Author	Anna Matveeva
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

Chechnya is a territory in the Russian Federation that has sought since 1991 to break away from Moscow's rule. It experienced a first military intervention by federal troops between 1994 and 1996, which ended in a Russian defeat and loss of control over the republic. Spillover of criminality from Chechnya, rise of Islamism, attacks on Dagestan, and several bombings in Moscow and in the North Caucasus, blamed on Chechen militants, prompted the Russian leadership to launch a second campaign in 1999. That war has continued, having assumed a character of a "holy war" and attracted Islamic fighters from abroad, including those from the Al Qaida network. Although more successful militarily, the war has not succeeded in resolving the political issue of Chechen independence. The Russian leadership, however, started to make a distinction between the separatist drive and terrorist threat to its territory emanating from Chechnya. This may form a basis for a solution, if Russia allows Chechnya to secede and a Chechen leadership could ensure that Chechnya does not threaten its neighbors. Although the West has generally supported Russian aims and found common interest in fighting Islamic terrorism, it has condemned its military methods. The OSCE was involved in facilitating peace negotiations during the first war, but the deteriorated security situation in Chechnya and Russia's unwillingness to cooperate have made further engagement problematic.

The Chechens are the largest ethnic group in the North Caucasus. In 1922, the Chechens were granted their own "autonomous oblast" (AO), but in 1934 it was merged with the Ingush AO, where Chechens were in the majority (57 percent). In 1943, Chechens and Ingush were deported to Central Asia, accused of collaboration with the German troops. The republic declared independence from Russia in November 1991 and adopted a constitution in March 1992. The independence movement was led by the Chechen National Congress, whose prominent member, former air force general Djohar Dudayev, became president of Chechnya in 1991. Following the declaration of independence and violence between supporters and opponents of the Chechen National Congress, Russian federal troops were sent to restore order but, owing to Chechen resistance and the refusal of the Russian Supreme Soviet to sanction the use of force, the troops were withdrawn. By June 1992 all Russian troops had left the republic, leaving behind a large stock of arms. The Ingush decided to distance themselves from the Chechen secessionist drive and left the dual-nationality republic.

On 10 December 1994, the Russian federal powers started the first military intervention into Chechnya, which became the largest war in the former Soviet Union. President Dudayev led the Chechen resistance to the Russian advances that culminated in the ill-fated storming of Grozny, massive loss of life, indiscriminate bombardment, and the destruction of most economic and social infrastructure in the republic. Crushing defeats by the federal forces vastly outnumbered limited military successes, while spectacular acts of hostage taking in Budennovsk and Kyzlyar demonstrated how vulnerable to the Chechen attacks the neighboring territories are.

Although the Federal Security Service (FSB) eventually succeeded in killing Dudayev, this failed to undermine Chechen resolve, and in summer 1996 the war intensified. After the storming of Grozny by the Chechen forces in August 1996, Moscow decided to retreat. The first war ended with the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords, which established the cessation of hostilities and committed the parties to delay the decision on political status for five years. Russian troops were withdrawn from the breakaway territory. The Treaty on Peace and the Principles of Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria—a no-use-of-force agreement—was signed in May 1997.

The postwar parliamentary and presidential elections took place in January 1997 and brought to power Aslan Maskhadov, chief of staff and prime minister in the Chechen coalition government, for a five-year term. The Islamic Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1998 and the sharia system of justice was introduced. Maskhadov tried to concentrate power in his hands to establish authority, but failed to create an effective state or a functioning economy. The situation gradually slid out of the control of the government, and the republic descended into chaos. The war and lack of economic opportunities left large numbers of heavily armed and brutalized "unemployed warriors" with no occupation but further violence. A growing epidemic of kidnappings, robberies, and murders of fellow Chechens and outsiders, most notably the beheading of four employees of British Granger Telecom in 1998, put an end to possibilities of outside investment. Maskhadov proved unable to guarantee the security of the oil pipeline running across Chechnya from the Caspian Sea. Illegal oil tapping and acts of sabotage deprived his regime of crucial revenues and exasperated his allies in Moscow.

Various opposition groups emerged around prominent field commanders. In August 1998, Shamil Basaev, hero of the Chechen resistance and a powerful warlord, broke off all relations with the Maskhadov government and requested the parliament and the sharia court to impeach Maskhadov for "treason," by which they meant his pragmatic approach to relations with Moscow. Several armed clashes between Maskhadov loyalists and oppositionists took place around the strongholds of rebellious commanders. At the same time, Islamists (dubbed by their opponents as Wahhabis) who had emerged in Chechnya during the first war started to proliferate and clash with the adherents of traditional Sufism. The presence of foreign Islamist fighters and the financial means they had to attract recruits added fuel to the existing tensions and created new fault lines in an already fragmented republic.

From the end of the first war, the border territories of the Russian Federation had progressively suffered from escalating crime stemming from Chechnya. Killings, kidnappings, and looting of property and cattle made social and economic activities virtually impossible, and led to the establishment of various local self-defense units. The regional and republican administrations increased their pressure on Moscow to seal the border with Chechnya with proper installations and border troops, and on several occasions they closed the border unilaterally. The culmination came after August 1999, when Chechen field commanders in opposition to Maskhadov led an offensive by Chechen and Dagestani militants into the highlands of Dagestan, where they clashed with the local rogue armies and with Russian troops.

