Author	Bram Posthumus
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Liberia was founded in 1822 and declared a Republic in 1847. The founding fathers were mainly a small group of freed American slaves. These 'Americo-Liberians' placed themselves at the top of the social and economic ladder leaving the majority of the (at least) sixteen indigenous peoples living in the interior of Liberia firmly at the bottom. They were considered 'savages' who needed to be 'civilised'. This situation persisted well into the twentieth century until a number of reforms intended to accommodate the indigenous peoples were introduced under the post-World War II presidents Tubman and Tolbert.
Despite these reforms, however, the closely-knit Americo-Liberian community continued to profit from their system of patronage. Opposition to the succession of unaccountable and intolerant regimes was virtually non-existent until the 1960s and 70s, when groups of progressive thinkers and politicians started to get organised. They staged the demonstration over price hikes in the country's staple food, rice, April 12 1979, which was broken up by the police. Dozens were killed. Precisely one year later, a group of seventeen men, among them the later head of state Samuel K. Doe, stormed into the presidential palace (called the Executive Mansion), stabbed the incumbent William Tolbert to death and took possession of the state. Days later, 13 prominent members of the Americo-Liberian elite were executed on the beach. These events represented a decisive turning point, laying bare the fundamental flaws of the previous 133 years of Liberia's history and sowing the seeds of the war that would destroy the country a decade later.
The new government's promise of hope soon became a record of lost opportunities and continued intolerance. Doe retained the presidency in 1985 only after heavily rigged elections. In the meantime, he had intimidated or alienated most of his erstwhile (progressive) political allies and driven them out of his government. Civil servants were also dismissed, including the director of the General Services Agency, one Charles Taylor, whom Doe accused of corruption. In the wake of a failed coup attempt by another formerly trusted member of the Doe government, Thomas Quiwonpka, also in 1985, the regime became brutal and erratic. It also introduced a new, tribalist, element into its retribution against the coup plotters. The plotters came from the Mano and Gio people and villages in Nimba County inhabited by Mano and Gio people were attacked and their inhabitants slaughtered by the Armed Forces of Liberia, whose ranks Doe had filled with many of his own Krahn tribesmen.
The international community did little to prevent further atrocities. Most notably, the United States, midwife to the country, refrained from intervention. On the contrary, presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush propped up the Doe regime with aid totalling close to half a billion US$. According to Reed Kramer, in the early 1980s Liberia became caught up in the secret designs of a US government obsessed with ending colonel Ghadaffi's power in Libya. According to articles published in the Washington Post and the New York Times in February 1987, the program was organised by the same people involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. Liberia not only played a pivotal role in the activities directed against Libya, from 1985 it was a stopover for US military and other assistance on its way to UNITA rebels fighting the government of Angola. In the meantime, Charles Taylor secured Libyan, Ivorian and Burkinabe aid for his bid to unseat Doe by force.

