Author	Anna Matveeva
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, an Armenian-dominated territory in Azerbaijan, is the oldest of the post-Soviet conflicts, dating back to 1988. Russia and the OSCE have been active as mediators. Multi-track efforts by international and local groups reached their peak in the mid-1990s, but were unable to break the stalemate. Hopes for a long-term resolution are based on a new round of international effort by the United States and Russia.

The conflict in Nagorno (or "Mountainous") Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic-Armenian area in the territory of Azerbaijan, involves the Armenian struggle for Karabakh and the ethnic violence that followed suit, and played a crucial role in the proliferation of conflicts elsewhere in the USSR and in its subsequent demise.

In the late 1980s, perestroika's freedom allowed Karabakh-Armenian ethnic grievances to be expressed. These included the perceived Azerbaijani policy of denial of cultural rights to the Armenians, resettlement of ethnic Azeris into Karabakh that led to the shift in demographic balance (Armenians made up 94 percent of the population in 1921, reduced to 76 percent in 1979), and suspicion that the region was starved out of resources because of its Armenian composition. Irrespective of the fairness of these arguments, these were deeply felt Armenian concerns. The desire for the region to be transferred from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction was at the heart of the ethnic dispute.

Armenians in the Union Republic of Armenia wholeheartedly supported their ethnic kin in Karabakh, and issued an appeal to the Soviet leadership in Moscow and then Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev himself to submit to the Armenian demands. With the appeals for transfer firmly rejected, the Karabakh Committee of nationalist-minded intellectuals was formed, which included the first president of independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and most of the future key political figures. The old Soviet elite jumped on the bandwagon of the struggle for Karabakh. In 1988 the Armenian Supreme Soviet, under intense public pressure, had to support the Karabakh Soviet's (local assembly) call for unification with Armenia. Karabakh proclaimed independence in 1991 rather than unification with Armenia in order not to undermine the latter's international standing, and remains a secessionist territory, unrecognized officially even by the Armenian government.

In February 1988, ethnically motivated killings occurred in Sumgait, Azerbaijan, when, unprecedentedly in Soviet history, Armenians were killed by mobs for the sole reason of belonging to an adverse ethnic group. Moscow's failure to react and exercise justice further escalated the conflict.

Further killings of Armenians took place in Baku in 1990. The late and inefficient deployment of ill-prepared Soviet troops only added fuel to the tensions. Some 200,000 Armenians (340,000 according to Armenian sources) fled Azerbaijan, mostly to Armenia, but also to Russia. The Armenian side learned the lesson that their security, as well as the future of Karabakh, was in their own hands. The formation of paramilitary groups began. The Karabakh self-defense army eventually developed into the best fighting force in the former Soviet Union. Fighting initially erupted in Karabakh. As a result, 47,000 Karabakh Azeris were forced to flee. Starting in November 1988, anti-Azeri demonstrations in Karabakh and Armenia led to escalation of interethnic tensions and, subsequently, the expulsion of 185,000 Azeris and 11,000 Muslim Kurds from Armenia in 1989.

Throughout the Soviet period, Moscow supported the Azerbaijani authorities against Armenian secessionists, and dispatched arms and Interior Ministry troops for pacification operations against Armenian villages in and around Karabakh. In 1989 an administration was set up to rule Karabakh directly from Moscow and mediate between the two sides. Still, de facto power belonged to the members of Karabakh Committee. In July 1992, the State Defense Committee was set up by the Karabakh Armenians to concentrate all political and military power in a single authority. The Azerbaijani side, supported by Soviet troops, enjoyed military success until spring 1992, when it controlled nearly half of Karabakh. Armenians gained an upper hand in 1992, taking the strategic Lachin corridor that connects Karabakh with Armenia, and the important points of Shusha and Khojaly.

In summer 1992, the Azeri side managed to fight back, retaking most of Karabakh. The Armenian counteroffensive of the winter of 1992–1993 led to more Armenian territorial gains—Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Kelbaijar, Kubatly, and Zangelan. In winter 1993–1994, the Azeri side made the last push, which resulted in a disastrous defeat, after which the May 1994 cease-fire was signed. Between 500,000 and 600,000 Azeris fled their homes. In July, Armenia, Karabakh, and Azerbaijan committed themselves to a cease-fire that generally held despite minor exchanges of fire between sides.

Post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, supported the Armenian cause, partly because Russian democrats struggling against Soviet bureaucrats in Moscow forged links with the Armenian Nationalist Movement (ANM). Supplies of Russian weapons to the Armenian side, as revealed in spring 1997, amounted to about $1 billion, and included tanks and long-range missiles. They constituted a vital contribution to the Armenian victory.

The conflict is a straightforward territorial dispute. In the 1920s, Stalin sought rapprochement with Turkey and tended to support Azerbaijani claims laid on the Armenian-populated lands of Karabakh, as well as of Nakhichevan where the population was approximately half Muslim and half Armenian. These political ambitions collided with Armenian aspirations to bring together historical homelands where Armenians still constituted a majority. The genocide of 1915, when an estimated 1 million Armenians were killed by forces of the Ottoman Empire, made a tremendous impact on Armenian national identity and helped to form a revanchist agenda. The religious aspect—Christian Armenians fought Azeri Muslims—had limited significance since both parties fought for an explicit ethnoterritorial agenda.

The ANM, created in 1989, emerged as a powerful vehicle of national mobilization and state building in virtually monoethnic Armenia. In Soviet times, de facto transfer of power from communists to the nationalists had already occurred, manifested in its confrontation with Moscow in 1990–1991 when the ANM enjoyed huge domestic support. Levon Ter-Petrosyan was elected in October 1991 as the first president of Armenia following the declaration of independence. It played a crucial role in the transition to independence, maintenance of stable government, and the incorporation of paramilitaries into an organized armed force.

By contrast, Azerbaijan suffered from intense political turmoil in the early years of independence and from the worst fighting on the Karabakh front. Its first president, Ayaz Mutalibov, a reformed communist, was forced to resign following the massacre of Azeri civilians in Khojaly in February 1992. The Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) came to power, and Abdulfaz Elchibey, its leader, was elected president in 1992. APF failed to take a firm grip on the political process, and created instead a chaotic government unable to deliver basic law and order. Losses on the Karabakh front, increased authoritarian tendencies, and Elchibey's policy of rapprochement with Turkey alienated him from much of the Azerbaijani population. In 1993, a successful coup against APF, led by a rogue colonel, Surat Husseinov, with covert support of the Russian military based in Azerbaijan, resulted in the defeat of the APF. However, the fruits of Husseinov's military coup were quickly monopolized by Heidar Aliev, a man with a long history of survival under different political regimes. Aliev is a former Soviet KGB general, chairman of the Azerbaijani KGB, then the communist leader of Azerbaijan and member of the Politburo. So he returned to his old job, but this time as the leader of an independent state. His authoritarian and highly personalized rule pulled the country from chaos to stability, but democracy was sacrificed on the way.