Following the intervention in Dagestan, Moscow was subjected to a bloody terrorist campaign that killed over three hundred people and was blamed by the Russian government on the Chechen terrorists. This prompted Russia to bomb Chechnya, thus triggering the beginning of the second full-scale war in October 1999. The bombing spelled the end of the wait-and-see policy pursued by Moscow over the previous three years, which had implied the peaceful reintegration of Chechnya into the Russian state.

After the Russian federal troops suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Chechen guerrillas in the first campaign, it seemed unlikely that the Russian establishment would be willing to intervene a second time, but the dynamics of the situation on the ground made Russian inaction impossible. The presidential campaign in Russia, emphasizing the resurgence of Russian power and the revival of the military, also required a good cause to fight for.

Conflict Dynamics

The second campaign differed from the first one in a number of respects. For one thing, the neighboring regions and republics, apart from Ingushetia, were supportive of the federal troops and hostile to their Chechen neighbors. Second, Russian propaganda, emphasizing Chechen terrorism and the victory in Dagestan, had the effect of boosting morale. Third, the Chechen fighters were far less internally united. Maskhadov, caught between militants and the Russians, proved unable to unite the Chechen nation to fight either the Russians or the Chechen warlords. Despite his legitimacy as the elected president of Chechnya—his term of office expired in January 2001—Maskhadov had little to bring to the negotiating table, since his authority over Basayev and Khattab was minimal, and the two in effect tried to assassinate him in the interwar period. And finally, ordinary Chechens were less enthusiastic about fighting than they had been during the first war. Military victory then had failed to bring peace and prosperity; on the contrary, after three years of lawlessness and economic devastation, the relative stability enjoyed by their North Caucasian neighbors has begun to seem more attractive.

The mobilization declared by Maskhadov was met with less enthusiasm than before, and the popular response seemed to be to flee rather than to fight. In the opinion of Ruslan Aushev, president of Ingushetia, Russia's major mistake was its failure to try to mobilize the Chechen people to fight on Moscow's side against the terrorists. If only Moscow could have capitalized on popular fear and resentment of warlordism, Chechnya's political incorporation would have been less traumatic.

During September 1999, the Russian military undertook air attacks against Chechnya combined with efforts to seal off the borders between Chechnya and the rest of Russia. The intervention by the ground troops started in October, causing a wave of civilians to the flee to neighboring Ingushetia, as well as widespread suffering. The initial Russian tactics were not to engage in frontal attacks, but to encircle the larger towns where fighters were suspected to be based and negotiate surrender if possible, or to bomb the area into submission otherwise. Progress into the lowlands was better than expected, but efforts in February to capture Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, proved difficult. Russia kept 80,000 troops in Chechnya, with the 15,000-strong 42nd Motorized Infantry Division, headquartered in Khankala, forming the backbone of the Russian military advances. Additional troops were stationed in the neighboring republics along the perimeter of Chechnya.

The Russian military managed to gain partial control over the eighty-kilometer Chechen-Georgian border, maintaining a presence in the disputed sector so as to control mountain paths leading to Chechnya. This border was a source of constant friction in Russian-Georgian relations. Russian commanders claimed that the Georgian government turned a blind eye to the penetration of mercenaries and the flow of arms to the Chechen fighters through its territory. Russia also accused the Taliban movement in Afghanistan of sending fighters to Chechnya and training the Chechen Islamist guerrillas, and threatened to launch air strikes against the Taliban similar to those carried out by the United States following the bombings of its embassies in Africa. Evidence of links between the Taliban and Chechen Islamists have emerged with the launch of the U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

Security in the Russian-controlled areas has been constantly undermined. The Russian forces have been repeatedly hit by Chechen ambushes, mainly in the southern mountains, and in May 2000, two high-ranking Russian administrators were killed in a terrorist attack in Grozny. In March 2001 three terrorist acts took place in Stavropol krai (territorial area) and Karachaevo-Cherkessi, killing twenty-three. The Middle East–style suicide attacks have made the Russian troops even more suspicious of Chechen civilians. Ambushes of Russian convoys in Ingushetia have shown that the Chechen fighters cross under the guise of refugees, which has led to even stricter control of the border and misery for the civilians who tried to flee to safety.

Moscow's main challenge in Chechnya is how to rule the republic effectively. The Security Council, the main federal body in charge of Chechnya, has produced many plans but little clarity. Instead, policy intentions have been articulated by President Putin in his interviews at home and abroad, in which he accepted the possibility of Chechen independence as long as it does not serve as a launching pad for attacks on Russian territory. Operational policy has been expressed through personnel appointments.

In this area, two concerns prevailed among the Russian leadership: the quest to create an indigenous Chechen administration that would enjoy at least some respect among the local population, and the effort to ensure tight financial control over expenditures for reconstruction in order to avoid a repetition of the large-scale theft of federal money allocated to Chechen reconstruction in 1996–1997. After the first war, Chechnya emerged as a financial "black hole," where federal funds intended for reconstruction were often embezzled. For instance, the Russian procurator's office unsuccessfully tried to trace $1.5 billion believed to have ended up in Swiss bank accounts. The ultimate aim of the Putin administration is to funnel reconstruction funds from the federal budget through a closely controlled native Chechen administration that enjoys a degree of respect both in Chechnya and in Moscow. This financial responsibility is to be shared with the presidential representative to the federal region of Southern Russia and the North Caucasus; the current representative is Victor Kazantsev, who served as the commander of the federal troops in Chechnya until April 2000.

