Author	Monique Mekenkamp
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

Although endowed with rich and extensive fishing grounds and reserves of as yet unexploited natural resources, including bauxite, phosphate and petroleum, Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in Africa. It is bordered by the states of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. The size of the country - approximately one million people inhabiting 36,000 square kilometres - is inversely proportional to its social complexity. There are about 22 ethnic groups with political systems ranging from the relatively centralised patrilineal states in the interior (Fula and Mandinga) to the acephalous societies of the coast (Balanta, Manjako, Pepel) and the Bijagós archipelago (Bijagós, Cocoli, Pajendinca). Guinea-Bissau also has a sizeable population of mixed descent.
Effective colonial rule began during the early decades of this century, although the Portuguese presence in the territory dates back to the 1440s. While colonial domination was relatively short, it was nevertheless characterised by harshness and brutality which, together with the stubborn refusal of the Portuguese to grant independence peacefully, inevitably led to war. The protracted conflict that started in 1962 as a guerrilla war, culminated not only in the first unilateral declaration of independence in Africa, but significantly it also led to the downfall of the fascist dictatorship in Portugal and the hasty dismantling of the Portuguese colonial empire.
On 24 September 1973 the Partido Africano para a Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), PAIGC, declared the colony of Portuguese Guinea independent. After a decade of bloody armed-struggle, hopes were raised that genuine political and economic independence would now be realised. Politics were however quickly monopolised by the ruling party, the PAIGC, which described itself as 'the supreme expression of the sovereign will of the people' and banned all organised political activities falling outside its control. An active national security police ensured that dissent was effectively stifled.
The security forces of president Luis Cabral's government executed about a hundred individuals suspected of collaboration with the Portuguese regime. After a failed coup attempt in 1978, more opponents met a similar fate and were buried in mass graves in the Oio region. In 1980, a successful coup d'état brought Cabral's Defence minister and one of the most prominent guerrilla leaders of the independence war, João Bernardo Vieira ('Nino'), to power.
One of the immediate consequences of the 'Readjustment Movement', as the coup became known, was a considerable reduction in political repression, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, and flagrant human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the period between 1980 and 1991 was also characterised by political instability, with attempted coups or take-over bids aggravating economic and social crises.
In 1991, at an Extraordinary Meeting of the ruling PAIGC, President Vieira announced the start of a process of transition to multi-party democracy. With that year officially designated the 'Year of Democratisation', the constitution was amended to allow for political pluralism, with guarantees for freedom of thought, assembly, association, demonstration and the press. Further moves towards the democratisation of Guinean society continued throughout 1992 and 1993, and by the time of the first multi-party elections in July 1994 there were about a dozen legal opposition parties. The elections passed off peacefully, voter participation was high, and President Vieira - whose status as war hero has remained high in the interior of the country - was returned to power with a small majority. The PAIGC won 62 of the National Assembly's hundred seats; Vieira was re-elected as the president of the Republic after a photo-finish rally with the opposition's candidate Kumba Iala (52-48 per cent). Slowly a vibrant civil society, underpinned by the new politics of consensus was beginning to emerge.
President Vieira however started to consolidate his position from early 1998 and decided to postpone the elections of July 1998 to October 1998. He divided key positions amongst his supporters, leaving the opposition parties with empty hands. Moreover, during the Congress of the PAIGC, Vieira succeeded in being re-elected to the presidency of his party. As such he was in contravention of the constitution which prohibits the president of the Republic from holding the position of president of a political party. In response the opposition and the media criticised these undemocratic actions in the strongest of terms.