Conflict Dynamics

There is consensus in Armenia about the status of Nagorno Karabakh: it is a part of Armenia and sooner or later the outside world will have to come to terms with the existing situation. In practical terms, Armenia already has formed a common state with Karabakh. Military and political figures from Karabakh, including president Robert Kocharian, hold key positions in Armenia. The enclave is well connected to the republic via a highway built with Armenian diaspora money, it uses Armenian currency, and Armenian youths usually serve half of their military conscription term in Karabakh. The struggle for the ethnic cause also strengthened the Armenian national identity. Armenia's military superiority and seizure of strategic positions around Karabakh mean that the risk of a new war is low. The Armenian diaspora financed a program of economic reconstruction in Karabakh, thus enabling the region to avoid the worst realities of postwar devastation.

Armenia, however, has to pay a price for its military gains. From 1989 on Azerbaijan has imposed a blockade of road, rail, and energy links with Armenia, supported by Turkey, which also closed its borders. The blockade caused severe economic problems for Armenia and led to an acute energy crisis in 1992–1993. Armenia retaliated with the closure of its border with Nakhichevan, an Azerbaijani enclave in Armenia separated from the mainland.

Currently, the mutual blockade is most damaging to Armenia since it lost a direct connection to Russia, its powerful strategic ally. However, it still enjoys links with Iran, where the Armenian diaspora is historically strong, and via Georgia with Russia. Continuous Armenian fears that Georgia might restrict Armenian transit seem hardly viable since ethnic Armenians populate
the Georgian region of Javakheti, posing a constant threat of secession that the Georgian authorities are eager to prevent. Armenian transit also brings customs revenue and transit fees into the Georgian treasury.

Another Armenian fear was its exclusion from the development of Caspian Sea energy-generating resources, which were expected to exclusively benefit energy-rich Azerbaijan. By 2000 these fears had diminished, since the Azerbaijani resources proved to be exaggerated, and the interplay of business and politics resulted in delayed investment and poor economic performance. Azerbaijani oil revenues are also expected to be far from sufficient on the short term to arm and recruit a mercenary force capable of posing a threat to the Karabakh army.

Each Azerbaijani president started his career with attempts to make military progress in Karabakh, and by appealing for Turkish technical and training support, which was rendered in part. Heidar Aliev even invited Afghani mujahedeen, with disastrous consequences. Since then, diplomatic efforts have been focused on exerting international pressure on Armenia and using the prospect of rich Caspian oil revenues for political purposes. Following the Kosovo crisis, Aliev moved to exploit the growing rift between Russia and the West, and sought a rapprochement with NATO. These are, however, long-term policy undertakings unable to materialize in the short run, while Russia's second war in Chechnya and Aliev's old age put more pressure to find a quick solution.

Negotiations center on the following issues. First, Armenia insisted on accepting Karabakh as a party to the conflict, a demand eventually accepted by Azerbaijan. Second, there are arguments in favor of either phased or package settlements. In 1997, Baku authorities and President Ter-Petrosyan, under considerable international pressure, accepted the OSCE proposal for a phased settlement, but that was rejected by the Karabakh authorities and the majority of Armenians. Ter-Petrosyan, who already ruled in an increasingly authoritarian way, was accused of national betrayal. He was forced to resign in February 1998 under pressure from key political and security barons whose careers were built on the struggle for Karabakh.

Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, the former leader of Nagorno Karabakh, was elected president in March 1998 and improved the democratic credentials of the regime. His position on Karabakh, however, is less comforting for the international community. Although Kocharian reaffirmed the Armenian commitment to peaceful settlement and met with President Aliev, the essence of his position is that Armenia and Karabakh can develop economically without a settlement and Armenia will not have to suffer from international isolation more than it has already done in 1992–1993. So far, this position has proven viable, since the economic situation in Karabakh is better than in its neighboring Azerbaijani regions. Whether it is sustainable in the long run depends on how the government manages the domestic economy and whether it is successful in fighting corruption. It is also dependent on aid from the diaspora and the pace of the development of power-generating capacity in Azerbaijan.

Official Conflict Management

Since independence, Armenia has been subjected to significant international pressure to make concessions on the Karabakh issue. So far, these efforts have brought little, or even negative, results.

Between 1988 and 1994, the Karabakh conflict had been subject to mediation by a variety of international actors, including Russia, Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Western countries and international organizations. Finally, in May 1994 Russia succeeded in brokering a cease-fire that left Armenian forces in control of 15 percent of Azerbaijani territory. In July, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh committed themselves to maintaining the cease-fire while seeking a negotiated settlement under Russian mediation. OSCE promised to deploy peacekeeping troops to supervise the situation, but disputes over whether required conditions on the separation of forces were met, as well as the composition of the international force, prevented this from happening. Russia volunteered to provide a peacekeeping contingent, but this proposal was rejected by Azerbaijan, which was suspicious of Russia's neutrality. The cease-fire generally held since without an external presence.

The OSCE Minsk Group was set up in January 1992 as the main international vehicle for resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Initially, the Minsk Group's work has been hampered by disagreements with Russia, which, being a member of the Minsk Group, still pursued unilateral initiatives. As a result, Russian and Western proposals kept undercutting each other and enabled parties to the conflict to play off international mediators against each other, until Russia acquired permanent cochairmanship of the group in December 1994. Under pressure from Azerbaijan, the Minsk Group cochairs at the OSCE Lisbon summit submitted a proposal in December 1996 for a framework of settlement of the Karabakh conflict based on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and providing for the "highest degree" of autonomy for the Karabakh Armenians within Azerbaijan. The Armenians vetoed the proposal and it was read as the "Chairman-in-Office" statement. The summit was a diplomatic victory for Azerbaijan, but in the Armenian view it has set back the peace process, disrupting the quiet diplomacy between presidential advisers from both sides. Armenians were convinced that Azerbaijan was using its oil weapon to force the United States to take Baku's side.

