the decline of superpower patronage in the early 1990s, controls on nonstate entities have declined and such groups have increasingly had to generate their own resources to support their military activities and patronage networks. The war years have been characterized by a rapid monetization of the economy, and the conflict has created tremendous incentives to find cash-producing activities including opium production, money laundering, and transborder trade, particularly in drugs, smuggling, and in the case of the United Front, the gem trade.¹⁶ In 1999 Afghanistan produced three times as much raw opium as all the rest of the world's production put together.¹⁷ A ban on poppy cultivation decreed by Taliban leader Mullah Omar did have significant impact,¹⁸ but with the fall of the Taliban, a significant increase in poppy production is forecast for 2002.¹⁹
According to a World Bank study,²⁰ in 1997 the transborder trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan generated around $2.5 billion per annum; however, by 2000 this had fallen to $930 million. The Taliban exacted a tax of about 6 percent on the opium and smuggling activities.²¹
As Rubin notes, the war is sustained by the availability of lootable or taxable resources and the low cost of recruiting fighters.²² Peace would disrupt the systems of production and exchange that provide warlords and their followers with livelihoods. One could therefore argue that economic forces have become more central to the dynamic of the Afghan conflict since the early 1990s, but that doesn't mean that state power was altogether irrelevant. Evidently, international recognition was one of the few bargaining chips that the international community had in dealing with the Taliban. Internationally recognized sovereignty affords access to major external resources, such as financing for the Turkmenistan-Pakistan gas pipeline and the reconstruction aid.
A central challenge now is reconstituting the Afghan state—at the heart of the Afghan conflict is the crisis in the legitimacy and capacity of the state. This process must be informed by an examination of the incentives and disincentives for putting the state back together. The war economy has created strong incentives for misgovernment ²³ and clearly the interests of those who profit from continued instability need to be addressed.

The Local Level: Afghan Society
An appreciation of the international and national dimensions of the Afghan conflict should be complemented by a "fine grained" analysis of Afghan society. This is frequently missing in analyses of the Afghan war; conflict is seen as exogenous to the society, causing breakdown and "social capital depletion." However, the relationship between conflict and society is more subtle and complex than the "breakdown" model suggests. There are important continuities with the past, while at the same time there have been profound social transformations that have fed back into the conflict.
For instance, Afghan social networks have been extremely resilient and adapted to the changing context. Historically, the state has both utilized, and been colonized by, such networks.²⁴ For example, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) utilized such networks when channeling arms to the resistance and the mujahedeen drew upon such relationships to mobilize fighters; more recently, such networks and relationships have also been used for drug smuggling and other criminal activities.
On the other hand, conflict has been a force for social change. The war brought intense ideological struggles into the most remote valleys.²⁵ It precipitated a new leadership, the reworking of traditional patron-client relationships, and an adherence to larger-scale identities based on religion, ethnicity, and political grouping.²⁶ One can identify a number of fault lines and tensions within Afghan civil society, which feed into the wider dynamic of the war. These include tensions over resources, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religion. Conflict entrepreneurs and external powers have effectively used ethnic tools to mobilize groups and the war has led to a shift in the balance of power among the different ethnic groups.²⁷ Although ethnicity is not an underlying cause of the war, it has frequently been conducted along ethnic lines.²⁸ This has had a corrosive effect on Afghan society and impedes the search for a solution to the conflict.²⁹
In many other respects the conflict has reworked social identities and challenged power hierarchies. The Taliban victory represented a "social revolution" in which the sons of poor tribes and clans were able to overthrow a tribal aristocracy.³⁰ In a dramatic reversal of previous patterns of change, it was the countryside who ruled the capital.³¹ Violence was thus viewed as a means to restore status and power.³²
Finally, the conflict has had a profound effect on gender roles and identities. The instrumentalization and politicization of Afghan women preceded the Taliban; although not as severely, the mujahedeen regime also restricted women's activities in the name of Islam.³³ Conflicting views on the role of women are symptomatic of ongoing tensions between tradition and modernity in Afghan society. In many respects the experience of exile has raised the expectations of women in terms of basic services such as education and health care and also their political role in the future. Peacebuilding strategies must provide women with the opportunity to play an active role in the public realm. The fact that places have been reserved for women in the Interim Administration is an encouraging start.
Therefore, a peace process that only involves the political elites is unlikely to bring long-term peace. A bottom-up approach to rebuilding civil society and "demilitarize the mind" is also necessary. This, however, must be based on an appreciation of the social transformations caused by the conflict; reconciliation and reconstruction are not about reverting to the status quo ante.

The Rise and Fall of the Taliban
"Taliban" is derived from the Arabic word talib, meaning "religious student." The Taliban's core leaders belong to a common political network, the Deobandi madrassas (religious seminaries for training of ulama) in the Pashtun tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since emerging as a military force in Kandahar in 1994, the Taliban, by 2001, controlled roughly 90 percent of Afghanistan (subsequently renamed the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 1997). The government was only ever recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban's preeminence in Afghanistan consolidated a number of the regional and national trends described above. First, it confirmed the regional nature of the conflict, with neighboring countries increasingly intervening inside Afghanistan. Second, the security provided by the Taliban enabled the consolidation and enlargement of the war economy.
A complex mix of factors, both internal and external, traditional and modern, contributed to the rise of the Taliban. On the one hand, they drew support from a network of madrassas. During the twentieth century the madrassas had become marginalized by state modernization programs, but were reinvigorated and became autonomous as a result of exile in Pakistan and the experience of warlord-dominated Afghanistan.³⁴ On the other hand, the Taliban's military and political ascendancy was clearly facilitated by external actors, and especially official, quasi-official, and private groups in Pakistan.³⁵ The Taliban were supported militarily and politically first by the Bhutto and then the Sharif administrations as they were seen to represent a Pashtun front sympathetic to Pakistan's interests.³⁶ It is estimated that by 1999 up to 30 percent of the Taliban troops were Pakistani volunteers.³⁷ By 2001 there were thought to be between 8,000 and 15,000 non-Afghan Taliban fighters.³⁸
The Taliban arose out of an extremely parochial and conservative milieu.³⁹ However, growing confrontation with the international community and ever-closer links with transnational Islamic groups pushed them toward a more radical agenda. Even before 11 September, experts were warning of the increased risk to regional stability as the pace of radicalization quickened.⁴⁰ The Taliban were a symptom of a deeper malaise—they represented a political response to an extreme situation.⁴¹ Although the Taliban collapsed relatively quickly, the dynamic of Talibanization within the region is likely to outlive the Taliban regime itself.

