Author	Anna Matveeva
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

In the early 1990s, Georgia survived a number of great upheavals that overshadowed its newly won independence. Conflict in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia led to violence and the flight of many Georgians from conflict zones. The situation in Georgia has stabilized since, but neither the political status of the breakaway territories nor the return of the displaced have been resolved, despite intensive international involvement. The UN took the lead in resolution of the Abkhaz conflict while the OSCE concentrated on South Ossetia, with international NGOs pursuing many second-track initiatives. Attacks of Georgian paramilitaries on Abkhazia have upset the fragile progress made both by leaderships and NGOs, making resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia more difficult than ever.

Abkhazia (12.5 percent of territory of the Republic of Georgia) is situated on the Black Sea coast, stretching along the Caucasian mountains and bordering Russia in the north. For Georgia, it is a valuable territory. The former Soviet Riviera, it contains half of Georgia's coastline, including the best resorts, rich agricultural resources, a major power station, and rail and road links to Russia. Demography played a vital role in a small-scale but brutal war in Abkhazia, with a high degree of intercommunal violence. Because of the influx of Georgians since the 1920s, the Abkhaz were a minority in their own homeland. Numbering just 93,000, they constituted just 1.8 percent of Georgia's population in 1989, and 17 percent of population of Abkhazia, with the remainder consisting of ethnic Georgians, accounting for 45 percent, and Armenians and Russians, accounting for a further 30 percent.

Georgian-Abkhaz interethnic relations deteriorated after 1988, as did relations between the central government in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, and Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. Cultural and language rights became the first focus of dissension, with a power-sharing dispute to follow. The main fighting took place in 1992–1993. Following civil strife in Georgia proper and the overthrow of the nationalist president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, power was assumed by an unstable coalition of paramilitary leaders, most notably Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani. They invited Eduard Shevardnadze, the former first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and later the Soviet foreign minister, to head the state in the hope of securing international recognition and domestic legitimacy. In August 1992, the Georgian State Council ordered Georgian troops, comprised primarily of paramilitaries led by Kitovani, to enter Abkhazia to ensure railroad safety and rescue officials allegedly kidnapped by Zviadists. Their entry was accompanied by wanton violence and human-rights abuses against Abkhaz and other non-Georgian civilians. Although Shevardnadze denied sanctioning the march on Sukhumi that led to full-scale war, he subsequently endorsed it.

In response to the Georgian attack, the Abkhaz, joined by most non-Georgians, mobilized support from ethnically related peoples of the North Caucasus, with Chechen fighters playing an important part in boosting military morale. The Abkhaz also benefited from Russian military support channeled through the Russian bases in Abkhazia. Initially the Abkhaz lost most of the territory to the Georgian troops, but in March 1993 managed to fight back and in June they launched a counteroffensive during which atrocities were perpetrated by Abkhaz troops. Their advance culminated in a decisive victory in September. The Georgian population fled from most of Abkhazia. In November 1999, the Abkhaz leadership proclaimed formal independence.

The conflict in Abkhazia is rooted both in the legacy of the Soviet nationalities policy and in the rise of ethnic nationalism during the demise of the USSR. The Soviet administrative arrangements were a source of grievance for both sides. Soviet policy granted political status to major nationalities within the Soviet state and ranked them in a hierarchical federal system. In the Soviet ethno-federal construction, the union republics had the highest status, followed by the autonomous republics in the second rank. Abkhazia was created as a separate union republic in 1921, but was joined with Georgia in a confederate union treaty later the same year. Abkhazia's status was downgraded in 1931 as a result of its incorporation into the Georgian union republic as an autonomous republic. The Soviet legacy continues to dominate mind-sets. The Abkhaz saw Stalin's Georgian nationality reflected in the post–World War II migration of large numbers of Georgians into Abkhazia. Meanwhile, despite the small Abkhaz population, Georgians were wary of preferential treatment accorded to the Abkhaz.

The political culture of the region is characterized by an exclusive ethnic nationalism and profound skeptism of autonomy structures. Since the late 1980s, actors on both sides have exploited to their political advantage opportunities presented by perestroika, greater freedom, and unprecedented geopolitical change. While Georgians were concerned with Russian domination and sought to break away from Russia's rule, the Abkhaz were driven by the fear of assimilation into the Georgian nation and the future viability of their community. Both sides attempted to elevate their political status: the Georgians by seeking outright independence from the Soviet Union, and the Abkhaz by demanding union republic status and status within the USSR equal to the Georgians. Cultural claims and interpretations of history brought intellectuals to the forefront of political battles, including the Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, a historian, and Georgian ex-president Gamsakhurdia, a Soviet dissident. The proliferation of Georgian militias led to a collapse of political authority over coercive forces. The Abkhaz retaliated by forming their own militias and forging links with the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples, which mobilized volunteers for the Abkhaz cause.

Russia played a controversial role in the conflict, with various parts of the Russian establishment supporting different sides. Parts of the Russian military and security structures and parliamentarians rendered assistance to the Abkhaz, but the Russian military also helped Shevardnadze to defeat his opponents in Georgia, evacuating him from the battlefield in Abkhazia. During the conflict, the Russian foreign ministry and the military high command acted as mediators between the parties, while individual military regiments pursued their own political and business agendas on the ground.

Conflict Dynamics

Since 1993, the internal political situation in Georgia has greatly improved. President Shevardnadze has managed to rid himself of unruly allies and consolidated his regime. As a result, the Georgian leadership is able to pursue a more coherent policy toward conflict on its territory. Still, Georgia painfully feels the loss of Abkhazia, and the leadership has attempted to bring it back under Georgian sovereignty in one form or another. To achieve this, Georgia has used three political tools: (1) imposition of economic restrictions on Abkhazia within a CIS framework enforced by Russia, (2) involvement of the Western powers to provide a counterbalance to Russian influence, and (3) tacit support for Georgian guerrillas groups such as the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, operating in the border zone. These policies have brought mixed results. Sanctions have only reinforced a siege mentality among the Abkhaz and radicalized their stance, and were mostly abandoned by Russia in 1999 when Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated and the second war in Chechnya began.

The internationalization of conflict-resolution efforts has paid off, bringing Georgia into the spotlight of the international community and enabling it to attract aid and investment. Guerrillas do put pressure on the Abkhaz, since they penetrate as far as Sukhumi and inflict casualties on the Abkhaz militias, but the Abkhaz militias respond with punitive raids, often indiscriminate, on Georgian returnees in the border area. Tensions escalated in May 1998 when fighting broke out in the border region of Gali, resulting in the expulsion by the Abkhaz troops of Georgian paramilitaries and some 40,000 Georgian returnees.

Little progress has been made at bilateral negotiations. Two major issues continue to stand out: the question of the future political status of Abkhazia and the return of Georgian internally displaced persons (IDPs). Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Abkhaz leadership sought to conclude a federal power-sharing agreement with Tbilisi, but since the war they've insisted on internal sovereignty within a loose confederation, or outright independence. Tbilisi wants Abkhazia to recognize that it is a subordinate part of the Georgian state while guaranteeing self-rule and noninterference in Abhazian internal affairs.

The Abkhaz maintain that unification in a single state does not provide any assurance that Georgia will maintain its obligations in the long run. They claim that if they disband their armed units, they will be unable to defend themselves if more nationalistic forces should gain power in Georgia. Furthermore, unification will be followed by a mass influx of Georgians, who might commit atrocities in revenge, and would gradually come to outnumber the Abkhaz, making them once again a minority in Abkhazia. Democratic processes will work in favor of the Georgians since they will have a numerical majority, and there will be no superior arbiter to ensure the Abkhaz rights. This has led the Abkhaz leaders to assert that they must never again allow themselves to become a minority—with a clear implication that they will not accept a return to their prior subordinate position.