Conflict Dynamics

In January 1998, Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Brigadeiro Ansumane Mané was suspended by president Vieira and accused of having failed to take measures against the traffic of arms to armed separatist groups in the Casamance region of Senegal. At the same time, more than twenty people including Guinea-Bissau soldiers and civilians and Senegalese civilians suspected of involvement in the arms trafficking, were arrested. This led to increased tension among the armed forces, many of whom were already dissatisfied with the low wages and poor conditions of service. On 7 June 1998, two days after Vieira had appointed Umberto Gomes as the new Army Chief, hereby dismissing Mané, Mané led a mutiny that soon plunged the entire country into civil war.
Two days after the start of the mutiny, on June 9, Mané announced the formation of the Junta Militar. During the first week of the conflict, it was demanded that Vieira change his policy and enter into dialogue with the Junta in order to bring about the desired changes. The Junta furthermore called for democratic elections to be held within sixty days. Mané and his men claimed they did not want to take over power, although criticising the regime of Vieira, but called for a dialogue in order to look for ways of improvement. Strong dissatisfaction with the corrupt presidential power and the harsh conditions of life led many people in Guinea-Bissau to side with the Military Junta. Soon the Junta could count on a rapidly increasing support from civil organisations and opposition parties. A few days after the mutiny, politically isolated and abandoned by most of his army, President Vieira was reduced to relying on foreign military force. It is almost certain, that Vieira had already started calling for military support from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry on June 7. Some say it is even very likely, that this foreign intervention was already in preparation before that date. 'Opération Gabou', as the Senegalese intervention was called, became operational with surprising rapidity, and the speed of the decision procedures made in Senegal were 'remarkable' in this respect.
Vieira's rescue by Senegalese and Guinea-Conakry troops led to a situation where the self-proclaimed Military Junta - representing ninety per cent of the armed forces reinforced by veterans of the armed struggle for national liberation - were fighting government forces, representing the remaining ten per cent of the population supported by troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry.
In the fifty days following June 7, intense bombardment with heavy artillery took place. The city of Bissau was mercilessly shelled by artillery from both sides resulting in great material destruction. Senegalese troops were reported to have acted as a brutal foreign occupying force rather than the army of the legal government. Generally it is thought that the hasty intervention of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry has prolonged the battle and spread the conflict throughout the country.

The Casamance factor
Relations between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal have improved in recent years, after occasional disturbances in the past. Casamance, the southern Senegalese region was part of Guinea-Bissau until the French took over. One of the structural problems in their relationship was the war in Casamance, where the rebel party Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MDFC) has, since 1982, been engaged in a guerrilla war in the border region of Guinea-Bissau. The majority of the Casamance people have close cultural and historical ties to large groups in northern Guinea-Bissau. For years, Guinea-Bissau gave guerrilla fighters safe passage into the refugee camps just across the border. This was a 'natural' favour as the freedom fighters of Guinea-Bissau of the PAIGC had used Casamance as a refugee basis during their guerrilla war against the Portuguese. The struggle for self-determination for the people of Casamance is one of the causes of tension. Furthermore, Guinea-Bissau has also provided the separatist rebels in the Casamance with weapons for many years, although according to the parliamentary report which was recently published, the amounts of arms sold were not particularly impressive. Responsibility has never been proven but the Senegalese government has always blamed the army of Guinea-Bissau.
Since Guinea-Bissau joined the West-African Monetary union (CFA-countries) in May 1997, President Vieira has embarked on a strategy of normalising relations with Senegal. The dismissal of Army Chief Mané was an element of this strategy. President Vieira had earlier distanced himself from the support of the separatist rebels and an inquiry was set up to investigate the arms traffic across their northern border. Vieira was not very cooperative with the inquiry commission during the execution of their work. However the leaders of both countries have subsequently committed themselves to improving relations. They are now united in their condemnation of both groups of rebels who they believe are helping each other. Some have noted that it is hard to believe that Senegalese president Diouf and Vieira actually believed that the Junta and the MFDC were collaborating; it is more likely, that an alleged collaboration between the two rebels was used as an argument to disqualify the Junta on a diplomatic level.
Efforts to restore peace between the Guinea-Bissau government and the rebels started almost immediately after June 7 1998. However, during the first week of the conflict, numerous initiatives from civilian organisations and parliament aimed at opening negotiations, were categorically refused by President Vieira. Also mediation attempts by Portugal, Angola, and Gambia proved ineffective. Diplomats in Senegal's capital expressed concern that the mediation attempts had lost their momentum, while more and more effort was being put into defeating the rebels by military means alone. After three weeks of fighting, Vieira adopted a tough line against the rebels who, he said, had tried to stage a coup d'etat against a legitimate government. He called on the West African military force, ECOMOG, to intervene and help put down the rebellion in his country. In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a resolution instructing the body to begin preparations to send an intervention force to Guinea-Bissau, if peace negotiations failed. A three-pronged strategy was adopted to try to restore peace in the country: dialogue and negotiation, sanctions and embargoes, and the use of force. Furthermore the body established a special committee on the resolution of the Guinea-Bissau crisis.
While Vieira and his Francophone partners were constantly stressing the rebellious, criminal and illegal character of the Junta, thereby assuring themselves of diplomatic legitimacy, it was after an intervention of Portugal, that the impasse was broken. Portugal supplied Mané with a satellite telephone, and started to criticise Vieira, who was not only fighting his own people, but in collaboration with Senegal, had started to close the country for any commercial or humanitarian transport. It was indeed Portugal, with an important diplomatic contribution in Cape Verde, that accomplished the first cease-fire of July 26, 1998. This truce was transformed into a formal cease-fire on August 25, but was breached in October. After a few days of fighting, the rebels gained control of most of the country. President Vieira declared a unilateral cease-fire on October 18 and said he was willing to hold talks with Mané. The rebels declared a cease-fire on October 23. At this time the conflict was in a deadlock - Vieira holding the centre of the capital and Mané controlling the rest of the country. The current peace agreement was finally signed on November 1 in Abuja, Nigeria after three days of talks. The agreement stated that:

