Author	Franklin de Vrieze
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

After a decades-long political conflict and the war of 1998–1999, Kosovo is trying to recover and to build a democratic and stable society. The period of self-rule will be an important test in building institutions and establishing rule of law. However, ongoing security problems are continuing to threaten all efforts to leave the period of conflict behind. An internationally facilitated dialogue on the final status of Kosovo seems unavoidable.

Taking into account the long history of tensions around Kosovo—since Tito's rule of the former Yugoslavia and long before—the origins of the most recent stage of the conflict have to be understood in terms of the new wave of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s in the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo, since 1974 one of the eight constituent units of the Yugoslav federation but formally a province within the Republic of Serbia, became a rallying point during the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic. The removal of autonomy from Kosovo and Voijvodina in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to demands for independence from other republics.

The revocation of Kosovo's autonomy initiated an increase in human-rights abuses and discriminatory government policies designed to put Serbs in most key positions in the province, inhabited by a majority population of ethnic Albanians. However, it would be a mistake to see the Kosovo crisis during the 1990s as a human-rights issue only. Both Kosovo-Albanian politicians and the Serbian government agreed that more was at stake.

Once the Yugoslav federation fell apart, the right to self-determination became the central demand of Kosovo-Albanian politicians, leading to a declaration of independence in 1991. Serbia denounced what it perceived as separatism and insisted upon respect for the territorial integrity of the newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) of which the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro became the two constituent parts.

In order to achieve independence, Kosovo-Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, elected in 1992 as "President of the Republic of Kosovo," opted for a two-way strategy: building a parallel society and internationalizing the Kosovo question. The parallel society was aimed at implementing the desired independence by ignoring Serbian state institutions as far as possible and building its own institutions, in particular in the fields of education, health care, and political institutions. Internationalizing the Kosovo question resulted in international sympathy for the nonviolent approach of Rugova and the parallel system.

Serbian authorities insisted Kosovo was an internal affair and rejected any formal mediation in the conflict (until mid-1998). They hoped that the parallel system would get exhausted and that the Albanian community would accommodate with the status quo. The status quo was also advantageous for Milosevic in the sense that his party gained almost all parliamentary seats due to the Kosovo-Albanian boycott of political life in Serbia. Both parties ignored each other, assuming time was on their side.

During the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, Milosevic was under heavy pressure from three months of demonstrations by Serbian opposition and students demanding him to accept his defeat in local elections. However, the main Serbian opposition parties did not have fundamentally different opinions on the status of Kosovo within Serbia and FRY—with the exception of recognizing the need for foreign mediation.

In Pristina, Rugova was confronted with increasing criticism for the perceived lack of results of the strategy of nonviolence. The exclusion of the Kosovo question from the Dayton negotiations and the diplomatic recognition of FRY in 1996, before any progress was made on the Kosovo question, led a growing number of Kosovars to conclude that violence was the only way to attract international attention.

In an effort to win time and to avoid the difficult issue of the status of Kosovo, on 1 September 1996 Belgrade and Pristina agreed to reopen all school and university premises for Albanian students. However, the failure to implement the education agreement, negotiated by the Italian-based Sant Egidio Community, directed the Independent Student Union of the University of Pristina to organize massive nonviolent protests for the unconditional return of university premises. It became clear Rugova's party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), was no longer in control of Kosovar Albanian political life. The violent suppression by Serbian police forces of student protests indicated that the possibilities of more active nonviolent resistance in Kosovo was exhausted. The step-by-step approach in settling different aspects of the conflict also seemed to have failed.

Frequently attacking police units in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) made public appearances at funerals of its fighters and sympathizers from November 1997 on, attracting tens of thousands of people. Serbian forces accelerated their actions. Serbian civilians were armed and paramilitary groups entered Kosovo from Serbia. On 28 February 1998, heavily armed Yugoslav forces attacked the Drenica area and killed KLA leader Adem Jashari and fifty-eight other inhabitants of the villages. This turned out to be a turning point for public opinion in Kosovo. While openly confronting Serbian police control, KLA declared "liberated territories" within central Kosovo.

While on the Albanian side KLA actions were increasingly judged as legitimate acts of self-defense, Serbian authorities became even more determined to destroy terrorism. After the war, KLA leader Hashim Thaçi acknowledged attacks were sometimes aimed at provoking a Serbian response and endangering local population, since this would increase chances of foreign military involvement in the conflict.

From February 1998 until March 1999 the domestic and international political agenda was dominated by the fighting on the ground. While the international community was paying little attention to the Kosovo conflict during its earlier phase, media coverage of civilian casualties and internally displaced persons initiated intensive international mediation, the so-called coercive diplomacy, or diplomacy with the threat of force. After increasing pressure in October 1998, U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic reached an agreement that included the deployment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. It helped to ease tensions between October and December 1998 and facilitated the survival of local populations throughout the winter.

The killing of forty-five Albanians in Raçak in January 1999 became another turning point in the conflict. Although forensic reports indicate that these people had been shot from a short distance, it remains in dispute whether they were civilians or combatants. Clearly, the Raçak events contributed to the indictment against Slobodan Milosevic and other Serb officials by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It also functioned as a galvanizing moment to unite European and U.S. allies behind a last effort to find a diplomatic solution: the Rambouillet negotiations.