The Abkhaz suspect that returnees will be a fifth column preparing the way for Georgian reconquest and have kept the rate of return to a trickle (UNHCR-assisted return has amounted to 311) by vetting returnees, but have not interfered with unofficial spontaneous return to the Gali region. A unilateral Abkhaz initiative to permit return to Gali was announced in 1999, but Georgia was prevented from providing security. Those who return do so at their own risk and find themselves at the mercy of Abkhaz militias operating in the border area and Georgian paramilitaries chasing them out. Since Gali is Abkhazia's prime agricultural region, gangs from both sides practice racketeering and deprive farmers of much of their income in return for dubious protection. The security situation in the Kodori Valley and the Gali district remains precarious. In December 2000, two UN military observers were kidnapped and held hostage in the Kodori Valley, and in January 2001 a remote-controlled mine explosion was directed at the CIS peacekeeping force (PKF). In April 2001 a wave of killings and hostage taking on both sides brought the parties to the brink of renewed hostilities.

Many IDPs are concentrated in Tbilisi and its suburbs or in Western Georgia close to the Abkhaz border. They form an outspoken lobby, with their own parliament, government-in-exile, and links to the paramilitaries operating in Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership sponsors the government-in-exile for two political ends: to put pressure on the Abkhaz side and to perpetuate the polarization of refugees so as to maintain the issue of the right of return. Some observers perceive that the Georgian government intentionally keeps IDPs in limbo, although after seven years of exile a policy to assist them in adapting to their new circumstances would probably be preferable.

Since late 1999, the World Bank and the UN Development Program (UNDP) started to pursue a new approach to the IDP situation to help them adjust to their new circumstances, without excluding the possibility of return. UNHCR has adopted a modified approach by targeting assistance to improve the situation of IDPs in their current places of residence, and to improve relations between the IDPs and the local population by increasing the transfer of resources to the regions under strain.

War and the collapse of the Soviet economic system have inflicted painful consequences on both sides, but Georgia has been able to attract international aid and investment, and has started to overcome the economic chaos that developed in the early 1990s. In Georgian-Abkhaz relations, mutual economic interests sometimes prevail over political confrontation; for instance, cooperation over the Inguri dam and hydroelectric power plants, vital for both sides, has progressed smoothly. Citing this example, the Abkhaz claim that there is no need to agree on status and restore relations to ensure progress in the economic field.

The predominant discourse on the Abkhaz side is that there is no desire to enter a common state with Georgia. The common perception is that if incorporated into Georgia, the Abkhaz have a lot to lose, such as security and dominant political position. Since the end of the war, the political regime in Abkhazia has undergone consolidation. President Ardzinba has managed to concentrate power within formal institutions and ensure functioning political process, although restrictions on internal democracy and free media are increasingly felt. Ethnic Abkhaz are dominant in both the political and commercial arenas. The economic viability of the breakaway regime has also improved. Rich agricultural land and ad hoc trade links with Russia and Turkey have ensured survival, and vacationers have started to return to the Black Sea resorts. Following Russia's introduction of the visa regime with Georgia in December 2000, which exempts Abkhazia and South Ossetia, incorporation of these territories into Russia's economic and social space has proceeded further.

Trade and economic restrictions contributed to the development of a criminal and national-resistance economy, and to the proliferation of smuggling and black-market activities. Attracting foreign investment is difficult, but international aid has helped to improve the situation for a reduced population.

Some observers express the view that the solution to the problems in Abkhazia is not related exclusively to reaching a settlement on the political status with the Georgian government, but also to finding new ways of ensuring sovereignty for all people living on the territory of Abkhazia and redefining relations between different ethnic communities irrespective of political status.

The two Russian wars in Chechnya have had an impact on developments in Georgia. During the first war, the Russian military needed to ensure President Shevardnadze's support against the Chechen fighters and especially his consent to use Georgian territory for air strikes on Chechnya. In return for this, the Russian military were prepared to close the Russian-Abkhaz border and to impose restrictions on the movement of Abkhaz males. However, in the interwar period Georgian-Chechen relations improved greatly while relations with Russia deteriorated. The beginning of the second war was marked by the opening of Russia's border with Abkhazia in retaliation for the lax border controls over the Chechen sector. Meanwhile, the security situation in the Kodori Valley and in Gali deteriorated throughout 2001 as kidnappings and killings of locals became frequent occurrences and Russian peacekeepers and UNOMIG personnel were targeted by Georgian paramilitaries. Tensions culminated in the October 2001 attacks in the Abkhaz territory by Georgian and Chechen fighters, the latter having been moved by the Georgian Interior Ministry from Pankassi Valley, where they concentrated escaping war in Chechnya. An UNOMIG helicopter was shot down and nine people died as a result. The Abkhaz mobilized and fought back, forcing the attackers to flee, while Georgia accused Russia of assisting the Abkhaz side in carrying out retaliation air strikes on the Georgian territory. The outcome was a political crisis in Tblisi, when the president dismissed his entire government and the parliamentary speaker amidst protests, and the Abkhaz requested membership in the Russian Federation.

Official Conflict Management

Shevardnadze's reputation attracted much international attention to the conflicts in Georgia, since they were interpreted as a testing ground of Russian neo-imperialism. However, intergovernmental organizations only became actively involved in Georgia in the postconflict phase by facilitating negotiations, monitoring the cease-fire, and providing delivery of various aid programs and serving to counterbalance the Russian influence.

The United Nations assumed the prime responsibility for resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia and since 1992 has worked in an uneasy partnership with Russian official mediators. In December 1993, talks between the Georgians and the Abkhaz under Russian and UN auspices resulted in the signing of a memorandum of understanding. The Georgian government had requested a multinational UN peacekeeping force. This was not endorsed by the UN, given peacekeeping problems in the former Yugoslavia, and a Russian force under the CIS mandate was agreed upon. In May 1994, agreements were reached on a cease-fire (Moscow Treaty) and on deployment of a CIS PKF to be monitored by a UN observer mission (UNOMIG). This force has remained in place ever since, with some 1,500 (Russian) peacekeepers (the PKF) and 137 UNOMIG officers (figures as of July 2000) patrolling a twenty-four-kilometer-wide security zone. The UNOMIG mandate is based on the right of return for all IDPs and preservation of territorial integrity of Georgia within the 1991 borders. UNOMIG has restricted its operations because of poor security in the conflict zone. Consequently, its impact is limited compared to the resources committed to the operation. UNOMIG presence was designed to ensure the impartiality of the Russian peacekeepers, but in reality does little to dispel Georgian allegations about PKF partiality.

Throughout the mid-1990s, the Abkhaz leadership was subjected to pressure to make concessions, first by the Russian government joined by the UN, and later by Western governments. Russia closed its land border with Abkhazia in late 1994 and imposed a naval blockade in response to the imposition of sanctions by the CIS in 1996. Moscow played a significant negotiating role and its bouts of shuttle diplomacy have borne fruit in a series of high-level meetings between Georgian and Abkhaz officials. This culminated in a major step forward in August 1997 when Shevardnadze and Ardzinba met in Tbilisi and signed an agreement renouncing the use of force.

Still, the role of Russia has given grounds for discontent on both sides. The Georgians accuse the PKF of failing to fulfill its mandate and secure the return of the displaced, lax imposition of border controls, and Russia of reluctance to complete its withdrawal, scheduled for 2001, from its military base in Gudauta (Abkhazia). Tbilisi has several times threatened to refuse to extend the PKF mandate, complaining that both Abkhaz territorial gains and the displacement of ethnic Georgians are perpetuated by the presence of the PKF. Well-equipped Georgian paramilitaries have targeted Russian peacekeepers in the Gali region, killing about sixty. The Abkhaz also have reason for discontent. They believe that the PKF is not doing enough to protect them from Georgian guerrillas and assert that contingents of North Caucasian volunteers would be more effective. Russia's support for Georgian territorial integrity and the sanctions it continues to impose on Abkhazia provoke resentment, but since Russia is the only Abkhaz ally, criticism is restrained.

In 1993, the UN Secretary-General designated Swiss diplomat Eduard Brunner as special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to mediate between the parties. Brunner's approach was to tackle the issue of political status first and encourage the parties to sign a peace settlement. In 1997 Yevgeny Primakov, the then Russian foreign minister, played a crucial role in arranging the high-level meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz officials, and an agreement mediated by both Moscow and the UN appeared to be close, but negotiations broke down at the last minute.

