Author	Bram Posthumus
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

Mozambique was among five Portuguese African colonies that successfully waged a guerrilla war in pursuit of independence. In Mozambique the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) was in the forefront of the struggle which began in 1964 and ended when the colonial government in Lisbon was overthrown by the Portuguese military in 1974. One year later, independence was declared. Under the presidency of Samora Machel and as a result of Soviet influence, the country adopted a Marxist-Leninist course, although it was combined with an economic model that mixed free markets with state control.
Mozambique's independence gave rise to considerable unease in the two remaining white minority governments in the region, Rhodesia and South Africa. Particularly worrying for the Rhodesians was Machel's support of the armed wing of the Zimbabwean liberation movement led by Robert Mugabe. In response Rhodesia worked out a strategy with two objectives: destabilising the new Mozambican government and disrupting the actions of the Zimbabweans. The chosen instrument was the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR), brainchild of Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation.
This strategy was a partial success. It did not prevent Zimbabwean independence in 1980, but succeeded in disrupting the development of Mozambique. The MNR was peopled by Portuguese and African soldiers of the old colonial army, ex-Frelimo fighters who had become disappointed by the authoritarian style the liberators had adopted, and mercenaries. It changed its name to the Portuguese-sounding acronym Renamo early in the 1980s and established itself in the Ndau-speaking central region of the country. At the outset, Renamo had no political agenda of its own: this was determined at first in Salisbury and then in Pretoria. It is disputed whether Renamo developed any political programme of its own when it became more of a local force. Its leader Alphonso Dhlakama frequently employed phrases like 'democracy' and 'free market' to defend Renamo's actions. It appears that if there ever was a Renamo ideology, it consisted of a keen sense of the injustice inflicted upon it by a hostile government, as Claudio Mario Betti of Sant' Egidio (one of the principal NGO mediators) has argued.
On the other hand, Frelimo, the victorious liberation movement of the left, turned itself into a 'vanguard party' in 1977. It made itself deeply unpopular by declaring traditional rule and practices 'backward'. Frelimo's criticisms of the traditional chiefs, who were stripped of their traditional powers, gave Renamo an especially good opportunity to score political points. Frelimo's most unpopular move was 'Operation Production', which involved the forced migration of urban dwellers to rural areas and the creation of so-called 'communal villages', which split families and uprooted people. The situation eased when Frelimo moved away from this rigid application of Marxist-Leninism - but by then it had lost most of its goodwill among the rural and some of the urban population of the country.
Renamo found it easy to recruit new fighters, besides its regular practice of press-ganging young boys into its ranks. Beaten into a corner by Renamo's military success which it owed in no small measure to its South African backers, the government entered into negotiations with South Africa, which resulted in the 1984 Nkomati Peace Accord. Under the terms of the accord, Samora Machel expelled the ANC, which was operating from his country. For its part, South Africa was to stop supporting Renamo, which it did not do until 1988, two years after Machel's death in an air crash on South African territory. The new president, Joaquim Chissano, renewed negotiations with the South Africans, and this time the flow of aid to Renamo did come to a virtual stop. However, by this time Renamo could survive on its own and was able to strike virtually anywhere in the country.
In the late 1980s, Eastern Bloc support for Frelimo diminished. The Soviets withdrew, realising there was not much to be gained from heavy involvement in an African country they neither understood nor cared about and facing the imminent collapse of their political system at home. Frelimo initiated moves away from doctrinal Marxist-Leninism. At the same time, the changes towards democracy in South Africa and the removal of the Republicans from the US presidency helped to significantly decrease the destabilising tactics that South Africa had, until then, been able to employ with impunity - if not American approval - against its neighbours to the north.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War precipitated the end of all conflicts in the region, including the one in Mozambique. In addition, the devastating drought in the entire southern African region in 1991-92, which all but wiped out Mozambique's capacity to produce food made it physically more difficult to continue fighting. Finally, there was growing battle fatigue on both sides - fed by the growing realisation that neither side could win the war - and widespread exasperation among ordinary Mozambicans about the never-ending violence and brutality.
It was against this background that peace negotiations were initiated. They were mediated by several African governments, the British multinational Lonrho and the Roman Catholic Church. The negotiations continued for three years and resulted in the General Peace Accord, which was signed in Rome on October 7, 1992. In a massive operation that lasted from late 1992 until March 1995, the United Nations oversaw mass demobilisation and the first elections which returned most fighters to civilian life and Frelimo to power in Maputo, while Renamo did well in Central Mozambique.