During these negotiations, crucial parts of the political proposals and the prospect of the deployment in Kosovo of an international military implementation force—with NATO at its core—remained unacceptable for Belgrade. After the Albanian delegation unilaterally signed the Rambouillet texts and with the aim to force the Serbian delegation to do the same, NATO started a bombing campaign against the FRY that lasted from 24 March until 10 June 1999. Yugoslav and Serbian forces, paramilitaries, and criminal groups committed war crimes and organized a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which overwhelmed neighboring Macedonia and Albania. Actually, two simultaneous military confrontations took place: a continued armed conflict between Yugoslav army, Serbian police, and paramilitaries on one hand, and KLA on the other hand; a war between NATO and Yugoslav/Serbian forces.

One could claim the first armed conflict has never been officially terminated (no cease-fire). The second war had been concluded by the Kumanovo agreement on the withdrawal of FRY forces and authorities and start of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) rule in Kosovo. After the changes in Belgrade and following the cooperation with NATO in South Serbia, Belgrade politicians are considering whether to join NATO's Partnership for Peace Program.

Conflict Dynamics

After intense negotiations between the representatives of the United States, the European Union, and Russia, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, setting out the guidelines for the international community's response to the postwar situation in Kosovo. UNSC 1244 endorsed an interim administration in Kosovo that established its internal structure along four pillars: humanitarian affairs (UNHCR), civil administration (UNMIK), democratization and institution building (OSCE), and economic development (EU). UNSC 1244 also mandated the international security presence (KFOR) with the responsibility for establishing a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and the international organizations working in Kosovo and for providing appropriate control of the borders/boundaries of Kosovo. One of the points from UNSC 1244 that aroused a lot of comments was the combined commitment to "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo" together with "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY."

After the summer of 1999, Kosovo was characterized by a high level of crime and aggression against the non-Albanian population, primarily Serbs. As a result, the remaining Serb population in Kosovo is now living in isolated enclaves in the north of Kosovo and in Mitrovica.

While in the beginning the violence was perceived as isolated attacks by individuals looking for revenge, UNHCR and OSCE judged in February 2001 that the pattern of violence had changed, that attacks became more highly organized, coordinated, and carefully targeted than was previously the case. The violence includes unlawful occupation of minority-owned properties and so-called strategic sales. This can be defined as a practice whereby the minority owners of property located within strategically important areas are induced to sell their property, as part of what appears to be an organized campaign. This inducement to sell may be linked to threats of or actual violence. In the area of Kosovo Polje/Fushe Kosove, numerous cases have been documented by OSCE. In Mitrovica, property disputes involve both Serb and Albanian people unable to regain their property in the other part of the town.

In spite of the presence of 37,000 armed soldiers, international governmental organizations seemed unable or insufficiently prepared to stop ethnically motivated violence and organized crime, which has shaken the confidence of the minority groups and has created frustration and confusion among the common Albanian population. While international political leaders increasingly blamed Kosovar Albanians for the ongoing climate of insecurity, they couldn't manage to establish the mechanisms of security, i.e., an effective police and justice system, which they were bound to do under the UN mandate. While pointing at the culture of silence of locals in relation to crime, UNMIK too often did not include local capacities in combatting crime.

The highly deficient judiciary stems from a lack of international judges and independent local judges who cannot be pressured, lack of well-guarded prison facilities, and lack of uniform penal legislation. Since the UN inter-
national police were not very effective in combatting crime, one can claim that an international police force would be more effective if set up by a regional organization such as OSCE or EU. In so doing, police would be recruited from a smaller number of countries, while today they are brought in from all over the world, with widely varying cultural backgrounds and professional skills. Giving more responsibility to the local police force, trained at the Kosovo Police School in Vucitrn/Vushtri, in investigation and other police work could also contribute to a better security situation.

On 21 June 1999, NATO and KLA signed an agreement on the demilitarization of KLA, but it is widely believed that a big share of the weaponry has not been handed over to KFOR. A number of KLA individuals were incorporated into a civilian agency for emergency help and reconstruction, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). Despite objection from KFOR and other representatives of the international community, leading figures within KPC seemed to perceive this protection corps as the foundation of a future army of an independent Kosovo.

The main political factors on the Kosovo-Albanian side are Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo, Hashim Tahçi and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (the main political party emerging from the KLA), and Ramush Haradinaj (former KLA commander now heading the Alliance for a Better Future of Kosova). All parties strongly advocate international recognition of an independent Kosovo, with international rule as an intermediate phase. In the weeks and months leading up to the Kosovo local elections on 28 October 2000, violent attacks or threats against journalists and political activists, mainly from LDK, took place. Leading Kosovo-Albanian opinion makers such as Veton Surroi clearly spoke out against the violence, including the violence against minority groups.