In February 2000, Moscow proclaimed an official end to the hostilities, marking the beginning of a period of postconflict reconstruction. But in reality, full control was never extended to the Chechen highlands. Attempts to create a pro-Moscow Chechen administration were only partially successful. The Russian authorities were forced to disarm pro-Moscow Chechen militia because of their unruly behavior and to distance themselves even from those Chechen leaders with whom they thought they could cooperate.

Mufti Akhmed-haji Kadyrov, a religious authority, appeared to be the only person who could be trusted. In June 2000, President Putin created a new Temporary Administration of Chechnya directly responsible to the Russian authorities and appointed Kadyrov as its head. Kadyrov is no Moscow puppet, unlike the Russian-backed administrations of the period of the first war, but had been a fighter on the Chechen side in the first war against Russia. He is also known as a staunch opponent of the Wahhabi version of Islam that has served as a source of inspiration for so many of the fighters in the second Chechen war. The Kadyrov administration was supposed to replace an earlier administration led by Nikolai Koshman, but confirmation of Kadyrov's status took over a year, and only in January 2001 did President Putin sign a decree establishing a system of executive power. He also appointed Stanislav Ilyasov, a Dagestani from Stavropol krai, as prime minister.

Local administrations in villages and towns have been created, led by loyal Chechens, often those who spent most of their lives in Moscow. The FSB gradually replaced the Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the main agency in charge of operations in Chechnya. It looked to Chechens who had problems with the law, promising them amnesty from prosecution if they agree to cooperate. In this way, the FSB has achieved leverage over some wealthy Chechen businessmen and their family networks, and manipulates them accordingly. Such local governments are backed by the authority of the Russian military administrations, where the commander in charge provides troops not only to maintain security, but also as a work force to restore essential civilian installations.

In an effort to preserve a semblance of normality, in 2000 Moscow organized by-elections for the Russian State Duma; at the time of the parliamentary elections (December 1999), those elections had not taken place because of the war. Aslan Aslambekov was elected as an minister of parliament from Chechnya. The next step would be to organize the election of a chief executive of the republic, but as of mid-2001, this has not yet occurred.

At the beginning of 2001, the Putin leadership made a decision to reduce the MoD force level from 80,000 to 15,000 over the next few years and to move operational control from the MoD to the FSB. However, after an initial withdrawal of 5,000 troops, it was decided at the 5 May 2001 meeting between Victor Kazantsev, Sergei Ivanov (the newly appointed minister of defense), Nikolai Patrushev (director of the FSB), and Boris Gryzlov (minister of interior) that the security situation was still turbulent and that a large-scale withdrawal was premature.

Currently, military operations focus on attacks on the Islamist Wahhabi leadership, especially the forces of Shamil Basayev and Emir Khattab, and attempts to eliminate or capture these two commanders, whose presence is viewed as essential to the resistance. Since being driven from the cities, the Chechens have shifted their tactics toward small-scale ambushes and attacks using land mines. The brutality, indiscipline, and corruption of the federal troops remains a major impediment to any political settlement in Chechnya. Federal operations involve widespread instances of indiscriminate bombardment, random killings, rape, and torture that the Russian authorities seem powerless to stop, and which have cost them dearly in the eyes of the ordinary people.

Official Conflict Management

The flimsy moral grounds used to justify intervention led Moscow to adopt a conciliatory stance in the aftermath of war. This also brought political moderates into key positions in negotiations with Chechnya. After the first Russian withdrawal in 1996, Russian officials had decided that Maskhadov was a moderate figure with whom they could deal on a pragmatic basis. He was expected to shelve the question of formal independence, while asserting the territory's de facto separation from Russia.

These assumptions proved false. Russian-Chechen dialogue was suspended after the kidnapping of Valentin Vlasov, presidential representative in Chechnya, in May 1998. The murder of Akmal Saidov, a staff member of the Russian delegation to Chechnya in September 1998, made the federal politicians even less willing to talk. The kidnapping of Deputy Interior Minister Gennadii Shpigun in March 1999 halted negotiations with Moscow completely. The moral high ground that Chechnya occupied during the war with Russia has been severely undermined by the beheadings of foreigners, public executions, and kidnappings of aid workers.

Since the beginning of the second war, Moscow has publicly refused to talk to Maskhadov, though behind-the-scenes contacts have continued. Finding a partner with whom to negotiate poses a real dilemma for Moscow. Maskhadov remains the nation's leader for the majority of ordinary Chechens, especially for those who fled the republic. The Russian Public Commission for Chechnya, headed by the State Duma Committee Chairman Pavel Krasheninnikov, met with the members of the Maskhadov government in May 2000 with the intention of entering into talks with him. However, his authority over the resistance fighters is minimal and he cannot make concessions on their behalf. Alliances and enmities between leaders are based more on personal relationships and opportunism than on political or ideological positions. Broadly, four kinds of warlords exist: Islamists, who fight more on religious than on ethnic grounds and enjoy external backing; heroes of the Caucasian wars of the 1990s who failed to adapt to civilian life; outright criminals who have been behind most of kidnappings; and local leaders concerned with security in their own area and driven primarily by local interests.