Official Conflict Management

Attempts to resolve the Afghan crisis have been ongoing, involving various actors and strategies, and mediation efforts by state and nonstate actors at several levels. In the Cold War years, the diplomatic focus was on the United States and the Soviet Union, with support roles played by Pakistan and the Afghan regime. Later, it shifted to the neighboring regional powers. There have also been a number of civil-society and diaspora-led initiatives. However, the primary role has been assumed by the United Nations, operating in Afghanistan with little collaboration or competition from other intergovernmental organizations, which tend to be weak throughout Asia.⁴²
It is important to note that there has never been one single UN body with a unified mandate and policy toward Afghanistan. In 2001 for instance, one could distinguish at least three distinct (and contradictory) policies toward the Afghan conflict. The UN Security Council (UNSC), spurred by the United States and Russia, imposed one-sided sanctions against the Taliban, while the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA, established in 1993 as successor organization to the "Good Offices Mission" created in the late 1980s) attempted to mediate between the Taliban and UF. The sanctions, however, undermined the ability of UNSMA to act as a neutral and impartial mediator. Meanwhile, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) was charged with delivering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population and, to achieve its goals, had been willing to engage the Taliban (and compromise principles according to its critics) to a greater extent than the other two UN bodies. In addition, the special rapporteur on Afghanistan reported on human-rights violations to the UN Human Rights Commission.⁴³
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a fundamental shift in the UN's efforts to resolve the Afghan conflict from bipolar approaches to multipolar approaches. After 1997 more attention was focused on the regional dimensions to the conflict with the initiation of the "six-plus-two talks" (the six neighboring powers, plus the United States and Russia).
The UN strategy aimed to (1) achieve a cessation of hostilities, (2) seek a regional political consensus in support of the peace process, and (3) seek direct negotiations between all parties on a political settlement.⁴⁴ In order to achieve these objectives, UNSMA pursued a three-track strategy for negotiation and mediation, i.e., the Central Track (dialogue between the main Afghan warring parties), Parallel Track (engagement with non-UN peacemaking initiatives), and the External Track (in the form of six-plus-two arrangement between the six Afghanistan neighbors and Russia and the United States).⁴⁵ Through regional consensus building and intra-Afghan dialogue, the UN aimed to:

• Establish a durable cease-fire
• Enforce a comprehensive arms and ammunition embargo
• Form a broad-based representative government
• Initiate reconstructionIn terms of achieving these policy objectives, the UN peace process has been a failure, and Afghanistan has proved to be a "graveyard for UN negotiation."⁴⁶

William Maley identified three main reasons behind the failure of the UN mission:

1. The inherent weakness of traditional peacemaking in contemporary wars. Orthodox mediation is based on the premise of interstate relations and dialogue. Bilateral negotiations or talks within the six-plus-two framework, however, have a limited impact, because of the transnational and nonstate entities that are an integral part of the conflict. Such "non-state actors may deny the authority of the very framework of rules and norms within which conversations between states occur."⁴⁷
   
2. The history of UN involvement in mediation. The UN has limited credibility with the different actors because of its previous failures, its limited capacities (both in terms of individual performance and political muscle), and, on occasion, a perceived bias.
   
3. The focus of UN mediation. The UN has often failed to understand that the crisis in Afghanistan runs deeper than the mere composition of the government. As one NGO worker commented, UNSMA are "looking at any people who will sit round a table and talk to each other." It aims to call a cease-fire, form a broad-based government, hold elections, and move into reconstruction. How this peace package will address the interests of the nonstate entities is not clear, however, since they may have little interest or need of a unitary Afghan state.

In recent years, there have also been a number of non-UN peace initiatives by Afghans and third parties, including three parallel processes that were launched by Afghans, primarily from outside Afghanistan and with support from foreign governments and nonstate actors. These were the "Rome process," which focused around the former king Zahir Shah; the "Cypress process"; and the "Bonn process." Pakistan, Iran, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and others have also been engaged in peacemaking efforts, but these initiatives have all have foundered, primarily because of the competing agendas of these "peacemakers" and the absence of a robust Track One process—due, in turn, to the insufficient support from UNSC members, notably the United States and Russia.
Although one can be critical of the UN role, without the political will of the international community, its impact was always going to be limited. As the UN Secretary-General commented in 1997, "It could be argued that . . . the role of the United Nations in Afghanistan is little more than that of an alibi to provide cover for the inaction—or worse—of the international community at large."⁴⁸
The overriding policy response from the Western powers in the post–Cold War years was either one of strategic withdrawal and containment or an aggressive single-issue focus. While governments failed to address fundamental structural causes of the conflict, the interconnected security problems deepened. The stakes in the conflict system have grown year by year, as have the opportunity costs of not acting to resolve the problem. The Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and the U.S. bombing of 1998 did bring Afghanistan back "on the map," but the focus was still on containing the conflict rather than resolving it.
There were signs in the months before 11 September that donor governments were beginning to comprehend the need to provide tangible incentives for peace through a reconstruction package and the creation of institutions of governance necessary to transform the war economy into a peace economy.⁴⁹ The basic preconditions now appear to be in place for a peacebuilding strategy that has the potential to address the underlying structural dimensions of the regional conflict system. These include: the appointment of Lakdar Brahimi on 3 October 2001 as the overall coordinator of diplomatic and humanitarian efforts; the signing of the Bonn agreement and the investiture of the Interim Authority in Kabul on 22 December; an agreement on the need for an international security force, part of which had arrived in Afghanistan by the end of 2001; and the commitments by major donors to establish a reconstruction trust fund.
All the main international and local players have aligned themselves behind the formation of a broad-based government and a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan. The effectiveness of the UN in the peacebuilding process will depend partly on institutional capacity, but even more on political will. Maintaining and sustaining the political momentum that has been generated in recent months will be a critical challenge.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Our analysis of the official conflict-management process points to the need for a more inclusive multi-track approach that involves all levels of Afghan society. In theory, peace promotion should involve a number of parallel but coordinated tracks that involve a wide range of state and nonstate actors, but such a multi-track has proved difficult in the Afghan context. It assumes common interests on the part of intervening agencies, a shared understanding of peace and a mechanism for coordinating tracks. In practice, international engagement in Afghanistan has lacked consistency and coherence. Interests in the region have fluctuated according to perceived strategic interests (from anticommunism, to oil pipelines, to drugs, etc.); peace initiatives, often linked to other agendas, have had limited credibility among Afghans; and coordination of multi-track approaches in a collapsed state context has proved extremely difficult.