Conflict Dynamics

On Christmas Eve 1989, a group of 150 fighters led by Taylor invaded the country from Ivory Coast. Doe swiftly dispatched troops to Nimba County, the area of the incursion, again killing hundreds of people. Taylor's troops of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) meanwhile cut through the country, also causing great loss of life. The NPFL reached the city of Monrovia midway through 1990.
The NPFL pushed its offensive to within a street of Doe's headquarters in the Executive Mansion, but it appears that US pressure dissuaded Taylor from launching an all-out assault on those sections of the city that were still firmly in the hands of Doe and another small faction which had broken away in February, the Independent NPFL. An offensive would certainly have resulted in bloodshed on an enormous scale.
Meanwhile, through the efforts of the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an interim government had been installed and an intervention force (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG) had landed to enforce peace. However, it too became a party in the conflict. With the then military ruler of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, reluctant to countenance a Taylor take-over of Liberia, ECOMOG dislodged the NPFL from the city and bombed NPFL-held towns elsewhere in the country. ECOMOG again prevented an NPFL take-over of Monrovia in 1992, when the rebels launched their ill-fated operation 'Octopus', which destroyed various parts of the city.
From 1991 onwards the insurgency fragmented into large-scale gang warfare. The NPFL became predominantly a business venture, selling timber, diamonds and iron ore through the port of Buchanan which it controlled, while other groups sprang up, most notably ULIMO (United Front of Liberia for Democracy), which later split into the ULIMO-J faction under Roosevelt Johnson and ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kroma. These and other factions fought each other for control of Liberia's ample resources. At times, as in the case of the predominantly Mandingo ULIMO-K, they painted themselves in tribal colours, but their forces also included mercenaries from Liberia and elsewhere in the region. The use of child soldiers became widespread and the abuse of a wide variety of narcotics resulted in large-scale atrocities and a mass exodus from the country. Men and women were mutilated, raped and killed, towns and villages looted and then burned. In one of the worst incidents, 600 civilians were massacred near the town of Harbel, on June 6, 1993. UN investigations pointed the finger at the remains of the army, although more recent evidence has linked the NPFL with the attack. War had become, in the words of Tiébilé Drame in the book Africa Now, a form of political and economic organisation; the marketplace at its most unfettered.
Only temporarily halted by a series of invariably short-lived peace accords, the succession of fighting, killing and looting sprees continued until the fourteenth peace accord was signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in August 1996. The worst fighting occurred on April 6 1996, when most of Monrovia was destroyed and thousands of desperate people sought refuge in overcrowded compounds such as the US Embassy or on ships such as the Bulk Challenge. Disarmament, first started and then aborted in the build-up to 'April 6', was restarted in November 1996 and overseen by ECOMOG, which in the process earned some respect. Within two months, close to 25,000 people had handed in their weapons and begun a reintegration exercise. Elections were held on July 19, sweeping Taylor to power in a landslide victory.
The elections were duly pronounced free and fair by domestic and international observers. However, the 'free and fair' nature of these elections is disputed. Taylor had a head start in terms of financial resources and media coverage (he owned the only functioning national radio station; all the other media had been targeted and destroyed in the April battle) and there was large-scale intimidation of voters. A major problem was the absence of hundreds of thousands of voters because they were refugees in neighbouring countries, unable to exercise their democratic right to vote.
Tensions between the various former faction leaders remain and occasionally become violent. The first major post-election incident occurred on September 20, 1998, following government accusations earlier that month that it had foiled a coup attempt. There was a shootout on the doorstep of the American embassy, between fighters loyal to former ULIMO-J commander Roosevelt Johnson and president Taylor's troops. It left at least 50 people dead. The gun battle was described by some observers as a deliberate attempt by Taylor's forces to gun down Roosevelt Johnson and many of his followers. Roosevelt Johnson fled into the American embassy and was then transported out of the country. He was charged with treason and convicted in absentia, in April 1999.
Since mid-1999, there have been rebel incursions into the northern province of Lofa County. They were at first beaten back but in the course of 2000 it became clear that the rebel activity was rather more serious and on a larger scale than previously thought. The provincial capital of Voinjama and at least two other towns were claimed by the rebels (who call themselves LURD, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) to have been taken in July. More government forces were sent to Lofa in August and there have been fierce clashes in the area, leaving dozens of casualties on both sides. Fighters from the civil war have also been mobilised and one Monrovia paper on 15 August 2000 opened with president Taylor's remark that he would raise 30,000 fighters if necessary. It can be gleaned from the reshuffle of the top military brass fighting in Lofa and the demotion of the Minister of Defence Daniel Chea in August and September 2000 that the government response to the new rebellion is in considerable disarray. The Liberian government has been linking the incursions to neighbouring Guinea, to former rival warlords who are still active outside Liberia and to opposition politicians that were defeated in the 1997 elections.