Kadyrov appealed to the Chechen field commanders to restore peace and stability, and expressed his readiness to talk to Maskhadov, despite the fact that Maskhadov failed to condemn the criminal activities of the warlords. In May 2000, general Troshev made a radical peace proposal when he suggested that a referendum should be held on whether Chechnya should remain part of the Russian Federation. Moscow also took steps to organize a loyalist Chechen political movement—the Union of Citizens for the Chechen Republic as a Democratic Rule-of-Law Within the Russian Federation (Solidarity)—to unite those Chechens who think that Chechnya's future lies with Russia.

Despite Western criticism of the campaign and its uncertain prospects, the second Chechen war has brought huge dividends at home. For the first time since the Soviet breakup, the feeling of national humiliation has been replaced by a belief that Russia is able to project power. The war in Chechnya also served as a launch pad for Vladimir Putin, then prime minister, to be promoted as a successor to president Boris Yeltsin. The military campaign costs $262 million each month, but high oil prices made it sustainable for the budget.

The Western Reaction
The West is in a difficult position vis-à-vis the second war in Chechnya. Russian territorial integrity, security of the North Caucasus, and the fight against Islamism all mitigate against a condemnation of Moscow's actions, let alone punishment of Russia in a tangible way. In the words of Javier Solana, "We are pragmatic and need a permanent dialogue with Russia." As the war progressed and the roles of foreign militants became more obvious, Western governments became more sympathetic to Moscow. The West could only criticize Russian military methods rather than the whole rationale for the intervention. With so many well-documented accounts of brutality by the federal forces, the West could not accept Russia's methods, but since Maskhadov had virtually no control over the "independent warriors," Russia viewed any advice to negotiate with Maskhadov as impractical and the West had no other concrete proposals to offer.

The OSCE and the Council of Europe took the lead in dealing with both wars, while the UN was involved only on the humanitarian side through its High Commission on Refugees. The decision to establish an OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya was made by the Permanent Council on 11 April 1995 after intense consultations in the wake of visits to Grozny and Moscow by a personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office. The group took up its duties on 26 April 1995. In December 1998, due to the deteriorating security situation in the region, the international staff of the group was withdrawn to Moscow.

The Assistance Group did contribute positively to Russian-Chechen negotiations during the first war. After the war it continued to maintain its presence in order to monitor transition to civilian rule and the establishment of political institutions, but lost rapport with the Chechen leadership due to its commitment to the principle of territorial integrity. With the beginning of the second campaign, the OSCE stepped up its activities and Knut Vollebaek, the OSCE chairman-in-office, conducted talks with presidents Maskhadov and Aushev. The November 1999 Istanbul summit acknowledged Russian territorial integrity and offered its assistance in the renewal of political dialogue. In return Moscow promised to permit Vollebaek to visit the region and eventually agreed to renew the OSCE mission in the Russian-controlled area of Chechnya. The intention was to locate the mission in Chechnya with the focus on humanitarian relief, but in May 2000 Russia refused to extend the mandate of the Assistance Group because of a disagreement on ambassadorial extraterritoriality and the rights of Chechen staffers to carry weapons. The Assistance Group then opened an office in Znamenkoye (northern Chechnya) on 15 June 2001, manning it with local staff of the group. The conditions for the return of international personnel to Chechnya, mainly concerning security requirements, are at present being negotiated with the Russian authorities.

The OSCE made another significant contribution to peace during the second campaign. Following the Russian claims that foreign fighters and Chechen guerillas entered Chechnya over the Georgian border, which led to a sharp deterioration in Russian-Georgian relations, the OSCE deployed an observer mission in February 2000 to monitor the movement across the border. The operation has been an example of a success in conflict prevention between two states, and Russia has appealed to the OSCE to extend the operation to cover the entire Russian-Georgian border. The issue is currently under consideration, but it is unlikely that the operation will cover the Dagestan sector because of the costs involved.

The Council of Europe (CoE) was mainly active during the second campaign, sending fact-finding missions to the region and advocating protection of the human rights of Chechen civilians. In April 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) voted to suspend Russian membership, as well as the voting rights of Russia's delegation, but this failed to gain the approval of the ministerial committee. PACE chairman Lord Russell-Johnston has been engaged in ongoing dialogue with Aslan Maskhadov, to the annoyance of the Russian presidential team. Under pressure from the UN Human Rights Commissioner and the CoE, Russian authorities established the position of human rights commissioner for Chechnya in April 2000 to work with the CoE experts.

Since then, the situation has started to improve. In January 2001, PACE approved a resolution submitted by Lord Judd that noted "encouraging, although limited progress." Positive developments included the beginning of reestablishment of the judicial system, including the establishment of local courts and police stations. It subsequently voted to readmit the Russian delegation to the full membership. At the same time, in April 2001, PACE published a report on crimes against civilians committed by the Russian troops.

International humanitarian agencies were active during the first Chechen campaign, but gradually withdrew or reduced their operations after killings and kidnappings of their workers, most notably the murder of six International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expatriate staff members in 1996. By the beginning of the second campaign, no agency had a presence in Chechnya. The main remaining agencies in the region were UNHCR, Médecins sans Frontières, and ICRC, which have distributed aid to those republican authorities who appealed for help, and in particular the government of Ingushetia, which has accommodated over 200,000 IDPs.