The Role of Humanitarian Aid
In parallel to the diplomatic response to the Afghan war, there has been a major humanitarian aid program, in response to massive humanitarian needs, but also motivated by political agendas. In the 1980s, refugee and cross-border programs were seen by many as the nonlethal component of aid to the Afghan resistance. By the early 1990s, as international interest in the Afghan conflict waned, the peace process and humanitarian aid program were, to a large extent, delinked, both politically and institutionally. By the mid-1990s, international attention had been revived due a range of factors including the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, oil pipelines, human rights, and the growing drug trade, accompanied by renewed interest in peacebuilding, multi-track diplomacy, and strengthening the link between aid and diplomacy.
With the Strategic Framework (SF) for Afghanistan, the international community endeavored to more explicitly link diplomatic and aid programs.⁵⁰ In 1998 a Strategic Framework document, produced after months of consultation among UN agencies, NGOs, and other actors, was endorsed by the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG)⁵¹ in London. With an overarching goal of facilitating the transition from a state of internal conflict to a just and sustainable peace, the SF brings together the three strategies (i.e., political, assistance, and human rights) of the UN to address the crisis. The SF defines the principles, general policies, and institutional arrangements for a coherent and effective response.⁵² Principled Common Programming (PCP), on the other hand, applies only to the assistance sphere and is a mechanism for establishing the assistance community's priorities, programs, and projects.
Together, SF and PCP represent in many respects an innovative response to the challenges of working in a chronically unstable environment, where the establishment of an institutional framework is needed to ensure coherence and complementarity of action. The lessons generated by this exercise have much wider relevance and should be studied carefully. While it is too early to come to definitive conclusions, the last three years have highlighted the practical problems of operationalizing such a framework.
There are, broadly, two sets of criticisms of the current process—those related to the macro issues of policy coherence and the politics of aid, and those related to organizational and bureaucratic constraints. First, the SF is based on the assumption that a robust and coherent political strategy will run in parallel with the assistance program; each in theory should exploit synergies with and support the other, but in practice the political process has faltered. In the absence of any real political process, attention has been focused largely on the assistance program. The result, critics say, has been a politicization of aid with humanitarianism being used as a substitute for robust political action. Strict conditionalities have been applied on aid to leverage political changes. It is argued that aid is being asked to do things that are beyond its remit and are normally left to diplomatic actors. Ethically, this is unsound since humanitarian principles are corrupted. Also, pragmatically, its effects are questionable; humanitarian assistance has limited leverage over the incentive systems of the warring groups, particularly if one juxtaposes the estimated $300 million per year in aid with the magnitude of resource flows generated by the war economy.⁵³
A second set of criticisms relates to organizational constraints, notably the inability of the assistance community to coordinate effectively, perhaps due in part to interorganizational competition and an unwillingness to relinquish sovereignty. It may also be due to the perception, amongst NGOs that the process has been a very top-down one with limited input from the field. In the absence of a centralized, statelike entity, agencies had a great deal of autonomy, and few are now willing to take direction from a more central authority. While the PCP has made progress in terms of developing agreement on broad principles and frameworks, less has been achieved where the "hard interests" of agencies are at stake.
A 2001 evaluation of the Strategic Framework process pointed to continuing tensions between the diplomatic and aid communities.⁵⁴ The report argued that there was continued distrust and antagonism between the political and aid actors. Most important was their differing assessments of the context. While UNSMA viewed Afghanistan as a "rogue state," the aid community conceptualized it as a "failed state." Differing analyses led to differing prescriptions, with UNSMA promoting isolation of the Taliban and the aid community arguing for engagement.⁵⁵

The Role of NGOs
For many years NGOs have been the mechanism of choice for donor governments unable or unwilling to engage directly with Afghan actors and institutions. Therefore, a multi-track approach to peacebuilding clearly depends to a great extent on the willingness and capacity of the NGO sector.
Currently, the NGO community can be divided into three broad categories: international, Afghani, and Islamic NGOs. Over 250 NGOs are members of one of six NGO Coordination Bodies.⁵⁶ Including nonmember NGOs, the number probably reaches 300. The ACBAR Directory of Humanitarian Agencies Working for Afghans 2000 covers 160 NGOs of all categories, from seventeen countries, with 23,413 staff members (22,377 Afghans, 705 Pakistanis, and 331 expatriates), and total expenditures between 1997 and 1999 of $376.4 million. NGOs' 1999 budget came from the UN (33 percent), the EU (20 percent), bilateral donors (20 percent), overseas international NGOs (20 percent), and others. In 1999, 91 percent of their budget was spent for Afghans inside Afghanistan and 9 percent for the refugee programs outside the country. In 1999, 45 key NGOs (14 Afghan, 4 Islamic, and 27 international Western) employed 73 percent of the total NGO staff and accounted for 75 percent of the total NGO budget.
The major areas of NGO work include health services, mine action, education, food security, (agriculture, irrigation, livestock, etc.) emergency response, rehabilitation, shelter, income generation, infrastructure, environment, community development work, and human rights. In addition to the six NGO coordination bodies in the country, British Agencies Afghanistan Group based in London provides information for the assistance community and engages with advocacy on behalf of the member NGOs.
Table 6.5.1 outlines a range of approaches adopted by NGOs and donor agencies to conflict management and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. We have divided the approaches into those that may have an indirect effect on peacebuilding processes and those that have an explicit and sole focus on peace.
Most NGOs are now more conflict-sensitive than they were in the 1980s and there has also been a trend toward longer-term developmental programming that aims to support local livelihoods and institutions. Such programs may aid recovery and reconstruction in the event of a peace process. However, programs with developmental and peacebuilding objectives represent a very small part of the overall aid portfolio; most funding goes to short-term humanitarian programs. The programs that do have peacebuilding objectives tend to be quite disparate and have only localized impacts.
Whether such micro projects can have a cumulative impact on conflict and peace dynamics is open to debate. The problem faced by both development and conflict-resolution NGOs is one of sustaining and scaling up impacts in a context of chronic instability. There are virtually no institutional stabilizing points at the level above the village for agencies to build upon. Therefore, peacebuilding and development projects often represent small-scale islands of success, dependent on ongoing funding and support from NGOs.
The evidence to date suggests that one should be realistic about the capacity of aid actors to influence incentive systems and institutions at the meso or macro levels. Multi-track approaches will achieve little if the central track is dormant or not functioning. Evidently there are things that aid agencies can do to improve the way they "do business," such as developing longer-term approaches, improving accountability, becoming more responsive to civil-society actors, and strengthening their advocacy strategies to influence the donor community and the international media. However, to an extent, the wider impact of their work depends on factors further up the economic and political chain. Unless political and economic incentives are changed through a combination of sticks and carrots by international and regional actors, aid represents at best a "holding operation"; it may play a role in supporting livelihoods and strengthening social capital, but it cannot be a leading edge in the peace process.