Liviu Bota, a Romanian diplomat who succeeded Brunner in 1997, tried an indirect approach leaving the issue of status aside and concentrating on more practical issues. He initiated the Geneva process, a series of meetings to negotiate political issues involving the parties and various international mediators. An action program was adopted by the end of 1997. Three working groups were set up for the prevention of a resumption of hostilities, the return of the displaced persons, and economic rehabilitation. A coordinating council was established and undertook many useful initiatives. Further meetings took place in Athens and Istanbul, supported by high-level delegations of Georgians and Abkhaz to each other's capitals, with the hope of creating a process in which the relationship could be rebuilt and progress in particular areas achieved, so as to facilitate subsequent progress on political status. Economic assistance was designed to provide an additional incentive for peace. The UNDP sent a needs-assessment mission to Abkhazia in February 1998, and a number of donors, including the United States and the EU, committed funds to reconstruction and assistance programs conditioned on progress toward a political settlement. This initiative failed after the May 1998 events in Gali when external agencies realized that parties were not prepared to move beyond their entrenched positions.

Bota facilitated internationalization of the conflict-resolution efforts, making it less of a Russian-led process. He also promoted the role of the Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia, a self-appointed group consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia, since such a mechanism had achieved successes in other conflicts. The Friends of the Secretary-General were recognized as official observers to the Geneva process in November 1997, but were greeted from the start with distrust by the Abkhaz because of their fundamental position on the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Neither of these approaches has so far had much success in achieving a negotiated settlement, but this can hardly be blamed on the UN, given the wide differences over the issue of status between conflicting parties and the lack of any real military threat. Rather, UN activities have helped to prevent more serious confrontations from erupting, forced the parties to reflect on the consequences of their actions in light of the international situation, and contributed positively to the management of the conflict and cease-fire.

The chairmanship of SRSG Dieter Boden reinvigorated the coordination-council process and provided impetus for the resumption of the work of Working Groups I and III. Nevertheless, a solution to Abkhazia's political status remains elusive. Still, there is some reason for hope following the March 2001 Yalta political dialogue. The sides issued a joint statement and signed a Program of Action for Confidence-Building between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties. The Annex to the program specifies concrete steps to be undertaken within the program's framework.

The Yalta meeting was notable in yet another respect: each official delegation included three representatives of the NGO community, which has had the effect of elevating the status of NGOs in the two regions. Still, the Yalta meeting had only limited impact, since ultimately neither side excludes the possibility of a resumption of military action.

The UN Human Rights Office in Abkhazia (HROAG) monitors and reports on human rights as part of the UNOMIG. The HROAG trains educators, the media, NGOs, the judiciary, and law-enforcement bodies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (Red Cross/Red Crescent) also plays an active role in the protection of the civilian population, with a special emphasis on vulnerable groups, by informing the authorities regarding cases of discrimination. UNHCR conducts limited protection monitoring in areas of return.

OSCE's function has been to support UN efforts, but the organization came to be viewed negatively by the Abkhaz following the Budapest 1994 and the Lisbon 1996 Summit decisions when the OSCE mentioned "ethnic cleansing" by the Abkhaz without expressing concern over Georgian intervention in Abkhazia. The establishment of the UN/OSCE Human Rights Office in Sukhumi in 1996 was initially viewed in such a light. The situation changed after the December 1998 Oslo Ministerial Council meeting when the OSCE increasingly engaged with officials, NGOs, and the media on the Abkhaz side. At present, it provides small grants to Abkhaz NGOs.

Although not directly engaged in conflict resolution, the European Union has been active in the region through its Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program, renamed EuropeAid. It has provided funds for the reconstruction of the Inguri dam and support for development of civil society, including dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz NGOs.

Any potential role for NATO in the Caucasus is a highly charged political issue, especially in view of NATO actions in Kosovo. Georgians hope that closer links with NATO, which their leadership promotes, will lead the alliance to enforce a peace deal in Abkhazia as desired by Georgia, despite the fact that NATO has given no indication of its readiness to do so. The Abkhaz are apprehensive of such involvement, but hope that Georgia's close relations with NATO will provoke Russia to be more supportive of Abkhazia. This in effect has happened since Russia's second war in Chechnya.

The Council of Europe accepted Georgian membership in 1999. Since then it has created the Venice Commission for discussions on the status of Abkhazia. The first meeting took place in February 2001 in Pitsunda, Abkhazia, and a second one should take place in Tbilisi.

Initiatives have also been taken by the Georgians and the Abkhaz themselves, such as the Bilateral Coordination Commission headed by Executive Director Zurab Lakerbaia, who is half Georgian and half Abkhaz.

In November 2000 a joint assessment mission visited the region, led by the UN, with the participation of OSCE, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission. The ICRC and UNHCR sent observers. The purpose of the mission was to evaluate conditions for the return of refugees and IDPs.

Multi Track Diplomacy

[* Some of the information in this section draws on research carried out for the joint EWI/FEWER Project on Mapping Local Capacities for Conflict Prevention in the Caucasus.]

In the early 1990s, development of civil society in Georgia including the conflict regions was influenced by ethnic politics and efforts to cope with the consequences of violence. As a result, a culture of tolerance was slow to develop. The Soviet legacy of state domination was significant, since there was scant understanding about the role of the third sector and its relationship to the state. A tradition of independent agents of society was largely absent, while the state regarded NGOs with suspicion and NGOs themselves easily became politicized. This was especially true with NGOs voicing opposition views on politically contentious issues, such as political status and the return of IDPs.

Since independence, sentiments have changed substantially. Prior to the outbreak of armed conflicts, societies were receptive to mobilization projects aimed at realization of national goals, but when wars and massive suffering followed, the lesson most people took away was that individual survival was more important than the pursuit of political goals. The societies became more inward-looking as the standard of living declined and the sense of disillusionment impeded the development of civil society, although Western policymaking entities provided external impetus and financial support for the growth of local NGOs.

Since independence, Georgia has been a cause célèbre for international involvement in the former Soviet Union. Many international humanitarian organizations are present in Georgia and their activities range from organizing the return of displaced persons to supplying emergency aid and assistance to the most vulnerable groups among the displaced, and strengthening capacities of local NGOs. For the small territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Western involvement in conflict-resolution activities has been huge compared to conflicts elsewhere in the CIS. Whether this occurred because the international community was hopeful that conflict resolution had more prospects in Georgia, or to Shevardnadze's leadership efforts to bring the issue into high profile, or because of the proximity to Europe and appeal of the place and its people, Abkhazia and South Ossetia emerged as a great opportunities for testing multi-track approaches.

On the positive side, this has meant that local NGOs have had a chance to consolidate their capacities and to acquire skills. Their efforts have been directed toward areas that the international community regarded favorably, and certain values that international community saw as positive have been cultivated. There is, however, a risk that an agenda will be imposed from outside, and that projects have been tailored to match the requirements of international donors. Moreover, involvement in the third sector has been a way for many intellectuals and academics to find new roles for themselves—and family members as well—in the area of conflict analysis and resolution after previous jobs ended along with the dissolution of the USSR. As a result, there is considerable skepticism on both sides about the other's intentions.

At the same time, where outright hostility between the parties to conflict precluded legitimate commercial links or social interaction, NGOs provided the only communication channels available. Still, constraints on their operations were also significant. Georgian interference with telephone lines out of Abkhazia in 1995–1998 made communication between NGOs on both sides difficult, and restrictions on movement for the Abkhaz and tensions in the border area prohibited direct contacts on the ground. Initially, logistical problems created suspicion between local NGOs, but the situation did improve when better interaction was possible and personal relationships were gradually rebuilt. NGOs in Abkhazia, as in other breakaway entities, faced another hurdle, in view of the general apprehension of international organizations, all of which adhere to the notion of the territorial integrity of Georgia. NGOs easily become susceptible to accusations that they've lost touch with their national agendas.