The attitude of the Russian leadership and public at large regarding international activities has been one of suspicion. The Russians were puzzled by the contrast in Western reaction to the first and the second campaigns, noting that Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe in the midst of the first war, but suspended from the council because of the second campaign. Following NATO actions in Kosovo which many Russians interpreted as a dress rehearsal for peace-enforcement operations in Russia, the West lost moral credibility, and humanitarian concerns were interpreted as a desire to undermine their country.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Prior to the outbreak of the first war, it was very difficult to attract international attention to problems in Chechnya, as International Alert discovered when it undertook a fact-finding mission to the republic in 1992 and sought to raise the issue. But the war quickly brought the republic into international focus, and the international presence prompted the development of local civil groups. This first war period was also marked by genuine cooperation between Chechen and Russian civil-society actors, such as the Committees of Soldiers' Mothers.

After the end of the first war in Chechnya, the security situation rapidly deteriorated, which impeded any international involvement. Consequently, the region became a "no-go" area for both foreigners and many Russians. The start of the second war in October 1999 made it virtually impossible for outside parties to intervene to establish peace because of the dangers on the ground and suspicions of the Russian secret services. Cooperation between Russian and Chechen NGOs also declined, largely because those Chechens who were prepared to work with Russians were looked upon with suspicion in their own society, and Russian propaganda influenced the attitudes of Russian NGOs. At the same time, the capacities and the confidence of the Chechen NGOs have increased significantly. Most NGOs had to move to Ingushetia at the beginning of the second war because of the security situation, but have returned to Chechnya since.

Facilitating Political Dialogue
The Conflict Management Group (CMG) has a long record of peace intervention in Chechnya. At the height of the first war in 1995, it established work-ing relationships with the Russian Security Council and the Chechen presidential team. This enabled CMG to bring parties to the conflict to the Hague Peace Palace conference in 1996, where CMG proposed to delay the decision on the status of Chechnya pending a referendum in ten to fifteen years' time. The proposal was rejected by both parties at the time, but the settlement signed later in the year was based on that model. In May 1997, CMG arranged a second meeting that included influential political figures from both sides, such as Chechen vice president Vakha Arsanov and Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky.

This initiative was followed up by a series of meetings in 1997–1998 in Moscow, Grozny, and Tatarstan, where CMG has been involved over a number of years in conflict-prevention activities. It was hoped that the Tatarstan example might help the Chechen leadership to adapt their expectations to the reality of the situation, and to enter into real bargaining with Moscow. Deteriorating security, lack of funding, and escalating infighting within the Chechen leadership group made it difficult to keep up the initiative, however. Plans have been drawn up to attempt to renew the project, pending funding, and also to capitalize on the willingness of the parties to talk, since their relationship is much worse now than during the first war.

General Alexander Lebed, current governor of the Krasnoyarsk krai, who served as Security Council secretary at the time, played a crucial role in ending the first campaign, having negotiated the end of hostilities with Aslan Maskhadov. He continued his efforts to bring peace to the region and created a peacemaking mission for the North Caucasus to facilitate dialogue between Chechnya, its neighbors, and the Russian authorities. Despite some initial promise, this initiative gradually came to a halt, since Lebed's political career failed to take off on a national scale and he became absorbed in power struggles in Krasnoyarsk. Moreover, Lebed was regarded as a traitor by the local Russians whose interests he failed to acknowledge while negotiating Russian withdrawal with Maskhadov.

In June 2001, the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), in cooperation with the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology (Russia), Peace Mission in the North Caucasus (Russia), and the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael), organized a meeting on "Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Chechnya" in Stockholm. The aim of the meeting was to develop the Peace Reconstruction Initiative for Chechnya, drawing on local knowledge of the situation and the expertise of international representatives. The meeting was the second in a series of three roundtable meetings, the first having been held in Pyatigorsk in December 2000. The goals were to inform the international community about the situation in Chechnya and to discuss the issues of security and economic development.

Progress was impeded, however, by the fact that the postconflict situation in Chechnya has not yet begun, despite Russia's official claims to the contrary. In the absence of a political dialogue between the federal authorities and the representatives of the Chechen authorities on the future of Chechnya, work on reconstruction and security lacks the necessary foundation to proceed.

Humanitarian Work
In 1995, the Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD) was established as a grass-roots organization and registered as an NGO both in Russia and the United Kingdom. It maintains its presence in Moscow, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, and works to support local capacities for peace. This involves projects with groups and individuals in the fields of human rights, peacemaking, community development, and humanitarian assistance. In Chechnya it cooperates with such organizations as Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains) and the Union of North Caucasus Women, a women's group working in community development and peacemaking.

The main project in the North Caucasus is the Little Star children's rehabilitation center in Grozny, opened in May 1997. In July 1997, two British psychologists working in the Little Star center, Camilla Carr and Jon James, were kidnapped, held for fourteen months in Chechnya, and later freed for ransom; since then, Little Star is staffed by local therapists. CPCD also provides humanitarian relief for the displaced in Ingushetia, and is involved in rehabilitation programs for traumatized children and essential reconstruction work. When the second war began, CPCD, together with Laman Az, set up a grain mill in the Chechen village of Sernovodsk to provide this service at low cost or for free for those in need.

NGOs that moved to Ingushetia when the second war began have now begun to return to Chechnya. One Laman Az group that went to Ingushetia and launched its humanitarian operations from the neighboring republic returned to Grozny to reopen its office, and currently operates in Chechnya. As the security situation has allowed, CPCD relief work has also gradually returned to Chechnya, where it works in close cooperation with the UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). The Caucasus Refugee Council, a Vladikavkaz-based Russian NGO, is engaged in humanitarian work with 5,670 families of IDPs from Chechnya in Ingushetia. Humanitarian and human-rights work has also been undertaken by Women of Don, a Rostov-on-Don-based Russian NGO.

