Author	Anne Graumans
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

KwaZulu/Natal's recent history has often been brutal. In the early nineteenth century, the area was part of the Zulu Empire, under rulers like Dingiswayo and later Shaka and Dingane. From the 1820s, the empire suffered greatly from an influx of English settlers and Afrikaner Boers of Dutch descent. The Boers were on their trek from the Cape, in order to escape the English whose influence they detested and whose abolition of slavery they resented. Boers and Zulus fought a number of bloody battles in the 1830s in the last of which - the 1838 Blood River battle - the Zulus suffered a crushing defeat. However, it was the English who annexed Natal in 1843. Most of the Boers in the province then left to establish the Orange Free State and the Zuider Afrikaanse Republiek. For a while the Zulu state continued to pose a formidable threat to both the English and its neighbouring African peoples.
When gold was discovered in the Transvaal, English and Afrikaners engaged in a full-scale war over this new source of wealth, first in 1880/81, then in 1899-1902. Natal witnessed a number of battles on both occasions and in 1897 the Zulu nation was finally destroyed to be followed by the Boer resistance which was brought to its knees in 1902. Bambatha, a Zulu chief, led a short-lived rebellion which was ruthlessly crushed by the English. South Africa became a unified republic in 1910, two years before the precursor to the African National Congress was established and four years before the birth of the Boer-dominated National Party.
The united South African state was every bit as restrictive for Africans as the previous individual smaller states had been, with the possible exception of the Cape. The ascension to power of the National Party (NP) in 1948, which was to entrench the apartheid system for the next 46 years, simply aggravated a situation which put Africans at a structural disadvantage. Successive NP governments pursued the so-called Homelands policy, creating 'native' areas for Africans, under the pretext of recognising traditional authority.
One of these 'Homelands' was KwaZulu, a collection of enclaves scattered throughout the province of Natal. It was only after the political transformation of 1994, which brought the first free elections in South Africa's history, that the first attempts at building a unified and democratic country could be made. One step was reintegrating the Homelands into the provinces; for Natal and KwaZulu, this meant the formation of KwaZulu-Natal.