Conflict Dynamics

One of the striking features of the dynamics of the Mozambican conflict is that, initially at least, they were not Mozambican at all. Renamo was a Rhodesian invention and without large-scale backing from the whites-only regimes in the region, it is doubtful whether the war would have continued as long as it did. The objective of this support was always twofold: destabilisation and retaliation for Mozambican support for the armed liberation struggle in both countries. During most of the war MNR/Renamo behaved in the manner its founders and backers intended, waging a campaign of terror that earned it the nickname the 'Khmer Rouge of Africa'. Its most notorious act was perhaps the Homoine massacre, where its soldiers killed over 400 civilians.
Renamo set up an elaborate system of forced food provision through slave-labour in the areas it controlled. This, combined with raids on Frelimo areas and neighbouring countries (particularly Zimbabwe and Zambia) kept it alive and operational. It destroyed government installations, especially schools and hospitals, and subjected the rural population to acts of abhorrent cruelty, cutting off breasts, limbs, ears and lips. Rape was used as a weapon of war and was especially directed against women who had previously joined the Frelimo-linked Organisation of Mozambican Women. Renamo made extensive use of child soldiers, who were frequently forced to kill their own families. It managed to get local support, particularly in Central Mozambique because the leadership of the movement came from the region. It received support there and elsewhere also as a result of widespread resentment over Frelimo's arrogance and misguided rural settlement policies.
On the other side, the Mozambican Armed Forces, are known to have committed human rights abuses against the same rural population, albeit not on the scale and with the systematic ruthlessness of Renamo.
The rural population, thoroughly traumatised by the ongoing atrocities and violence, left the countryside in large numbers, swelling the cities. A second preferred area was the Beira-corridor from Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port city of Beira, where tens of thousands found refuge in enormous camps that stretched for miles on either side of the roads and railways that were guarded by the Zimbabwean Army. The Zimbabweans have played a critical role in guarding this economically vital corridor and assisting the Mozambican army in their various offensives against Renamo, at considerable human and economic cost to themselves.
The war was a typical low-intensity conflict in line with the American concept of destabilisation that was also tried and tested in - among others - Nicaragua. It was a guerrilla bush war par excellence, rendering large parts of Mozambique ungovernable and unsafe. All facilities that had been installed since independence, especially local clinics and schools, were destroyed and their personnel murdered. Renamo also destroyed bridges, and roads, sabotaged power and telephone lines and railways. Some estimates place the costs of damage as high US$ 3.5 billion.
Perhaps the most lasting effect of this destabilisation campaign has been the effect on the mostly rural population: the strategy of making people utterly insecure in their own villages has worked very well and people still remain in the towns, unwilling to go back into the bush. An additional problem has been created by the fact that both sides have littered the countryside with landmines, making agriculture a hazardous occupation.