The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) has maintained a presence in Stavropol krai providing humanitarian aid to IDPs from the first war who arrived in the krai in 1995–1996. DRC maintained cooperation with the regional authorities, assisting in forming policies toward migration issues and accommodation of the new entrants. Since the start of the second war, DRC and NRC, which has maintained a presence in the Southern Caucasus, have moved to supply relief aid to the new IDPs from Chechnya. DRC hosted weekly NGO meetings in Nazran (Ingushetia) to coordinate their activities.

The Cultural Centre of Vainakhs of Stavropolie was involved in delivering humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups in Chechnya, both Chechens and Russians, during the interwar period. Following the beginning of the second war, Kharon Deniev, its head, was appointed by the DRC as its local staff member responsible for distribution of humanitarian aid to Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia.

Advocacy and Human Rights
In Russia, the first Chechen campaign was marked by widespread opposition to the war, a significant antiwar movement, and cooperation between Russian and Chechen organizations. By the start of the second campaign, however, the atmosphere had changed, especially as a result of the kidnapping of Russian journalists who had provided coverage sympathetic to the Chechen cause during the first war. Though these journalists were freed for ransom, the attitude of the mass media changed. In 1999, civil society in Russia largely supported the intervention, if not the particular methods employed by the military. However, initial prowar enthusiasm subsided as casualties among Russian soldiers mounted, and human-rights groups consolidated their efforts to protest against the war.

The Anti-War Committee is a forum of Russian human-rights groups protesting against the war in Chechnya. Its members include the Memorial Human Rights Centre, the Union of Committees of Mothers of Russian Soldiers, the Russian Human Rights Network, the Antimilitarist Radical Association, the Young People's Human Rights Centre, Movement Against Violence, the Democratic Union Party, the Centre for Development of Democracy and Human Rights, the Anarchist Antiwar Movement, and other groups and individuals. The goal of the committee is to demonstrate publicly that not everybody in Russia agrees with the war in Chechnya. The committee organizes a variety of activities such as rallies, meetings, and publications.

The Union of Committees of Mothers of Russian Soldiers (renamed Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Russia) is a humanitarian organization dedicated to the plight of Russian military personnel. It is involved in advocacy activities against the war, submits open letters to the Russian president, counsels the families of the affected servicemen, and takes up individual cases of violations of the human rights of soldiers.

The London Information Network on Conflicts and State-Building, a London-based NGO with an office in Tbilisi, has been involved in Chechnya since the end of the first war, and has organized meetings throughout the 1990s both in London and in the region to promote international conflict-resolution efforts. At the beginning of the second war, it organized a visit of a group of Laman Az members who went to Georgia and from there paid international visits to raise public awareness of the situation in Chechnya and to advocate President Maskhadov's position.

The Cultural Centre of Vainakhs of Stavropolie krai has been involved in monitoring human-rights violations related to the North Caucasian diasporas and raising public awareness of interethnic peace in Stavropol krai in the interwar period. It has worked with the regional authorities to monitor interethnic relations in the krai and especially on the border between Stavropol krai and Chechnya.

Quaker Peace and Service (QPS) was active during the first war in mobilizing Russian and Chechen civil-society groups to advocate peace and protest against the war. It organized a peace march from Moscow to Chechnya in an effort to generate publicity and appeal directly to the Russian troops. However, the fact that it attempted to unite very diverse social and political groups that otherwise had little in common with each other undermined the public message it sought to project. Work with the women's groups was one of its most effective undertakings.

Young People's Programs
CPCD has facilitated a Young People's Peacebuilding Network in the North Caucasus, sponsored by the EU Technical Assistance to the CIS (TACIS) program, providing individuals and local groups with training in alternatives to violence, and with e-mail communication facilities. Four youth meetings and two seminars have been held since its establishment. Laman Az is one such Chechen youth group working closely with Assa in Ingushetia, the Caucasus Forum, and CPCD.

Promotion of Citizen Security
The legacy of two wars in Chechnya has left the territory heavily mined, but there are few maps of the minefields. Land-mine awareness is a serious concern. CPCD is engaged in the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines through its partner organization, the Human Rights Investigation Bureau. Laman Az members have also played an active role in the mine-clearing program and have initiated a land-mine training program for the local staff members. In 1997, Laman Az conducted surveys of the Achkoi-Martan and Urus-Martan regions of Chechnya in an effort to identify the mined areas and in 2000 undertook a project to raise awareness of mines and unexploded ordnance among IDPs in Ingushetia and the inhabitants of Chechnya, acting as an implementation agency for the UNHCR. The project focused especially on children in cooperation with UNICEF.

Early Warning
International Alert (IA) has been involved in peacebuilding activities since 1992, having sent the first fact-finding mission to the republic to assess the mounting tensions. Unfortunately, early warning failed to influence decisionmakers in the West who at the time believed in the democratic credentials of the Yeltsin regime.
The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response started its Caucasus program in 1997 and provides early-warning reports on Chechnya that can be found on FEWER's website (see Resources).