Conflict Dynamics

This history goes some way to explain the intractability of KwaZulu-Natal's troubles. The recent history of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal dates back to the mid-1980s, when the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) sought to consolidate its influence in the province, against the growing support for the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the United Democratic Front (UDF), both aligned to the ANC. Conflict occurred between youth and elders, the Zulu Royal House and its chiefly rivals and between the more forward looking, urbanised organisations associated with the UDF and ANC and the rural-based, chief-led Inkatha movement.
The conflict in KwaZulu-Natal, which reached its zenith in the months preceding the 1994 elections, was different in nature to the equally fierce IFP-ANC battles in Gauteng that raged in the streets and hostels. In KwaZulu-Natal the long-standing war between the UDF and the IFP, which re-ignited in ANC-IFP form after the lifting of the ban on the ANC, was fought in many isolated, mainly rural areas where ANC political structures were less well established or as tightly knit as in urban areas.
The presence of a strong regional political party, the Inkhata Freedom Party headed by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the nephew of Goodwill Zwelithini, king of all Zulus, has proved to pose a great challenge to stability in the region. In the past thirty years or so, Buthelezi has carved out a personal political empire in the province, using the IFP, which purports to represent all Zulus, as his instrument. From an anti-apartheid activist, he has steadily changed into an uncompromising Zulu nationalist, finding himself on a collision course with the ANC for political reasons and also with King Zwelithini for political and personal reasons.
Information has gradually emerged about the plot that was hatched by the apartheid security forces to foment violence among rival black political parties and leaders, a phenomenon that has become known as the 'Third Force'. Former military and security personnel who were put on trial after 1994 on murder charges have revealed that many assassinations were carried out by the security forces and security force-trained hit-squads, notably the KwaZulu police, which acted as the armed wing of the IFP. This was done, possibly with the knowledge and consent of the highest leaders of the country in those days, in order to destabilise and confuse the anti-apartheid struggle and its structures. Given the history and volatility of KwaZulu-Natal, these destabilising seeds fell on particularly fertile ground. The police merit special mention in this respect because of their perceived inaction in the face of widespread communal and political violence. It made them vulnerable to charges of collusion, which turned out to be at least partially true, as its murky background becomes clearer.
The IFP has been accused of throwing its weight behind the effort of the NP to crush the Mass Democratic Movement aligned to the ANC during the 1980s. More recently the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has held Chief Buthelezi responsible for all the gross human rights violations committed under his leadership of the party, the KwaZulu government and the KwaZulu police. The TRC states that the most devastating indictment of the IFP's role in political violence was found in the commission's statistics which identified the IFP as the foremost perpetrator of gross human rights violations in KwaZulu and Natal between 1990 and 1994. Training of paramilitary units in the Caprivi Strip during 1986 by the SADF and the training in 1993 and 1994 of between 5,000 and 8,000 IFP self-protection unit (SPU) members at the Mlaba training camp must be seen as the responsibility of Chief Buthelezi. The TRC went as far as describing the IFP as an ally of the apartheid-state since high echelons within the IFP cadre cooperated with the South African Police and Defense Force, receiving both financial and logistical assistance.
Police attitudes appear to have improved of late but midway through 1998 allegations of law enforcers fomenting violence resurfaced, together with an upsurge in the violence. President Mandela himself said in July 1998 that there were 'rotten elements' within the police that were helping to fuel the violence. Recent reports in the Mail & Guardian show that the police service and national defence force choose sides, often along party lines, in conflicts. The police and security forces have also been accused by Amnesty International of ill-treating suspects and prisoners as late as April 1999.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that as a result of the simmering conflict local 'war lords' have managed to carve out small territories for themselves, over which the leadership of both parties appear to have little or no control. Neither the IFP nor the ANC could rely on apartheid's police forces to provide their leaders with sufficient security. This led to the formation of Self Defence Units (SDU) in the case of the ANC and Self Protection Units (SPU) for the IFP. The units consisted of young men who received military training and were provided with small arms. The failure to integrate the units into the post-1994 transformed South African Police Service and national army has led to a contingent of approximately 5,000 to 10,000 young and unemployed people who often rule the townships of KwaZulu-Natal. The breakdown of family life, particularly in rural areas and the appropriation of SDU and SPU structures by criminal elements further aggravated the lawlessness of these 'community serving' units.
The Mail & Guardian has reported the existence of camps in northern Natal where white right-wingers and former security force operatives provided military training to IFP loyalists as recently as this year. The TRC furthermore brought to the light that several truckloads of small arms were transported by the apartheid-security forces to the training camps of the IFP in Mlaba.
The 1994 transition to majority rule finally made it possible to put in place some of the conditions that would make the start of a peace-process on a significant scale a viable option. A parliamentary democracy was introduced. A Bill of Rights was adopted that encompassed all citizens of the country. Some of the earliest peace-making efforts were stepped up and new activities begun. However, the pattern of violence has still not been decisively broken. Violence returned to KwaZulu-Natal in the run-up to the 1999 national elections. Especially in the Richmond area, where between June and August 1998 well over fifty people were killed in politically motivated violence. This followed the killing of a regional IFP leader in April and preceded the violent deaths of three ANC activists in October 1998.
A complicating factor in identifying those responsible is the emergence of a new political party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM). Three key figures in the UDM are Bantu Holomisa, the former ruler of the Transkei 'homeland' who was expelled from the ANC because he had levelled corruption charges against party stalwarts; Roelf Meyer, the acclaimed NP negotiator who helped achieve the 1994 transition; and the late Sifiso Nkabinde, a former powerful ANC leader in KwaZulu-Natal, who was expelled from the party following murder charges against him, from which he was later acquitted. Sifiso Nkabinde was killed in a shoot-out in January 1999. A retaliation act killed eleven people. The violence now re-emerging in the province can be seen as a result of either the old ANC-IFP rivalry or the new ANC-UMD animosity.