When energy-resource development and foreign direct investment in Azerbaijan started to materialize in 1996–1997, the profile of the Minsk Group changed. An oil lobby emerged in the West to act as a counterbalance to the Armenian diaspora and the Caspian Sea area acquired more international significance. The post of Caspian Coordinator was established in the U.S. Department of State. Because of changing context, new Russian foreign minister Yevgenii Primakov and the new U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, each made more effort to advance the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. New commitment to the region also resulted in improved cooperation within the Minsk Group when in 1997 the United States and France joined Russia as cochairs. The group submitted successive proposals for a phased settlement consisting of two elements. The first one provided for the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied territories, deployment of an international peacekeeping force, repatriation of the Azeri IDPs, and lifting the blockade. The second one provided for the preservation of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and a de facto self-governing status of Karabakh. By autumn 1997, Baku and Levon Ter-Petrosyan had accepted the plan as the basis for negotiation, but it was rejected by both political elites and society at large in both Armenia and Karabakh. When Ter-Petrosyan publicly endorsed the plan and attempted to pressure the Armenian political establishment into concessions, this set in motion the train of events that forced his resignation in February 1998.

Robert Kocharian, who succeeded Ter-Petrosyan, has little incentive to be accused of betraying Karabakh by entering into concessions, if avoidable. Moreover, time, the weaker-than-expected economic performance of Azerbaijan, and reinforced Russian commitment to Armenia make the position of the Armenian leadership look more sustainable that it seemed in the mid-1990s. The main issues of contention are as follows:

• The status of Karabakh. Baku has stated that it is prepared to grant the highest degree of autonomy to Karabakh without elaborating what this means in practice. Karabakh and Armenia reject any vertical subordination to Baku and insist on real sovereignty.
  
• Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijani territory outside Karabakh, which the Armenian side regards as a guarantee of Karabakh security and as a bargaining chip. In principle, the Armenia side accepts the eventual return of most of the occupied territories, but is in practice reluctant to relinquish them before the final settlement is signed.
  
• Security of Karabakh. The Armenian side insists on strong security guarantees in compensation for a withdrawal from the territories it currently holds. It demands the right to retain its own security forces, long-term presence of international peacekeepers, and the permanent maintenance of the Lachin corridor to enable unrestricted communication with Armenia. A complex lease arrangement for Lachin proposed by the Minsk Group has so far proved unconvincing.
  
• Return of refugees and IDPs, especially to Shusha. Baku insists that Azeri IDPs should be allowed to return to Shusha, a predominantly Azeri town at the time the conflict broke out. From the Armenian perspective, Shusha is an ancient Armenian homeland of great symbolic significance. Shusha is situated on a strategic height overlooking Stepanakert, the Karabakh capital, and served as a launching pad for the Azeri side for bombarding Stepanakert in 1992.
  
• Schedule for resolving the crisis. The Minsk Group has advocated a phased approach, claiming that it will be impossible to tackle difficult issues, such as status, before some confidence-building measures have been implemented. The Armenian side argued that this would provide a unilateral advantage to Azerbaijan since it will be the Armenian side that is required to give up territory at the first stage and endanger its security. Instead, it insists on a "package" solution that will incorporate all major issues in a single settlement.

The first two years of the Kocharian government have not brought any significant changes in the negotiation process. Throughout 1999 there were indications that Aliev and Kocharian had started to take steps forward on the political settlement, meeting at international forums for undisclosed discussions, but the October 1999 shootings in the Armenian parliament and the subsequent turmoil in the Armenian ruling establishment disrupted the initial progress. Internal struggles on both sides have intensified and shifted the focus of both the elites and the population at large from the Karabakh issue to the immediate political battles. The November 1999 OSCE Istanbul summit did not make any substantive statements on the Karabakh issue.

In early 2001, the Karabakh peace talks gained significant momentum, culminating in the Key West summit (3–7 April), at which the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia met for intensive negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE. As cochairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States, Russia, and France were mediators at the talks. The Key West meeting was a result of the two presidents' direct dialogue during over fifteen bilateral meetings conducted in recent years, and managed to establish a relationship of trust. Joint investigations of cease-fire violations and confidence-building measures along the line of contact also helped them to get to know each other better. International pressure was very important: French president Jacques Chirac met with the two presidents under the auspices of the Minsk Group, which was followed by concerted efforts by the U.S. and Russian leaderships. This demonstrated a rare example of cooperation and goodwill between the major external players.

Time is also an important factor as the status quo is negative for both countries. President Aliev is aging and prefers to sign a peace settlement during his term of office rather than leave such a political burden to his successor, especially if his son is to replace him. Aliev understands that every leader who succeeds him would be less capable of making a significant compromise. For President Kocharian, the effects of isolation, a by-product of the conflict, are a powerful brake on economic progress, resulting in a slow pace of development and the depopulation of the country over which he presides.

The contours of a possible deal are unclear. The Economist (London) speculated that it was shaping up as follows: Azerbaijan receives back six of the seven occupied regions and an internationally protected road, linking it to the isolated enclave of Nakhichevan. In return, Karabakh and the adjacent Lachin corridor will be granted self-governing status, implying its de facto independence.

Both presidents returned from Florida to hold consultations with their political allies. However, since Key West, developments on this front have been discouraging. Consultations with the domestic constituencies only seemed to have hardened the leaderships' positions. Given this, a planned follow-up meeting in Geneva in mid-June has been called off. The current obstacles are that the two sides live in deep isolation from one another, that public opinion in both countries is skeptical or even hostile toward a peace settlement, and that the two presidents—while close on many issues—are reluctant to make further concessions.

The major obstacle to a successful peace settlement remains entrenched public opinion on both sides. The two presidents seem to be "ahead of their populations" in their understanding of the need for compromise. A British journalist and publicist on the Caucasus, Tom de Waal identifies four key reasons why the presidents, apparently so keen to reach a solution, find themselves unable to take their societies with them.

1. Both leaders believe that a tough stance at home will win them more at the negotiating table. While Aliev tries to put pressure on international mediators to do more for Azerbaijan, Kocharian may be calculating that a little brinkmanship with the aging Aliev could force more concessions out of him.
   
2. The presidents find it easier to imagine a peace settlement in Florida than back home. Publics in the region are critical of the internationals, and the United States in particular, for "rushing" the process. The potential danger is that the two leaders might sign onto something that they cannot deliver.
   
3. Their respective personalities easily explain such attitudes. Neither man is a democrat. Aliev is a former Politburo member who has rigged all the elections he has held since coming to power. Kocharian was the wartime leader of the Karabakh Armenians. Both men energetically pursued the "military option" over Karabakh in 1993–1994. For them, the popular will presents a potential threat and they would rather manipulate it than engage in dialogue.
   