On the Serbian side, the Serb National Council in Gracanica, under the leadership of Bishop Artemije (and until end of 2000, also Father Sava Janjic), was challenged by Serb politicians from Mitrovica headed by Oliver Ivanovic. While the Gracanica-Serbs were generally more favorable to cooperation with UNMIK in order to achieve their aims of return of Serb refugees and protection of Serb civilians and cultural monuments, the lack of progress on these matters became an obstacle for the Mitrovica-Serbs to fully cooperate with UNMIK structures. Ivanovic recently lost his influence to Momcilo Trajkovic, FRY President Kostunica's representative in Kosovo, and Marko Jaksic, his representative in Mitrovica. At the beginning of July 2001, Nebojsa Covic, who successfully mediated in the crisis in southern Serbia, was appointed head of the Serbian government coordination team for Kosovo. Father Sava Janjic was one of the very few Kosovo Serb opinion makers admitting mistakes and past crimes against Albanians while appealing for tolerance and protection for Serbs in Kosovo.

The divided city of Mitrovica remains a focal point for renewed tensions and conflict. After a high number of atrocities committed during the war, Albanians moved to a large extent to the south, while Serbs—also from other parts of Kosovo—moved to the north of the city, which is north of the Ibar River. So-called bridge watchers and remnants of the security forces of Serbia increased tensions toward Albanians trying to visit relatives in the north. Albanians are claiming that KFOR policy contributed to the division of the city, while the international community is stressing that security and the people's right to return to the original place where they lived remain its first preoccupation.

The electoral defeat of Slobodan Milosevic and the inauguration of Voijislav Kostunica as new FRY president have had a major impact on developments in Kosovo. As long as Kosovar Albanians are still imprisoned in Serbia (while hundreds of Serbs, Albanians, and others are also still missing), Kosovo-Albanian political leaders remain very reluctant toward a dialogue with Belgrade. At the same time, the international community has become engaged in active partnership with the new Belgrade, discussing all issues, including Kosovo.

The crisis in southern Serbia and the support coming from Kosovo for the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda, and Bujanovac (UCPMB) brought the European Union even closer to Belgrade's concerns. NATO mediated a cease-fire between Yugoslav and Serbian forces on the one hand and armed Albanians on the other, leaving space for a political agenda on eliminating the discrimination of local Albanians in southern Serb society. NATO gave the green light for Yugoslav forces to return to the Ground Safety Zone around Kosovo. Hundreds of UCPMB fighters welcomed the deal to leave for Kosovo and escape persecution in Serbia.

The origins of the crisis in Macedonia are complex. Addressing the concerns and fears of both Macedonians and Albanians will probably be a long process at both the political level and within the society. A link to the Kosovo question could be found in the connections between the National Liberation Army (NLA; UCK in Macedonia), underground circles in Kosovo, and the Albanian diaspora operating from Zurich and Pristina. Some Albanians from Macedonia joined UCK in Kosovo during 1998–1999. After the war they felt no longer welcome or safe in Macedonia and stayed in Kosovo. Some of them returned to Macedonia to join NLA, since integration in Kosovar society didn't succeed as hoped.

Official Conflict Management

Important official conflict management initiatives within Kosovo are related to the efforts to include leading Albanian and Serbian politicians in governing Kosovo. In order to fulfil the UNMIK mandate to develop "provisional democratic self-government institutions," Dr. Bernard Koushner, special representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), created the Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC). The weekly KTC meetings have consultative and advisory functions, hoping to bring about a process of dialogue and peacemaking among the political leadership of Kosovo.

On 15 December 1999, UNMIK established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), a body involving representatives of a broad cross section of Kosovar society. From this body evolved the Joint Interim Administrative Council, which functions as an executive body. Twenty departments or ministries have been established, each of which is controlled by two heads, one international and one local. The creation of these structures were accompanied by the dissolution of all parallel structures, including the Kosovo Provisional Government headed by Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi and Ibrahim Rugova's function as president of the Republic of Kosovo.

Frustration among local populations about the constraints on self-rule indicated a need for much greater involvement and responsibility of Kosovars at all levels of governance. SRSG Koushner judged that a first step would be local elections on 28 October 2000, as a means for Kosovo to improve its democratic credentials. The campaign of Albanian political parties focused more on mechanisms to implement independence than on the local issues of how to run a community. UNMIK tried to preempt postelection violence with a visit from U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke, who persuaded the five largest political parties to sign a joint statement agreeing to recognize the ballot results. LDK gained a convincing victory following voter dissatisfaction with the "revolutionary behavior" of the ex-KLA leadership, who had forcibly gained political and economical advantages after the war. However, Albanian parties saw these elections more as a warm-up exercise for the real "battle": parliamentary elections in November 2001.

A particular form of official conflict management had to do with Yugoslav and Serbian elections on 24 September and 23 December 2000. While the international community agreed that Kosovo is part of FRY, it was not eager to organize the September elections in Kosovo, since it had no confidence at all that the Yugoslav presidential and parliamentary elections would be free and fair. Moreover, any direct involvement of UNMIK in these elections could considerably increase tensions with the Albanian majority population. Finally, they decided not to object if the Yugoslav state were to organize the elections in the Serbian parts of Kosovo, but outside of official buildings. With the Democratic Opposition of Serbia ready to defeat Milosevic also on the republican level on 23 December 2000, UNMIK decided to facilitate Kosovo Serbs participating in these elections, while the Serbian election commission dropped all Albanians from the voters list.