Official Conflict Management

The General Peace Agreement, which was signed in Rome on October 4, 1992, was remarkably comprehensive. It included provision for the formation of political parties; described how elections should be held; stipulated freedom of movement and freedom of the press; prepared the way for the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force - for which both Frelimo and Renamo would make troops available; and it made arrangements for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. A number of important state and non-state actors helped mediate in the process that brought about this Agreement. Others have moved in to help consolidate the peace.
The United Nations became involved when the General Peace Agreement had been signed. It was tasked with overseeing the transition from war to peace and its response was comprehensive. UNOMOZ (UN Operations in Mozambique) covered the demobilisation, encampment of ex-combatants, preparation for elections - including literally buying both parties, especially Renamo, into the political process -, mine clearance and humanitarian assistance. Despite serious scandals - including child abuse by some of its military personnel, the high cost (US$ one million per day) and the bureaucratic bungling for which the organisation was notorious, the UNOMOZ operation, which lasted from December 1992 until March 1995, more than twice as long as originally intended, was an overall success.
The reasons for this success and for the fact that the political will existed to provide extensive financial backing for UNOMOZ lie in the wider African context. After the disasters of Somalia and Angola, the UN badly needed an African success story. Mozambique provided the occasion, and a number of factors unique to Mozambique contributed to the successful outcome: the belligerents had lost their will to fight, there were no resources over which to fight (unlike in Angola) and the only resource that was abundantly available were the UN millions. Alternating displays of compliance and intransigence by both Renamo and Frelimo opened the UN purse at every turn; in this sense the Mozambican peace was bought. It was also clear that the political will to repeat this feat, for example in another Angolan initiative, did not exist. Mozambique was a one-off.
African governments have been involved in the war and the peace process in various ways. The governments of Zimbabwe and Tanzania provided crucial military and political support to Frelimo and Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe's personal mediation during negotiations leading up to the General Peace Agreement proved crucial. Zimbabwean troops provided important military backup to the Mozambican army, helping in offensive action and on at least one occasion overrunning Renamo's Gorongosa headquarters, in 1985. Documents seized on that occasion also proved continued South African support for Renamo, in spite of the Nkomati agreement with the Mozambican government.
Apartheid-South Africa, Malawi and Kenya backed Renamo politically and militarily. Support for Renamo by the immediate neighbours only diminished significantly after the rise to power of president F.W. de Klerk in South Africa and the signing of a 1986 agreement between the Mozambican and Malawian governments. In the earlier stages of the talks that finally led to the General Peace Agreement, the Kenyan government carved out a mediating role for itself with considerable success: the first direct talks between Frelimo and Renamo were held in Nairobi in August 1989. Kenyan influence declined when the Rome talks got under way.
Post-apartheid South Africa, Botswana and Zambia have mainly acted as facilitators, providing space for negotiations to take place. Mozambique and South Africa have now signed an agreement aimed at reducing the flow of arms between the two countries. To date, South Africa and Mozambique have jointly destroyed more than 1,000 tonnes of small arms and ammunition in Mozambique, the most spectacular - and worrying - find being a 900 tonnes cache that was destroyed in an action in the first months of 1999. South Africa also co-sponsored a UN resolution adopted in December 1998, which called for an international conference on the illicit arms trade. A date for the conference has yet to be fixed but it should take place within the next two years.
The Mozambican government's desire to end the destabilisation of its country led it into negotiations with apartheid-South Africa, resulting in the Nkomati agreement of 1984. Under the deal, South Africa would end its support of Renamo, while Mozambique would expel the ANC from its territory. This it duly did, while South Africa continued supporting Renamo. Under the new president Joaquim Chissano, the drive towards a peaceful solution to the conflict intensified.
One factor which has helped significantly in preventing even further prolonged bloodshed is the fact that in spite of vociferous lobbying by extreme right-wing Republicans and others, neither the Reagan nor the Bush administrations in the US gave overt aid to Renamo. An important factor in the maintenance of this policy was the report by R. Gersony, written for the US State department, which provided a damning indictment of Renamo's murderous tactics. It is difficult to say how much longer the war would have continued if the US had decided to step in on the side of Renamo in the same way as it has helped Unita in Angola. It needs to be added, though, that because of the Cold War psychology, which reigned supreme in Washington, apartheid-South Africa had considerable license to destabilise regimes which were, in the American view, too close to the Soviet union. Mozambique was one of them. The Italian government covered the cost of hosting the delegations during the Rome talks and provided Renamo with substantial amounts of money, to keep them on board in the peace process.
The Italian government is said to have spent up to US$ 20 million on keeping the peace process going. Frelimo was also kept on board; the Italians promised generous aid packages and assistance in the reconstruction of Mozambique's infrastructure.
The European Union announced in December 1997 that it had set aside US$ 160 million to facilitate the re-integration of former combatants into society in all southern African nations that had seen violent civil conflict. An assessment of the requirements of each country was to be started in 1998.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Researcher Carolyn Nordstrom of Berkley University in the United States carried out field work in Mozambique between 1988 and 1996 and found a remarkably resilient 'culture of peace', as she called it. Home-grown, informal, based on age-old practices of welcoming, healing, counselling and reintegration, Nordstrom found these groups all over the country and concludes that the persuasiveness of this particular culture of peace has been responsible for the durability of the peace process in Mozambique.
Civil society in Mozambique did not really come into its own until after the General Peace Agreement was in place and Frelimo had renounced its monopoly on all significant social and political activity. During the war, by far the most important internal player in the country in promoting a climate for peace talks, was the Roman Catholic Church. The Mozambican Christian Council, an ecumenical body worked hard to ensure the continuation of the peace talks, especially between 1990 and 1992. Both were heavily engaged in local peace building and community reconstruction, as were some international aid agencies. Traditional beliefs have also played a role, both in terms of individual healing and restoring faith in previously shattered communities.
With peace firmly in place and the one-party state removed from public life, space has become available for other non-state actors to play a role. This is certainly evident in the print media, where there has been a proliferation of newspapers and magazines. Although they cater for a limited, mostly urban, social group, these do include the policy-makers. Through them, the urban elite are kept in touch with events in rural Mozambique. There are human rights organisation in place, including the Liga Mozambicana de Derechos Humanos and the (anti-Frelimo) League for Human Rights (LDH), which deals with - among other things - continued police brutality. LINK is an umbrella NGO, grouping together a broad variety of Mozambican NGOs, which is currently engaged in civil education, incorporating non-violent methods of conflict resolution. LINK is supported by - among others - the Mennonite Central Committee from Canada.
The Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique, notably in the person of Bishop Jaime Gonçalves of Beira, acted as a mediator by maintaining contacts with Renamo. It began making public appeals for peace in 1983 and issued various pastoral letters, including one entitled The Peace that People Want. Overcoming initial government hostility, the Church gained wider recognition as direct negotiations finally got under way between Renamo and Frelimo and during the protracted talks in Rome, Bishop Gonçalves was present as an observer.
Churches remain active in the effort to persuade civilians to hand in weapons for destruction. The Council of Churches in Mozambique runs a programme entitled 'Transforming Arms into Hoes', of which the weapons destruction exercise is a part.