Electoral Code of Conduct
The shaky KwaZulu-Natal peace process is a product of many months of tough negotiations between the ANC and the IFP following the ANC's rejection of the provincial results of the 1994 elections, which the ANC believed were irregular. Following Mandela's intervention, however, the ANC finally accepted the results. May 27, 1996 was to be a turning point where all parties would reach a formal agreement denouncing violence. This would be followed by a delegation from both parties to brief their principals in Cape Town.
At the provincial ANC conference in December 1996, a special amnesty for the province was mooted. This was discussed at the presidential level of the two parties followed by one-to-one meetings between Mbeki and Buthelezi. The two agreed on cooperation between the IFP and ANC before a team of three senior leaders from each organisation was appointed to work on the modalities of peace before this year's elections. However, attempts by the IFP and the ANC to cobble together a code of conduct for political parties in the troubled province of KwaZulu-Natal ahead of the 1999 elections collapsed in June 1998. These efforts were resuscitated and led to the signing of an Electoral Code of Conduct in May 1999.
In its election manifesto the IFP promotes itself as a national party on the grounds that it will be contesting all nine provinces. At the same time the IFP wants to consolidate power in KwaZulu-Natal. The objective of establishing a 'Kingdom of KwaZulu' as a federal unit within the greater South Africa seems to have moved to the background.
On the other hand, the IFP seems to have taken a more hard-line approach for the province. At the opening of the provincial legislature in February 1999, the IFP replaced Ben Ngubane as regional premier with former minister of arts and culture, Lionel Mtshali. Premier Mtshali surprised his audience with his party's call for international mediation to define a political role for the Zulu monarchy. The issue, which threatened to derail the 1994 elections, has been in abeyance, and the ANC had hoped that the forging of closer ties between the parties had forestalled the demand completely. But, as observers note, the demand is closely allied to the continued existence of traditional authority structures in the provinces.
The June 1999 national and provincial elections in KwaZulu-Natal passed without major incident. The IFP won the elections in the province with 42 per cent of the votes, against 39 per cent for the ANC. Power-sharing is a possibility with the IFP offering up to seven provincial cabinet posts to the ANC. While the detente between the two political parties seems to be firmly embedded, a possible danger lies in the fact that the IFP is dependent on support from IFP aligned traditional chiefs in the rural areas, who do not share the same interests and views as the politicians at the national level.

Official Conflict Management

The new South African government has on several occasions appealed for peace in KwaZulu-Natal. President Mandela visited the province in 1995, on June 16 - a very important national holiday commemorating the children's uprising in Soweto - and again on June 12, 1998. The government's requests only met with limited success, and in late 1995 troops were sent in by Minister of Safety and Security Mufamadi to quell the unrest. It is ironic that Chief Buthelezi is Minister of Home Affairs in the same government.
A later mediation effort undertaken by vice-president Thabo Mbeki in 1996, in which provincial party leaders Jacob Zuma (ANC) and Frank Mdlalose (IFP) were also ---involved was more successful.
In July 1998, troops were again ordered into KwaZulu-Natal, to try and combat the resurfacing violence. In August 1998 National Police Commissioner, George Fivaz dispatched senior police officers to close down the Richmond police station. The station was replaced by a National Intervention Unit under Commissioner Andre Pruis. A Joint Operational Centre would coordinate the activities of all units except those of the special investigation units. In close cooperation with the Joint Operational Centre a Priority Committee was to be set up in Richmond. This was effectively an attempt to set up ad hoc committees at grassroots level to deal with issues of violence, counselling, displaced persons, freedom of movement, and related problems.
A significant official contribution to peace in KwaZulu-Natal has been made by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which has been operating across the country since 1994. Confessions made before the Commission have helped uncover the sinister workings of the 'Third Force', the existence of which had previously been doubted. The TRC discovered that a network of security and ex-security force operatives, often acting in conjunction with right-wing elements and/or sectors of the IFP, had fomented, initiated, facilitated and engaged in violence which resulted in gross violations of human rights, including random and targeted killings.