Despite UNMIK's aim to hand over policy and management responsibilities to both Albanian and Serbian politicians in Kosovo, there has been considerable criticism of the approach of the international community in Kosovo. After the war, international officials took over almost all official Yugoslav positions of authority, leaving local Albanian or local Serb expertise aside in developing legislation, managing institutions, and analyzing problems. The local co-heads in UNMIK departments have very little policy influence and often no access to all documents. Also, after the local elections of 28 October 2000, international administrators kept crucial competences. There are growing demands for accountability for internationals governing Kosovo, demands stemming from Kosovar political parties, elected representatives, and the UN ombudsperson, Marek Antoni Nowicki.

A particular form of official conflict management has to do with the question of ongoing displacement of minority populations. The primary motivation for such emigration is fear for physical security as well as restrictions on freedom of movement and limited access to basic services and employment prospects. The UNHCR has worked on promoting the creation of conditions conducive for refugee return. With representatives of the Kosovo Serbs, they reached a consensus on a "Framework for Return 2001," the basic principles upon which to base further activities linked to the potential return of Kosovo Serbs. The UNHCR has embarked on a series of consultations with prominent Kosovo Albanians to solicit their views on how to proceed. Roma, Ashkaelia, and Egyptian communities also faced displacement. As a result of the Humanitarian Round Tables with representatives of these three communities, UNHCR negotiated a Platform of Joint Action (April 2000), which initiated direct talks with officials of the JIAS, including Kosovo-Albanian politicians and intellectuals. While Kosovo Albanians have returned to the province in huge numbers, the question of Kosovo Albanians returning to locations where they constitute a numerical minority, such as the towns of Mitrovica and Strpce, still demands special attention.

As part of a larger anticrime effort aimed a taking out of circulation the huge quantity of weaponry, which remained in Kosovo nearly two years after the conflict, UNMIK launched a weapons amnesty campaign between 1 May and 3 June 2001. KFOR continues to forcibly confiscate weapons and weapon depots.

Since the international community in Kosovo is no longer a mediator but an active player in the field, with its own interests to have its mission accomplished without casualties, it becomes clear that official conflict management is developing along three lines: (1) between the international community itself and the local population, (2) between local Albanians and Serbs, and (3) between the Albanian representatives and Belgrade, who are not yet at the beginning of any meaningful dialogue.

On 17 November 2001 members of all of Kosovo's communities voted for a new Kosovo Assembly, bringing to an end the ten-year-old separated, parallel political systems Albanians and Serbs were entrenched in. The OSCE mission in Kosovo has delivered upon its commitment to provide safe and convenient access to the electoral process to all voters and communities.

Rugova's LDK gained 46 percent of the votes, Thaci's PDK got 25 percent, AAK got 8 percent, and Coalition Return 11 percent. Since none of the parties got a majority in the 120-seat Assembly, a coalition government is unavoidable. The new transitional Kosovo authorities will be responsible for most policy areas, while SRSG remains the guarantor for respect for the UNSC 1244 provisions and the overall security policy. However, many political analysts expect growing tensions between UNMIK and the Kosovo institutions over the issue of the final status of Kosovo. The parties in the governing coalition will be challenged to deliver progress in the fields of economic recovery, establishing a social and health security system, improving education standards, and diminishing poverty. This challenge will be all the more pressing with new municipal elections ahead for the end of 2002.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Semiofficial Dialogue
During a long-standing conflict or under new political circumstances, NGOs can play a distinctive role by bringing together key political players in a neutral and informal atmosphere.

The Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) of Princeton University in the United States organized Serb-Albanian semiofficial roundtable discussions in 1997. In December 2000, in Skopje, PER organized a significant conference—"Albanians as Majorities and Minorities: A Regional Dialogue"—that became the first face-to-face meeting between the Kosovo-Albanian leadership and members of the new government in Belgrade. Belgrade authorities reiterated Kostunica's offer to meet Rugova to discuss the situation in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians indicated it was too early for that, referring to the general elections after which the new Kosovar institutions would have a full mandate to conduct talks with Belgrade and all actors. Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb leaders agreed that full protection of the rights of minorities in Kosovo must be provided.

Based upon a detailed proposal, the rights of Serbs were the topic of an in-depth discussion in Prishtina on 21 December 2000, organized by the Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives (KACI). KACI's proposal was exceptionally concrete in describing rights for minority groups in the fields of language, parliamentary representation, administration and judiciary, culture, and religion.

The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) brought together all relevant Kosovo-Albanian and Serb political and community leaders in July 2000 at Airly, Virginia. They adopted a "Pact Against Violence" covering such subjects as elections, media, civil society, security, refugee return, and areas for priority attention for the international community. In March 2001, USIP brought together Kosovo's newly elected mayors, deputy mayors, and municipal assembly members, calling for the adoption of a legal framework for Kosovo-wide institutions and establishment of an independent ombudsman.

From 1995 until 1999, Pax Christi Flanders and The Netherlands facilitated a dialogue program between Serbian and Albanian political parties, NGOs, and student associations involving representatives from twenty organizations. Meetings on points of common interest between the two groups, visits to Belgrade and Prishtina by people from the other community, and an exploration and comparison with the political process in Northern Ireland were the main elements of the program. After the war, the cooperation with Northern Ireland continued, this time with the different communities from Kosovo.