4. Most importantly, there is a fear of loss of power, as has already happened to Ter-Petrosyan, the first Armenian president. For both men, self-preservation would seem to be the highest goal, higher than peace and prosperity. Ultimately, both men may decide that the cost of signing a peace agreement is too high and that they could be swept away by the storms of protest it arouses.

Multi Track Diplomacy

In the early 1990s, development of civil society in the Caucasus has been influenced by ethnic agendas and by efforts to cope with the consequences of violence. As a result, a culture of tolerance was slow to develop. The Soviet legacy of state domination was significant, since confusion prevailed over what the third sector is and how it relates to the state. A tradition of independent agents of society was largely absent, while the state regarded NGOs with suspicion and NGOs themselves easily became politicized. At times, many acted as the covert opponents of the regime.

After independence, popular moods changed substantively. Prior to the outbreak of armed conflicts, societies have been greatly affected by mobilization projects aimed at realization of national goals. Wars and massive suffering followed suit. The lesson most people learned was that individual survival is more important than any political initiative. The societies became more inward-looking as the quality of everyday life took a sharp downturn.

At the same time, Western aid targeted toward the development of the third sector, the presence of international humanitarian organizations, and periodic threats to democracy created new impetus for local groups to develop. However, few of them take up issues of resolution of the Karabakh conflict, although there is a wide proliferation of NGOs in Armenia and, to a lesser extent, in Azerbaijan. About sixty local NGOs exist in Karabakh itself. By the same token, compared to conflicts in Georgia, the Nagorno Karabakh dispute attracted peace efforts of international NGOs on a much more modest scale. Moreover, international humanitarian NGOs in Karabakh experienced severe constraints on their presence, since their mandate to operate was conditioned on approval from Baku, which Karabakh Armenians found unacceptable. As a result, only the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières managed to establish permanent missions in Karabakh.

Those local and international groups who are involved in conflict resolution pursue the following range of activities.

Bilateral Contacts
Given the high degree of interethnic tension and a general lack of desire by the parties to engage in dialogue, few bilateral meetings have happened so far. The Helsinki Initiative 92 (HI-92) organized two meetings with representatives of Azerbaijani NGOs in 1994 and in 1995, bringing ethnic Azeris to Stepanakert. In 2000, Karen Ohajanian, the organization's head and a Karabakh minister of parliament, visited Baku to take part in preparations for the next International Helsinki Citizen's Assembly (HCA) meeting in Baku. The visit was widely covered by the Azeri mass media.

The Swiss-based Caucasus Media Support Project played a crucial role in promotion of bilateral contacts. Important achievements were the trips of Azerbaijani journalists to Armenia (October 1997) and Karabakh (September 1998) and of Armenians to Azerbaijan (July 1999). Journalists met with leading politicians and this made the fact of such contacts more acceptable in the societies in conflict. For instance, Mark Grigorian, president of Cooperation and Democracy (C&D), visited Azerbaijan in July 1999, meeting President Aliev and Azeri senior officials. His articles about the trip were printed in both the Armenian and Azeri press.

LINKS is another INGO to embark on a series of bilateral measures. Apart from working on a number of pan-Caucasian initiatives aimed at development of good governance practices, in 2000 it undertook a mission to Karabakh to hold talks with the Karabakh leadership and its political rivals on future conflict-resolution strategies. Relevant discussions have been held on the Azeri side as well.

Two German foundations, namely the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung organized meetings of representatives from the South Caucasus in Sofia and Istanbul, attended mainly by politicians from both sides. Subsequent meetings in Yerevan and Baku were designed to facilitate dialogue between journalists. The Azerbaijan Foundation for the Development of Democracy was the Azeri partner for this project.

Multilateral Contacts and Training
The Transcaucasia Dialogue movement of the HCA, a project in community mobilization, was one of the first to start pursuing multilateral initiatives in the Caucasus. It has been supporting a network of civic initiatives, namely HCA local branches in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Karabakh, since 1992. This built relationships of trust between individuals from different sides of the conflict and helped to protect local activists from domestic political pressures. Some of its most active members are HI-92 and the Human Rights Center of Azerbaijan (HRCA), which position themselves within the broader HCA movement. Both take part in wider networks and all-Caucasian peacemaking efforts, and HRCA also provides early-warning reports for INGOs such as FEWER.

In November 2000, the HCA General Assembly was held in Baku, bringing together six hundred participants, including over forty Armenians, twelve of them from Karabakh, with personal security guarantees from President Aliev, which were offered as a goodwill gesture for promoting Azerbaijan's entry into the Council of Europe. At the initiative of Arzu Abdualayeva, who was elected as new cochair of HCA International, an appeal for dialogue between Cultures and Civilizations was launched, with the purpose of fostering civil society in the Southern Caucasus. The assembly was facilitated by International Alert. A fringe subconference was held, addressing the issues of human rights, regional economic cooperation, religious dialogue, and youth projects. Currently, preparations for an Armenian-Turkish exchange of writers and intellectuals by Armenian and Turkish HCA committees are under way.

International Alert (IA) has been involved in the Karabakh conflict through the activities of the Caucasus Forum, a network of Caucasian NGOs active in conflict resolution. The aim of the forum was to provide an ongoing space for dialogue on conflict resolution and to incorporate the broader Caucasian context into particular peace efforts. The forum also gives an opportunity for civil-society representatives from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Karabakh to maintain contacts and discuss their situation in a more relaxed atmosphere of pan-Caucasian dialogue. The latest of the Caucasus Forum events took place in Tsakhkadzor (Armenia), where the participants decided to proceed with projects in the core dimensions of the forum's peacebuilding activities, such as women, youth, journalists, and ex-combatants' programs.

The Norwegian Refugee Council was involved in a regional project in the South Caucasus aimed at networking and strengthening regional capacities to deal with conflicts.

Much international effort was dedicated to the provision of conflict-resolution training. Participants from Armenia and Azerbaijan have attended training courses together with participants from other conflict zones from around the world in a number of U.S. organizations, such as George Mason University. In 1995 the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland has hosted individuals from each of the hot areas in the South Caucasus for a four-month program of NGO training.