1. a government of national unity will be formed, including representatives of the rebels;
2. all foreign troops will be withdrawn and replaced by a 600-man West African (ECOMOG) peacekeeping force;
3. and presidential elections will be held by the end of March 1999.

A glimmer of hope emerged. Delegations from the government, the junta and ECOWAS later reached a draft agreement on the arrival of additional ECOMOG troops and a timetable for the withdrawal of Guinean and Senegalese soldiers, which is envisaged under the peace agreement. However fighting resumed at the end of January 1999 marking the first major incident since the peace accord.
Peace talks were again held under the auspices of ECOWAS including diplomatic representations from Portugal, Sweden and France. On February 17 Vieira and Mané agreed, in the spirit of national reconciliation, to work together to guarantee peace in Guinea-Bissau and resolved never again to resort to arms in order to solve their problems. Later that week Francisco Fadul was sworn in as prime minister of the government of national unity. This seemed to mark the end of the armed rebellion whereby Vieira was able to save his regime at the cost of several hundreds lives, several thousands of refugees and the destruction of the socio-economic infrastructure.
General elections were scheduled to take place in March 1999 under the regional accord signed in Nigeria in November. However delays in implementing the peace process, including the withdrawal of Senegalese troops, made a March election impossible. The Senegalese and Guinean troops finally left the country at the end of March, and have successfully been replaced by a 600-strong ECOMOG force.
By early May however, it had become apparent that Vieira was increasing both his ground forces - particularly the rapidly recruited and trained aguentas - and his armaments. The Junta then decided to launch a final assault on the loyalist troops. Witnesses of the talks between president Abubakar of Nigeria and Ansumane Mané stated that Abubakar had strongly recommended this kind of operation. Thus, fighting started again on May 6 when loyalists resisted efforts by the West African intervention force, ECOMOG, to disarm some of the presidential guards. After this, troops loyal to president Vieira surrendered to those backing former Armed Forces Chief Ansumane Mané after a shootout in Bissau. Vieira sought protection in the French embassy but was refused; he then turned to the residence of the Bishop, where he was eventually discovered by the Junta, after which he was handed over to the Portuguese embassy. Finally Portugal granted Vieira political asylum. General and legislative elections are now rescheduled for November 28, 1999.