Local Civil Society in Kosovo
Efforts to stabilize and improve life in Kosovo will have to focus on different types of associations, broader than the classical NGOs, including human-rights groups, humanitarian organizations, women's and youth organizations, educational and cultural organizations, professional associations and unions, and minority-rights associations, among others. As was the case in other areas of the former Yugoslavia, civil-society organizations (CSOs) mushroomed in the wake of the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1989. After the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy, organizations and networks in the fields of human rights, health, education, and rights for women, youth, and students were established. This parallel, well-organized infrastructure facilitated basic community services and advocated the interests of the Albanian population. They also provided unity and discipline, which were crucial under the conditions of repression. However, structures that served well during this time of repression are not necessarily well suited to a new situation of institution building, democratization, and developing pluralism.

Also in the 1990s, several NGOs emerged calling for peace and tolerance among Kosovars and between Albanians and Serbs. Nansen Group, Post-Pessimists, Albanian Youth Action Pjeter Bogdani, and others facilitated contacts among young people from the different communities. Their efforts, often with the support of international NGOs, were unable to influence the rising violence escalating to war. Today, while CSOs and individuals within the ethnic communities may discuss the need for tolerance, most Kosovars agree reconciliation on a wider scale must wait. Consequently, multiethnic CSOs are a rarity in Kosovo today. The realization of a large number of widely spread interethnic projects seems unrealistic in the short run. Civil-society building will have to take its starting point in the separate communities, and then see what local civil-society networks can gradually build upon to stimulate and support community building around Kosovo to ease tensions between members of different ethnic communities.

The collapse of the former Yugoslav federation, ten years of isolation in Kosovo, the war, and the return of groups of Kosovar refugees are heavily affecting social and economical life in today's Kosovo. The erosion of the middle class, serving in their functions as teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants, et al., has been evident since the conflict. The middle class, as one of the main carriers of a democratic society, realizes very few options for active involvement in the improvement of social and economic life. The need for defining a much wider understanding of CSOs beyond the role of classical nonprofit NGOs will be crucial for these forces to be mobilized. Nearly half of the NGOs started since 1998, and many only first constituted themselves after registration at UNMIK began in mid-December 1999.

From an almost uncountable number of CSOs, we would like to give the following short overview of local CSOs.

Organizations assisting the NGO sector. The Kosovo Foundation for Open Society is an active link to the Soros Network that supports local civil-society initiatives, including cultural groups and media. The Kosovo Civil Society Foundation primarily concentrates on information and data collection, capacity building of local NGOs, and civil education programs. The Association for Democratic Initiatives is dealing with NGO development, media, and youth centers. Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives organizes cultural and educational programs, round tables, and, as an independent policy think tank, monitored local elections on 28 October 2000.

Human-rights organizations. During the last ten years, the Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms has been one of the major sources on human-rights violations in Kosovo. After the war, the organization is carefully developing new skills and awareness of minority questions. The Kosovo Helsinki Committee is a branch of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights in Vienna. The Humanitarian Law Fund from Belgrade has also an office in Prishtina.

Humanitarian aid associations. The Mother Theresa Association was the main institution in the parallel health system. Up to the time of this writing, it cooperates with international humanitarian organizations. Also the Red Cross of Kosovo and a number of recently founded local humanitarian associations are also active. In north Mitrovica and in the Serbian enclaves, the Yugoslav Red Cross are continuing to work.

Women's organizations. The Centre for the Protection of Women and Children is the main organization for women's concerns, implementing health programs, legal and psychological counseling, and assisting refugees. Kosovo Women Initiative is working with people form different ethnic backgrounds. Also, the Kosova Albanian Women's League and several newly established organizations are active.

Youth and student organizations. The Independent Students Union of the University of Prishtina played a major political role prior to the war. Also, the Post-Pessimists, Albanian Youth Action Pjeter Bogdani, Hapi i Ri and Youth of Prizren, Millennium in Kamenica, and numerous other youth organizations are active throughout Kosovo. Kosovo Initiative for Democratic Society is the Prishtina branch of the Nansen network. The Forum in Prishtina has emerged as a strong actor in the fields of media (magazines and TV programs), NGO-training and computer courses, monitoring election campaigns, and initiating protests against domestic violence. The Forum initiated the Kosovo-wide "Boll Ma!" campaign.

Educational and cultural associations. Since 1994, the Association for Unity and Diversification Against Separation Mitrovica is working on civic culture and education in the city of Mitrovica. It is in charge of a local radio station and is conducting regular public debates. The Kosovo Education Centre, linked to the faculty of philosophy in Prishtina, develops activities that also include non-Albanian schools.

Professional associations and unions. The Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, established in 1990, is currently reshaping its programs and approach in close cooperation with international trade-union organizations. A future effort at labor legislation, to be issued by UNMIK, is at the core of the discussion.