The Role of Civil Society
Over the last twenty years, peace negotiations have been conducted at the international and national level and Afghan civil society has had virtually no voice in the process. Whether a just peace can be arrived at as a result of negotiations between outsiders and warring parties with a record of human-rights violations is questionable. One of the aims of the Strategic Framework process was, by linking the political and assistance strategies, to stimulate involvement from a wider cross section of the Afghan population. In practice this has been difficult, partly because of the nature of the conflict and civil society in Afghanistan and partly because of deficiencies within the aid system.
First, in the second decade of the war economic agendas have become a central part of the conflict dynamic. A regional war economy has developed, along with a new leadership whose power is based upon establishing a monopoly of violence and controlling this economy. Leadership, therefore, is based on coercion rather than consent. Since civil society appears to have only a limited influence on the current dynamics of the conflict, it is difficult to see it becoming a leading edge in a peacebuilding process. The potential for exerting pressure "from below" to influence the incentive systems of leaders and promote humanitarian principles appears to be limited.
Second, Western notions of "civil society" do not transfer easily to the Afghan context. The idea of building a broad civil-society constituency for peace may only be possible in contexts where civil society is composed of vertically and horizontally integrated formal, rule-based organizations. Moreover, research from elsewhere suggests that where the state is weak and fractured, civil society will be similarly divided and lacking in voice; a strong healthy state is usually the precondition for a strong and healthy civil society. In Afghanistan, by contrast, the state has collapsed and civil society predominantly consists of a complex web of informal, norm-based networks based on blood, kinship, tribal, religious, cultural, and ethnic ties. Notable among these are the institutions of elders, Jirga (an assembly or council of Pasthun or Baluchi headmen and elders), Shura⁵⁸ (an Islamic consultative council), and religious networks. The interests and power base of such networks tend to be highly localized. To an extent, such institutions have enabled Afghan communities to construct a
so-called mud curtain⁵⁹ to keep an interfering and often repressive state at bay. The fact that such institutions have survived over centuries and are remarkably resilient and adaptable is attributed to their stable legitimacy with Afghan communities in meeting essential societal needs, including local governance. This might be contrasted with modern civil formations, especially the political parties, which became increasingly irrelevant during the 1990s.
Historically based institutions such as the elders' Jirga play a role in local governance, conflict resolution, resource management, and management of state-society relationships in local spheres. Such institutions manage diverse local conflicts between individuals, families, and communities, and between communities and the state. Conflict resolution takes place through negotiation, arbitration, and adjudication by applying sharia,⁶⁰ local laws and norms. The state has historically respected the role of these institutions and this practice continued under the Taliban and United Front. In a number of instances, local institutions resisted externally imposed policies. In Khost, for instance, in 1998–1999, there was popular resistance to the Taliban-imposed local authorities. However, the capacity of such institutions to address conflict on a wider scale is limited.
Therefore, peacebuilding efforts need to be based upon a realistic assessment of the potential and limitations of civil society. Civil-society support programs in postconflict societies can run the risk of diverting funding and support away from the central task of state building. What is needed is a more strategic, sustained, and nuanced engagement with Afghan civil society than has occurred in the past. Particular attention should be focused on the peacemaking role of the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), and strengthening of the bottom-up peacebuilding impacts of civic groups.
The Loya Jirga⁶¹ clearly has an important role to play in the eyes of most Afghans. Over the last three centuries, there have been sixteen Loya Jirgas (three in the eighteenth century, two in the nineteenth century, and eleven in the twentieth century, including two convened by the communist leaders). Issues addressed by these Loya Jirgas included appointing and legitimizing national leaders (e.g., kings and presidents), national strategies for liberation and defense against foreign aggression, national policies and governments, national constitutions, etc.
The Bonn agreement of 5 December 2001 reaffirms the role of the Loya Jirga. Two national meetings are to be held, one (an emergency Loya Jirga) to decide on the composition of a Transitional Authority for the next two years and a second (a constitutional Loya Jirga) to adopt a new constitution for the country.⁶² The success of the emergency Loya Jirga in establishing the Transitional Authority will depend on (1) inclusive representation from all sections of the Afghan society, and (2) its ability to demand compliance and enforce implementation of its decisions. For the former, the legitimacy, integrity, and competence of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga is critical. This is to be established during the Interim Administration. However, the latter will depend on first rebuilding the national state institutions, including national law enforcement institutions, and second, the commitment of the international community to support the implementation of the Bonn agreements. International engagement is particularly important during this initial period when there is an absence of national state institutions.
The second area of engagement with civil society is a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding with the aim of strengthening social capital and rebuilding the linkages between Afghan society and the state. In the past, aid agencies have looked to civil-society institutions as interlocutors for managing local welfare and recovery assistance programs. However, aid agencies were often too transient and had insufficient understanding of community-level dynamics to work with them. The result of such an approach was the disappearance of thousands of project-based and externally funded Shuras once the funding stopped. Moreover, uncritical support for "traditional" institutions has had unintended impacts; for instance it has led to the exclusion of women or support for ethnically based groups, sometimes fueling tensions at the local level. A more sophisticated analysis is required, including, especially, nurturing women's organizations (with a real constituency in Afghan society) and other nonsectarian civic groups that have crosscutting ties. Donors will need to embrace a broad view of "civil society" and to develop mechanisms for engaging with less formal bodies in rural areas that may not mirror their ideal models of an NGO. However, the role of NGOs, particularly Afghan NGOs, is likely to be a critical component of the peacebuilding effort. To an extent, one of the primary sources of Afghan leadership has been held in "cold storage" during the war years, within the NGO sector. This leadership must be nurtured and encouraged to take on new roles, whether in the public, private, or civic sectors.

Prospects

The dynamics of the Afghan conflict have been transformed as a result of recent events. In the space of three months the negative military and political stalemate of the previous three years has been shifted. From being an "orphaned" conflict, Afghanistan has become the focus of world attention. For the first time in the history of the war, there appears to be the collective will and the promise of sufficient resources to get to grips with the dynamics of the conflict.
While there is reason for cautious optimism in view of recent developments, this optimism should be tempered by a realistic assessment of the task ahead. Our previous analysis highlighted the continuing existence of the factors that caused and sustained the conflict. These include the competing agendas of regional powers, the continuing Talibanization of Islamic groups in Central and Southern Asia (despite the demise of the Taliban), an expanding war economy, the crisis of states within the region, and deepening poverty. Unless these interlocking crises are addressed, violent conflicts will continue to be a feature of an extremely volatile regional conflict system.
Therefore, winning the peace depends on addressing root causes and entails a transition from peacemaking to peacebuilding. Peace processes elsewhere have often faltered when key actors failed to look beyond the peace settlement. Evidently, peace involves more than simply ending the fighting and peacebuilding must involve a discussion about what kind of peace should be built, how it will be defined, and who will be involved in the debate. Experience from elsewhere (and the lessons of past failures in Afghanistan) suggest that these debates should be as inclusive as possible—peace processes that marginalize groups in society are likely to generate grievances that lead to renewed conflict.
Given the deep-seated nature of the regional conflict system, there is unlikely to be a smooth transition from war to peace in Afghanistan. Chronic political instability for a number of years to come is quite likely. In many postconflict settings (South Africa, for example) there has been a shift from militarized violence to widespread social violence. The worst-case scenario (apart from a major armed confrontation between Pakistan and India) would be a return to the warlordism of the mid-1990s. There are indications that this is already occurring, with warlords establishing their power bases and reports of roadblocks, robberies, and the looting of aid in a number of areas.
Which scenario is acted out will depend to a great extent on whether international engagement is sustained and whether it is the right kind of engagement. In the past, international action has often been part of the problem rather than the solution. It has been halfhearted, uncoordinated, often one-sided, and has frequently created the wrong kinds of incentives. Of all the great powers, the United States has been the most inconsistent and inattentive in its policies toward the region.⁶³ Continued support by the United States for a UN-led peacebuilding process is essential. Without Western commitment and international attention, the competing interests of neighboring powers and the negative dynamic of the war economy will reassert themselves. The track record of the international community is poor in terms of the gap between the promise and the delivery of reconstruction packages.
Even if international attention is sustained, it must be the right kind of engagement. Politically driven aid helped create the tensions within Afghan society that led to the conflict in the first place and sustained it during the jihad years. There are dangers that a major injection of aid resources into a conflictual and resource-scarce environment will exacerbate tensions and renew the cycle of violence. Aid actors should avoid at all costs the mistake of re-creating the Afghan rentier state, in which a small group of "shareholders" benefit from the peace dividend.
We have used the words "cautious optimism," but the greatest stress should perhaps be placed on the word "cautious." As research shows, societies that have a legacy of war are more likely to experience violent conflict in the future.⁶⁴ Afghanistan is a country that is geared up for war and a profound transformation is required for it to become a country that is "geared up" for peace.