International
The Community of Sant' Egidio, the Italian-based assembly of lay Christian communities, mediated the first contacts between its old friend Bishop Gonçalves of Beira and Renamo, paving the way for mediation by the Mozambican Roman Catholic Church. Sant' Egidio opened up its own contacts with a hostile, anti-church Frelimo and a suspicious Renamo and finally managed to build up a relationship of trust with both sides. Discretion was the hallmark of Sant' Egidio and this has enabled it to keep communication open. Sant' Egidio went on to host all twelve rounds of talks that were held in Rome from July 1990 until the General Peace Agreement, October 7, 1994. The Community has been criticised for being too lenient towards both sides, but it has at least helped produce the peace desired by the majority. As Ibrahim Msabaha wrote in a comprehensive evaluation of the talks which appeared as a contribution entitled 'Negotiating an end to Mozambique's murderous rebellion' in Elusive Peace: 'Delay was the price of success...' And Sant' Egidio's Betti would add that in peace mediation one can only be sure of success if the process is actually owned by those who are involved in it: forced solutions, forced agreements do not work.
Special mention must be made of the international anti-apartheid movement, which has kept the Mozambique issue firmly on the international political agenda, through campaigns, lobbies and tangible support to Mozambique itself, even during the 1980s, when South Africa was engaging in its greatest destabilisation efforts. It is especially remarkable, given the prevailing political climate at the time in key countries such as the US, UK and Germany, whose governments effectively condoned South Africa's activities in the region.
As an endorsement of Mozambique's decision to pursue the path to a durable peace, the South African NGO ACCORD conferred its 1997 Africa Peace Award - a biannual event - on the nation of Mozambique. It was presented by a previous winner, Nelson Mandela, whose first official state visit as president of South Africa had, quite significantly, been to Mozambique.
A special position in the run-up to and during the negotiations was held by the British multinational company Lonrho and especially its flamboyant chairman, 'Tiny' Rowland. Lonrho had significant infrastructure and agricultural interests in Mozambique, including the vital oil pipeline from Beira to Zimbabwe. Initially, Lonrho paid Renamo to leave its assets alone, a strategy that was abandoned in the face of escalating violence. Rowland then started a prolonged shuttle diplomacy exercise, involving key players including Renamo leader Alphonso Dhlakama, Mozambican president Chissano, South Africa's foreign minister Botha, Kenyan president Moi and Zimbabwean president Mugabe. He personally facilitated meetings, even by flying people to European and African venues in his private jet and mediating directly between Chissano and Dhlakama. Rowland's personal involvement and investment -millions of dollars were poured into Renamo to keep them in the peace negotiations - helped speed up the negotiations and on more than one occasion prevented them from total collapse.
There are some international initiatives to help support the ongoing disarmament in Mozambique. The Japanese cities of Fukui and Itoh have spearheaded a campaign called 'Guns for Hoes', in which bicycles, hoes and other pieces of equipment are gathered in Japan and shipped to Mozambique, where they are plugged into a scheme which gives out these implements for anyone who brings in a weapon. In very much the same vein, the Dutch Foundation 'Vraag en Aanbod' (Supply and Demand) runs a scheme in cooperation with the church in Zambézia, in which repaired bicycles, sewing machines and carpentry tools are exchanged for guns.

Prospects

Peace has prevailed since 1992. That in itself is a remarkable achievement. Given past events, Mozambicans have demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for reconciliation. 'We have accepted to live with the past', is the way a Maputo street trader put it and she sums up the mood. Almost all of the refugees have returned and have begun to reconstitute their lives as best they can.
The tensions that from time to time still appear between Frelimo and Renamo are confined to the political circuits. Renamo has transformed itself from a guerrilla force into a political party and Frelimo has relinquished its monopolistic hold on power. Renamo has real political power in the centre of the country and holds seats in Parliament. It stages walk outs and threatens to derail local and national elections almost routinely, but the realisation that there is more to be gained from political debate than a bush fight is pervasive. It makes for a modicum of political balance, sometimes shaky, but nevertheless real.
Many of Mozambique's problems are of course still related to the conflict: overpopulated cities, a weak infrastructure, an unresolved landmine problem (there are an estimated 1.5 million mines and clearance is continuing slowly). A lot of repair work was undone by the floods that hit Mozambique in March 2000, which also caused landmines to come unstuck and pose a renewed threat. And then there is the problem of the thousands of ex-combatants, who feel short-changed by their former masters who spend their time playing politics in Maputo, while they have to get by on a pittance. With the proliferation of small arms, some take their struggle to survive back to the bush and engage in acts of banditry.
Further economic expansion is urgently needed along with a more equitable distribution of wealth in order to include those who have not been able to profit from the impressive growth figures Mozambique has recorded since the mid-1990s. Corruption has, unfortunately, become a major problem. As some commentators have pointed out, the issue of ethnicity could become more pronounced. Although Renamo found its home in the predominantly Shona and Ndau-speaking centre of the country, which it now dominates politically, ethnicity has played its role mostly under the surface. However, these tensions may surface if wealth distribution is not seen to be equitable among the many regions of the vast country.