Training and Capacity-Building
In 1995, a Dutch charity, Chechen Relief, set up the Agency for Rehabilitation and Development (ARD), an NGO in Chechnya. ARD taught local trainers and schoolteachers to work with affected children, young people, and women and help with their psychosocial rehabilitation after the first war. Since autumn 1997, it has no longer been possible for foreigners to go to Chechnya, but a training seminar was held in Piatigorsk (southern Russia). ARD also established itself as an NGO in Ingushetia, and since the start of the second war most of its members work in an IDPs camp in Chechnya. Roswitha Jarman, an independent British consultant working in the Caucasus, was involved with both the CPCD and ARD.

The CPCD offers training in the fields of community development, peacebuilding, and humanitarian work, and links local NGOs with partners outside the region. It was instrumental in helping many local groups to get established. Laman Az sought to consolidate the Chechen NGO sector prior to the second war and organized a conference in Grozny where all NGOs could meet and learn about each other. It also worked as a capacity development center for less-developed NGOs since Laman Az had an established office in Grozny. DRC also worked intensively to provide training in project management and community development for IDPs and in capacity-building for the local NGOs.

Chechen civil activists have been also involved in a number of multilateral pan-Caucasian undertakings. In 1998 when the Caucasus Forum of NGOs was founded with assistance from the IA, Chechen NGOs participated and benefited from capacity-building assistance provided by the forum. In 2000, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, personal representative of the Austrian OSCE chairperson-in-office for missions in the Caucasus, and Freimut Duve, the OSCE representative on freedom of the media, launched a book project entitled Caucasus—Defense of the Future, containing essays by Caucasian writers. The project was aimed at promoting dialogue among representatives of intelligentsia in the Caucasus.

Paula Gutlove from Cambridge, Massachusetts, organized a training seminar in autumn 1998 on "Health as a Bridge to Peace" in Piatigorsk for Chechen, Russian, North Ossetian, and Ingush participants, financed by the World Health Organization, and a follow-up meeting in spring 2000.

Concluding Remarks
The efforts of INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations) have strengthened cross-ethnic and cross-clan solidarity in Chechnya and promoted civic values as an alternative to networks based on family and ethnicity. Apart from providing valuable humanitarian assistance, they have empowered local groups, especially women's groups that otherwise might not have been able to operate in an increasingly male-dominated environment. They also played a significant role in providing access for the Chechens to wider international networks, publicity opportunities, and funding.

At the same time, the Russian authorities have grown increasingly suspicious of western INGOs, believing that they engaged in conflict-resolution activities in Chechnya in order to facilitate its formal secession from Russia. At times, the attitudes and behaviors of INGOs could have been interpreted in such a light, and even if they did not constitute formal policy, they raised expectations on the Chechen side that there was a substantial constituency in the West that was willing to support independence.

Reports and appeals by Western human-rights INGOs failed to resonate with the Russian authorities and the wider public. Since the beginning of the second war they have been viewed in Russia as an indication of obliviousness to the killings and kidnappings of Russian and Chechen civilians prior to the second war. Also, they are seen as having a greater interest in criticizing the Russian state than in protecting human rights, irrespective of political concerns.

During the second campaign, the activities of international agencies in the North Caucasus have acted as an irritant to the FSB, which has suspected them of spying and interfering in Russian internal affairs. The agency has not always accepted their humanitarian mandates and has interpreted their peacebuilding efforts as attempts to obstruct the federal authorities' efforts to maintain order. CPCD was one such NGO, seen by the FSB as detrimental to stability. Another example involves those members of Laman Az who received training from the Berghof Research Center in Germany on raising land-mine awareness; in response, the Russian press accused Germany of training Chechen terrorists.

Prospects

The situation as it now exists offers little reason for optimism in Moscow, as it is difficult to bring such a secessionist war to an end. Reaching a compromise will be more difficult now after extreme violations of human rights by both sides and the emergence of an Islamic movement with broad international links.

In the opinion of presidential aide Sergei Yastrezhembsky, the Russian authorities view the prospects as follows: the Chechen conflict cannot be resolved solely by military means, but the transition to a political phase requires the end of the military operation. The political process in Chechnya will evolve more rapidly after the Chechen resistance is neutralized. A further obstacle to the political phase of conflict resolution is that there is no single figure within the Chechen diaspora who could unite all Chechen clans and districts and take responsibility to rid Chechnya of links with international Islamic terrorists.

Maintaining security will remain a major challenge. While the military campaign in the mountains may continue for years, the Russian-controlled areas are not secure either; Russian forces will likely face prolonged guerrilla war and terrorist attacks. As Russia has a conscript army, this may increase opposition to war by a Russian public unwilling to sacrifice its sons for the sake of conquering a remote territory. In such a situation, even if the Russian government proves relatively conciliatory and the majority of the Chechen population does not side with the insurgents, it could take years for the guerrillas to reconcile themselves to integration into the Russian Federation.

Moscow's relationship with its citizens of Chechen nationality is also problematic. What Moscow called the "fight against terrorism" turned into a wave of xenophobia against Chechens and Caucasians in general. The achievements of the Soviet era in creating indigenous professional classes and infrastructure have been severely undermined, and reintegration into the social environment will be slow and painful. Until a new leadership, untarnished either by a "Moscow puppet" image or by links with criminal warlords, emerges in Chechnya, the population will remain confused and torn between the two camps.