Bilateral Contacts Between NGOs
International NGOs (INGOs) played a significant role in opening up channels for dialogue between the conflicting parties, having facilitated a number of direct contacts between the opponents. In many cases, without the support of INGOs these initiatives could not have developed. International Alert (IA) has been involved in conflict-resolution activities in Abkhazia since 1992, and in February 1996 facilitated an informal meeting between Georgian and Abkhaz NGO representatives at the conference in Moscow that started the development of the long-term program of confidence-building measures in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The initiative is funded by EU TACIS and laid the foundation for the emergence of the Caucasus NGO Forum (see below).

From 1 to 5 June 1996, International Alert facilitated the first meeting between Georgian and Abkhaz NGO and policymaking communities. The International Center on Conflict and Negotiations (ICCN), the best-developed Georgian NGO working in the conflict-resolution field, was IA's partner on the Georgian side at the initial meeting and in the following Georgian-Abkhaz confidence building projects. The Abkhaz partners in this project were the Civic Initiative–Person of Future Foundation. Its founders were a part of the Abkhaz political establishment. Although they participated in the NGO activities in their individual rather than official capacities, they had better access to the key political actors and decisionmakers in Abkhazia. In 1997, IA facilitated a bilateral meeting between Georgians and Abkhaz NGOs in Yerevan on overcoming mutual stereotypes. It continues with its confidence-building program, focusing on three strategic priorities—women, young, people, and ex-combatants—and has brought Georgian and Abkhaz NGO representatives to an internship program in London.

United Nations Volunteers (part of the UNDP), has done extensive work among the IDP community and with Abkhaz NGOs. It played a prominent role in the establishment and development of contacts between the divided communities and in facilitating access to Abkhazia for other INGOs. Martin Schümmer, Paata Zakareishvili (who has done pioneering work in conflict resolution with Abkhazia partners), and Batal Kobakhia from the Centre of Humanitarian Programs (CHP) all made major contributions.

Paula Garb from the University of California at Irvine, whose early work in Abkhazia addressed environmental and development issues, later addressed the role of citizen diplomacy options for postconflict settlement, helping to initiate a series of bilateral meetings in Russia. The "academic" nature of this work was key, since the Abkhaz were reluctant to engage in bilateral dialogue with the Georgian side by the late 1990s. In subsequent meetings, discussions have moved from academic to policy issues.

In 1997 a dialogue process was initiated by the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, and United Nations Volunteers (UNV) that involved civic activists, officials, and politicians. After a break of three years, this dialogue process was reinvigorated by Berghof and Conciliation Resources and in 2000 and 2001 five informal dialogue meetings have been organized for officials from Georgia and Abkhazia.

Russian organizations, namely the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (IEA), led by its director Valery Tishkov, Glasnost Foundation under the chairmanship of Sergei Grigoriants, and individuals such as Viktor Popkov from the NGO Omega, promoted dialogue interventions in the early 1990s. They were, however, inevitably perceived by the Georgian side as Russian-biased.

Other organizations involved in promoting dialogue were VERTIC (LINKS/Caucasus Links at present), which organized a Georgian-Abkhaz meeting on environmental issues in 1996, and the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University, which made an effort to bring together Georgian and Abkhaz parliamentarians in the United States in 1997.

However, from fairly early on the Abkhaz demonstrated an increasing reluctance to take part in bilateral contacts with the Georgian side. Their argument was that these contacts would lead nowhere if the ultimate goal of such projects was the reintegration of Abkhazia back into Georgia. Subsequently, the Abkhaz preference for multilateral contacts gained momentum.

Multilateral Contacts and Training
There is no shortage of multilateral projects in the South Caucasus. At the same time, constraints exist on the ability of local actors to pursue multilateral undertakings without the involvement of international groups, since such activities normally have a political undertone, however subtle, or are perceived as such. For instance, South Ossetian and Circassian organizations maintain contacts with Abkhaz NGOs for activities such as citizen education and sport exchanges, but this is greatly facilitated by their common political agenda. By the same token, this political filter is often applied to the links between Georgian, Chechen, and Azerbaijani NGOs.

The HCA was one of the first organizations to establish a network of local NGO offices through its Transcaucasia Dialogue movement, begun in 1992. In Georgia HCA branches include a national office in Tbilisi and branch offices in Kutaisi and Telavi. The HCA branches have served as umbrellas for civic initiatives and new NGOs that lack legal status and organization. In 1996 the International Helsinki Citizen's Assembly (HCA) established a regional structure with a Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) liaison officer based in Tbilisi and Baku. The HCA South Caucasus Commission on refugees/IDPs was initiated by the IDP Women's Association from Tbilisi. The commission responded to the 1998 Gali crisis by fostering regional cooperation on social-psychological rehabilitation and protection of social, economic, and political rights.

In 1998, IA facilitated the confidence-builidng meeting at which the participants decided to establish the Caucasus NGO Forum, an international undertaking providing for pan-Caucasian interaction. In part, the creation of a multilateral platform was a response to the Abkhaz's reluctance to continue bilateral meetings with the Georgians. The forum is a network uniting about fifty local peacemaking organizations from the North and South Caucasus and provides an opportunity to take into account the broader Caucasian context, its interrelated conflicts, linkages, and alliances. For instance, it enabled a dialogue between Georgians on one hand, and Circassians and Chechens who supported the Abkhaz, on the other. The forum has focused on programs for women, youth, and ex-combatants, and organized a peacebuilding mission to Karachaevo-Cherkessia to calm down local passions and make local actors realize the bitter lessons of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

LINKS and its partner Caucasus Links have pursued a multi-track approach in the Caucasus, working with prospective young leaders and professionals and extending links between different ethnic groups.

Participants from the Caucasus attended conferences and courses in conflict resolution in a wide variety of Western organizations. The Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland has been involved in the Caucasus since 1994, and in 1995 brought together individuals from various hot spots in the South Caucasus for a four-month program of NGO training.

The ICCN implements "Peace Education and Conflict Management Training," which is to continue into 2004. ICCN is also involved in the South Caucasus Network for Civil Accord in partnership with eight NGOs from the region.

The Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) has launched an initiative for the Stability Pact for the Caucasus where conflict resolution in Georgia is a central tenet.

Reintegration of Displaced Populations and Conflict Prevention
In societies affected by large-scale displacement, the displaced persons represent a source of future conflict—a recruitment base for those who seek to achieve settlement by force. Many of the displaced are confused about the current situation and whether their best solution is to adapt to the new environment or to await their return home. At the same time, IDP groups play an active role in peace initiatives, since they consist of those people most affected by the conflict.

The IDP Women's Association pursues important work in and around Tbilisi, and also in the Zugdidi and Kutaisi regions of Western Georgia where many IDPs are concentrated. It has worked with CHP (Abkhazia) on a joint project to send children from both sides to the holiday camps. ICCN in Georgia has been undertaking a "Program of Training in Conflict Resolution Skills and Methods," sponsored by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), which played a significant role working with the displaced in Georgia. ICCN runs seminars and conflict-resolution workshops in Tbilisi and ten other regions where concentrated settlements of IDPs are located. This work is important in mitigating tensions and improving the atmosphere in the community, but has not yet reached out to the radical and vocal IDP political structures.

Local NGOs also work closely with international organizations and INGOs in relief provision. They do valuable work in improving morale, such as sending children from displaced families to summer camps, working with especially vulnerable groups, and increasing awareness of existing opportunities for help and empowerment. For example, Assist Yourself in Georgia has recently compiled an information packet for IDPs providing information on the rights of IDPs, and on governmental structures and aid agencies offering information on employment and training opportunities.

Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants
Separatist entities experience a very great need for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life or into the proper armed forces. Some are handicapped and psychologically traumatized, and the resources to help such vulnerable groups are extremely limited, while others never surrendered their weapons, do not hold proper jobs, and easily become engaged in crime and drug taking.

In Abkhazia, CHP renders medical and psychological assistance to ex-combatants and assists veterans' organizations. The CHP also has a rapid-response capacity to deal with veterans' problems. In 1999, the Caucasus Forum organized a meeting of ex-combatants in the Caucasus to build bridges between them and to promote their capacity to act as peacemakers. In May–June 2001, it facilitated an ex-combatants' conference entitled "Behavioral Norms in Caucasian Conflicts and Wars: Traditions and Current Practices."

