Author	Jos van Beurden
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

The impact on Djibouti of conflicts in surrounding countries is clearly reflected in the fluctuations in its population. Refugees and illegal migrants, coming from and returning to Somaliland, Ethiopia and Eritrea, have meant that total population has varied between 500,000 and 600,000. According to UN estimates, in 1998 the country sheltered some 70,000 - 100,000 refugees and illegal immigrants. Some 80 per cent of Djibouti's inhabitants live in cities, mostly in Djiboutiville.
Djiboutians are of either Somali or Afar descent. The Afar, comprising around one-third of the inhabitants of the northern part of the country, are the largest ethnic group. They have kinsmen in Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Issa, comprising almost one-third of the total population, are the second largest single group. However, the Issaq and Gadaboursi, also of Somali descent, together form the majority of the population. They live mainly in the southern part of Djibouti. There is also a long-established Arab trading community and several thousand French expatriates. Djibouti is predominantly Islamic.
Since its independence in 1977 Djibouti has been confronted by a number of problems. Firstly, as the only country between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean it has a significant Western military presence playing host to some 3,200 troops of its former coloniser, France. Djibouti played a crucial role in the French participation in the Gulf War (1991) and for Operation Restore Hope for Somalia (1992). Although the Paris government wants to cut the number of military personnel to some 2,600, Djibouti is to remain an important operational base. From late 2000 onwards it will play a role in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The French presence is crucial to the Djibouti economy.
Secondly, the economy of this tiny state is rendered vulnerable by its dependence upon neighbouring countries, notably Ethiopia. The growth of modern Djibouti followed the French-Ethiopian decision to build a 780 kilometre long railway to Addis Ababa, a plan made when Eritrea was an Italian colony and Ethiopia landlocked. The health of Djibouti's economy is directly related to the demand for its port facilities in Ethiopia. In Djibouti's independence year Somalia and Ethiopia fought their Ogaden War which effectively brought Ethiopian import and export activity to a standstill. Following the closure of Assab in Eritrea to the Ethiopian import and export trade, the port of Djibouti is now flourishing once again. The UN has spent millions of dollars in 2000 developing Djibouti's port and roads in order to bring in enough food and avert famine in Ethiopia. Ethiopia encouraged this initiative.
Thirdly, as part of a divide and rule policy, and fearing the association of the Somali with pan Somali-nationalism, the French administration gave preferential treatment to the nomadic Afars. The Somali, however, were dominant in Djiboutiville and were often better educated and more fully integrated in the commercial life of the colony. As a result, the Issa and other Somali began to seek independence while the Afar preferred to maintain the French connection. An ethnic contradiction continues to exist.
After independence, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, an Issa, became the country's president. At first Djibouti's national coalition was relatively united. Soon, however, this balance disappeared as Gouled Aptidon's tendency towards authoritarianism and propensity to favour his own kinsmen became apparent. The national coalition broke down in the 1980's, when a movement for effective multiparty democracy was launched. Subsequently, Gouled Aptidon's Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès became the target of much political unrest while the opposition was organised into the FRUD (Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie).
1991 was an eventful year in Northeast Africa. Somalian President Siad Barre was ousted. A civil war created a flow of refugees into Djibouti - some observers claim as many as 120,000. Ethiopian President Mengistu Haile Mariam was replaced by Meles Zenawi from Tigray. Many of Mengistu's sympathisers fled to the tiny city-state. The independent Eritrea became a new neighbour.
In October that year, 3,000 Afar launched an attack on government-positions in the Afar area of Abah. This marked the beginning of a three-year civil war and several more years of instability in which ethnicity and lack of democracy were the key issues. The government employed migratory guerrilla-fighters from Ethiopia, granting them Djiboutian nationality upon conscription, and providing them with light armaments bought on the black market in Somalia and Ethiopia. Its army, swollen from 3,000 to more than 16,000 men, put down the insurrection and the whole country was placed under a general mobilisation order. Claiming that the attack was carried out by men in Ethiopian army uniforms, the government invoked French military assistance against this foreign aggression. Officially Paris only offered a team of 'observers', but there was compelling evidence of French military involvement at the time. For their part, the rebels denied that any Ethiopian Afar or former Mengistu advisors had been involved in the attack.
In 1992 the events of the previous October forced President Gouled Aptidon to make some constitutional changes and allow more political parties, but in reality he remained the sole leader of Djibouti. In 1994 the government and a faction of the Afar-led FRUD signed a Peace Accord. The rest of the FRUD, led by Ahmed Dini, continued to fight the government, accusing the president of 'tribal dictatorship'. The Government began a poorly led demobilisation programme for its oversized security force.