In May 2001 a workshop entitled "Stability and Peace in the Caucasus: The Case of Nagorno Karabakh" was organized by the Development and Peace Foundation at the Evangelische Akademie Loccum. The workshop sought to bring together the official representatives of all sides, civil-society actors, and international mediators and international NGOs. Still, locals were vastly outnumbered by internationals: out of 146 participants, 29 were Azeri and 16 Armenian. The presence of international mediators such as Carey Cavanagh and Vladimir Kazimirov provided an extra clout, and the fact that the workshop happened shortly after the Key West meeting heightened the international interest.

The conference discussed the interrelationship between the confidentiality of the peace process on one hand, and the isolation of civil societies and the general public from high-level peace initiatives on the other. It warned that this might result in a huge gap in understanding between the top political leaderships and their respective societies, when and if the agreement is made. The participants also noted a deepened understanding by the international community of the issues surrounding the Karabakh conflict, such as the attitudes and perceptions of the genocide on the Armenian side and the deficiency of existing international law. The conference has also exposed a range of opinions within the Azeri and Armenian communities, who were prepared to discuss them in an open forum, marking a substantial change from the earlier uniformity and increasing the number of avenues for compromise.

In 2000, the Centre for European Policy Studies formed a task force for the Stability Pact for the Caucasus under the leadership of Michael Emerson. The task force published two reports in May and October 2000 outlining the concept of the plan. The second report was a substantial refinement of the first, benefiting from a summer of consulting the leaders of the secessionist regions.

The Stability Pact offers an alternative paradigm for political and territorial arrangements in the Caucasus in opposition to the Westphalian concept of nation-states that does not appear to be able to bring peace and development to the region. It is based on the analysis of the way the evolution of the EU has gone. The Stability Pact argues that these alternative strategies are of fundamental importance for the future of Europe. In a Europe with fuzzy frontiers, the EU's voluntary offer to export its policies for application to its neighbors, thus reducing perceptions of exclusion (although still limiting participation in key political bodies), is emerging as a key issue. It may be called the neomedieval empire, i.e., one with a set of peripheral associates rather than an EU that becomes a clear-cut European neo-Westphalian state. This is a major aspect of the emerging "future of Europe" debate, but one that has not yet been brought out sufficiently clearly. This attachment to conventional self-determination may need to change if the stability of the European periphery is to be achieved.

Based on such thinking, it advocates conflict resolution based on fuzzy constitutional settlements for Karabakh and Abkhazia. Both cases would see political solutions closer to confederalism than federalism for Azerbaijan and Georgia in relation to the secessionist entities. The option of secession would, however, be excluded. Power structures would be essentially horizontal rather than vertical, with very thin union structures. Asymmetric relations would be provided, notably in the case of Karabakh with co-ethnic Armenia. Refugees and IDPs would be able to return to such areas as the Azeri provinces occupied by Armenian forces and the southern region of Abkhazia. This will be supported by a new regional security order in which the settlements of the conflicts would see monitoring and enforcement by military units from OSCE member states under an OSCE umbrella.

In 2000, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, personal representative of the Austrian OSCE chairperson-in-office for missions in the Caucasus, and Freimut Duve, the OSCE representative on freedom of the media, launched a book project, Caucasus: Defence of the Future, containing essays by Caucasian writers. The project was aimed at promoting dialogue between representatives of the intelligentsia in the Caucasus.

Working with the Displaced
In Armenia, the conclusion that displaced Armenians will not return to Azerbaijan was arrived at fairly early on, and efforts to integrate new arrivals were made from the beginning. They were mainly state-driven with some international input. By contrast, in Azerbaijan, where the IDP and refugee population is much larger and where hopes for return still exist, local NGOs played more prominent roles. For example, the Baku-based NGO Hayat deals primarily with delivering humanitarian and development assistance to the vulnerable groups, most notably IDPs from Nagorno Karabakh. Hayat is engaged in the Migration Sector Development project, the regional initiative facilitated and funded by the International Organization for Migration that also involves Georgian, Armenian, and North Caucasian NGOs. Hayat conducts research into problems facing vulnerable groups and provides training and capacity-building seminars for local NGOs dealing with migration issues.
The Danish Refugee Council, working in Azerbaijan on the grassroots level, has focused on long-term peacebuilding and the creation of new possibilities for the IDP community. Its programs focused on the Fizuli and Sumgait regions, providing training in skills for prospective returnees.

Mass Media and Information Exchange
One area where significant progress has been made is the development of contacts between journalists and the facilitation of information exchange. This goal also fit in with a broader agenda of development of free media in the Caucasus pursued by many Western organizations. An important role has been played by the Caucasus Media Support Project, funded by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The project has aimed to create a regional dialogue between journalists in the South Caucasus, to facilitate more balanced reporting and enable travel to the opponent's territory. Between 1997 and 2000, twelve conferences and training seminars took place in various locations in the Caucasus involving over two hundred participants from local print and broadcast media. Bulletins were produced in Russian and English.

In May 2001, seven journalists undertook a unique trip, crossing for the first time the front line between Azerbaijanis and the Armenians of Karabakh. The trip was organized by the American, French, and Russian cochairs of the Minsk Group. They designed a route that took in the sections of the population that are most affected by the stalemate: in Azerbaijan, displaced people; in Armenia, people suffering because of the economic isolation of their country. They also want to open up three routes across the Line of Contact that can be used by aid agencies and mediators. In 2000, they made two crossings of the Armenia-Azerbaijan frontier, which has also been closed. This third crossing was the most sensitive because it took place in what is the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan.

The Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) published the periodical WarReport from 1995 to 1998, making efforts to incorporate local voices into the English-language publication. It also pursued the Transcaucasian Media Training, Human Rights and Information Project, in development of independent mass media in the Caucasus, and published the Media Caucasica quarterly magazine in which C&D was involved. In 1999, IWPR started an on-line service on the Caucasus.

Promotion of Public Debate
One venue for public debate are press clubs. The Yerevan Press Club, cofinanced by the EU's Poland and Hungary Action for Rehabilitating the Economy and TACIS programs, acts as a forum for debate on issues of democracy and security, and also undertakes media monitoring in Armenia. Journalists participating in the Yerevan Press Club have been involved in contacts with their Azeri counterparts. Stepanakert Press Club, modeled on the Yerevan club, was established in Karabakh with a similar agenda. Baku Press Club operates in Azerbaijan.

The Caspian Studies Program at the JFK School of Government and the Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies at the University of California–Berkeley act as such centers of debate and discussion in the United States. For example, the Caspian Studies Program organized a panel discussion on "Negotiations on Nagorno Karabakh: Where Do We Go from Here?" soon after the Key West talks. The discussion was led by Ambassador Carey Cavanaugh, U.S. special negotiator for Nagorno Karabakh and NIS Regional Conflicts, and OSCE Minsk Group cochair, who sought to generate international support for the momentum for change.