Initiatives Among Particular Social Groups
The Centre for Human Rights and Support for Democracy in Abkhazia is engaged in developing women's capacities to act as peacemakers, and organizes women's bilateral and multilateral projects. It was involved in organizing a women's conference in Abkhazia in October 1999. CHP provided psychological rehabilitation for war-affected women in Abkhazia and undertook projects on sending women and children from both sides for treatment and rehabilitation.

In the Caucasus, contacts and trust are more easily established between young people than among the older generations, despite the fact that many young men have been involved in the fighting. Georgian NGOs such as Multinational Georgia have been taking steps to promote contacts among young people. This includes training seminars for young leaders and meetings of young journalists. The Academy for Educational Development (U.S.) brought children from both sides to summer camps in the United States and in the region, while the United Methodist Committee On Relief (UMCOR) set up youth houses for the young people in Tbilisi, Zugdidi, and Sukhumi.

The Foundation for the Development of Human Resources facilitated a bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz meeting of elderly people in Sochi. This is especially noteworthy since this was one of very few dialogue meetings organized without intervention by the external actors.

Mass Media and Information Exchange
Many INGOs have been active in the promotion and development of independent media. For example, Conciliation Resources (CR), in collaboration with UNV concentrated on capacity-building activities in Abkhazia, running training seminars for journalists and and NGOs. CR sought to pursue media and public awareness work across the conflict divide, having facilitated a visit of a Georgian journalist to Abkhazia and vice versa. A Georgian and an Abkhaz journalist who traveled together then made a joint radio program on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. CR also facilitated a series of TV discussion programs, undertaken by Studio Re, a Georgian NGO.

The Caucasus Media Support Project, funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, has been engaged in a project to promote regional dialogue among journalists in the South Caucasus, to facilitate more balanced reporting and make travel to the opponent's territory possible. Between 1997 and 2000, twelve conferences and training seminars were held, involving over two hundred participants from local print and broadcast media.

Between 1995 and 1998, the Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) published WarReport, a magazine that originally covered the conflicts in the Balkans and also later covered the Caucasus. It incorporated local voices into the debate, and drew on the local media networks. In 1999 IWPR launched an on-line service on the Caucasus.

Although the exchange of information has been established, it is not without problems. For instance, the Abkhaz side excluded Nuzhnaia Gazeta ("The Needed Newspaper"), the most popular Abkhaz daily, but also one critical of the authorities, from its official list of publications destined for the exchange with the Georgian side. The Abkhaz Information Ministry also limits distribution of the Georgian media to a tightly knit group of confidantes. Caucasus Home, a Georgian NGO, has played a valuable role here by supplementing the halfhearted efforts of officialdom. In summer 2001, ICCN started to produce The Peace Times, a new peacebuilding bimonthly magazine in Georgian.

Cross-Border Visits and Exchanges
South Ossetia has unrestricted interaction with Georgia, but Abkhazia remains officially off-limits to Georgians. UNV played a vital role in providing links between two divided communities and in facilitating visits by Georgian and Abkhaz representatives to each other's territory. Batal Kobakhia from Abkhazia and Paata Zakareishvili from Tbilisi were the first to achieve this breakthrough. Subsequently, five representatives of the Georgian NGOs visited Abkhazia to participate in the South Caucasian NGO Conference on Migration held in Pitsunda.

In autumn 1999 the head of Assist Yourself, a representative from the displaced community who is half Georgian and half Abkhaz, was invited by the Abkhaz women's organizations to take part in a conference in Pitsunda. She was able to convey the problems and feelings of the displaced Georgians to the Abkhaz side. In November 1999, LINKS facilitated a conference on "Self-Determination in Conditions of Interdependence" organized in partnership with the National Human Rights Committee of Abkhazia, which was attended by Georgian representatives. A number of other significant cross-border visits and exchanges have also taken place, usually organized with travel assistance by the UN. In 2000, the Caucasus NGO Forum organized a women's conference in Tblisi in partnership with the Caucasus House, in which representatives of Abkhaz NGOs took part.

Research and Public Debate
Research and analysis occupy a prominent place in the activities of many NGOs. Much of the published research is on issues of conflict, but in some cases, it tends to provide historical justification for claims and actions of different sides. The other, more practical field of research is that of polling and population surveys. In Abkhazia, for instance, a sociological research group of the Civic Initiative Foundation conducted several surveys focused on demography and migration.

In Georgia, the Caucasian Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development (CIPDD) plays a leading role in debate and research on politics, security, and monitoring of the interethnic situation. ICCN also helps promote intellectual debate on political issues and conflict resolution.

Initially, Western reporting and debate on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict appeared to primarily reflect the Georgian perspective on the conflict due to the international isolation of Abkhazia. In the early 1990s, however, Abkhazia's profile was raised by the Unrepresented People's Organization, which sent a fact-finding mission to Abkhazia and served as an advocate for the Abkhaz position.

Since then the situation has changed considerably. In 1997, Bruno Coppieters of Vrije Universiteit of Brussels, together with colleagues from CIPDD, the Institute of Ethnology (Moscow), and the Centre for Human Rights and Support for Democracy (Abkhazia), organized two conferences in Brussels presenting the Georgian and Abkhaz perspectives on the conflict and addressing the issue of federalism and the principle of shared sovereignty. The aim of the project was to inject new ideas drawn from relevant European experience into the Georgian-Abkhaz search for a solution. Georgian and Abkhaz participants visited Switzerland and Belgium to be exposed to comparative federal experiences. A third project was started in the summer of 2000 on the foreign policies of federal states entitled "Federalization, Foreign Relations and the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict." Here, the focus is on a model of foreign policymaking in a federal framework largely based on the Belgian ethno-federal experience.

In 1999 CR published A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, which includes contributions by Georgian, Abkhaz, and international authors. Another project, led by Paula Garb on the effectiveness of citizens' diplomacy, resulted in a publication with contributions from Georgian and Abkhaz participants.

Enhancement of Local Capacities for Peace
In the context of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, civil-society actors in Abkhazia are at a disadvantage compared to their Georgian counterparts. Some INGOs have attempted to assist Abkhaz NGOs to find an identity and a social role independent of their potential partners in Georgia. UNV has helped to start many local projects in Abkhazia aimed at postwar rehabilitation, the promotion of a culture of peace, and the emergence of independent media. Both IA and the Berghof Foundation have engaged in activities to advance conflict-resolution skills in Abkhazia.

Since early 1998, CR has concentrated on capacity-building work in Abkhazia by providing training on conflict management, strategic planning, and international relations to NGOs, academics, and official actors in Abkhazia.

Currently CHP in Abkhazia functions as a resource center for other NGOs and conducts training in conflict resolution, in partnership with international NGOs and independently. In 1999, CHP was responsible for running a small-grants competition in Abkhazia aimed at building the capacity of the local NGOs.

Early Warning
Many local and international groups are engaged in the early-warning activities. For instance, ICCN runs a project on early warning and dissemination of information regarding potential tensions in Georgia, such as the situation in Ajara. The Conflict Resolution in the Post-Soviet States Project, pursued jointly by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Moscow) and Conflict Management Group (Harvard University) established the Network for Ethnic Monitoring & Early Warning of Conflicts in early 1990s to provide early warning and foster discussion of possible action. The Project produces the Bulletin, published quarterly in Russian and English, including entries on Georgia. Since 1998, the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) has published online reports on early warning and conflict prevention in Georgia.
In June 1999 the EastWest Institute launched an initiative, together with FEWER, on "Early Responses to Early Conflict Warnings in the Caucasus."

Children's Needs and Psychosocial Rehabilitation
With support from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), UMCOR established a youth house in Sukhumi to serve the needs of vulnerable children. Programming includes language, art, and music classes, a journalism program, and computer training, as well as psychosocial rehabilitation.

Enhancement of Citizen Security
Activities for enhancing the security of citizens are mainly taken up by international organizations together with the respective governments, INGOs such as the Halo Trust, and local actors, mainly CHP. These involve land-mine awareness, repair of schools and other public buildings damaged by war, and human-rights monitoring. The Halo Trust completed a comprehensive mine survey in March 2000 and continues the mine-clearing of priority sites, with plans to expand its operations in the near future. ICRC assists victims of mine accidents with health care services (including surgery) and a workshop to produce artificial limbs.