Minority-rights associations. There are a considerable number of minority-rights groups emerging at different locations in Kosovo. Given the security problems, their activities are quite limited. Turks and Bosniaks gather in Prizren. Roma groups are now divided into Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians. In Pristina, the Civic House and Radio Contact are strong (although threatened) promoters of ethnic tolerance.
The OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Democratization, established a number of NGO field offices to encourage local civil society. With a shrinking OSCE presence in Kosovo, these field offices are now being handed over to the local communities.
In 2000 and 2001 the Kosovo Civil Society Foundation did research on the actual needs of local CSOs and came up with the following recommendations. There is continued need for skills and management training of CSO activists and organizations staff. This training has to happen at the local level, by local trainers, through Kosovar civil-society organizations.
Part of the relevance of CSOs in Kosovo rests on their ability to address pressing issues of society through the formation of strong equal partnerships with international NGOs. At the community level, outside of the major cities, it can be difficult to establish such partnerships. Moreover, a growing number of international NGOs are leaving Kosovo without keeping resources for the locals to take over.
Given the enormous problems of social and economical development, including the integration of young people, there is a need to build local social and economical expertise to develop employment opportunities. The mobilization of professional networks and associations will become more relevant.
The development of policy-oriented NGOs or independent think tanks is of critical importance for civil society to realize its potential in bringing about an accountable and transparent governance in Kosovo. To date, this domain has been left to international organizations or institutions. Local policy-oriented NGOs or independent think tanks such as KACI can play an active role in the sensibilization of politicians and public opinion in terms of the issues involved in the Stability Pact and the perspective of European integration, rather than in terms of conflict scenarios.

International NGOs in Kosovo
The presence and activities of the big international NGOs in Kosovo cause mixed reactions. While they have realized a quick recovery from war damages in the fields of infrastructure, shelter, and humanitarian needs, many Kosovars fear their presence will have a significant negative impact on the development of civil participation and Kosovar self-reliance. Sometimes they tend to bring together people around running projects rather than around values. With their tremendous resources and comparatively high salaries for local staff, they might create new, unrealistic norms that will be hard to keep once international assistance shifts away from Kosovo. The salary policy of the international community in Kosovo might also distract qualified people from their local organizations or professions to fulfill a supportive or administrative role with the international organizations, supposedly trying to strengthen local civil society.

Moreover, and to ensure that international assistance does not feed into, exacerbate, or prolong the conflict, humanitarian and development agencies commissioned a report on what more they could do to minimize intercommunal violence or to promote interaction between communities in Kosovo. The report Do No Harm (20 November 2000) initiated lively debate among international workers in Kosovo about the so-called ghettoizing of minorities. One of the dilemmas indicated is: "Despite the best of intentions, providing special structures and assistance efforts to minorities may be counter-productive and potentially dangerous in the short term if it fuels or inflames pre-existing resentments, competition over scare resources, perceptions of bias, or anger among members of neighboring or surrounding communities. Special structures or assistance efforts may inadvertently become flashpoints."¹ Of course, this dilemma will rarely be sufficient grounds for discontinuing assistance programs for people in need. However, it does call for more creativity and heightened sensitivity to intercommunal dynamics in the areas where ethnic Albanians and minority groups intermingle or adjoin.

Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Initiatives
Next to reconstruction and humanitarian work, a number of international NGOs are specifically focusing on peacebuilding initiatives.

Following its eight-year-long activities in the region after the Kosovo war, the Balkan Peace Team (Germany/Netherlands) started an interethnic youth center in Dragash. It is now taken over by a consortium of NGOs including the forum Civil Peace Service (Germany).

Pax Christi (Flanders and the Netherlands) and the forum Civil Peace Service facilitate a peacebuilding program comparing and contrasting Kosovo and Northern Ireland, including Albanians, Serbs, and Bosniaks. Pax Christi is developing a yearly Kosovo Peace Week. Interchurch Peace Council (Netherlands) supports a community-building program in Mitrovica.

United Methodist Committee on Relief is developing numerous peace initiatives, including radio stations, multicultural sports festivals and drama classes, a newsletter with Serb and Albanian input, etc. Activities take place in Gjilane and Mitrovica.

The International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Service (CRS), and American Refugee Council are developing peacebuilding programs in the areas where they have also deployed their humanitarian programs. CRS is working with Parent and Youth councils, regional Justice and Peace commissions, and different training courses. CRS also encourages interreligious dialogue in Kosovo.

Partners for Democratic Change established a Kosovar branch, focusing on community mediation for family and social disputes, building democracy at the local level, and training on change and conflict management.

Bol Ma! (Albanian for "Enough"), a broad campaign initiated by The Forum against domestic violence, was started from within the Kosovo-Albanian society in May 2001. It is a public-awareness campaign with the aim to initiate a public debate about all kinds of violence and to increase cooperation between local populations and police forces in combatting crime. Given the massive response from Kosovar youth and the activities in most cities and in a growing number of villages, Bol Ma! can be considered the first Kosovo-wide and postwar Albanian initiative for nonviolence and change of public atmosphere in Kosovo. Although not active in non-Albanian areas, this campaign is of critical importance since it provokes an inter-Albanian reflection and dialogue on responsibility for violence.

Prospects

The prospect of a functioning Kosovar assembly and executive branch has put new emphasis on the question of the status of Kosovo. Blocked between the determination of the Albanian population not to accept Belgrade's rule over Kosovo and UNSC 1244 reaffirming the territorial integrity of the FRY, former SRSG Koushner expressed his belief that to try to define Kosovo's final status could create more problems that it solves. Therefore, the extension of the actual provisional status formed the basis of the discussions on the legal framework, enabling the holding of Kosovo-wide parliamentary elections on 17 November 2001. These elections will take place according to an electoral system of proportional representation and with the requirement that all parties should have a list with one-third of the candidates being women.