Conflict Dynamics

The conflict in Djibouti was low key in the first months of 1998, while prospects for a lasting solution remained absent. FRUD-underground forces carried out several small-scale attacks on army-installations in northern and western Djibouti. As in previous years, they were no real threat to the government and casualties remained limited. However, they did undermine the credibility of those within FRUD who had chosen to co-operate with the government in 1994.
President Gouled Aptidon and his nephew and heir-apparent, Ismael Omar Guelleh, were unwilling to share their power, and Afar distrust of the government remained deep-seated. During the December 1997 legislative elections, the ruling party, which had concluded a coalition with a faction of FRUD earlier in 1997, took all 65 seats in the National Assembly. Some leaders of FRUD-underground, who had been arrested in Ethiopia in September 1997 and handed over to the Djibouti-authorities, were still in jail.
In the second half of 1998 the silent civil war in Djibouti was intensified by the Ethiopian-Eritrean border conflict. Long before it came into the open, Ethiopia had begun to intensify its relations with Djibouti. In 1996 the two countries concluded an agreement to combat the Al-Ittehad al-Islam, a fundamentalist group operating from south-western Somalia. In 1997 they agreed to join their fight against smugglers and drugs trafficking. Djibouti handed over a number of Oromo refugees to the Ethiopian police.
Because of the closure of the Eritrean port of Assab for Ethiopian imports and exports, Djibouti and Ethiopia decided to work on the renovation of their joint railway. The work, funded by France and the EU, started in April 1998 and led to a sudden increase in Ethiopian transit-cargo. Later, Ethiopia stationed troops inside Djibouti to protect lorries on the road and trains to Addis Ababa, which would otherwise be vulnerable to terrorist attack. It may also have wanted to dissuade Eritrea from making use of the armed opposition in Djibouti. During a FRUD-attack in September 1998 a plant and vehicles belonging to a French company were damaged.
At the same time Djibouti's relationship with Eritrea deteriorated significantly. In June 1998 Djibouti deployed its army to the north, where FRUD-units were based, in order to patrol its borders with Eritrea and prevent any incursion. Some French army units joined the Djiboutian troops, officially to participate in a de-mining programme. Early in 1999, France made a frigate available to patrol the coast and prevent any foreign troops landing.
In late 1998, Eritrea accused Djibouti of allowing Ethiopia to use its port for importing military equipment for use in the border conflict. Djibouti immediately severed its relations with Eritrea and recalled its ambassador. Later that year the Executive Secretary for IGAD, Tekest Ghebrai, who is an Eritrean, was refused entry into Djibouti. Apparently the five-year agreement to increase contacts and co-operation, which Djibouti and Eritrea signed in December 1997, had not sufficiently cemented the two countries together. In his capacity of IGAD-Chairman, President Gouled Aptidon tried in June to mediate in the conflict, but during the November 1998 mini-OAU-Summit in Ouagadagou on the border conflict, Gouled Aptidon was quickly rejected as mediator by Eritrea on the grounds that he was not sufficiently independent. Tensions rose to the point were war seemed imminent, as a Djiboutian official observed.
The presidential elections, which had been promised for 1998 and eventually took place in April 1999 led to a much needed change. Gouled Aptidon's top aide Ismael Omar Guelleh won convincingly. The mine planted by the armed faction of FRUD in northern Djibouti, which killed seven policemen one week after Guelleh's victory was one of the last acts of violence in the civil war in Djibouti. Negotiations began between the Government and the armed wing of the FRUD, and on February 7, 2000, a seven-point agreement for reform and civil concord, including a cease-fire agreement, was signed in Paris. In late March, opposition leader Ahmed Dini returned after nine years in exile. In May the Government and the armed wing of FRUD held a meeting and set up sub-commissions for disarmament and compensation; rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-fighters; decentralisation; and strengthening the democratic process. In April 2000 Djibouti and Eritrea restored their diplomatic and commercial relations.
The damage resulting from civil war and unrest is serious and trade and services have deteriorated. This has resulted in the destruction of livestock, water resources, and education and health facilities. Djibouti's humanitarian aid requirements have increased significantly since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. In 2000 the country has suffered from a severe drought.