Concluding Remarks
INGOs working on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict make positive contributions in a number of ways: by providing the breakaway Abkhaz regime with a voice to counterbalance the statist perspective advanced by the IGOs, thus limiting the effect of international isolation; by establishing the infrastructure and promoting the spirit of bilateral contacts, making direct dialogue between senior Georgian and Abkhaz politicians possible; and by beginning the process of social rapprochement between the divided communities, enabling personal relationships to be gradually reestablished, and facilitating links between Tbilisi and Sukhumi intelligentsia.

Such contacts have been instructive in outlining the best practices of multinational states elsewhere and making parties to the conflict think through the alternatives to the current deadlock. All these efforts have contributed to a growing realization that in isolation, neither diplomatic nor civil-society efforts can resolve the conflict. Furthermore, civil-society contacts have built solidarity and respect between civil actors from the opposite sides: for example, the fact that a group of Georgian intelligentsia published a statement in the Georgian press calling for a peaceful resolution of conflict in Abkhazia produced a powerful resonance in Abkhaz society.

In Abkhazia the main achievement of the three years of bilateral interaction is the establishment of the channels of communication with Georgian representatives of civil society. Remarkably, these channels withstood the impact of the spring 1998 events in the Gali region. The positive outcome of the sustained dialogue has been that the relations between individuals have been restored. As one respondent put it, "each society now has a small number of people who do not suffer from stress when meeting people from the other side."

Nonetheless, civil-society initiatives toward peace involve a relatively small segment of the population that does not appear to be growing significantly. In the opinion of Ghia Anchabadze, those people who take part in the Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue should spread their new understanding of the existing realities to their wider community. Anchabadze identified this as the main future task for the Georgian NGOs—a task thus far unfulfilled, as they do not yet have sufficient influence in their communities.

As Batal Kobakhia said in June 2001, one result of the Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue in Abkhazia had been that the enemy image of the Georgian side became less intense and more diffuse. People in Abkhazia stopped getting angry at the actual fact of interaction with the Georgians, or of children being sent together to the holiday camps, and do not pay much attention to Georgian visitors to Abkhazia, even those from the IDP community. The NGO activities also give the Abkhaz authorities greater latitude for action within the Abkhaz community, bridging the gap between the political dialogue and social attitudes. Still, a gap exists between progress achieved on Georgian-Abkhaz NGO cooperation and the deterioration of the overall political environment, as a negotiated settlement now seems more remote than ever.

NGO representatives from the separatist states who cooperate easily with their counterparts from the opposite side have not abandoned their political positions, such as the commitment to independence, and sometimes name such contacts as "peace enforcement" for civil society. Nevertheless, despite criticism at home, the Abkhaz NGOs remain committed to contacts with their Georgian counterparts. Their argument is that since the conflict happened with the Georgians, relationships should be restored first and foremost with them. The Abkhaz NGOs feel that civil-society initiatives provide greater flexibility in terms of issues and concerns that they can address, in contrast to the official negotiations where Georgia has the upper hand. At the same time, there is a reluctance on the Abkhaz side to face the problem of the displaced ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, and INGOs have failed to persuade the Abkhaz to acknowledge this issue.

Beyond that, it is difficult to determine the impact of the civil-society initiatives. Second-track diplomacy is regarded as a slow process and it may be unrealistic to expect quick fixes to result from it. Expectations of what civil-society initiatives can achieve have to be moderated, since key decisions are being made at the level of political negotiations. Many observers believe that the time perspective applied to the first-track diplomacy is inapplicable for the second-track interventions, and that a longer-term view is more appropriate. Successes and failures in the Georgian-Abkhaz peace process should be regarded in this light. For instance, NGOs elaborating alternative peace solutions confront difficulties because NGOs have thus far failed to muster enthusiasm for their efforts from political leadership or to seriously engage the governments in their peace efforts. The predominant perception is that the political leadership on both sides doesn't trust their own NGOs/civil representatives.

Some local and international observers still feel that this process has been aggravated by the conflicting relations within the INGO community stemming from competition for fame and funds, and institutional and personal rivalries. Researcher Susan Allen Nan confirms that the apparent competition between international conflict-resolution specialists desiring to claim credit for conflict-resolution progress discourages locals attempting to work with internationals. Georgian and particularly Abkhaz participants in conflict-resolution efforts have lost patience with the seemingly endless stream of efforts in which they are asked to participate. Abkhaz sometimes participate in such workshops only to ensure that Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia will not attempt to represent Abkhazia there. However, Nan also finds that in some instances the multiple conflict-resolution efforts directed at the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict do indeed complement each other, building a stronger peace process together than the sum of their individual initiatives.

Prospects

The lack of political progress is a source of frustration on the Georgian side. The policy of the Abkhaz leadership is to maintain the status quo, since in any peace settlement their status will likely be reduced. Much attention has been directed toward Abkhaz leader President Ardzinba and his role as the major stumbling block to postconflict progress. However, there is a growing realization that personalities matter only so much: for instance, the appointment of Anri Jergenia as the new prime minister of Abkhazia in 2001 produced no impact on the Abkhaz stance toward Georgia. So far, the Georgian leadership has been unable to move the Abkhaz from their position by means of negotiations or by offering economic incentives, and a more confrontational approach has emerged throughout 2001. It is more difficult for representatives of Georgian civil society to argue for reconciliation, as it goes contrary to the developments on the ground and actions of the Georgian authorities.

Currently, both sides are affected by the change in the geopolitical situation following the attacks on the United States and ensuing Russian-U.S. rapprochement and deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Georgian leadership to exploit geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the United States to their advantage. First, Russia has been transformed into a Western ally. Moreover, Moscow's claim that Georgian negligence has enabled the growth of international terrorism has sounded more credible in the light of the October 2001 attack on Abkhazia and evidence of the presence of Arab instructors and training camps in Pankissi. Second, there is an increasing realization that substantial international, especially U.S., aid to Georgia has done little to enable internal transformation, but encouraged dependency and corruption instead.

In Georgia, the internal atmosphere has become increasingly radicalized, as the government crisis looms large and even Shevardnadze's own political future has been put into question by growing opposition to his corrupt and inefficient rule and uncertainty regarding the continuation of Western support.

The Georgian government's sponsorship of the attacks on Abkhazia and support for the Chechen fighters, the existence of which had been previously denied, made a discouraging impact on the international engagement in Georgia. Doubts have been raised about the commitment of external actors to the region for some time. The SEF Forum, for instance, noted that there is waning interest by external actors that is reflected in diminished involvement, a trend that is likely to continue. In this situation, overestimation of both the readiness of the external actors to take action and the available options open to them to exert influence may result in disillusionment and dashed expectations. The conference's opinion was that as a result of disappointments, both the United States and the EU would review their original motivation for action. They will continue to provide some resources for the peace process, but the longer the negotiating processes and blockades continue, the more their interest will decline.

One has to add that since most international attention is likely to be directed toward involvement in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the priority of the South Caucasus will be diminishing. Moreover, hopes for a visible progress, characteristic for the 1990s, gave way to pessimism and expectation of a Cyprus-style deadlock.

The SEF Forum, as did many other commentators, concluded that Russia's role is key. Meanwhile, Russian-Georgian relations have deteriorated steadily since Vladimir Putin came to power in Moscow. Georgia's inability or unwillingness to secure its border with Russia over the Chechen sector, its lack of control over the criminal situation in Pankissi Valley and subsequent spillover of instability, the introduction of the visa regime for the Georgian citizens and exemption of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from it, and Russia's efforts to preserve its military bases in the minority-populated areas of Georgia, have all contributed to escalation.

These tensions culminated in the aftermath of attacks on Abkhazia when the Georgian parliament voted for the termination of the PKF mandate and the withdrawal of the peacekeepers. Shevardnadze threatened to take his country out of the CIS. These threats caused little fear in Moscow: Putin personally announced that he would consider removing Russian peacekeepers and said that Georgia should approach the UN to handle the cease-fire issue. Moscow also indicated that it would not oppose Georgia's leaving the CIS and would pull out its troops from the Gudauta base by the end of 2001. Apparently, Russia's interest in Georgia, including its conflicts, diminishes, while security of its southern border remains of primary importance.