The National Peace Accord made provisions for codes of conduct for political parties and organisations, codes of conduct for police and the security forces, guidelines for the reconstruction and development of communities, and mechanisms to implement its provisions. It committed parties to a multiparty democracy and to respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms underpinning a democracy, and provided for a system of peace committees at all levels of society to monitor adherence to the Accord and resolve disputes using mediation and arbitration. These committees united representatives from conflicting parties and civil society in one forum. The effectiveness of the Accord was, however, questioned in KwaZulu-Natal where high levels of violence continued. IFP supporters have accused the National Peace structures of providing a stronghold for the ANC.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Some of the ANC and IFP initiatives have been brought about by the activities of the Independent Projects Trust (IPT), a Durban-based NGO which devotes its efforts to resolving the conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. It endeavours to foster an attitude of non-violent conflict management through extensive community training, media campaigns, research and analysis and political lobbying. Since its inception in 1990, the IPT has worked with urban and rural communities, traditional leaders, schools and local branches of the main political parties to create an environment in which peaceful settlement of problems becomes the norm. It has also worked with the police in conflict management skills training, in order to help them shed their reputation as a force of brutal repression. Recently the IPT started broadcasting on the radio to increase its reach in the KwaZulu-Natal province. The IPT receives government and non-government support from (among others) Norway, the Netherlands, the USA and the UK.
ACCORD (the Durban University-based African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes) runs a public sector programme which aims to train key members of the public service in conflict resolution methods and strategies. This programme operates in KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape Province. ACCORD also runs a variety of training programmes in KwaZulu-Natal targeted at young people and intended to get them out of the environment of violent crime and into gainful employment. Its Youth Skills Empowerment Programme is aimed primarily at empowering young people in key flash points in KwaZulu-Natal by providing them with the skills to enable them to either initiate or assist in peace and development projects in their local areas. A secondary purpose is to build confidence among various groups of young people, especially those who have been on ACCORD training programmes - and to encourage closer working relationships among them. Furthermore, ACCORD monitors the situation on the ground in KwaZulu-Natal through the Early Warning System.
The Centre for Conflict Resolution seeks to contribute towards a just peace in South Africa and elsewhere by promoting constructive, creative and cooperative approaches to the resolution of conflict and the reduction of violence. It provides third-party assistance in the resolution of political and community conflict, equips people with conflict management skills, promotes public awareness of the value of constructive conflict resolution, promotes democratic values and advocates disarmament and demilitarisation. Mediation, training, education and research are among the Centre's main activities, with an emphasis on capacity-building at grassroots level. Centre staff have been deeply involved in the transition to a democratic South Africa. They served as monitors, trainers, mediators and policy advisors in Peace Accord Structures and several key commissions.
The Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) is an independent NGO which aims to promote democracy and a culture of tolerance by empowering individuals and designing programmes that transform institutions. They have three main programmes in KwaZulu-Natal, a civil society leadership development programme, a councillor support and training programme, and a programme aimed at the integration of amakhosi, or traditional leaders.
The Freedom of Expression Institute supports media that are attacked by people in authority; for example, it supported the Mail & Guardian after it accused the authorities in KwaZulu-Natal of not doing enough to stem the violence and was subsequently and unsuccessfully sued.
The Provincial Parliamentary Programme is a joint programme of the Lawyers for Human Rights, the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, Black Sash and IDASA. It aims to strengthen public participation in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature and trains civil society representatives in lobbying and advocacy strategies.
Some analysts also emphasise the potentially positive influence of religious institutions, if only because of their sheer size and consequently the number of people they can reach with a message of peace and reconciliation. In the same vein, local musicians and theatre groups are reaching out to communities with a similar message. Their impact is of course difficult to assess, but there can be little doubt about the value of their potential influence.
The KwaZulu-Natal Programme for Survivors of Violence aims to assist and support individuals, families and communities that have been fragmented due to high levels of violence in the province.
The National Peace Accord Trust works towards creating a generation of people empowered with skills and deep commitment to work to restore the family cohesion and community relationships damaged by South Africa's violent history.
The Human Rights Committee in cooperation with the Network of Independent Monitors has conducted extensive research into the role of the security forces in Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal, and their report was published in early 1999. The Network of Independent Monitors closely monitors political violence.
The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation provides extensive information and research on its website from a broad range of South African and international organisations in the area of conflict prevention. It lists published articles by subject and has links with related websites.
The Vuleka Trust is a church-based organisation committed to community development. It aims to promote and enhance justice and reconciliation and empower people through the acquisition of interpersonal skills in order to respond creatively towards themselves, others and the environment. Among its activities are facilitating and promoting conflict resolution and mediation, conducting skills training programmes in basic human relations, handling conflict creatively, developing effective negotiating skills and designing educational events and conducting community services. It also runs a schools project and a youth leadership training programme.
The Diakona Council of Churches comprises fourteen member churches and three member organisations and aims to promote peace through active participation in community police forums and local peace structures and through developing skills in handling conflict and trauma. It also promotes the creation of a vibrant democracy through training in lobbying and advocacy and the monitoring of government and the economy. The Diakona Council of Churches also takes part in the World Council of Churches initiated programme 'Peace to the City' for Durban. Sixteen human rights networks and peace organisations take part in this initiative.

International
The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) was particularly active during the local elections. Alongside its customary work of alleviating human suffering, it actively campaigned for calm during the local elections, using the media to appeal for a reduction of the violence. This 'humanitarian message' was disseminated through radio stations and the national press. It also produced a video with the same message.
The Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is involved in a demilitarisation and peace-building initiative aimed at raising the understanding of dynamics and to identify practical policies and interventions, which could support sustainable peace and human development.
Ultimately reconciliation must be home-grown and consequently the international NGOs have only a limited role to play. The African people of South Africa have shown an impressive capacity for reconciliation, as is demonstrated by the extraordinary scenes that have taken place before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and by the fact that, for example, policeman and mass murderer Brian Mitchell was able to take his place in the Zulu community he had so terribly damaged. Just as the reconciliation efforts in the country at large have been developed in accordance with their own unique dynamics, so too the process in KwaZulu-Natal will run its course. Outside assistance on terms that are defined locally remains welcome.

Prospects

Essentially, the ANC wishes to extend its existing power throughout virtually the entire country including KwaZulu-Natal, while the IFP wants to retain its power base in the province, in the knowledge that it has no other possibility of building such a base. The detente between the IFP and the ANC has been jeopardised by recent developments such as the installation of hard-liner Lionel Mtshali as Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and the ousting of Bheki Cele (ANC) as chairman of the portfolio committee on safety and security. The ANC has even criticised the IFP's conclusions on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, arguing it would harm the detente policy pursued.
Political violence in KwaZulu-Natal is likely to persist for the time being. A culture of violence based on the rural-urban division, and tensions between the traditional and modern, the young and old seems to be deeply embedded. The ANC is gaining power among the urbanised, modern youth. Traditional structures with chiefs and indunas are likely to remain in place, leading to friction over scarce resources.
As for the main protagonists of the present conflict, they are both part of the problem and part of the solution. Consequently it must be stressed that some initiatives have been taken by the IFP and ANC to resolve the problem of politicised violence in the province. Unfortunately, their efforts at talking their way out of the problems have met with limited success. The events surrounding the 1994 elections are partly to blame for this. More recently, the dialogue between the ANC and the IFP has been threatened by Lionel Mtshali appointment as premier.
It has also become clear that the violence in KwaZulu-Natal cannot be explained only through reference to political rivalry. Some observers argue that the division between militant youth and conservative traditional leaders in KwaZulu-Natal was the single most important factor underlying the sectarian violence of the 1980s and that its impact can still be felt. The Protection and Defense Units are also, albeit in different forms, still operational and armed. There is an abundance of arms and the illegal trade in arms flourishes in the region. The infiltration of criminal elements in factions and gangs and the deplorable social and economic situation in both the rural and urban areas further contribute to the continuation of political violence. The Network of Independent Monitors has warned of a sharp increase in political violence as a result of the stockpiling of weaponry in conjunction with paramilitary training camps.