Official Conflict Management

Neither the United Nations nor the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have played decisive roles in the Guinea-Bissau conflict. The role of the UN generally has been weak, and at crucial moments during the peace process they were simply absent.
The UN has been more active in the post-conflict phase. Following the peace agreement the Security Council of the UN called on the parties in Guinea-Bissau urgently to form a government of national unity and to hold elections not later than the end of March 1999. The Council unanimously adopted resolution 1216 (1998) calling for the full implementation of the agreements between the government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta signed in August, November and December, the UN said in a press release. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also decided to send an electoral needs assessment team to Guinea-Bissau. The Security Council welcomed a meeting of donors to Guinea-Bissau in Geneva on 4-5 May 1999, sponsored by the UNDP, to mobilise assistance for the country's humanitarian needs, its socio-economic rehabilitation and peace-building. At this conference 32 countries and international agencies pledged US $200 million in aid for the next three years.
Furthermore, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has appointed Samuel Nana-Sinkam, a Cameroonian national, as his representative in Guinea-Bissau and head of UNOGBIS, the UN Post-Conflict Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau. This had already been planned some months earlier, however, and the delay has had an impact on the UN's credibility and its capacity. UNOGBIS is mandated, among other things, to help build democracy and the rule of law and to organise free and transparent elections; to work with all involved to facilitate the implementation of the Abuja agreement; and to harmonise the activities of the UN agencies working in Guinea-Bissau. UNOGBIS is to include two officers responsible for monitoring human rights and providing technical assistance for measures to protect human rights, including during the election period.
OAU initiatives have been marginal and the organisation has shown itself powerless to mediate in the conflict. It has happily left the search for a solution to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The first cease-fire in August was concluded under the auspices of ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP). ECOWAS, formed in 1975 to promote economic integration among its members, has assumed an increasingly important diplomatic and military role in the region.
While Senegal and Guinea rushed troops to Bissau to help Vieira fight the rebels, the CPLP deployed a contact group to mediate between the belligerents. This mediation resulted in negotiations that led to the first cease-fire. The CPLP contact group also decided on July 31 to send some hundred Portuguese-speaking military observers from member nations to Guinea-Bissau to monitor the cease-fire.
In the search for a solution to the conflict the rivalry between the CPLP and ECOWAS was very noticeable. The CPLP had always advocated an internal solution, and this approach was strongly supported by political parties, civil society and the diplomatic representatives of Portugal and Sweden, who have played an important role. However, ECOWAS preferred a sub-regional solution that involved the mutineers, the government, ECOWAS, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea and later also the CPLP. ECOWAS at first wanted to exclude the CPLP from the peace process, supported by France, which pled for 'having exclusively the West Africans solving problems of West Africa'. Before the mediation, an emergency meeting was called in order to harmonise and coordinate the mediators' efforts. The Cape Verdian Foreign Minister Jose Luis Jesus tried to ease the tensions by highlighting the importance of both institutions in conflict resolution. 'ECOWAS plays a very important role in intervening in conflicts in Africa and in the mediation in the Guinea-Bissau conflict. Like ECOWAS, we are guided by the desire to achieve peace as fast as possible by facilitating dialogue between the two parties.' (Press agency IPS, August 1998)
A special committee of ECOWAS together with Gambian president, Yahya Jammeh, mediated the peace agreement of November. The Government and the Military Junta, the peace negotiators; ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese speaking countries, the UN and the OAU all signed the agreement.
After the war of May 6-7, France actively tried to push both the UN as well as the EU to consider the military action as a coup d'état and consequently condemn the Junta. France has asked for an economic embargo on Guinea-Bissau. After well formulated protests from Portugal and Sweden - supported by the Netherlands - the EU eventually decided not to issue a condemnation, but, instead, 'to follow the situation carefully and eventually draw its own conclusions'. The French media continue to try and influence international opinion by spreading negative messages about the Junta, suggesting that they are mistreating the population, and that it has various important opponents among political parties and civil society.

Multi Track Diplomacy

The civil society in Guinea-Bissau, community leaders, prominent individuals, religious groups and non-governmental organisations, has been active in seeking peace and defending human rights, sometimes placing themselves in danger. Their efforts have not been widely reported but they have made a significant behind the scenes contribution. Throughout the period of fighting, many civilians, both from inside the country and living in the refugee community, have tried continuously to bring the parties together for talks and to propose ways to secure a future for Guinea-Bissau in which all human rights are respected.

Domestic
Internal attempts to end the fighting began two days after it started. The major role was played by the Goodwill Commission of parliamentarians, representatives of the three main religious groups and of non-governmental organisations. It was led by the late Bishop of Bissau, Dom Settimio Arturo Ferrazzetta, who died, aged 75, on 27 January 1999.
The Bishop has been very active in efforts to achieve peace between the rebels and the government from an early stage in the conflict. He regularly urged both leaders to respect each other and their people and start a peace process. He has made impressive efforts to promote the peace process. In later phases the Bishop has always supported the negotiations and consistently acted as go-between to foster the dialogue between the two parties. Both parties have honoured him as a 'martyr of peace'.
Members of the Goodwill Commission met president Vieira and brigadier Mané and tried to bring the belligerents to a less extreme point of view in order to expand the opportunities for agreement. For example, they urged the Junta to accept ECOWAS as a mediating partner. They acted in liaison with the CPLP and ECOWAS. In September, when it seemed that the CPLP and ECOWAS had failed to reach a common understanding, the Goodwill Commission decided to pursue internal mediation in liaison with the diplomatic representatives of Sweden, Portugal and France. They helped pave the way for the Abuja agreement.
Apart from its mediation work, the Commission has also staged 'Marches for Peace' and has sent letters to the United Nations and the European Union to urge them to intervene.
In spite of the country's small size and widespread poverty, Guinea-Bissau's Liga Guineense dos Direitos do Homem (Guinean League for Human Rights) has been called one of the most impressive human rights organisations in Africa (University of Minnesota: The Status of Human Rights Organisations in Sub Sahara Africa). The organisation emphasises the rights of women. The bulk of the Liga's work is to inform the people of Bissau of their legal rights and obligations, to monitor the human rights situation in the country, and act as an advocate for those whose rights have been infringed. Before the war, public education was effected through a weekly programme broadcast over the government radio and the publication of a bulletin containing educational articles, information on human rights abuses in Guinea-Bissau, and accounts of the activities of the Liga.
The leading members of the Liga were scattered during the conflict. A few stayed in Bissau throughout, but their work was severely limited by the bombardments and the breakdown in communications systems. Nevertheless, in August 1998 they set up an International Human Rights Observatory in Cape Verde, in collaboration with other non-governmental human rights organisations. It aimed to monitor human rights and press the parties to the conflict to respect human rights. It published a monthly magazine, 'Observatório'. In December 1998, when it seemed that the war had ended, the Observatory was closed and the Liga resumed its normal work in Guinea-Bissau.
The Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa (National Institute of Studies and Research - INEP) is the largest and most active research institution in Guinea-Bissau. The institute for example has conducted a study on the Guinean democratisation process. INEP has also been a key actor in the country's development, acting as a knowledge centre and the main consulting body for the entire country. The Institute furthermore undertakes a wide range of activities, including hosting national and international seminars, conferences and colloquia. However, most of its premises and archives were destroyed during the war. INEP is now actively working on its reconstruction and institutional rehabilitation and is already demonstrating its role in Guinea-Bissau society, as it is actively involved in a large-scale habitat rehabilitation programme in Bissau with the Dutch Development Organisation. (SNV).

International
Many international humanitarian organisations are present in Guinea-Bissau and their activities range from organising the return of refugees, to supplying emergency aid and food. The International Red Cross Committee and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are some of the humanitarian organisations active in the country. The ICRC also launches regular appeals and closely monitors the situation in Guinea-Bissau.
A Common Humanitarian Action Plan has been developed by UN agencies to manage humanitarian assistance in a Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Guinea-Bissau. Consultations have been held with the government, the military junta and the donor community. The principal goal of the appeal is to facilitate the rapid return to a normal situation for population groups most affected by the conflict and to begin cooperation with the new Government of National Unity as soon as it is constituted.
Several projects have been undertaken within the Action Plan. The UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for relocating and providing basic assistance for the Senegalese refugees in Guinea-Bissau, and for the repatriation and initial reintegration of the refugees of Guinea-Bissau in the sub-region. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is active in the coordination of humanitarian assistance programmes. It facilitates coordination and information sharing among all partners. Furthermore OCHA plays a role in organising agency missions and formulating follow-up recommendations in order to assess humanitarian needs. Both UNCHR and OCHA seek the participation of local authorities and NGOs in the implementation of the programmes.
However, the roles played by the various UN organisations should not be overestimated. WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF did little during the period of conflict, while the relief of tens of thousands of dislocated people was mainly done by the rural population, whose food and seeds stocks have been reduced to a bare minimum. Also the ICRC has often been slow and indecisive. Generally, the multilateral humanitarian organisations have insufficient knowledge of the humanitarian situation in the country before or during the conflict.
A Solidarity Platform of NGOs with the People of Guinea-Bissau has been formed. It has met three times since June 1998 to discuss the war and possible solutions. Many European NGOs are present in this platform. The aim of this Platform is to organise meetings to enhance cooperation and to support the peoples of Guinea-Bissau. It has for example drafted an appeal for peace.
ECHO (office for humanitarian affairs of the EU) has developed an action plan for food security, health care and reconstruction. SNV/INEP are executing a habitat rehabilitation project within this framework. Unfortunately, ECHO is hindered by slow Brussels-bureaucracy.
Amnesty International has regularly called both parties to respect human rights. It has issued several reports regarding the implementation of human rights issues in the new constitution and in the peace accords. In its last report it also issued recommendations.

Prospects

In the years before the war the government made little attempt to develop a culture of accountability or to build institutions for the protection of human rights. In 1998, an Anti-Corruption Committee and another institution (Tribunal das Contas) were created, which can be considered important institutional steps forward. On the other hand, under the Vieira regime, the presidential top never showed any signal of respecting these institutions. Nevertheless, according to the latest Amnesty International report, two factors encourage hope that in the wake of the conflict a new era may begin in which human rights are respected and protected. On the one hand, the vision and strength of will of NGOs, religious groups and others working for peace and to enhance the range of human rights, is strong. Equally encouraging is the new Government of National Unity's promise to respect human rights and its plans to promote important developments in human rights protection.
The November accord may turn out to be less fragile than its two predecessors. However, political and material reconstruction will only be possible through the establishment of a legitimate democratic regime. The Prime Minister of the transition government, Mr Francisco Fadul has expressed the need for internal reform, but has clearly indicated the need for international responsibility in this matter. He calls for the coordination and transparency of the input of all foreign partners of the country. International aid and assistance is necessary in this post-conflict phase. According to the OCHA, there is an urgent need for donor funding to implement humanitarian programmes.
A positive development is the appointment of human rights officers within the UN Post-Conflict Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). Their role is to provide support and technical assistance to the government and to NGOs as well as monitoring the human rights situation.
A recent appraisal of the future is expressed by Roy van der Drift from INEP: 'It is extremely important at this moment, that the international community shows the willingness and intelligence to make a profound analysis of the situation, which will throw a much more positive light on what is actually going on. Until now, all aspects of the Abuja treaty as well as the national Constitution, are respected. The Junta has succeeded in restoring public order, and hardly any incidents are reported. Military presence in the streets of Bissau is every day diminishing. Parliament and civil society are constantly involved in the decision processes. The elections, set for November 28th, have never been questioned (apart from one political party, the PRS of Kumba Iala, which has stated that it is already prepared for immediate elections - which logistically is not feasible). Ansumane Mané, who is considered as one of the main persons in the country at this moment, is generally considered as an extremely important factor for the consolidation of peace. Being totally bankrupt, the government of National Unity should be enabled as soon as possible to finance its own functioning, as well as the functioning of Public Administration and Justice. Quick measures to improve the economic and humanitarian situation are to be taken. Moreover, it is important to restore public/government structures on the countryside, and replacing the 'informal' Junta representatives by formal civil officials.'

Recommendations

The Solidarity Platform for the people of Guinea-Bissau organised its first meeting, under the aegis of the Voluntary Organisations in cooperation in Emergencies, (VOICE) on July 6, 1998 in Brussels. The aim of this meeting was to exchange information on the political, military and humanitarian situation in the country following the outbreak of the crisis. The Platform also drafted an Appeal to the International Community to call for the opening up of humanitarian corridors and the urgent realisation of aid. This appeal was signed by some thirty organisations.
Another meeting in Paris on September 29, 1998 resulted in a Declaration by the NGOs in solidarity with Guinea-Bissau, to pool their information and their concern, to coordinate their efforts in favour of peace, to consider aid for the victims of the conflict and to alert public opinion. The Declaration, among other issues, called for:

• a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the active building of peace by the people of Guinea-Bissau themselves, removed from foreign interference, and for the participation of the civilian organisations to be taken into account in the negotiations;
• impartial mediation based upon the major interests of the people of Guinea-Bissau; the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In a Memorandum of June 1999, the Platform also made some recommendations concerning conditions of stability, a new culture of power, protection of fundamental rights and focused on issues such as transparency and good governance, rehabilitation.
Amnesty International has recently made recommendations to the Government of National Unity, donor governments and the international community. These recommendations focus on measures necessary to prevent human rights violations, particularly during the forthcoming election campaign. They also focus on the longer-term development of institutions and practices for the protection of human rights. Recommendations include the development of a programme of civic education in preparation for the election; the return of key trained personnel; the effective training and posting of national and international election observers; reforming the criminal justice system; the restructuring and retraining of the police; and guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary.

Service Information

REPORTS:	United Nations: UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Guinea Bissau. January-December 1999. OCHA 1998; Amnesty International: Guinea-Bissau - Human Rights in war and peace, July 1999; Guinea-Bissau - Protecting human rights - a new Era? April 1999; Guinea-Bissau - Human Rights under Fire. July 1998; Solidarity Platform for the People of Guinea Bissau: Appeal for Guinea Bissau and the Situation in Guinea Bissau. July 1998; Declaration in Paris. September 1998, Sida; Guinea-Bissau 1997: Going into High Gear - A macroeconomic report, by renato Aguilar.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Guinea-Bissau 1998 - Democratic Legality versus Democratic Legitimacy, by Lars Rudebeck. In: Webs of War - Armed Conflicts in West Africa. Africa Study Centre, Leiden/the Netherlands, March 1999; Democracy - Legitimate Warfare in Guinea-Bissau, by Roy van der Drift. In: Webs of War - Armed Conflicts in West Africa, Africa Study Centre, Leiden/the Netherlands, March 1999; Civil War in Guinea-Bissau, by Napoleon Abdulai. In: ACCORD-magazine Conflict Trends, October 1998, Issue 1; Guinea-Bissau - Power, Conflict and Renewal in a West African Nation, by Joshua B. Forrest. Westview Press, Boulder, 1992.
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Renato Aguilar - Department of Economics, Gothenburg University, Sweden. Email Renato.Aguilar@economics.gu.se; Roy van der Drift - INEP, Guinea Bissau. Email van.der.drift@sol.gtelecom.gw; Abdulai Napoleon - ACCORD, South Africa. Email anapoleon@accord.org.za; Gill Nevins - Amnesty International. Email gnevins@amnesty.org; Lars Rudebeck - Department of Political Science, Uppsala University, Sweden. Email lars.rudebeck@uland.uu.se
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.bissau.com/ (General information); http://guineabissau.forward.net (No Djunta Mon!, meaning Let's Join Hands in the local language Kriol, a website dedicated to assisting efforts to end the crisis in the country); http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/$$guinea_bissau?OpenView (ICRC); http://www.imf.org/external/NP/sec/decdo/ecowas.htm (ECOWAS); http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/8463/ (Portugese language site on the conflict); http://www.uvm.edu/~whawthor/guinea.html (Guinea Bissau links); http://africa-research.csusb.edu/countries/gbi01.htm (INEP - in the long term INEP will publish its own website).
ORGANISATIONS:	Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisa (INEP), BP 112, Bairro Cobornel, Guinea-Bissau, Tel. +245 251 867, Fax +245 251 125, (Temporarily at SNV-head Office in Bissau, tel. 222 881, 222 882), Email inep@sol.gtelecom.gw, snv@sol.gtelecom.gw; Solidarity Platform of the People of Guinea-Bissau, c/o Associação para a Cooperação Entre os Povos (ACEP), Apart. 24 433, 1250 Lisboa, Portugal, Tel. +351 1 386 5278, Fax +351 1 386 3699, Email: acepongd@mail.telepac.pt.

About the author

Monique Mekenkamp is coordinator of the survey project undertaken by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention. She has studied International Relations at the University of Amsterdam and majored in peace and conflict studies at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. She has travelled through southern Africa and lived in Cameroon, Nigeria, and former Zaire.