To sum up, a strategy for solving political conflicts could not be defined from outside the region. The local and regional actors bear the main responsibility for their conflict and for its resolution. Meanwhile, neither Georgia nor Abkhazia is ready for a serious compromise: Georgia will not accept a "peace of the winners," and Abkhazia is not prepared to relinquish the Georgian-populated Gali region, which may prove a security risk impossible to control.

Recommendations

Parties to conflict often take an attitude that their conflicts can be resolved for them by outside powers. Sometimes the behavior of Russia and the West in the Georgian-Abkhaz context sends messages that can be interpreted in such a light. An alternative view to this is that the conflicts have local roots and are better understood by the local people who share the same historical and cultural legacy. According to this view, it is up to the Georgians and the Abkhaz to find a solution.

If the trend toward confrontation on the ground continues, it will be counterproductive for INGOs to work against such a powerful current, as neither they nor their local partners have any leverage over the radical actors. Instead, it would be more helpful to concentrate on moderation of public attitudes and the development of effective governance than on conflict resolution as such, and to engage in only a limited number of projects so as to avoid confusion. It would be useful if INGOs work toward encouraging a sense of realism among the Georgian society and help it to come to terms with the postwar situation and its actual outcome. This may help both the elites and the population to accept the fact that the past is irretrievable and make steps to rescue what can be saved. Such a task, however, may be too radical and unpopular for INGOs to engage in.

What may be more feasible is to discourage competition among Western NGOs, to introduce a code of conduct, and to ensure coordination of their activities by an outside body. Since it is impractical for the INGOs to regulate themselves, it would be better for international donors or IGOs to assume such a role with the additional benefit of providing logistical support where necessary.

The SEF Forum identified some starting points for strengthening peace efforts. These include promotion of an intensive debate on the various concepts of federalism and the ways in which such notions may be enshrined in future constitutional arrangements between Georgia and Abkhazia; incorporation into the overall peace process of measures aimed at building new confidence and encouraging reconciliation; and a more active role for Russia in mediation. The forum also noted that success in the peace process is only possible with synergy between first-track and second-track initiatives, since these initiatives are interdependent.

The SEF Forum stressed that in order to achieve success, peace initiatives must win support from broader segments of the population and address their concerns. The key challenge to civil-society initiatives is to include a broader spectrum of actors in their activities, and to provide stimulus at the political level. In this respect, there is a great need for more professionalism within the NGO sector. Local NGOs can increase their effectiveness by becoming more transparent about the ways they operate and the projects they pursue, by making more use of the media in raising awareness and by redoubling their efforts to disseminate balanced information. The following recommendations concerning outside support were made:

• Involvement of external groups can improve the reputation and degree of acceptance of the work of the local NGOs, especially if the latter are faced with hostility and defamation on account of their work for reconciliation.
  
• Appropriate "division of labor" between international organizations and INGOs should be ensured: while IGOs can play a special role in maintaining pressure on the governments to involve forces working for peace and take up mediation functions, INGOs can open up additional channels and provide more space for arguments to be made by playing a facilitative role and serving bridge functions between the parties to conflict.
  
• When selecting local partners, the donor community should try to ensure that local groups have been in existence for some time, have developed participatory structures and have been involved in practical activities.
  
• INGOs should abstain as much as possible from introducing their own political agendas into peace work.

One of the key tasks of peace work is to empower the particularly vulnerable sections of population and to build up their capacities. For such purposes, integrated schemes are needed that include both the IDP population and the local population in order to break through the isolation of the IDPs. Short-term measures aimed at improvement of the housing situation and the creation of jobs must be expedited. These measures need not conflict with the longer-term goal of IDP return.

Many participants at the SEF Forum recommended the development of a comprehensive approach to the whole Caucasus region and creation of a Stability Pact for the Caucasus along the lines of the Pact for Southeastern Europe.

In fact, such a pact has been advocated by the CEPS, which set up the CEPS Task Force in January 2000. The pact has developed a conceptual paper entitled "Stability Pact for the Caucasus in Theory and Practice." Following the publication of a first document in May 2000 proposing a comprehensive stability pact for the Caucasus, members of the CEPS Task Force traveled to the three states of the South Caucasus and to Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, Ajara, and South Ossetia. In September 2000, CEPS organized a conference together with the Armenian Center for National and International Studies on "Prospects for Regional and Transregional Cooperation and the Resolution of Conflicts."

The proposed stability pact process includes systemic and constitutional aspects, with suggestions on how to overcome the transitional problems of weak states and reconcile conflicting principles such as independence and territorial integrity, or the choice between federation and confederation. Particular consideration is given to how a Caucasus stability pact could serve the interests of Russia as the region's key player, together with enhanced cooperation with the EU over the "Southern Dimension" concept.

A joint EastWest Institute and FEWER conference (Brussels, January 2000) on early warning and early action in the Caucasus concluded that in conflict prevention, warnings should be issued about the possible side effects of intervention since too much international involvement can raise unreasonable hopes and send the wrong signals to local actors. Overly enthusiastic conflict-prevention measures can do more harm than good, bearing in mind that the Georgian state has managed to sustain a fragile peace in Ajara and Javakheti. This might precipitate conflict in either region or elsewhere in Georgia when it is subject to a sudden increase in attention. There is a general mind-set, especially in Abkhazia, that there is no reward for peace. Violence may be perceived as a means for receiving both more international attention and the necessary resources for reconstruction and reform.

Miscellaneous

South Ossetia: Waiting for a Final Settlement

Georgia is a multiethnic country and other areas of actual or potential tension exist within its territory. While each of them has its unique background, political actors in the conflict areas look at each other and especially at the developments in Abkhazia, the most significant conflict, to see what kind of settlement will be achieved there in the end, and level their demands accordingly. This is particularly relevant for the conflict in South Ossetia.

Conflict in South Ossetia unfolded along similar lines as in Abkhazia, with mutually exclusive claims to the territory and the Ossetian fear of assimilation into the Georgian nation at its heart. South Ossetia is much smaller than Abkhazia, with a population of about 60,000. In Soviet times, South Ossetia was established as an autonomous region (oblast) within Georgia. While Ossetians were ruled from Tbilisi and separated from the rest of the Ossetian people, the main bulk of whom live in the Russian Federation, the Georgians considered that South Ossetians were in a privileged position vis-à-vis other regions of Georgia. In the period of perestroika (1989–1991) Georgians started to assert the primacy of Tbilisi's authority and Georgian language and culture.

The actual conflict is largely associated with a resurgence of Georgian nationalism under President Gamsakhurdia. In August 1990, South Ossetia issued a declaration of sovereignty and demanded recognition from Moscow as an independent subject of the USSR. Tbilisi retaliated by abolishing South Ossetia as a distinct administrative entity in December 1990. Fighting erupted at the end of 1990 between Ossetian and Georgian militias and the national guard, and resulted in expulsion of the Georgians from Tskhinvali, the region's capital, who then besieged and bombarded the city from surrounding hills.

The fighting continued after Gamsakhurdia's fall from power and the Ossetians, supported by North Caucasians, gained the upper hand in 1992. Population exchanges took place: Ossetians from other parts of Georgia moved to South or North Ossetia, and most ethnic Georgians left South Ossetia, although four Georgian-populated villages remain. A cease-fire was signed in June 1992 to be supervised by a combined Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian peacekeeping force under a Joint Control Commission (JCC) with North Ossetia represented, together with Russia and the parties to conflict. The JCC also serves as a forum for ongoing discussions between the parties.

In South Ossetia, unlike Abkhazia, the issue of repatriation is not so important, since both sides accepted de facto population exchanges and some Georgians managed to return. There is also less sense of ethnic resentment, and people are free to travel and engage in commerce. Gradually, links between North and South Ossetians have cooled off, and the South Ossetian leadership has learned to play a balancing act between its ethnic kin in Russia and the Georgians.