Official Conflict Management

In 1991, when the civil war broke out, France refused to help the Gouled Government, which it considered corrupt and authoritarian, but offered to mediate with the FRUD-rebels. This resulted in an initial cease-fire in 1992. However, the government used this lull in the conflict to acquire new arms, and the war continued. When the FRUD-rebels had secured control of more than half of the country, France changed its mind and assisted the government's army by, for example, defending the town of Dikhil.
The Gouled-Government has made some concessions including the introduction of a multiparty system, a more decentralised administration and press freedom. The opposition has taken advantage of this limited democratic freedom, and some independent unions have been established. At the same time it saw the concessions as delaying-tactics. In the December 1994 Peace Accord these concessions were more clearly defined. The FRUD faction which continued its armed opposition to the government claimed that the Accord did nothing to bring about the demobilisation of the clan-based militia recruited by the government and that the multiparty system was subject to so many conditions that only a few were in a position to profit from it. After the April 1999 Presidential elections chairman Ahmed Dini of the FRUD armed faction stated that 'as long as there are no negotiations, there is no way of putting an end to armed struggles', indicating his willingness to have a dialogue with the new strongman.
To further aid the peace process, France, the European Union and the African Development Bank provided funding for the demobilisation and social reintegration of 8,500 soldiers. Until 1996 only 3,000 of the more than 16,000 strong army were demobilised and targets for 1996, 1997 and 1998 were not reached. The government hoped that many demobilised Issa would return to south-western Ethiopia. The Ethio-Eritrean border conflict may further interrupt demobilisation efforts.
The day before the legislative elections of December 1997, the European Parliament expressed 'alarm at the situation of human rights in Djibouti' and said that it was particularly anxious at the violence exercised against the members of the opposition'. Although the Government has improved its human rights record since the agreement with the FRUD armed wing and FRUD leaders are free to operate in Djibouti, conditions in prisons remain poor. Late 2000 a mutiny started among policemen. Although there were two deaths and six wounded it is not expected to disrupt the new political balance in the country.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Before the 1977 Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia and the famines which followed the country's independence in 1977, civilian organisations in Djibouti were limited to a small number of interest groups, charities such as the Rotary Club and some agricultural and fishery cooperatives. Their relationship with the State was defined in a law dating from 1901. Community development organisations were established only in the 1980s. In the 1990s they began to focus increasingly on activities for the urban poor, AIDS-victims, women, refugees and on relief aid.
The reality of serious underdevelopment, a weak government and the International Monetary Fund's pressure on the government to further reduce its public spending heightens the need for a strong civil sector and increased NGO activity. Djibouti receives much development aid, notably from the European Union, the Council of Europe and France, but civil organisations are for the most part weak and often ethnically based.
Political parties and trade unions have traditionally been important forms of association in Djibouti. Over the years since independence there have been some thirty political parties, although only four of them were declared legal after 1992. However, many parties, whether they are aligned with the government, the opposition or the rebels, are plagued by a partisanship which can be traced back to ethnic and sub-ethnic affiliations. Consequently, neither the rebels, the political opposition, nor the government have a constant and stable support from their members.
Unions of Primary and Secondary Education Teachers were set up in 1993. A federation of trade unions, UDT/UGDT, was also established and includes a wide variety of professions including workers in health, telecommunications and public works. They are intended to be multi-ethnic, are not allied to any political party in the country and aim to act as a social partner for the government.
Both political parties and unions have often been the target of repression. Students protesting about inadequate scholarships in December 1998 were fired on by armed police. The government created its own unions and even forced some trade union-leaders to resign and go into exile. Djibouti has almost no human rights organisations. Although there are some human rights activists, their work has been seriously frustrated by the security forces. Frequently the subject of legal action, French lawyers who would like to defend them are often refused entry visas.
Amnesty International, the US Government as well as associations of Djiboutians in the diaspora, especially in France, have criticised Djibouti's human rights record on numerous occasions, claiming that security forces carry out extra-judicial executions, maltreat prisoners and rape female prisoners. The freedom of the press is often limited and the authorities have been known to seize printing machinery. In 1998 several newspaper editors were imprisoned. In October 1998 French-based Djiboutians opposed to the government occupied the Djibouti Embassy in Paris. Protest organisers included three organisations of Djiboutians and one support group.
A 1995 UNDP report concluded that local NGOs play a marginal role in the socio-economic development of the country. Local NGOs are mostly unknown outside their own immediate community base. They get almost no support from the state or from donors. They lack the capacity to be real partners in the long-term development of the country. Apart from ethnic-based organisations and loyalties, Djibouti has no tradition of people organising themselves.
There are some forty local NGOs. They have a serious capacity problem and often lack a clear policy and programme. Only a few are involved with sustainable development, including advocacy and conflict resolution. Very few are multi-ethnic. L'Association d'Entraide du Quartier 4, an urban-based NGO in Djiboutiville, is a good example. It works closely with traditional elders. Many NGOs are local sports or cultural associations. The activities of most of the other NGOs reflect the day to day problems of Djibouti. They focus on the urban unemployed youth, on women, on Ethiopian youngsters who are to be repatriated, on HIV-patients, or on nomads who need emergency aid. In addition there are some fishing and agricultural cooperatives.
In conclusion, there is a rather limited and oppressed civil society in Djibouti, while the space for new independent initiatives is limited. The government is using a wide variety of means to pacify this form of opposition, while it strongly favours its own civil society organisations. It is too early to see an effect of the February 2000 agreement with the FRUD armed wing on the possibilities for the civil society in Djibouti.