After months of debates, the new SRSG, Hans Haekkerup, signed the "Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government" on 15 May 2001. Kosovars voted for a national assembly with 120 seats. Ten of those are reserved for Serbs and ten for Kosovo's other minorities. The assembly will elect a Kosovar president. He in turn will nominate a prime minister who will form a government. Two ministerial posts must be reserved for a representative of the Kosovo Serbs and one other minority group. Kosovo's government will then begin to run the province.

Significantly, UNMIK will still be responsible for justice, law and order, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. SRSG Haekkerup will be able to veto anything that he considers to be in contradiction with UNSC 1244.

Kosovo-Albanian leaders wanted the constitutional framework to contain a clause promising a referendum on independence. Not only did they not get it, but also the "provisional" arrangements have no time limit. The Rambouillet texts that the Kosovar-Albanian delegation signed in March 1999 stipulated that the interim government for Kosovo would have lasted for three years before the question of the final status would be addressed. Now that is no longer the case. This is now put off until "an appropriate future stage," as Haekkerup put it.

Hashim Thaci, head of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, stated that the constitutional framework "holds hostage the issue of independence." Also, Ibrahim Rugova and Ramush Haradinaj, the other two main Albanian leaders, disapproved the lack of a referendum on the provision. However, none of them boycotted the elections, since they consider the "Constitutional Framework" as a document enabling holding the general elections, after which the new parliament would start debating the issue of a real constitution and the final status of Kosovo. However, Kosovar publicist Veton Surroi advocates focusing on Kosovo's development as a functioning and civic state rather than on its international recognition. The self-rule period could be used to build the institutions, go through a process of internal consolidation, establish rule of law, and in this way prepare for eventual statehood.

Prior to the signing of the "Constitutional Framework," Haekkerup met FRY president Kostunica several times. However, Kosovo Serb leadership failed to include a veto mechanism into the text. Haekkerup reaffirmed UNMIK's guarantees for equal rights of different communities. He stated that a veto right for the Serb community would result in a complete stalemate in the work of the assembly. On 5 November 2001, UNMIK and FRY authorities reached an agreement on concrete measures to improve living conditions for Kosovo Serbs. Consequently, Belgrade called Kosovo Serbs to vote for "Coalition Return," the Kosovo-Serb entity to be represented in the Kosovo Assembly.

While it is reasonable to expect that Belgrade will not return to Kosovo in a ruling capacity, it is also obvious the international recognition of Kosovo as an independent state is not on the agenda in the foreseeable future. The extent to which this protracted transitional status succeeds in generating economic wealth and progress will determine its chances of success, along with continued participation of the major political actors. Since the "Constitutional Framework" will be the law until "an appropriate future stage," local Albanians and Serbs will be challenged to try to find a modus vivendi for living next to each other. If they fail, they might face a conflict without end.

However, future developments will also be influenced by the outcome of debate on reshaping relations between Serbia and Montenegro, in particular following the transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague. If Montenegro would become an independent state or an internationally recognized subject within a Serb-Montenegrin confederation, the present "provisional" status of Kosovo might become even more tenuous.

Nebojsa Covic, head of the Serbian government coordination team for Kosovo, advocates the creation of an Albanian and Serbian entity within Kosovo, following the Bosnia and Herzegovina principle. With Kosovo remaining one single unit under UN patronage, the Albanian entity would be protected by international forces and the Kosovo Protection Corps, while the Serbian entity would be protected by FRY security forces. He considers it a move to gain ten years of peace necessary for economic recovery and state consolidation in Serbia, ahead of the inclusion of Southeast Europe into the EU. International officials reject any idea that might lead to a possible division of Kosovo.

Recommendations

In its report After Milosevic (26 April 2001) the International Crisis Group (ICG) proposed that the international community facilitate an orderly process that can produce a final political settlement. In order to move the present situation forward, the report mentions the "possibility of negative guarantees" being given to the Kosovo Albanians. Under these guarantees, the Kosovo Albanians would never again be subjected to the uninvited presence of Serb military or police personnel, since it might be easier to reach agreement about how things will not be done than how they will be done. ICG notes that the option of a loose association between independent sovereign states, in which members would cooperate as much as they perceived to be in their common interest, might be a type of relationship that could serve as a model for Kosovo's or Montenegro's relation to Serbia.

ICG supports the International Independent Commission on Kosovo, headed by Richard Goldstone, in its proposal for "conditional independence." Based upon an agreement between the international community, the Albanian majority, and the minorities, Kosovo would become self-governing outside the FRY but within an international framework. The international community would take responsibility for protection of minorities and would also integrate Kosovo into a more effective stability pact.

In any case, long-term international involvement in Kosovo seems to be inevitable financially, security-wise, and politically. In order to avoid a situation in which "coercive diplomacy" toward almost all partners in the region becomes necessary, local ownership of political developments is needed. The prospect of European integration for Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro, with open noncriminal borders, might eventually give perspective.
Other recommendations include:

• Additional resources and training should be provided to the Kosovo police service to allow it to take primary police responsibilities in Kosovo by 2002.
  