Exchanges of War Prisoners
Despite the fact that active combat ended in 1994, exchanges of war prisoners and information on missing persons remains a burning problem. The HCA branches both in Armenia and Azerbaijan played an active role lobbying for the restoration of human interaction and reduction in ethnic resentment. As a practical measure, they were engaged in exchanges of prisoners of war and Anait Baiandur (Armenia) and Arzu Abdullaeva (Azerbaijan) won the Olof Palme Peace Award for their efforts. HI-92 is also actively engaged in exchanges of prisoners of war, hostages, and missing persons. Zinvori Mair (Society of Soldiers' Mothers), an Armenian grassroots NGO, was engaged in lobbying activities as well as practical issues of human-rights protection and prisoner exchanges.

Enhancement of Democracy and Human Rights
Many local NGOs that were originally established with a human-rights mandate, such as HI-92, founded in August 1992 as a civil-society reaction to the events in Khojaly, later broadened their focus to include democracy building and issues of conflict resolution. As a result, two agendas—fight for democracy and human rights, and resolution of conflict—go hand in hand and are often pursued by the same individuals. This also refers to NGOs such as HRCA or C&D. HRCA is the most established human-rights organization in Azerbaijan. The main activities are focused on human rights and minorities by monitoring and distributing information, and on direct engagement in the protection of citizens' rights by visiting prisons and trials, liaising with political parties, and putting pressure on the government to adhere to human-rights standards. The Institute of Peace and Democracy (Baku) is engaged in the protection of human rights and women's and young people's civil movements. It publishes Azerbaijani Press on Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms, which provides a summary of the mass-media monitoring on human-rights issues, but is also involved in the conflict-resolution agenda. The institute has a group on conflict studies that focuses on internal conflicts, but also monitors international developments.
In Armenia, C&D was involved in mass-media monitoring since 1996 and took part in ensuring fair coverage of the parliamentary elections there in 1999. It has compiled an English-language Elections' Guide for Journalists and established the elections' website.

Humanitarian Assistance
Given the difficulty for international humanitarian organizations to operate in Karabakh, the presence of those few that did was extremely important for the local people, both practically and psychologically. For example, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, founded on the initiative of Baroness Caroline Cox, has been involved in providing humanitarian assistance to the Armenians in Karabakh since 1990. This aid has taken the form of international public diplomacy in support of the Karabakh Armenians and of medical assistance, such as the building of a rehabilitation center in Stepanakert for persons paralyzed as result of the war, provision of medical supplies, and support to educational facilities, including organizing student exchanges.

Women as Peacemakers
Some peace initiatives were taken by women's organizations either as a part of a Caucasian regional effort, such as the Transcaucasian Women's Dialogue, or within their own political entities. In Azerbaijan, the Association for Protection of Women's Rights is one of the most vocal and active organizations involved in civil-society building and conflict resolution.

Concluding Remarks
There is no single convincing explanation as to why the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh attracted far less conflict-resolution professionals than similar conflicts in Georgia. A number of factors appear to have played a role.

First, international NGOs implicitly did not believe that progress in Karabakh could ever be made and felt that the Armenian position was fully entrenched. Second, interethnic hostility was so intense that few people of substance would be willing to participate in a bilateral dialogue with the opposite side. Such sensation was indirectly fueled by the Armenian diaspora, which in the beginning of 1990s supplied finance for the Karabakh struggle, and later found itself opposing the oil lobby in the West that advocated Azerbaijani interests. Third, the nature of civil society on both sides produces obstacles. In Armenia and partly in Karabakh, military victory and relative security led to the feeling that as far as Armenians are concerned, the issue has been resolved and peace is a reality. Azerbaijan should rather concentrate on assimilation of the displaced and economic development than on the pursuit of unrealistic goals.

In Azerbaijan, authoritarian control by the state left few local NGOs genuinely independent. Those that survived concentrated on the struggle for internal democracy and human rights as the most pressing issues. Fourth, international NGOs found the social environment difficult to cope with, and after many initial approaches resulted in frustration, initiatives were not taken any further.

Finally, the needs of the Karabakh Armenians appear to be different from those of the Abkhaz and Ossetians, who take an active part in conflict-resolution initiatives. While the Abkhaz have to break through international isolation and gain access to foreign donors, the Karabakh Armenians can travel freely on Armenian passports and appeal for money to the Armenian leadership and diaspora organizations. As a result, there is a lack of popular belief in the validity of peacebuilding efforts; the only issues that provoke popular interest are the exchange of prisoners of war and a search for missing persons. Armenian intellectuals are interested in the theory of conflict resolution, but only as far as it can justify the Armenian claim on Karabakh. Azerbaijani intellectuals feel that they have no other option but to follow the presidential line on Karabakh, and their space for an independent initiative is more limited.

Prospects

Throughout the 1990s, negotiations have not brought much tangible result. Neither side was prepared to enter substantive bargaining, but rather conducted "negotiations about negotiations." Presently, the situation is changing, and there are signs that the conflicting sides are more committed to making some progress. The Azeri leadership probably feels that Azerbaijan's position cannot be strengthened any further; on the contrary, there is a real risk that it could weaken. First, Azerbaijan's oil resources have proven to be more limited than expected. Second, the president is aging and might not survive much longer. In the event of his death and subsequent infighting for the leadership position, the Karabakh issue could become a platform for a bid for power. Renewed fighting with potentially disastrous consequences for Azerbaijan cannot be ruled out. Therefore, a settlement of the Karabakh conflict is best concluded soon, while President Aliev is still in power. Third, from the Azerbaijani point of view, Russian help, as promised by President Putin, could be very useful in order to reach a negotiated settlement.

The internal political situation In Armenia became volatile following the October 1999 assassinations in parliament. Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkssian was killed, together with six other politicians, including the parliamentary speaker. An attempt was also made to kill President Arkadii Gukasyan of Nagorno Karabakh.

While Aliev's political and physical survival is an acute, but short-term, concern, the general political and social framework is a more important durable factor. Consensus among the general public in Armenia and in Karabakh that the conflict is already resolved and no action is necessary is extremely difficult to change. During election campaigns, the conflict in Karabakh is hardly mentioned while economic and social issues dominate the political agenda. Armenia does not suffer from the blockade as much as Abkhazia does, and so far the effects of the international condemnation have proved minimal. Refugees from Azerbaijan have been resettled in Armenia and have no desire to go back to Azerbaijan. Moreover, less developed and more authoritarian Azerbaijan does not appear an attractive alternative for the Karabakh Armenians who can rely on financial and political support of the Armenian state and diaspora. At the same time, the Azerbaijani army currently is unable to pose a serious military threat to force the Armenian side into concessions.