International
Among the ten to fifteen foreign NGOs those of religious (Christian) origin and those in the medical field are best represented. Their programmes are aligned with overall government policies. Some of the refugee populations have set up their own relief organisations. The Somali Relief and Development Agency is an example. These organisations often co-operate with UNHCR.

Prospects

Experts stress, that Djibouti is a young and artificial entity, where nomadic traditions often outweigh civil society initiatives. Djiboutians who try to go beyond the ethnic-individualism often meet with opposition.
The Ethiopian-Eritrea border conflict heightened the traditional ethnic tensions. This external conflict was quickly internalised. Because France did not oppose Ethiopia's lengthy flirtation with the authoritarian Gouled Aptidon regime, it became a party in the conflict. If the Government of Djibouti accuses Eritrea of support for the armed FRUD-faction, it is entitled to invoke French military assistance. The peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea which was signed in Algeria on December 12, 2000 will help to increase stability in Djibouti. The possible re-opening of the port of Assab in Eritrea for Ethiopian im- and exports will be an economic step back for Djibouti.
Although Djibouti received military assistance from France to protect its territorial integrity, its relationship with its former coloniser will change in the not too distant future. Gouled Aptidon's good relations with top French politicians, including the presidents François Mitterand and Jacques Chirac, who both favour(ed) leniency towards the authoritarian Djiboutian regime, have not endeared him to the present Socialist government of Lionel Jospin. France is reviewing its African policy, and Djibouti may soon lose its place at the top of the favoured country list. This will have serious economic repercussions. The reduction of French troops is expected to begin in 2001. The efforts to demobilise the large army after the end of the civil war in 1994 has met with limited success. Of the more than 16,000 security force personnel, half has been demobilised voluntarily. Those selected for demobilisation more recently have shown reluctance to lose their secure, though poorly paid jobs. The demobilisation effort has largely depended upon foreign funds. Reintegration has remained weak. The peace accord signed in February 2000 and the extra income, resulting from the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict could create better prospects for the demobilisation programme.