Recommendations

Perhaps the most important recommendation is that of the Jubilee 2000 debt relief pressure group which emphasises the need to get serious about writing-off the debts of the so-called Highly Indebted Poor Countries, of which Mozambique is one. Debt reduction is on the cards remaining to be played and should bring some relief as Mozambique is one of the most heavily indebted countries in the world. In July, 1999 the IMF and Worldbank announced that Mozambique's annual debt repayment will be reduced from US$ 169 million to US$ 73 million in the period 1999-2005. If acted upon, this initiative will free up considerable local resources for much-needed economic development.
There has been serious criticism of the adopted model of elections. Mozambican journalist Carlos Cardoso has contended that at a cost of up to US$ 70 million - almost half the country's entire export revenue - elections are too expensive an exercise for the country to repeat with every change of government. He has advocated starting the election process locally and then moving it to the national level, which would, in his view, make for a more popularly recognisable and cheaper exercise in democracy.
Also on the subject of money, Alex Vines has raised the question whether throwing money at a peace process in such a fashion encourages the participants to stall in order to extract as much cash from the exercise as possible; a strategy that Afonso Dhlakama in particular has pursued with considerable success.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin - published by AWEPA, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
REPORTS:	Human Rights Watch: Conspicuous Destruction - War, famine and the reform process in Mozambique. 1992; Landmines in Mozambique. London, 1994; Peace Research Institute Oslo: Reassessing the Impact of Humanitarian Mine Action: Illustrations from Mozambique; http://www.prio.no/publications/reports/reassessing_the_impact_of_humanitarian_mine_action/default.asp.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	ACCORD - The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective, by Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson and Alex Vines (eds.). Conciliation resources, London, 1998; Managing Arms in Peace Process - Mozambique, by E. Berman. UN Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 1996; The State, Violence and Development - The political economy of war in Mozambique, by M. Chingono. Avebury, Aldershot, UK, 1996; Le cause des armes en Mozambique - Anthropologie d'une guerre civile, by G. Geffray. Paris, 1990; Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, by A. Hallam, K. Halvorsen, J. Lexow (et.al.). Oslo, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997; Peace without profit - How the IMF blocks rebuilding in Mozambique, by J. Hanlon. Oxford, 1997; Apartheid's Contras and the roots of war - An inquiry in the modern history of Southern Africa, by W. Minter. London, 1994; The United Nations and Mozambique - 1992-1995. UN, New York, 1995; RENAMO: from terrorism to democracy in Mozambique?, by A. Vines. James Currey, London, 1996; Mozambique - UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-94, by R. Synge. Washington, D.C., US Institute of Peace, 1997; Elusive Peace - Negotiating an end to civil wars, by I.W. Zartman (ed). Brookings Institute, Washington, 1995.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.sortmoz.com/aimnews (news-site of the government press agency, in English and Portuguese); http://www.mozambique.mz/awepa (Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, in English);
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Alicia Mabota - Liga Mocambicana de Derechos Humanos; Joseph Hanlon - freelance journalist, e-mail jhanlon@open.ac.uk; William Minter - Washington office on Africa, e-mail wminter@igc.apc.org; Alex Vines - Human Rights Watch, e-mail hrwatch.uk@gn.apc.org.
ORGANIZATIONS	Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: ACCORD; Sant' Egidio; Link.

About the author

Bram Posthumus has worked as a freelance journalist since 1990. Before that he was a teacher of English language and literature in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. His work in journalism concentrates mainly on West and southern Africa and on the themes of conflict and post-conflict situations and migration. He has travelled extensively in both regions, visiting among others Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Zambia and Guinea, with Mali, Senegal and Chad planned for the near future. He publishes in a variety of international magazines (African Business, New African, EU-ACP Courier) and other monthlies and weeklies in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and South Africa.