The longing for independence has not receded among those Chechens who are not fighting the federal troops at present. It is only that they are largely unwilling to align themselves with the Islamists, and regard their jihad as dominated by foreigners. As Kadyrov himself stated, fighting Moscow did not advance the Chechen struggle to achieve independence, and "we have to chose another route." Moscow did finally begin to make a distinction between criminality and separatism, and assumed a more relaxed stance on the issue of the Russian Federation's territorial integrity. During the first war, the predominant concern in the Yeltsin circle was that Chechnya would be the first republic to break away and that other republics would follow suit, until Russia disintegrated as the USSR had disintegrated. By contrast, the Putin leadership views Chechnya as an exceptional case that is not representative of any general separatist aspirations. The Russian leadership finally started to make a distinction between foreign-backed Islamic terrorism and a pro-independence drive on behalf of ordinary Chechens, which may be far less threatening to Russia than Moscow previously assumed. As it is easier to govern in the conditions of voluntary compliance than coercion, the desire to hold onto Chechnya at all costs may be diminishing in Moscow. Security of the North Caucasus however, remains a top priority.

Recommendations

The most realistic—and dignified—solution to Russian-Chechen relations would be an independent Chechnya, recognized by Moscow, that would not serve as a destabilizing factor for the rest of the North Caucasus. This, however, is a long-term goal, unrealizable until the last Wahhabi is driven out of Chechnya and tangible concessions are made to the Chechen aspirations for independence. Still, some practical steps can be taken in this direction, such as negotiating a power-sharing agreement with Moscow that will give Chechnya a great deal of autonomy. This can only be done when the Kadyrov government is more securely established.

There are, however, some legal foundations to build upon: a draft power-sharing agreement was negotiated between the Chechen parliament and Moscow in December 1992. President Dudayev opposed the agreement and used his opposition to undermine his legislature. Moscow has since offered to renegotiate the agreement a number of times, and it may be worth considering.

There is a consensus among internationals on the need to provide humanitarian relief for the foreseeable future, but this is complicated by the inability of foreign aid workers to operate freely in Chechnya. In such a situation, the aid is most effectively distributed through local NGOs and community leaders, assuming they are properly trained and organized. Strengthening their local capacities has been undertaken, but the need for more work still exists. It is hoped that as local NGOs become more developed, it will, in time, be possible for them to make a transition from relief to development work or to actual conflict-resolution activities.

In the present circumstances of the Russian-Western rapprochement, it is important that the brutality of the Russian troops and police forces in Chechnya does not go unnoticed and Moscow is held accountable for human-rights abuses. After the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Western leaderships made it clear that they recognize that Russia has a real cause and that Chechen terrorism does exist. This, however, does not imply that the Russian forces should denigrate themselves to the same methods and cause even more suffering than Chechnya has already had. In the long run, this will be only beneficial for Russia.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, University of California, Berkeley; Crisis in Chechnya, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, Czech Republic; FEWER Reports, London; Monitor & Prism, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC; WarReport, 1995–98, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London
REPORTS:	Amnesty International, Russian Federation/Chechen Republic: Humanity Is Indivisible, Open Letter to the United Nations from the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, EUR 46/38/99, November 1999. Human Rights Watch, Chechnya: A Renewed Catastrophe, available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/russia/chechnya. Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, The Caucasus and the Caspian, Seminar Series vols. I–III, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, 1996–1998. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, North Caucasus Update, June 2000.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, by Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal. London, Pan Books, 1997. Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, by Anatol Lieven. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1998. No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflict in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, by Edward W. Walker. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland, by Anna Matveeva. London, RIIA, 1999.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES	www.amina.com (Chechen Republic On-line, Chechen website in English) www.cdi.org (Center for Defense Information, USA) www.chechengovernment.com (Maskhadov website, in opposition to Kavkaz-Tsentr) www.hro.org/Human Rights On-line (the Russian human-rights network) www.iwpr.net (IWPR's Caucasus reporting service, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London, UK) www.kavkaz.org (Kavkaz-Tsentr, Chechen website in Russian) www.rferl.org (Crisis in Chechnya, by the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Tom de Waal, e-mail: tomdewaal@hotmail.com Chris Hunter, Center for Peacemaking and Community Development, e-mail: peacecentre@glasnet.ru Anatol Lieven, Carnegie Center, Washington, D.C., e-mail: alieven@ceip.org Arthur Martirossian, Conflict Management Group, e-mail: martiros@cmgroup.org Anna Matveeva, expert on the Caucasus, London, e-mail: sophiamat@ukonline.co.uk Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, International Alert, London, e-mail: gtergabrielian@international-alert.org Anna Zelkina, SOAS, e-mail: az4@soas.ac.uk DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: In Chechnya Caucasus NGO Forum; Center for Peacemaking and Community Development; Center for the Study of and Management of Conflict (Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology); Don Women's Union; Mission Peace in North Caucasus; Union of the Committee of Soldier's Mothers of Russia; International Conflict Management Group; Danish Refugee Council; FEWER; International Alert; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; Médecins Sans Frontières; Quaker Peace and Service

About the author

Anna Matveeva is a program manager at Saferworld (on small arms and security). She previously worked as a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) and program head at International Alert (London). As a scholar specializing in issues of conflict and the politics of post-Soviet Eurasia, she has authored publications such as The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland (London: RIIA, 1999) and academic articles, and undertook projects for organizations such as the International Peace Academy, EastWest Institute, Minority Rights Group, and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.