Official Conflict Management

The efforts undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have proved decisive. Although bedevilled by differences in interests and policies among the member states (Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast supported Taylor, while Nigeria in the early 1990s certainly did not), ECOWAS acted as mediator in a long succession of peace negotiations, including the comprehensive Cotonou Agreement of July 1993, which unravelled in early 1994, and both Abuja Accords, of August 1995 and August 1996 respectively. Again, in 2000, West African foreign ministers have been attempting to find a way out of the new crisis looming in Lofa County.
Ecowas also set up an intervention force, the Ecowas Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was led by Nigerian forces and also contained contingents from Ghana and Guinea, among others. It began operations in August 1990. In its early days success and failure were evenly mixed. While it succeeded in saving the lives of many refugees it failed to prevent President Doe from being abducted by faction leader Yormie Johnson from under its nose and then tortured to death on its own premises (it is even alleged that ECOMOG connived with Johnson to have Doe removed, an accusation that is vigorously denied). The initial anti-Taylor position also damaged ECOMOG's image as a neutral force, and it lacked the numbers and resources to actually enforce or keep the peace. Its reputation was further damaged by the behaviour of the Nigerian troops on 'April 6', some of whom indulged in looting sprees while others watched.
Yet in February 1998 an enthusiastic Monrovian crowd bid farewell to the force, shouting 'Thank you ECOMOG, we love you.' The change which earned ECOMOG a modicum of respect may well have come about as a result of the appearance of a new head of the Nigerian government. Relations between Taylor and the former Nigerian military ruler Ibrahim Babangida were largely hostile, while Babangida's successor Sani Abacha and Taylor appeared to understand each other better.
However there was also a growing sense that the Nigerian military and Taylor were mutually indispensable. Abacha needed a success story involving Nigerians to brush up the severely tarnished reputation of his nation. If that entailed accepting Taylor as president of Liberia, then so be it. For his part, Taylor knew that he needed Nigerian approval for his presidency. And so, according to journalist Tom Kamara and researcher Stephen Ellis, a slow convergence of interests took place. All this enabled ECOMOG to oversee the disarmament of the combatants, taking in the guns and handing out a small demobilisation package. In time, Taylor duly won his elections. The ECOMOG mandate expired in March 1998 and the force relocated most of its operations to Sierra Leone.
The relationship between the Liberian government and various ECOMOG field commanders remained edgy, not least because Taylor, in breach of the Abuja II Agreement, denied ECOMOG the opportunity to restructure the Liberian army. Instead, he appointed a commission to prepare the restructuring exercise. In May 2000, the commission submitted its report to the president and further action is awaited.
The United Nations worked together with ECOMOG for the duration of its mission, making it the first co-operation between the UN and a regional body, even though Security Council approval for the West African peacekeeping operation came only after the first ECOMOG troops were already in Liberia. Following the 1993 Cotonou Peace Agreement, the UN Security Council voted to set up an observer mission in Liberia, named UNOMIL, the United Nations Observers Mission in Liberia. Its brief was to monitor the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and verify disarmament throughout the country. However, the Cotonou Agreement was short-lived and it was only after various extensions of the mandate and the second Abuja Agreement that UNOMIL could oversee large-scale disarmament, together with ECOMOG. The expansion of ECOMOG, deemed important at the time, was co-financed by the UN Trust Fund for Liberia.
UNOMIL went on to play an observer role during the July 1997 elections. It helped where it could to enable the seriously understaffed and underfunded Liberian Independent Election Commission to do at least some of its work. The mission ended in September 1997. The UN has also maintained a weapons embargo against Liberia since 1996.
At least a dozen other UN organisations are working in Liberia, most notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which assists in bringing back the hundreds of thousands of refugees from surrounding countries, together with the Liberian government (in the shape of the Liberian Repatriation, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Commission). Other significant players include UNICEF, which finances the vocational programs carried out by local NGOs. Other UN actions included sending a high-level commission of inquiry into the infamous Harbel massacre, June 6, 1993 when 600 civilians were killed.
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) sent observers and mediators to various peace negotiations. It also sent some troops in support of the ECOMOG operations. Most significantly, the Liberian crisis compelled the OAU to relinquish its previously unyielding stance on the total territorial integrity of its sovereign member states, thus making support for the ECOMOG efforts possible. Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have maintained the Mano River Union (MRU) since the 1980s for purposes of enhanced trade and co-operation. Since war started to spill from Liberia into Sierra Leone, cross-border security matters have also been featuring in the deliberations of MRU ministers in a body called the Mano River Union Security Council. Also, the problems between Guinea and Liberia have featured in ministerial consultations. However, they remain without any tangible consequence and the MRU, although frequently evoked 9especally by the Liberian government) may not be more than a mere talking shop, unable to act in the face of really dangerous developments.
Individual governments, including the United States, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom have given logistical support to ECOMOG, enabling it to better carry out its work. In particular, the United States, under the Clinton administration, has taken more interest in a peaceful Liberia; special presidential envoys Susan Rice and Jesse Jackson were regular visitors to Monrovia. Jackson's role is seen by many Liberians in-country and in exile as controversial, because of his alleged proximity to Charles Taylor.
The Government of Liberia repeatedly makes the right noises about reconciliation, investigations into human rights abuses and respect for the rule of law. It also staged a major public event in July 1998, the National Conference on the Future of Liberia, to showcase the considerable rhetorical talents of president Taylor and many others. Many well-worded statements of intent were issued during the month-long event. Another highly publicised event was the symbolic burning of guns and ammunition in a massive bonfire in Monrovia on July 26, 1999. The actual destruction of the arms took place in Tubmanburg on October 18, 1999.
A Human Rights Commission and a National Reconciliation Commission have also been set up but they remain dormant and their mandates unclear. One of the few tangible actions of the Reconciliation Commission have been the attempts to settle violent local disputes in Lofa County between Lorma and Mandingo groups, a carry-over from the civil war tinged with religious overtones. In the meantime, human rights organisations continue to demand reform, especially of the notoriously violent and corrupt security forces, including the police and the dreaded Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU). Complaints of harassment and murders of politicians and civilians recur regularly.
The Government has taken an active role in the repatriation of refugees, through the Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission, LRRRC, which works together with the UNHCR.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Many local initiatives aimed at ending the war have been taken. For a long time, these were inspired and to some extent co-ordinated by the Inter Faith Mediation Council (IFMC), a group of religious leaders who wanted to bring the conflict to an end by getting the faction leaders to talk to each other and by mobilising the people against the violence. This last initiative resulted in two hugely successful 'Stay At Home' campaigns in 1995 and 1996. These were acts of civil disobedience in the face of brutal attacks on the civilian population; they were later and more dramatically employed in Sierra Leone where the people staged a long stay-away campaign, following the military coup in that country on May 25, 1997. In August 2000, the IFMC was reported to be involved in trying to mediate between the LURD dissidents and the government, in order to find a peaceful way out of the dangerously volatile situation in Lofa County.
There have been other important civil organisations that have contributed to the restoration of some kind of peace. The Liberian Women's Initiative (LWI) has brought together women from all walks of life in order to speed up the end of the war. Through a sustained campaign directed at important policy-makers in the peace process (including all Ecowas Heads of State, the US and the UN), the LWI managed to get a hearing for its proposals. Through constant lobbying, it gained access to some of the peace negotiations. Probably its most important achievement was ensuring disarmament prior to elections, a position it put forward vigorously and which was reflected in the large-scale disarmament exercise of 1996-97. Prior to the elections the LWI was engaged in voter education. It is currently engaged in community work in the poor suburbs of Monrovia and elsewhere in the country. This includes the promotion of non-violent ways to resolve disputes. Civic education continues, in conjunction with the Centre for Democratic Empowerment (see below).
An interesting and at the time important player in the disarmament exercise was Susukuu, a development organisation run by the veteran politician Togba Nah Tipoteh. Susukuu devised a 'School for Guns' program which offered one year of education in exchange for weapons. The program was part of the successful effort in which well over 24,000 combatants handed in their guns between late November 1996 and early February 1997.
A prominent part in the re-education exercise aimed at ex-combatants is played by the Liberia Opportunities Industrialisation Centres, (LOIC). It has devised special programs to deal with the present situation, offering six-month courses to war-affected youths which include vocational and business training, detraumatisation and civic education. Scores of former child combatants have gone through the courses it has set up in various parts of the country.
The Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJP) has continued to promote respect for human rights and the rule of law by challenging government not to renege on its promises and by offering legal aid to disenfranchised members of the public. It monitors the human rights situation in the country and publishes its findings in Situation Reports, offering well-documented assessments and recommendations for action. The CJP has consistently asked the government of Liberia to carry through its plans to deal with human rights abuses and reconciliation, two issues it considers inseparable. In October 1998 the CJP asked for a thorough inquiry into the September shootings in front of the US embassy. In May 1999, CJP director Samuel Kofi Woods received a special honour from Pope John Paul II, in recognition of his service to humanity.
The Centre for Democratic Empowerment, (CEDE) headed by former interim president Amos Sawyer, has been engaged in peace-building community activities, promoting disarmament before the elections and national reconciliation thereafter. It is currently engaged in consultations with the government concerning reorganisation of the security forces and national reconciliation.