Such developments, however, have not brought any progress on the issue of political status. Ossetians maintain that they will settle for the same status as is eventually agreed upon with Abkhazia, while Georgians offer the wide-ranging autonomy. From a practical point of view, the conflict is almost resolved: both sides agree that the resumption of hostilities is unlikely and cooperation on economic matters is ensured. However, the Georgian government would like to gain control over the Ossetian military highway, the main commercial artery connecting Georgia with Russia, and to generate revenue from customs, but the Ossetians are reluctant to submit to this demand.

The OSCE took the lead in conflict management in South Ossetia. An OSCE mission was established in late 1992, and in March 1994 its mandate was extended to monitor peacekeeping operations. Relations between OSCE monitors and peacekeepers were good, and it was agreed in February 1997 that hostilities had subsided to a level that allowed a reduction in the peacekeeping and monitoring activities.

Negotiations were held under Russian auspices and supported by the OSCE mission with the JCC providing a forum for the discussion of practical matters. In May 1996, the parties signed a memorandum on refraining from the threat of force, solving the refugee problem, and gradual demilitarization. Various UN agencies, most notably UNHCR and UNDP, and the EU provided humanitarian and reconstruction aid, as well as investments in human-resource development and conflict-resolution meetings and training.

Harvard University's Conflict Management Group (CMG) has facilitated unofficial "one and a half track" meetings between officials and political leaders. Much fruitful work was done with the Georgians and Ossetians in low-key bilateral seminars with external experts and study visits. CMG has been working in Georgia since 1995 to facilitate informal brainstorming and joint problem solving among senior officials and negotiators from Georgia and South Ossetia. Four meetings have been held since April 1995, resulting in an easing of tensions and cooperative efforts on practical matters, such as IDP return, restoration of basic services, and economic development.

At the fourth brainstorming meeting a Joint Steering Committee, composed of Georgian and Ossetian participants in the CMG meetings, was established to create an informal forum parallel to the official negotiation process. This group continues to meet, and has also conducted a survey of public attitudes and media in Georgia and South and North Ossetia. The ICCN from the Georgian side was involved in conflict resolution in South Ossetia in cooperation with CMG and NRC. The latter has facilitated relief efforts in South Ossetia since 1996, and in 1997 the UNHCR and NRC started to work together on the reconstruction program for returnees. It was involved in conflict-resolution activities through the CMG/NRC Georgia-South Ossetia Dialogue Project, in which NRC provided important support to CMG. LINKS also played an active role in conflict-resolution activities in South Ossetia.

The prospects look brighter for South Ossetia than in Abkhazia because the conflict-resolution process has already yielded results on the ground with a sense of local ownership. Interethnic relations have greatly improved and normal human interaction has been largely restored. Economic incentives, lack of a large displaced community in Georgia, and conciliatory policies of the Georgian government under Shevardnadze have all contributed to the easing of tensions. Economic and social initiatives have taken root and cooperation can continue on a pragmatic basis bypassing the unresolved status problem. At the same time, the exemption of South Ossetia from the Russian visa regime has the effect of advancing South Osetia's integration into the Russian economic and social space.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Abkhazian Newsletter, International Documentation and Information Centre for Abkhazia/the Netherlands; Caucasus Report, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, Czech Republic; Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, University of California, Berkeley; FEWER Reports, London; Monitor & Prism, daily news and analysis, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC; Moscow News, Russian weekly, also published in English with regular updates on the Caucasus; WarReport (1995–1998), Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London; Working Paper Series, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, University of California, Berkeley;
REPORTS:	Amnesty International, Amnesty International 1999 Annual Report on Georgia, London, 1998. Conciliation Resources, "Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process," Accord: International Review of Peace Initiatives, issue 7, 1999. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki HRW World Report 1999, Georgia, Human Rights Developments. Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Laws of War and Russia's Role in the Conflict, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, vol. 7, no. 7, March 1995. United Nations Development Program, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia, Working Group III, March 1998. United Nations, Reports of the Secretary General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. Latest: 19 January 2000.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	A Question of Sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process, edited by J. Cohen. London: Conciliation Resources, 1999. Contested Borders in the Caucasus, edited by Bruno Coppieters. Brussels, VUB Press, 1996. Managing Conflict in the former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives, edited by A. Arbatov, A. H. Charles, and L. Olson. Cambridge, MA, CSIA and MIT Press, 1997. No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflict in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, by Edward W. Walker. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, 1998. The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, by Edmund Herzig. London, RIIA/Pinter, 1999.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.ceps.be/Research/Caucasus (Centre for European Policy Studies, a full text of the Stability Pact for the Caucasus can be downloaded from it) www.eurasianet.org (Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute) www.fewer.org (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response) www.iwpr.net (Caucasus reporting service, Institute for War and Peace Reporting) www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi (Caucasian Regional Studies, Vrije University of Brussels, in Russian and English) www.rferl.org (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline) www.socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet States) www.soros.org/caucasus (Soros Foundation)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Jonathan Cohen, Conciliation Resources, e-mail: j.cohen@c-r.org Bruno Coppieters, Vrije University of Brussels, e-mail: Bruno.Coppieters@vub.ac.be Paula Garb, Global Peace and Conflict Studies, e-mail pgarb@uci.edu Edmund Herzig, University of Manchester/RIIA, e-mail: edmund@bnn.dircon.co.uk Julia Kharashvili, IDP Women's Association (Tbilisi), e-mail: julia.kharashvili@undp.org.ge George Khutsishvili, ICCN, Tbilisi, e-mail: iccn@access.sanet.ge Arthur Martirossian, Conflict Management Group, e-mail: martiros@cmgroup.org Anna Matveeva, expert on the Caucasus, London, e-mail: sophiamat@ukonline.co.uk Susan Allen Nan, e-mail: sallenn@emory.edu Ghia Nodia, chair of the board, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy, Tbilisi, Georgia, e-mail: ghian@caucasus.net Dennis Sammut, LINKS, London, e-mail: dennissammut@hotmail.com Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, International Alert, London, e-mail: gtergabrielian@international-alert.org Marten van Harten, independent consultant, e-mail: harten16@ zonnet.nl Edward Walker, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies, University of California, Berkeley, e-mail: bsp@socrates.berkeley.edu Paata Zakareishvili, e-mail: paatazak@access.sanet.ge
ORGANIZATIONS	In Georgia Norwegian Refugee Council 19A Tabukashvili Street 380086 Tblisi Tel.: +995 32 923 162/64 Fax: +995 32 982 564 E-mail: res.rep_georgia@access.sanet.ge http://www.nrc.no In Abkhazia Foundation Civic Initiative, Man of People Foundation 9 Zvanba Street Sukhum(i), Abkhazia, Georgia Tel.: +995 88 122 2 41 37 / 88 122 27162 E-mail: dianapp@yahoo.com International Global Peace and Conflict Studies University of California, Irvine 717, Social Science Tower Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA Tel.: +1 949 824 1227 Fax: +1 949 824 1544 E-mail: pgarb@uci.edu DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: In Georgia; Assist Yourself; Association of IDP Women; Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development; Caucasus Links; International Center on Conflict and Negotiation; Partners-Georgia; South Ossetian Center on Humanitarian Initiatives and Research; Union Public Movement Multinational Georgia; United Nations Association of Georgia; In Abkhazia; Association of Women of Abkhazia; Center for Humanitarian Programmes; International; Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution; Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management; Center for European Policy Studies; Conciliation Resources; Conflict Management Group; East West Institute; Evangelische Akademie Loccum; FEWER; Helsinki Citizens Assembly; Interchurch Peace Council ; Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution ; Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology ; Institute of War and Peace Reporting ; International Alert ; LINKS; United Nations Volunteers

About the author

Anna Matveeva is a program manager at Saferworld (on small arms and security). She previously worked as a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) and program head at International Alert (London). As a scholar specializing in issues of conflict and the politics of post-Soviet Eurasia, she has authored publications such as The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland (London: RIIA, 1999) and academic articles, and undertook projects for organizations such as the International Peace Academy, EastWest Insititute, Minority Rights Group, and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.