• Vigorous investigation and prompt action should be taken against members of the Kosovo Protection Corps found to engage in improper activities.
  
• UNHCR and OSCE should continue its efforts to facilitate dialogue at local and provincial levels on the position of local Serbs, Roma, and Ashkaeli.
  
• UNMIK should increase its efforts to establish a functioning judicial system by deploying more foreign judicial personnel, increasing the salary of local judges, devoting more resources to local judicial personnel and infrastructure, and introducing European criminal and civil law codes. Also, salaries of members of the Kosovo Police School could be increased.
  
• In order to contribute to a process of recognizing and reconciling, a Balkan-wide regional truth and reconciliation commission could be established.

Miscellaneous

1. Gregg Hansen, "Minorities Alliance Working Group, Kosovo," paper published by the Do No Harm Project, 2000.

Service Information

REPORTS:	ICRC, Book of Missing Persons in Kosovo, 2nd edition, 11 April 2001. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, Oxford University Press, 2000. Independent International Commission on Kosovo in cooperation with the Olof Palme International Center and Global Reporting, The Follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why Conditional Independence? Solna, 2001. International Crisis Group, After Milosevic. A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace, ICG Balkans Report 108, Prishtina/Brussels, 26 April 2001. Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, ICG Balkans Report 123. Kosovo Report Card, ICG Balkans Report 100, Prishtina/Brussels, 28 August 2000. IWPR, Kosovars Forge Democracy, by Shkëlzen Maliqi, IWPR's Balkan Crisis Report No. 190, 27 October 2000. Albanian Extremists Pose Regional Threat, by Shkëlzen Maliqi, IWPR's Balkan Crisis Report No. 224, 7 March 2001. OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova as Seen as Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999, ODIHR, Warsaw, 1999. OSCE and UNHCR, Report on Kosovo Minorities: Anyone Can Become a Victim, 3 April 2001. The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Kosovo/a Independent? Perhaps, but What Matters Is How, TFF Press Info 106, 4 December 2000.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Civil Resistance in Kosovo, by Howard Clark. London, Pluto Press, 2000. Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention, by Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds). Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2000. Kosovo: An Unfinished Peace, by William G. O'Neill. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. "Self-Determination in Kosovo Will Take Much Determination," by Steven Erlanger. New York Times, 1 February 2001. Winning Ugly—NATO's War to Save Kosovo, by Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.aimpress.org (AIM Press Agency) www.albanian.com (Albanian Daily News) www.alb-net.com (Kosova Crisis Center) www.b92.net (B-92 news station) www.civpol.org/unmik (United Nations International Police in Kosovo) www.crisisweb.org (International Crisis Group) www.egroups.com/group/balkanhr/fullinfo.html (The Balkan Human Rights List) www.euinkosovo.org (European Union's Commitment to Kosovo) www.greekhelsinki.gr (Balkan Human Rights Pages) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) www.kforonline.com (KFOR Online) www.kosova-info-line.de/APP (Association of Political Prisoners) www.un.org/peace/kosovo (United Nations Mission in Kosovo UNMIK) www.voiceofroma.org (Voice of Roma)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Yll Bajraktari, The Forum, e-mail: ylli@ipko.org Sally Broughton, Search for Common Ground in Macedonia, e-mail: sallyb@sfcg.org.mk Mient Jan Faber, Interchurch Peace Council, The Hague, e-mail: mjfaber@ikv.nl Alan Frisk, Catholic Relief Services, Kosovo, e-mail: alan_kosovo@hotmail.com Lulzim Peci, Kosovo Civil Society Foundation, e-mail: lulpeci@yahoo.com Arben Qirezi, independent political commentator, Prishtina, e-mail: arbale@yahoo.com
ORGANIZATIONS:	In Kosovo Humanitarian Law Center Tel.: +381 38 528 270 / +381 63 210 534 E-mail: kkosovar@Eunet.yu Kosovo Civil Society Foundation Tel.: +381 38 43.904 / +377 44 141.993 E-mail: lulpeci@yahoo.com Kosovo Initiative for Democratic Society Nansen Dialogue Center Tel.: +381 38 24 650 E-mail: kids_pri@hotmail.com www.nansen-dialog.net NGO and Radio Mitrovica Tel.: +381 28 29 905 / +377 44 146233 E-mail: r_Mitrovica@yahoo.com International Catholic Relief Service, CRS Justice and Peace Program Tel.: +377 44 500 695 Forum Civil Peace Service Tel.: +49 228 981 4515 / +377 44 130 773 E-mail: forumZFD@t-online.de Partners for Democratic Change Center on Change and Conflict Management in Kosovo E-mail: lshammond@hotmail.com / pdci@ix.netcom.com www.partners-intl.org Project on Ethnic Relations (PER) Voice of Roma www.voiceofroma.org United Methodist Committee on Relief Tel.: +381 38 549 187 Fax: +381 38 549 189 E-mail: umcor@gbgm-umc.org http://gbgm-umc.org/umcor DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: The Forum; Kosova Action for Civic Initiatives (KACI)

About the author

Franklin de Vrieze has been following developments in Kosovo on a professional basis since 1992. He facilitated a five-year dialogue project between Albanian and Serbian political parties and NGOs on behalf of Pax Christi. He is currently working for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.