Recommendations

In this final section we outline recommendations for how the international community can best support the transition from war to peace in Afghanistan. The international community has limited understanding of why states collapse, and even less about how to put them back together again. Therefore the need for realism and humility should be emphasized—international action cannot engineer long-term peace, but the right kinds of intervention may increase the probabilities of this happening.
Although our focus has been primarily on the international community, we recognize that the key actors are the Afghans themselves. International support should be geared toward creating the preconditions that enable legitimate representatives of the Afghan people to make decisions about their future without external interference.⁶⁵

Peacebuilding Principles
There are both short-term and long-term priorities. However, all forms of intervention—whether in the security, political, socioeconomic, or humanitarian spheres—need to apply the following peacebuilding principles.⁶⁶

• Provide sustained support. The key question is, are the Western powers in this for the long haul? Can the diplomatic and political momentum be sustained? We are talking here about a decade or more of sustained and consistent support—politically and financially. The major powers must make concrete commitments of long-term support, to which they should be held accountable.
• Tackle underlying causes. While the war has changed over time, leading to new dynamics and incentive systems, the central task remains the reconstitution of a legitimate state with a monopoly of force—it was the crisis in the legitimacy and capacity of the state that led to the outbreak of war in the first place and if unaddressed is likely to contribute to renewed violence. Short-term priorities should not distract attention from the central task of rebuilding institutions (a political transition), transforming the war economy into a peace economy, and dealing with the legacy of violence (a socioeconomic transition).
• Address the regional dynamics. The Bonn agreements must be complemented by international agreements among the regional powers to ensure noninterference and the pursuit of legitimate interests in Afghanistan through peaceful means, which conform to international legal frameworks and respect the Afghan right of self-determination. Robust support for attempts to resolve neighboring conflicts (e.g., Kashmir) and to prevent renewed or emergent conflicts (e.g., Tajikistan, Ferghana Valley) should be provided and complemented by efforts to address the conditions that are leading to instability in the region, such as Talibanization, growing poverty, and state crises.
• A comprehensive approach. As outlined above, previous efforts at peacemaking and peacebuilding tended to undercut one another, creating the wrong types of incentives/disincentives. Efforts must be directed toward developing a common analysis, leading to a comprehensive and coherent peacebuilding framework. This does not mean repeating the mistakes of the Strategic Framework, which attempted to create a monolithic management framework. There does need to be room for separate, complementary approaches and initiatives, but a patchwork of unrelated and uncoordinated interventions in the name of "independence" and "flexibility" is simply not good enough. The UN and NGOs must be prepared to sacrifice a level of sovereignty to ensure better coordination. There will be new actors entering the field (not least the Afghan state, but also new international donors), leading to overlapping coordination and accountability mechanisms. Strong UN leadership and particularly the role of Brahimi will be central, as will the development of a centralized funding mechanism, perhaps in the form of a Strategic Recovery facility.
• Conflict sensitivity. All forms of assistance should be designed and implemented so that they are sensitive to the dynamics of conflict and peace. Peacebuilding is not necessarily synonymous with development; the wrong kind of development may be conflict-producing. Conflict sensitivity is likely to mean a range of things and could include: developing the capacity to conduct high-quality analysis; monitoring the distributional effects of aid (particularly impacts on intergroup tensions); building in ownership and inclusiveness to aid programs; developing "do no harm" and peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) tools; and disseminating information through the media about peacebuilding efforts.
• Accountability, ownership, and learning. In the rush to establish programs and profile, there is a danger that agencies will repeat past errors and not place a sufficient premium on understanding the context or reflecting on lessons from the past. The Strategic Monitoring Unit (SMU) established in 2000 to improve learning and accountability should be a central player, but it is likely to be sidelined by new and better-resourced actors. We recommend that sufficient political and financial backing be provided to the SMU so that it has the profile and capacity to ensure that learning and accountability are built into the aid effort from the beginning. Second, we recommend the establishment of a government body, a "National Reconstruction Auditor," within the Ministry of Reconstruction to ensure accountability in the planning and implementation of reconstruction. We have already pointed to the dangers of a small group of shareholders being the main beneficiaries of the potential peace dividend. Donors need to develop high standards of accountability and transparency for themselves. Similarly, they must set clear standards in terms of governance to ensure that the new Afghan state is accountable and responsive to its citizens.

Short-Term Challenges
A critical factor in war-to-peace transitions is the sequencing and mix of short-term and long-term activities. Quick and credible incentives for peace need to be created, while, simultaneously, longer-term structural issues are addressed. Getting the right balance is going to be difficult; while "buying out" the warlords may be necessary in the short term, it is important not to lose sight of the need for justice and reconciliation. Some of the key short-term and long-term challenges ahead include:

• Security. Establishing a legitimate monopoly of force is the first priority. Security is the absolute precondition for a viable peacebuilding process. With the fall of the Taliban, old patterns of insecurity, lawlessness, criminality, and human-rights abuses have reemerged. An immediate and long-term priority will be the reestablishment of the state security institutions. The role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as a catalyst, supporter, and trainer will be critically important in the reestablishment of national law enforcement bodies. Rather than a classical demobilization strategy, in the long term a security-sector reform approach is necessary, linking security issues to a wider package of good governance measures.
• Protection. In many parts of the country there appears to be a growing protection vacuum as local warlords reassert their control and lawlessness and human-rights abuses increase. The international community must not turn a blind eye to this. There is an urgent need for human-rights monitoring and enforcement. The ISAF must be able to operate outside of Kabul to support Afghan security forces in keeping the peace and enabling human-rights groups and aid agencies to be operational throughout the country.
• Humanitarian action. The drought- and security-induced humanitarian crisis continues. Delivering massive quantities of humanitarian aid into Afghanistan is essential both in terms of saving lives and winning the peace. International actors must make this an absolute priority. Aid agencies should be provided with the resources and political space to deliver an effective aid program. This cannot happen while aid is seen as a strategic tool—part of the "war against terrorism." It must be separated out from the military and diplomatic action. Humanitarian actors should also ensure the efficacy of the humanitarian assistance program. Finally, emergency work should be designed so that it lays the groundwork for subsequent development activities. There will be a need to follow humanitarian assistance with quick-impact transitional activities that can support livelihoods and create alternatives to the war economy.

Long-Term Challenges
The key medium- to long-term challenge is to effect a transition toward national governance. Support for a broad-based coalition is essential. This has to be based upon a sophisticated understanding of the incentives and disincentives for peace (and an understanding of what kind of peace different external and internal actors wish to see established). This applies at all levels, from the Afghan farmer choosing whether to grow onions or poppies, to the warlord choosing whether to become part of the government or reestablish his fiefdom, to the regional power choosing whether to support the coalition as a whole or to promote certain elements within the coalition. While we have argued that the international community cannot engineer peace, it can help tip the balance in favor of collaboration by creating the right incentives—and enforcing penalties on the spoilers.
The record of the international community in terms of promoting good governance has been, at best, mixed, even in stable settings, because of a lack of local ownership, a formulaic approach, short time frames, and an inconsistent application of "bottom lines." Clearly, Afghan governance must be homegrown and not based on "off the shelf models" of Western liberal democracy. Some underlying principles can perhaps be taken as universal, including international norms on human rights, women's participation, and broad involvement of all sections of Afghan society. These ideals can be worked toward over time and achieved in different ways; however, an insistence on Western forms of governance may actually impede the establishment of more important underlying democratic "norms." Elections, for example, should not be viewed as the "be-all-and-end-all." In a number of postconflict settings, they have been destabilizing and counterproductive. Decentralized or federal systems may appear attractive to many Western analysts, but in the short to medium term, we feel the priority must be to build a strong central state with a legitimate monopoly of force. Support for a federal solution at this stage would cause massive tensions between the center and the regions. This is not an argument for a return to the centralized but weak state that led to the Afghan crisis. However, a strong center is a precondition for supporting and strengthening the state at the local level—in the same way that a vibrant civil society tends to mirror a strong and legitimate state.
Central to the task of establishing legitimacy will be the need to develop the capacity of the state to deliver services—this includes establishing a governance framework that would help transform the war economy into a peace economy and create opportunities for licit livelihoods. Support for the agricultural sector will be central to kick starting the Afghan economy. The state must also be supported in delivering education and health services to its population. Modern schooling, not just in Afghanistan but throughout the region, is a critical priority. The madrassas that fuel the dynamic of jihad have flourished because of the decay of the state school system. This is in no small part due to the policy prescriptions and market dogma of the international financial institutions. The multilaterals must learn from these failures—the standardized structural-adjustment package may be conflict-producing.
Finally, Afghanistan in the long run will not develop itself through aid funds. Development in the end will depend on the expansion of the private sector. Afghanistan's role as a bridge between Central and Southern Asia will need to be exploited, particularly in terms of trade and oil pipelines. Greater opportunities for regional cooperation may result, but they should be accompanied by measures such as oil trust funds to ensure that the profits are equitably distributed.

Miscellaneous

1. This chapter builds upon research funded by the Department for International Development (UK) on NGOs and peacebuilding and subsequent research funded by International Alert on aid, conflict, and peacebuilding. The authors would also like to thank the following people who gave substantive comments on an earlier version of this paper: William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, Barnett Rubin, Elizabeth Winter, and Mohammed Ehsan Zia. They bear no responsibility for the views expressed herein, which are those of the authors alone.
   
2. Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995.
   
3. Adapted from Haneef Atmar, Sultan Barakat and Arne Strand, From Rhetoric to Reality: The Role of Aid in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, York: University of York Press, 1998; and Koenraad Van Brabant and Tony Killick, The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations: Case Study: Afghanistan, Paris: OECD, 1999.
   
4. The United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Jabha-yi Muttahid-i Islami-yi Milli barayi Nijat-i Afghanistan). The UF was formed in 1996 as an alliance of the groups opposed to the Taliban. The president of the ousted government, Burhanuddin Rabbani, remained the president of Afghanistan and the titular head of the UF, although real power lay with Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the minister for defense (Human Rights Watch, 2001: 12).
   
5. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolutions 1267 on 15 October 1999 and 1333 on 19 December 2000. It has been argued that these were largely driven by the United States and followed the August 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, allegedly by bin Laden's Al-Qaida network. Resolution 1333 involved one-sided sanctions that aimed to disrupt the Taliban's capacity to conduct military operations (William Maley, "Talibanization and Pakistan," in Talibanisation: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia, edited by Conflict Prevention Network, Berlin and Brussels: Conflict Prevention Network, 2001, p. 66).
   
6. Matthew Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder: A Study of the Afghan Conflict and Attempts to Resolve It. Manchester: Institute for Development Policy and Management, 2001, p. 11.
   
7. C. Johnson, Afghanistan. A Land in Shadow. Oxford: An Oxfam Country Profile, 1998.
   
8. Jonathan Goodhand, "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan," Central Asian Survey 19(2), 1999, p. 267.
   
9. Barnett R. Rubin, "Regional Instability in South and Central Asia," in Talibanisation: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia. Berlin and Brussels: Conflict Prevention Network, 2001, pp. 13–32.
   
10. See Maley, "Talibanization and Pakistan," pp. 53–74; and Ameen Jan, Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan: The Role of Pakistan, New York: International Peace Academy, 1999.
    
11. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War 13(3C), July 2001.
    
12. Rubin, "Regional Instability in South and Central Asia," p. 81.
    
13. Olivier Roy, "The Transnational Dimension of Radical Islamic Movements," in Talibanization: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia. Berlin: Conflict Prevention Network, September, 2001, p. 81.
    
14. Maley, "Talibanization and Pakistan," p. 70. As Maley notes, such groups have been used by the Pakistani army, especially Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), as a tool of regional policy. For example, Harakat ul Mujahidin and Lashkar I Tayyeva became the main fighting units in Kashimr after 1995 with the full support of the Pakistani army, at the expense of the more nationalist Kashmiri groups (p. 83).
    
15. This has led some to argue that rather than attempting to engineer peace, external parties should give "war a chance" (Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," American Political Science Review 89[3], September 1995, pp. 681–690.)
    
16. Barnett R. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan," World Development 28(10), 2000, p. 1797.
    
17. UNOCHA, Afghanistan–2000 Appeal, UNOCHA, 1999, p. 1.
    
18. Rubin, "Regional Instability," p. 14.
    
19. There are already reports of poppy planting in newly "liberated" areas. Given the level of poverty and the lack of alternative livelihoods this is hardly surprising. It was estimated that before the Taliban opium edict, between 3 and 4 million Afghans—or about 20% of the population—were dependent on poppy for their livelihoods.
    
20. A. F. Naqvi, Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations, Islamabad: World Bank, 1999.
    
21. M. Z. Khan, "Study Report: Afghanistan's International Trade Relations with Neighboring Countries," Afghanistan Watching Brief, UNDP/World Bank, June, 2001.
    
22. Rubin, "Regional Instability," p. 17. It has been estimated that upwards of half a million people are directly dependent on war-related activities for their living (John H. Ostrom, Understanding the Economy of Afghanistan: An Exploratory Study. Stockhom: Swedish Institute for Development Assistance, 1997).
    
23. Rubin, "The Political Economy of War," p. 1799.
    
24. The dynastic patrimony of Amir Abdul Rahman (1880–1901) is a case in point. As Oleson argues, the "Iron Amir's" rule was characterized by an ongoing struggle to establish a modern centralized state, independent of traditional Durrani tribal structures (the "tribal state') who had previously formed the military and political backbone of the Afghan state (Asta Oleson, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan. London: Curzon Press, 1995, p. 89.).
    
25. Kristian Harpviken, "War and Change in Afghanistan: Reflections on Research Priorities," in Return to Silk Routes: Current Scandinavian Research on Central Asia, edited by Mira Juntunen and Birgit Schlyter. London: Kegan Paul, 1999, p. 169.
    
26. Kristian Harpviken, "War and Change in Afghanistan: Reflections on Research Priorities," in Return to Silk Routes: Current Scandinavian Research on Central Asia, edited by Mira Juntunen and Birgit Schlyter. London: Kegan Paul, 1999, p. 170.
    
27. Before the war, the Pashtuns dominated the Afghan state. However, the conflict brought a new assertiveness from non-Pasthun minorities such as the Tajiks and Hazaras who mounted an effective resistance to the Soviet invasion. There has been a shift in the ethnic balance of power during the course of the war and the Interim Authority is strongly represented by non-Pasthun minorities from the UF. For the dangers of an essentialist notion of ethnicity, leading to a belief in ethnic quotas for governance, see Conrad Schetter, "The Chimera of Ethnicity in Afghanistan: Ethinic Affiliation no basis for a new Regime," NZZ Online, 2001: www.nzz.ch/english.
    
28. Human Rights Watch have documented numerous human rights abuses during the course of the war including Taliban discrimination against, and massacres of, Hazaras.
    
29. See Barnett R. Rubin, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid and Olivier Roy, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001, p. 6, and Fielden and Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder, p. 10.
    
30. Rubin et al., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 11; Fielden and Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder.
    
31. Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban" Current History 98(625), 1999, pp. 79–91.
    
32. Fielden and Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder, p. 15.
    
33. Nancy H. Dupree, "Afghan Women Under the Taliban," in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley, London: Hurst & Company, 1998; and Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, the Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War 13(3) July 2001.
    
34. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban."
    
35. A. Davis, "How the Taliban Became a Military Force," in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by W. Maley, London: Hurst & Company, 1998; and Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, the Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War, vol. 13, no. 3(C), July 2001.
    
36. Jan, Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan.
    
37. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000, p. 100.
    
38. Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan: Crisis of Impunity, p. 11.
    
39. Rubin, "Regional Instabililty," p. 17.
    
40. Roy, "The Transnational Dimension of Radical Islamic Movements," p. 88.
    
41. See Ibid., and Rubin, "Regional Instability," p. 15.
    
42. Rubin, "Afghanistan Under the Taliban."
    
43. Rubin et al., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, p. 25.
    
44. UNOCHA, Afghanistan–1999 Appeal, UNOCHA, 1998.
    
45. See Fielden and J. Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder, for a detailed discussion on this.
    
46. William Maley (ed.), Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban. London: Hurst & Company, 1998, p. 183.
    
47. Ibid., p. 186.
    
48. Cited in Ibid., p. 198.
    
49. Rubin et al., The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.
    
50. Another impetus for change was the realization by the United Nations of the need for internal reform.
    
51. ASG (Afghanistan Support Group) is a donor states' forum with sixteen members established in 1997 that meets usually twice a year to discuss key issues concerning emerging humanitarian situations, donor policies, assistance provision, coordination, etc.
    
52. A. Donini, The Strategic Framework for Afghanistan; A Preliminary Assessment, unpublished paper, 2000.
    
53. On the other hand, one should not underplay the symbolic and practical importance of aid in Afghanistan. There is no longer a functioning state and all public welfare functions are being performed by aid agencies, with the UN becoming in effect a surrogate government. Humanitarian aid agencies have in fact been criticized for sustaining the conflict as they enable warring groups to free up resources that they would otherwise have to allocate for Afghan communities. Aid, after agriculture, is the second most important sector of the licit economy. Aid agencies employ around 22,000 Afghans and are one of the main providers of off-farm employment in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the entire national budget of the Taliban administration for public healthcare in 2001 was said to be around $1 million, a figure dwarfed by the annual expenditure of the aid community on healthcare, which was estimated to be $23.6 million in 1997, $20.2 million in 1998, $10.8 million in 1999 (Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand, "Coherence or Cooption? Politics, Aid and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan," The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2001, online: www.jha.ac/articles/a069.htm.).
    
54. Mark Duffield, Patricia Grossman, and Nicholas Leader, Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, Commissioned by the Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afghanistan, September 2001.
    
55. Fielden and Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder.
    
56. ACBAR, ANCB, SWABAD, ICC, NCB (Herat), and NGO Forum Kabul.
    
57. Adapted from Atmar and Goodhand, "Coherence or Cooption? Politics, Aid and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan."
    
58. The debate on "traditional" Afghan institutions is a contested one. The authors have stressed that war and social change have profoundly reshaped Afghan institutions. However there are also important continuities with the past. The shura is a case in point, representing perhaps, the "reinvention of tradition" in the sense that contemporary actors have revitalized such institutions by drawing upon historical and religious traditions. Whether we view it as "new" or "traditional," the shura constitutes an important consultative and decisionmaking institution, albeit with variations in terms of local context.
    
59. L. Dupree, Afghanistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
    
60. The Islamic code of religious law, based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditional sayings of Muhammad.
    
61. During the last two decades, the Loya Jirga has been continually invoked as a mechanism for establishing a national consensus. However, without a strong central track process the Loya Jirga had limited leverage over the warring groups. It could perhaps play a role in legitimating a consensus but was unable to create one.
    
62. K. A. Annan, UN Secretary General Letter 5 December 2001 to the President of the Security General, re "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," 2001.
    
63. G. Austen, "Great Power Geo-Strategic Roles in South and Central Asia," in Talibanization: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia, CPN In-Depth Study, September 2001, p. 112.
    
64. Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War," in Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, edited by Mats Berdal and David Malone. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
    
65. Fielden and Goodhand, Peace Making in the New World Disorder.
    
66. Many principles could have been included in this section. We have picked out some of the essential ones.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Afghanistan Consolidated Appeals, Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan; Afghanistan Outlook, Office of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan; ARIN, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, London;
REPORTS:	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "Preventing New Afghanistans: A Regional Strategy for Reconstruction", by Martha Brill Olcott, January 2002. "Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality", by Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, Janaury 2002. Christian Michelse Institute, Peace-Building Strategies for Afghanistan Part I: Lessons from Past Experiences in Afghanistan, by Astri Suhrke, Arne Strand, and Kristian Berg Harpviken, January 2002. Conflict Prevention Network, Talibanization: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia, CPN In-Depth Study, September 2001. Human Rights Watch: Afghanistan. Crisis of Impunity. The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War, July 2001. Cluster Bombs in Afghanistan, October 2001. Humanity Denied, Systematic Violations of Women's Rights in Afghanistan, October 2001. Recommendations to the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, Tokyo, 21-22 January 2002, 17 January 2002. International Centre for Humanitarian Reporting: Afghanistan, Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones, edited by E. Girardet and J. Walter, Crosslines Global Report, Geneva/Dublin, 1998. International Crisis Group: Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development, Osh/Brussels, 27 November 2001. International Peace Academy: Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan: The Role of Pakistan, by A. Jan, 1999. OECD: The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations: Case Study: Afghanistan, by K. Van Brabant and T. Killick, Paris, 1999. Overseas Development Institute: Shifting Sands: The Search for "Coherence" Between Political and Humanitarian Responses to Complex Emergencies, by J. Macrae and N. Leader, HPG Report 8, London, 2000. The Changing Role of NGOs in the Provision of Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance: Case Study 1- Afghanistan/Pakistan, by N. Nicholds Borton, UK, 1994. "Security and Cash for Afghanistan Right Away", comment by William Shawcross, The International Herald Tribune. 31 January 2002. Swedish Institute for Development Assistance: Understanding the Economy of Afghanistan: An Exploratory Study, by Ostrom, January 1997. Swiss Peace Foundation: Afghanistan: Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in a Regional Framework, by Barnett Rubin, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, and Olivier Roy, Koff Peacebuilding Reports, January 2001. United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs: Afghanistan, Coordination in a Fragmented State, by A. Donini, E. Dudley, and R. Ockwell, A Lesson Learned Report, 1996. UNDP/World Bank, "Study Report: Afghanistan's International Trade Relations with Neighboring Countries", Afghanistan Watching Brief, by M. Z. Khan, June 2001. United States Institute for Peace: Rebuilding Afghanistan—A Framework for Establishing Security and the Rule of Law, 15 January 2002. UNOCHA: Afghanistan--1998 Consolidated Appeal, 1998. Afghanistan--1999 Appeal, 1998. Afghanistan--2000 Appeal, 1999. Initial Inter-Agency Humanitarian Emergency Assistance Plan for Afghans in Afghanistan and in Neighboring Countries, October 2001--March 2002.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Afghanistan, by L. Dupree. Princeton, NJ, Princetown University Press, 1980. "Afghanistan Under the Taliban", by Barnett Rubin. Current History 98(625), 1999, pp. 79--91. "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions", by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General Letter, 5 December 2001 to the President of the Security General, 2001. "Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan Conflict and United Nations Peacemaking", by M. Fielden and Jonathan Goodhand. Conflict, Security, Development 1(3), 2001. "Coherence or Cooption? Politics, Aid and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan", by Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2001, online: www.jha.ac/articles/a069.htm. "Doing Well Out of War", by Paul Collier. In M. Berdal and Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. "From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North Eastern Afghanistan", by Jonathan Goodhand. Central Asian Survey 19(2), 2000, pp. 265--280. From Rhetoric to Reality: The Role of Aid in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, by Haneef Atmar, Sultan Barakat, and Arne Strand. York, UK, University of York, 1998. Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley. London, Hurst & Company, 1998. Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, by A. Oleson. UK, Curzon Press, 1995. NGOs and Peace Building in Afghanistan, by Sultan Barakat, Ehsan, and Arne Strand. Workshop report, The University of York, 1999. NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies--Afghanistan Study, by Jonathan Goodhand. UK, University of Manchester/INTRAC, 2000, online: idpm. man.ac.uk/idpm/idpm-dp.htm. Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, by M. Duffield, P. Grossman, and N. Leader, Commissioned by the Strategic Monitoring Unit, Afghanistan, 2001. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, by Ahmed Rashid. London, I. B. Tauris, 2000. The Chimera of Ethnicity in Afghanistan: Ethnic Affiliation No Basis for a New Regime, by C. Schetter, NZZ Online, 10 December 2001, www.nzz.ch/english. The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946, by L. S. Vartan Gregorian, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1967. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, by Barnett Rubin, Ashraf Ghani, William Maley, Ahmed Rashid, and Olivier Roy. New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2001. "The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan", by Barnett R. Rubin. World Development 28(10), 2000, pp. 1789-1803. The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State, by Barnett Rubin. New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1995. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism", by Ahmed Rashid. Current Affairs Digest, book 66, February 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.afgha.com/ (Northern Alliance site ) www.afghanan.net/ (AfghanNet) www.afghan-info.com/afghnews.htm (Afghanistan Information Center) www.afghanistan.org/ (Afghanistan Peace Organization ) www.afghanradio.com/azadi.html (Azadi Afghan Radio) www.afghan-web.com/aop/today.html (Afghanistan Online news) www.afghan-web.com/politics/ (Afghan Politics) www.crisisweb.org (International Crisis Group with reports on Central Asia online) www.eurasianet.org/ (An Open Society Institute site that provides an independent source of news and analysis about Tajikistan) www.fas.harvard.edu/~centasia (Perhaps the richest and most concentrated source of information on Central Asian studies worldwide) www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/afghan.html (INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict in Afghanistan) www.institute-for-afghan-studies.org/ (Institute for Afghan Studies) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace reporting) www.loyajirga.com (Loya Jirga site) www.omaid.com/ (Afghan newspaper with international distribution) www.pcpafg.org (Office of the UN Co-ordinator for Afghanistan) www.preventconflict.org/portal/centralasia/ (A conflict prevention initiative by Harvard scholars with detailed a detailed data base of summarized articles and links) www.reliefweb.int (ReliefWeb Afghanistan) www.usip.org/library/regions/afghan.html (Excellent overview of Taliban and Afghanistan Web Links)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Rehman Baba, University Town, Peshawar, Pakistan Nancy Dupree, e-mail: acbaar@radio.brain.net.pk Simon Fisher, Responding to Conflict, e-mail: simon@respond.org William Maley, School of Politics, University College, Australian Defense Force, e-mail: w-maley@adfa.edu.au Peter Marsden, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, e-mail: peter.marsden@refugeecouncil.org.uk Ahmed Rashid, e-mail: review@brain.net.pk Olivier Roy, French Center for Scientific Research, e-mail: oroy@princeton.edu Barnett R. Rubin, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, e-mail: Barnett.Rubin@nyu.edu Susanne Schmeidl, Swiss Peace Foundation, e-mail: schmeidl@swisspeace.unibe.ch Elizabeth Winter, British Agencies Afghanistan Group, e-mail: elizabeth.winter@www.baag.org.uk
ORGANISATIONS:	Office of the UN Co-ordinator for Afghanistan, H 292, St 55, Sector F-10/4 Islamabad, Pakistan, Tel +92-51-2211451, Web site: www.pcpafg.org Data on the following organizations can be found in the Directory section In Pakistan: Afghan Development Association; Afghan NGO's Coordination Bureau; Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief; Co-operation Center for Afghanistan; Co-operation for Peace and Unity; Islamic Coordination Council; Program on Peace Studies & Conflict Resolution; Research and Advisory Council of Afghanistan; Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan; In the United States: Afghanistan Foundation; Afghanistan Peace Association; Human Rights Watch; Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy; Women's Alliance for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan; United States Institute of Peace; Others: British Agencies Afghanistan Group; Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit; Swiss Peace Foundation.

About the author

Jonathan Goodhand is currently a lecturer in the Department of Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He previously conducted research with University of Manchester, INTRAC, and DFID on aid, conflict, and peacebuilding, and has managed NGO programs in South and Central Asia. Mohammed Haneef Atmar has an M.A. in Post-War Recovery Studies, University of York, United Kingdom. He is currently deputy country director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Afghanistan. He has written extensively on aid policy and practice, aid policy and peacebuilding in Afghanistan, and institutional development of NGOs, among others.