Recommendations

Service Information

Newsletters and Periodicals:	Horn of Africa Bulletin (bi-monthly newsletter published by the Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala/Sweden); Indian Ocean Newsletter (weekly published by Indigo Publications Group, Paris/France); Inter-Africa Group News and Networking Service (Monthly Update, Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa/Ethiopia); Focus on the European Union and Peace-Building Efforts in the Horn of Africa (newsletter published by Saferworld/London)
Reports:	Saferworld and Inter-Africa Group: Prevention of Violent Conflict and the Coherence of EU Policies towards the Horn of Africa: A Case Study on Demobilisation in Djibouti, August 2000; Bonn International Center for Conversion: Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Conflict Prevention in the Horn of Africa - Discussion Paper, by Kees Kingma & Kiflenariam Gebrewold, July 1998; PNUD/UNDP: Rapport de Consultation sur les ONGs a Djibouti, by Niba Houssein, October 1995
Other Publications:	La Securité au Sommet, l'insecurité à la base, by François-Xavier Verschave (ed.). Dossier Noir No 12, l'Harmattan, Paris, 1998;Le Mal Djiboutien - Rivalités Ethniques et Enjeux Politiques, by Ali Coubba. Paris/L'Harmattan, 1995;The Horn of Africa - Prospects for Political Transformation, by Colin Legum. London/Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1992;Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa, by John Markakis. SAGE Publications, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi, 1998
Selected Internet Sites:	http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/djibouti.html (Links for Djibouti); http://www.arab.net/djibouti/djibouti_contents.html (ArabNet on Djibouti); http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en/dj.html (Government site); http://www.aacc.at/About_Us/Arab_League.htm (League of Arab States); http://www.emulateme.com/djibouti.htm (Basic info on Djibouti)
Resource Contacts:	Mme Mariam Hassan Ali - former Secretary-General of Syndicat des Enseignants Djiboutiens du Second Degré (Teachers Union in Secondary Education), now exiled. Email: Denis.mariam@wanadoo.fr; Roger-Vincent Calatayud - lawyer of some Djiboutian ex-ministers and human rights activists; Email: rv.calatayud@wanadoo.fr
Organisations:	L'Association Française des Amis des Démocrates de Djibouti (AFADD);Tel. +33 5 62 341 083;Fax +33 5 62 513 909 Email afadd@wanadoo.fr L'Association Djibouti Esapce Nomade (ADEN);M. Jean de CHATELPERRON;25, avenue du Château;94300 Vincennes;France;Tel. +33 1 43 989 606;Fax +33 1 43 989 602;Email aden@clubinternet.fr Survie;57 Avenue du Maine;75014 Paris, France;Tel. +33 1 43 270 325;Fax +33 1 43 205 558

About the author

Jos van Beurden studied Law and Peace at the Universities of Utrecht, Amsterdam and Groningen in the Netherlands. He has studied Northeast Africa since 1977, paying regular visits to Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea since 1985. He has also visited Somalia and Djibouti. He is the author of country studies on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan for the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, and of an Ethiopia NGO Country Profile for the Dutch Co-Financing Agencies.