International
Of the international NGOs, The Carter Center has been actively involved in shuttle diplomacy, carried out by former US President Jimmy Carter, who has visited the country five times, on the last occasion, as an observer during the July 1997 elections. The Carter Center has served as a source of information for virtually all parties and mediators in the crisis and has assisted local peace promoting and human rights organisations. At present, it is the only international human rights-oriented NGO still remaining in Monrovia and under threat of being closed as a result of a lack of financial resources and diplomatic pressure on the part of the Liberian government.
The Swiss-based Femmes Africa Solidaire (FAS) had an observer mission in Liberia during the elections, under the auspices of the OAU. Prior to the elections, FAS organised an all-women training course on conflict resolution, reconciliation and the electoral process. Civic education training sessions were continued after the elections.
Another Swiss-based NGO, Fondation Hirondelle, set up Star Radio in Monrovia, which is an independent radio station that broadcasts news bulletins in all of Liberia's sixteen languages. It relies on local staff and is studiously non-partisan. Its bulletins are distributed through the Internet. Star Radio was closed down by the Liberian government in March 2000 on the grounds that is was a foreign-managed operation. The station has not been allowed to operate since, thus depriving large parts of Liberia of the only non-partisan local source of information.
International NGOs, including Dutch Interchurch Aid and Oxfam, have supported local initiatives in Liberia aimed at promoting peace. Others are either stepping up their involvement or starting to assist Liberian NGOs; among them International Alert. This organisation supports (together with the government of the Netherlands and USAID) Talking Drum Studio, which produces radio programs to encourage reconciliation and reconstruction. According to International Alert, survey results show that in the Monrovia area ninety per cent of the population listens to Talking Drum programs. Human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch continuously monitor the situation in Liberia and have issues critical statements regarding the increased harassment of media workers, the ongoing human rights violations by the security forces and the police. Amnesty issued a statement on August 12, 2000 urging the security forces operating in Lofa County to respect human rights.

Prospects

The idea that anything good may have come out of the Liberian civil crisis has been buried. The country's infrastructure remains largely in ruins, barring some internationally funded repairs and the restoration of a few government buildings and installations. Hundreds of thousands of people remain outside Liberia or have been newly displaced by the fighting in Lofa County. Former fighters who did not hand in their weapons during the disarmament exercise (their numbers are estimated to be up to 15,000) may have joined the forces fighting the rebels in Lofa or may have crossed the border to meet their colleagues of the Revolutionary United Front, the main rebel group in Sierra Leone. But a good number of them engage in acts of banditry inside Liberia, further diminishing the sense of security for countless citizens, many of whom are traumatised, destitute and lacking in the most basic facilities of life. Their general living conditions have been in steep decline for well over a decade. Disillusion is rife.
The government behaves increasingly like an administration under siege. It has stepped up its media crackdown since the beginning of 2000 and has continued to put great pressure on the small but vigorous civil society in place which is active in Monrovia and elsewhere. The determination on the part of human rights activists, media workers, lawyers, women activists and others and their initial willingness to work with the new government to ensure that Liberia becomes a viable and democratic nation is gradually giving way to disillusion. Fundamentally, the long-standing Americo-Liberian versus indigenous dichotomy has not been resolved. In fact, new tensions among the various peoples of Liberia have been added as a result of the war. Many members of Liberia's fledgling civil society have left the country, believing that democracy will not be allowed to flourish under the present dispensation. Tensions among former warlords remain high and occasional outbreaks of violence continue to cause panic among ordinary citizens. There are persistent reports of gross human rights violations against civilians by the security forces and the police, both in Monrovia and in the interior. Internationally, the government has come under scrutiny and criticism for its aid to the RUF in Sierra Leone. The government continues to deny being engaged and diamond smuggling and gun-running for the RUF and has instead accused his neighbours, most notably Sierra Leone, Guinea and even Nigeria of harbouring disaffected elements or former warlords who are intent on overthrowing his government.
As a result of these allegations, the government is confronted with the prospect of a further decrease in the aid flows it claims to need for restoring the country. The European Union, one of its largest donors, has initiated administrative moves to have some of the aid suspended later in the year. A UN arms embargo remains in place although this could possibly be circumvented with the help of one of the few remaining Taylor-friendly governments in the region, Burkina Faso.
By far the most serious immediate threats to the kind of semi-stability in the sub-region are threefold: the escalating conflict in Lofa, the continuing tragedy in Sierra Leone and the possibility of these wars spilling into Guinea. It would appear that Liberia is the chief source of this regional instability but instead of taking a critical look at its own performance, the Liberian government persists in its policy of blaming others. In June, the pro-government Monrovia Guardian newspaper published a story linking Sierra Leonean deputy Defence Minister Hinga Norman and former ULIMO J and K fighters to an assassination plot against president Taylor. In August, the government-controlled Patriot newspaper published an article blaming Britain, the US and the CIA of staging a war against Liberia, using Guinea and Sierra Leone as proxies. And the accusations against Guinea for harbouring and actively aiding the LURD continue unabated.
These are enough ingredients for a subregional conflagration. To this one can add the continued movement of people following fighting in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the security crackdown in September 2000 of Guinea against mainly Sierra Leonean refugees, the numerous freelance bandits and rebels forces wreaking havoc on civilian life in all three countries, the shaky peace agreement in Sierra Leone, the heavy-handed 'stability' enforced in Guinea by its authorities and the continued volatility in Liberia. All this calls for policies of military restraint and serious diplomacy. However, what appears to prevail at present is external posturing and military violence and the suppression of dissent internally. Things are not looking well, neither for Liberia nor its neighbours.

Recommendations

Service Information

REPORTS:	Human Rights Watch: Easy Prey - Child soldiers in Liberia, London, 1994.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Liberia 1989-1994 - A study of ethnic and spiritual violence, by Stephen Ellis. African Affairs, 1995; Liberia - A casualty of the Cold War's end, by Reed Kramer. Paper issued by the African Studies Program of the Center of Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, USA, 1995; ACCORD - The Liberian Peace Process 1990-1996, by J. Armon and A. Carl (eds). Conciliation Resources, London, 1996; The International Dimension of internal conflict - The case of Liberia and West Africa, by Emmanuel Kwesi Aning. CDR Working Paper 97.4, 1997; Liberia, the Quest for Democracy, by Gus Liebenov. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988; Regional Peacekeeping and international enforcement - The Liberian Crisis, M. Weller (ed). Grotius Publications, Cambridge; Liberia - Railroading to Peace, by V. Tanner. Review of African Political Economy, 25(75), March 1998; From Civil War to Civil Society - The transition from war to peace in Guatemala and Liberia. - World Bank & Carter Center. Washington/Atlanta, 1998; The Liberian Civil War, by Mark Huband. London; Frank Cass, 1998; The Mask of Anarchy, by Stephen Ellis. London, 1999; Voting for Peace, post-conflict elections in Liberia, by Terrence Lyons. Washington; Brookings Institute, 1999.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.gis.net/~toadoll/ (news on Liberia, connectivity to other relevant sites, including the BBC's Africa service); http://www.emory.edu/CARTER_CENTER/homepage (mission reports on Liberia and the Carter Center's work there); http://www.unorg/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unomil (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, information on UNOMIL, also background and all UN Security Council resolutions on Liberia); http://www.man.uk/idpm/idpm_dp.htm (Institute for Development Policy and Management that features some good papers on Peace Building and Complex Political Emergencies; http://www.theperspective.org (recent articles)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Samuel K. Woods - fax +31 70 381 8058; Etweda Cooper/Massa Washington - secretary-general and information officer at the Liberian Women's Initiative; Bob Dillon - director LOIC; Stephen Ellis - Africa Studie Centrum, Leiden/The Netherlands. Email Ellis@fsw.LeidenUniv.nl; David Carroll - The Carter Center. Email dcarrol@emory.edu; Addai Sebbo - former program manager International Alert; Bineta Diop - FAS.
ORGANISATIONS:	LOIC, Matadi, Monrovia, Tel. +231 226 337; Fondation Hirondelle, 3 Rue Traversière, CH 1018 Lausanne, Switzerland, Tel. +41 21 647 2804, Fax +41 21 647 4469, Email info@hirondelle.org, http://www.hirondelle.org. Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Catholic Justice and Peace Commission; Centre for Democratic Empowerment; Femmes Africa Solidaire (FAS); International Alert; Liberian Women's Initiative; SUSUKUU; The Carter Centre; Oxfam.

About the author

Bram Posthumus has worked as a freelance journalist since 1990. Before that he was a teacher of English language and literature in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. His work in journalism concentrates mainly on West and southern Africa and on the themes of conflict and post-conflict situations and migration. He has travelled extensively in both regions, visiting among others Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Zambia and Guinea, with Mali, Senegal and Chad planned for the near future. He publishes in a variety of international magazines (African Business, New African, EU-ACP Courier) and other monthlies and weeklies in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and South Africa.