To sum up, there are no real pressures for the Armenian side to give up its territorial gains and claim on Karabakh. The argument can be made that Azerbaijan's interests are better served by allowing Karabakh to secede, while regaining the occupied territories and reaching an acceptable compromise on the Lachin corridor. However, such a political burden proved too heavy even for such a mighty leader as President Aliev.

Participants of the Wilton Park Conference concluded that although there was reason for some optimism, due to an improved cooperation between the co-chairs of the Minsk Group, the potential for escalation still remains. An insecure new president seeking to reinforce his position through a military victory could unleash renewed fighting. The other danger, in the Key West conference's view, is that the approach of a peace settlement that would require compromises on both sides, may prompt hard-liners to embark on policies to sabotage a peace deal. Anxiety also exists about the potential public reaction to compromises. The Azeri and the Armenian presidents, well aware of the political realities faced by their countries, are more able to agree on the outlines of a future peace settlement than to justify such a settlement to their respective constituencies.

As De Waal notes, there is an unhappy paradox at the heart of the Karabakh peace process. Two essentially undemocratic leaders are pursuing a peace settlement. They have apparently come close to achieving one. They understand that a peace deal is best for their countries, yet they are reluctant to engage their societies in the process. Clearly there are reasons why undemocratic leaders, as in Armenia and Azerbaijan, can actually do more in a peace process. The political base they need to consult with is narrow. They have to worry less about elections. They can simply ignore the nationalist consensus that still grips their respective publics. Equally, it is pointless to wait for more democratic leaders to emerge, which could take a generation—and is, in any case, more likely to be a consequence of peace than a cause of it. Still, the lack of trust between authoritarian leaders and their publics is the biggest problem for the Caucasus in general and the Karabakh peace process in particular.

Recommendations

Many of the activities of international NGOs have been targeted toward the development of free media and the facilitation of contacts between journalists from both sides of the conflict. With much work done, it may be worth turning their attention to other potential areas and tools. However, to achieve such a goal, it will be useful to reflect on the past record of multi-track conflict-resolution activities and assess the lessons learned. This may help to determine whether it is wise to pursue conflict-resolution efforts any further, or whether the political and social environment in both Armenia and Azerbaijan is not conducive to real progress and the international community should rather concentrate on maintaining open channels of communication until changes in domestic or international settings occur.

The start of the second Russian-Chechen war demonstrated the fragility of a "no war, no peace" situation and the freezing of conflicts, which in Karabakh seem an entrenched status quo. There are warning signs that renewed hostilities on the ground may not be ruled out. In such a context, early warning and low-key confidence-building measures may be appropriate steps to undertake.

Despite the long history of the Karabakh conflict, society in Azerbaijan has not yet had a chance to process the recent traumatic experience and come to terms with the new situation. A deep feeling of national humiliation appears to have settled in, and neither promises of an oil boom nor efforts to blame the military defeat in Karabakh on Russia currently pursued by the ruling establishment have helped in overcoming such sensations of a nation in distress. International actors, therefore, are urged to help Azerbaijanis to feel more like proud and confident citizens who can take responsibility for their own affairs rather than expecting, or apprehending, an externally generated solution.

International organizations, as well as the West and Russia, should take care not to push leveraged mediation too far, since it has produced negative impacts in the past and can do so in future. A cautious approach may be more appropriate than excessive zeal. As the Caspian Studies Program warns, failure to achieve peace in this recent round of negotiations could easily collapse into a situation of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This would be a worse scenario than the current stalemate. Energy development in Azerbaijan will receive an enormous setback, as international companies will be reluctant to invest in a country at war. The Karabakh conflict may become a platform for emerging rivals for the presidency.

The Caspian Studies Program concentrated on recommendations as to which action is to be taken by the international community in the postconflict stage, talking about the signing of the Karabakh peace settlement as an "almost done deal." It recommends, for instance, one concrete action: resettlement of Azerbaijani IDPs in some or all of the occupied districts that are outside of the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh under Armenian occupation. However, Carey Cavanagh, speaking at Chatham House in May 2001, noted that it is unrealistic to hope that all IDPs would return to their original settlements, given the choice, and that the Dayton peace process showed that once interethnic coexistence is brutally interrupted, restoration is not that easy.

The Caspian Studies Program further stresses that since the OSCE is likely to be the leading agency in the postconflict period, it should make a particular effort to be well prepared for the challenges ahead. In the past, the OSCE has repeatedly suffered from understaffing, and in some cases the quality of deployed personnel was not on par with the high demands of the job. The OSCE should encourage member states to identify their citizens who are qualified and willing to serve on a field mission and to hire appropriate experts on the open market. Similarly, the UN needs to decide which of its agencies will take the lead role. Once designated, this agency should develop a clear contingency plan that will allow for a timely response. It is especially important that the agencies identify a sufficient number of motivated and well-qualified workers for the mission.

As part of international settlement efforts, the involved sides should strive for sustained cooperation and coordination. Within this framework,

1. International organizations should coordinate future rehabilitation programs. There is a need to decide on the lead agencies for rehabilitation and development projects and to secure joint planning with clearly delimited responsibilities.
   
2. The United States should use the positive dynamics of cooperation with Russia to make the decisive breakthrough. The current cooperative position of Russia should be appraised, while at the same time contingency planning should be carried out in case Russia's policies in the region change.
   
3. In order to help President Aliev promote a peace settlement in Azerbaijan, the U.S. Congress should cancel Section 907(a) of the Freedom Support Act. In the interim, the executive should waive or reinterpret the limitations to the extent that is legally possible.

The international community should be ready to address other issues too. Parts of the occupied territories are mined, but many of the minefields are not properly documented. The international community should assist Azerbaijan in the speedy marking of the minefields, followed by demining. Countries with expertise in this field should be sought out and encouraged to contribute to this humanitarian effort. It will also be necessary to repair and rebuild at least the land communication links between Azerbaijan and the occupied territories, so that the return of IDPs and economic revival can proceed.