Recommendations

Most NGOs in South Africa share the view that South Africa's transition to democracy began rather than ended with the elections of April 27, 1994. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation argues that transition and transformation agendas must still be developed and consolidated through building a popular human rights culture, through fostering lasting reconciliation, through the transformation of inherited state institutions and through consolidating democracy and development in South Africa.
The Independent Project Trust emphasises that inter-group stereotyping and animosity have to be overcome. Young people must be targeted through education in order develop trust and create security. Faith in the rule of law and an increase in the respect for human rights is central to this process, according to Amnesty International.
The Constitutional Court, the South African Human Rights Commission and civil society organisations argue that crime needs to be more effectively addressed through improving the criminal justice system by giving its personnel adequate resources and proper professional training.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Indicator Project South Africa, based at the University of Natal publishes two quarterly journals: Indicator and Crime & Conflict.; Track Two (quarterly), published by the Centre for Conflict Resolution. (http://www.un.ac.za/ indicator); The KwaZulu-Natal Briefing, published by the Helen Suzman Foundation's KwaZulu-Natal Monitoring Project at the department of politics, University of Natal, provides analysis of events; The Mail & Guardian has regular features on the situation in KwaZulu/Natal
REPORTS:	IPT: Smoke and Fire in KwaZulu-Natal - Geostrategies behind the Peace Process; Network of Independent Monitors/Human Rights Committee; Richmond - Role of Security Forces. March, 1999; Indicator Project South Africa; Political and Economic Identities in KwaZulu-Natal, R. Morrell (ed.). University of Natal; Institute of Race Relations: The Natal Story: 16 years of conflict, by Anthea J. Jeffery. 1997, Institute of Race Relations; USAID: Managing Conflict - Lessons from the South African Peace Committees, by Nicole Ball and Chris Spies. November 1998, USAID Evaluation Special Study Report No 78.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.webpro.co.za/clients/ipt (The Independent Projects Trust); http://www.truth.org.za (Truth and Reconciliation Commission); http://www.accord.org.za (ACCORD); http://wn.apc.org (South African NGO network Sangonet); http://www.idasa.org.za (IDASA); http://www.imssa.org.za (IMSSA); http://www.anc.org.za/ (ANC);http://www.ifp.org.za/ (IFP); http://www.violence.co.za (Natal Monitor); http://www.mg.co.za/mg (Mail & Guardian); http://www.ananzi.co.za (South African search engine); http://www.witness.co.za/witness.htm (newspaper The Natal Witness); http://www. wits.ac.za/csvr (Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation).
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Mary de Haas - School of Anthropology and Psychology, University of Natal. Tel. +27 31 260 2431; Jenny Irish - Network of Independent Monitors. Fax +27 31 307 2814; Glenda Caine - director Independent Projects Trust; Hussein Solomon - ACCORD, E-mail hussein@accord.co.za; Jabulani Mabaso, Leah Lethale - Independent Mediation Services in South Africa; Laurie Nathan - executive director Centre for Conflict Resolution; Graeme Simpson - director Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation; Maggie Paterson - Amnesty International London office.
ORGANIZATIONS:	Diakona Council of Churches, PO Box 61341, 4008 Bishopgate, Tel + 27 31 305 6001, Fax + 27 31 305 2486, diak@iafrica.com; KwaZulu-Natal Peace Committee Development Unit, Private Bag X54356, 4000 Durban, Tel + 27 31 309 6530, Fax + 27 31 309 6563; KwaZulu-Natal Programme for Survivors of Violence, 206, Burger sTreet, 3200 Pietermaritzburg, tel + 27 331 42 1378, fax + 27 331 94 7841, psvpmv@iafrica.com, http://www.geocities.com/hotsprings/spa/3028; National Peace Accord Trust, PO Box 40-1144;4071 Redhill, tel + 27 31 23-9344, fax + 27 31 23 9443, kznnpat@wn.apc.org; The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, http://www.wits.ac.za/csvr, csvr@wn.apc.org; City of Peace Programme, http://www.durbanpeace.org.za, coord@durbanpeace.org.za, Tel + 27 31 305 6001, Fax + 27 31 305 248; International Development Research Centre (IDRC), PO Box 477, Wits 2050, tel + 27 11 403 3952, fax + 27 11 403 1417, http://www.idrc.org Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Independent Project Trust (IPF); ACCORD; Centre for Conflict Resolution; Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASAS); Vuleeka Trust.

About the author

Anne Graumans worked as an intern at the National Peace Secretariat in Johannesburg in 1994. She has worked with several research institutes and NGOs in Cape Town and Johannesburg and is currently a freelance researcher based in Amsterdam.