Moreover, the UN and the OSCE need to improve the caliber of specialists who occupy operational posts, perhaps by recruiting some experts from outside their organizations' framework. To date, appointments of leading personnel have often been plagued by interstate politics, where candidates have been chosen by citizenship before any other quality.

International agencies await a clear signal from the OSCE that a settlement is likely to materialize before they launch needs-assessment missions, and thus have not conducted formal estimates. The World Bank should take the lead and provide direct access to funding for Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as mobilize additional financial resources and seek to attract private investors. Under the coordinated leadership of the OSCE, international agencies should start working out the responsibility for sharing strategies in financing and implementation of the rehabilitation and development programs.

De Waal draws up recommendations with an idea in mind that the settlement is still some way away. He suggests taking existing elements of the framework agreement and incorporating them into a "phased" or "step by step" plan, in which some of the thornier problems (such as security issues and the status of Karabakh itself) are postponed until later. The Armenians could, for example, give up some occupied territory, while Azerbaijan and Turkey could open up some communications with Armenia, perhaps through the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, which is also suffering from economic isolation.

The participants in the Loccum conference stressed that since the societies are not prepared for a peace deal, civil-society contacts and multi-track diplomacy are needed to prepare the ground for implementation of a peace agreement. There was a strong shared view among the participants that starting up a peace process without respective civil societies being ready for it, both psychologically and practically, can be detrimental. It was emphasized that the decisions that the international actors make about the peace process should be accomplished in an inclusive way, engaging the local stakeholders in the decisionmaking process.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Azerbaijan Press on Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms, Institute of Peace and Democracy, Baku, Azerbaijan; Caspian Studies Program Reports, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Caucasus Report, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, Czech Republic; Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Working Paper Series, Berkeley ; Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, University of California, Berkeley; Monitor & Prism, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC; Moscow News, Russian weekly, also published in English with regular updates on the Caucasus; WarReport (1995–1998), Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London
REPORTS:	Amnesty International; 1999 Annual Report on Armenia, London, 1998. 1999 Annual Report on Azerbaijan, London 1998. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; 2000 Armenia Program 2000 Azerbaijan Program
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Humanitarian Action in the Caucasus: A Guide for Practitioners, by Greg Hansen. The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Humanitarianism and War Project. Providence, RI, Local Capacities for Peace Project, 1998. No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflict in Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, by Edward W. Walker. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, 1998. Pride of Small Nations, by Suzanne Goldenberg. London, Zed Books, 1994. Russia's Policies in the Caucasus, by Pavel Baev. London, RIIA, 1997. State Building and the Reconstruction of Shattered Societies. Berkeley, University of California at Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, April 1999. The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, by Edmund Herzig. London, RIIA/Pinter, 1999. The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict, by Shireen Hunter. Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994. Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, by Ronald Grigor Suny. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.ceps.be/Research/Caucasus (Centre for European Policy Studies) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, London) www.poli.vul.ac.be/publi (Caucasian Regional Studies, Vrije University of Brussels, in Russian and English) www.rferl.org (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, daily news and analysis) www.socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet States) www.soros.org/caucasus (Chronology of events in the Transcaucasus)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Vicken Cheterian, CIMERA, e-mail: vicken.cheterian@cimera.org Thomas de Waal, e-mail: tomdewaal@hotmail.com Mient Jan Faber, Interchurch Peace Council, e-mail: mjfaber@ikv.nl Mark Grigorian, Cooperation and Democracy, e-mail: markos@media.am Edmund Herzig, University of Manchester/RIIA, e-mail: edmund@bnn.dircon.co.uk Zhanna Krikorova, e-mail: zhanna@arminco.com Arthur Martirossian, Conflict Management Group, e-mail: martiros@cmgroup.org Anna Matveeva, expert on the Caucasus, London, e-mail: sophiamat@ukonline.co.uk Karen Ohajanian, Helsinki Initiative-92, Stepanakert, e-mail: karandje@hca.nk.am Dennis Sammut, LINKS, London, e-mail: dennissammut@hotmail.com Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, International Alert, London, e-mail: gtergabrielian@international-alert.org Marten van Harten, independent consultant, e-mail: harten16@zonnet.nl Edward Walker, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post Soviet Studies, University of California, Berkeley, e-mail: eww@socrates.berkeley.edu Arif Yunusov, Institute of Peace and Democracy, Azerbaijan, fax: 009 99 412 94-14-58
ORGANIZATIONS:	In Armenia; Cooperation and Democracy 7 Saryan Street Yerevan 375002, Armenia Tel.: +37 42 27 21 19, 58 11 65 or 58 75 36 E-mail: markos@media.am; Norwegian Refugee Council Yerevan 50 Khanjian Str. Tekeyan Center Yerevan, Armenia Tel.: +374 1 57 17 21 Fax: +374 1 57 46 39 E-mail: admin@nrc.am www.nrc.no In Azerbaijan; Norwegian Refugee Council-Baku Norway House, Boyuk Quala Street 40 Icheri Sheher Baku, Azerbaijan Tel.: + 994 12 98 81 25 / 92 8 Fax: + 994 12 92 69 19 E-mail: nilsnrc@intrans.az http:www.nrc.no International; Norwegian Refugee Council Grensen 17 P.O. Box 6758 St. Olavs plass 0130 Oslo, Norway Tel.: (47) 23 10 98 00 Fax: (47) 23 10 98 01 E-mail: nrc-no@online.no DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: In Armenia; Armenian Center for National and International Studies; Armenian Sociological Association; Armenian Young Lawyers' Association; Conflict Resolution Center of Armenia; Democracy Union; Fund Against Violation of Law; Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of "Helsinki Initiative-92"; Union of Non-Governmental Organizations of Shirak Region; Yerevan Press Club; In Azerbaijan; Azerbaijan Human Rights Resource Center; Azerbaijan Young Lawyers' Union; Committee of Democracy and Human Rights; Human Rights Centre of Azerbaijan; Institute of Peace and Democracy; Resource Centre on National Minorities; Society for Humanitarian Research; International; Center for European Policy Studies; Cimera; Evangelische Akademie Loccum; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Helsinki Citizen's Assembly; Institute for War and Peace Reporting; International Alert

About the author

Anna Matveeva is a program manager at Saferworld (on small arms and security). She previously worked as a research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House, London) and program head at International Alert (London). As a scholar specializing in issues of conflict and the politics of post-Soviet Eurasia, she has authored publications such as The North Caucasus: Russia's Fragile Borderland (London: RIIA, 1999) and academic articles, and undertook projects for organizations such as the International Peace Academy, EastWest Insititute, Minority Rights Group, and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung.