Author	Kristoffel Lieten
Publication	Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia
Year	2002

Summary

The 'People's War', an armed uprising by Maoist extremists, began in March 1996. By the end of 2001, the total number of deaths had reached two thousand and, following a series of dramatic attacks, the Nepalese government declared a state of emergency in November 2001. The immediate objective of the insurgents is to turn Nepal into a so-called New Democratic people's republic as a first step toward building a new socialist society. The Maoists have extended their activities throughout Nepal, but their stronghold lies in the hill districts in the western part of the country. The hilly terrain, with dense forests and few roads, is favorable for guerrilla warfare. It is a region that continues to be exploited in a feudal fashion by Hindu landowners who rule over the local Magars, a downtrodden ethnic group.

Landlocked Nepal has never been colonized but has remained in an impoverished and "semicolonized" feudal condition throughout the twentieth century. Despite a good deal of development aid and a sizeable income from tourism, it remains the poorest country in Asia, other than Afghanistan. Adult literacy in 2000 was only 40 percent and 42 percent of its 20 million people lived below the poverty line. The country has been ruled by the autocratic regime of the royal house and the so-called panchayat system, the traditional leadership appointed by the king. Political dissent has been summarily repressed while corruption and economic polarization have gone hand in hand. At the end of the 1980s, the opposition against the panchayat system came into the open. From 18 February 1990 onwards, a mass movement coordinated by the Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and the United Left Front (of communist parties) erupted. After massive public protest that lasted one-and-a-half months and left many dozens of people dead, multiparty democracy (after a short-lived existence in the late 1950s) was restored. Enthusiasm for the elections was great, particularly in the Kathmandu valley, but overall only around half of the electorate participated in the elections.
Following the promulgation of a new constitution, the NCP narrowly won the first general elections from the communists. The many communist factions, who had temporarily renounced their differences to operate as the United Marxist-Leninist Party (CPN-UML) were a force to be reckoned with. The next (midterm) elections (in 1994) were won by the UML. The UML appeared to offer a structural alternative with a policy that included land reforms and democratically elected village councils, but dissent in all parties, including the communist movement, soon destabilized the entire political system. In a period of ten years, more than a dozen majority, minority, and coalition governments collapsed and the country descended into a condition of political chaos and instability.
For a number of reasons, the hope that the majority had in the new democratic system was dashed. Members of the erstwhile panchayat government were brought in as an alternative to the power of the communists. With them, many politicians who had sustained the authoritarian regime, and had amassed wealth, were pardoned and even became policymakers under the new system.
Corruption continued as before and party leaders accumulated riches and wealth. The bureaucracy, which had been trained under the authoritarian panchayat system, continued in office.
By proclaiming Hinduism the state religion, the new constitution institutionalized religious discrimination. The representation in parliament of ethnic minorities, lower castes, and women is remarkably low. The high-ranking male Brahmins, who form only a small minority of the population, remain dominant. The discontent among the various ethnic groups and among the lower castes in the Hindu hierarchy, who de facto have been excluded from upward mobility, has created a wide divide between the ruling class in Nepal and the ethnically homogeneous underclasses.
The actual beneficiaries of development and of development aid were mainly the high-caste elites from towns and villages. What actually has happened is that development funding has become a major industry that was characterized by massive corruption, a complete lack of transparency, and inefficient implementation. The massive financial aid provided lucrative jobs for the Western-educated, Kathmandu-born employees and contractors, but local people hardly ever benefited. The polarization between the development-aided rich and the big majority of poor people thus generated resentment in the minds of the people. It is interesting to note that from 1956 onwards in the Rapti zone in the midwestern hills of Nepal, where the "People's War" movement is at its strongest, the United States had been active in aid projects meant to develop the region and to beat back the leftist influence. It was an area where feudalism was at its strongest and where rural discontent had brought the poor people onto the side of the communist crusade for equality and justice, which in fact meant land reform. The U.S. aid that was aimed at "attacking poverty and preventing a communist uprising," provided high salaries and imported life-styles to civil servants and traders but failed to bring development. It thus helped the common people build a critical consciousness toward such models of foreign-supported development that neither generated development nor justice. As soon as the development project, launched with a view to eliminating poverty and backwardness was phased out, the "People's War" erupted from the very heart of Rapti. The main international donor agencies, particularly India and the United States, are perceived as having contributed to the success of the Maoist movement by raising the expectations of rural people for the development of their region and by in fact creating a thin layer of wealthy beneficiaries, leaving the majority with a heightened sense of deprivation and inequality.
The Maoists thrive on this perception of economic and political imperialism by outside agencies. It was relatively easy for them to tap the discontent amongst the impoverished youth and hit back at those who are regarded as exploiters and profiteers. They could do this in regions where the communist movement had been traditionally strong.
An explanation of the rise of Maoism can be sought in these specific conditions in Nepal. The horse trading and jockeying for power in the elected parliaments have reinforced the conviction that radical change can only be achieved through an armed uprising, say the ideologues of the movement. The material environment, however, only provides the background to the galloping violence. The Maoist movement has also been assisted by the failure of mainstream politics to provide a coherent mass movement against poverty and injustice. Nepal is one of the countries where parliamentary communist parties have a substantial electoral following. They were respected for their stand on democracy, nationalism, antifeudalism, and antipoverty politics. However, they squandered their credit when they formed the government and succumbed to disunity and opportunism. The Maoists then could claim that they were taking on the mantle of righteous and radical resistance against the old system.

Conflict Dynamics

There is indeed another important side to the rise of the Maoist rebellion, namely pure power politics and opportunism. Maoism in Nepal is part of a long history of internal bickering within the communist movement. The first Maoist rebellion was known as the Jhapa Movement, after the southeastern district where it was centered, close to Naxalbari, just across the border in India where Maoists had also revolted. It was a "class-enemy annihilation campaign" carried out by the Coordination Centre in 1971. The embryonic organization later developed into the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist). The CPN(ML) merged in 1991 with the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) to become the CPN-UML.
Factionalism and splits around self-righteous leaders have characterized the communist movement in Nepal. One such leader, Prachananda, formed his own Maoist party in 1986. He did not join the United Left Front that in 1990 started the movement for the restoration of democracy and was very successful in the first parliamentary elections. As part of the rival United People's Front (UPF), Prachananda was less successful. His front gained nine seats. The Nepali Congress Party cornered 110 seats and the CPI-UML, 69 seats. By the time of the 1994 elections, Prachananda and Babu Ram Bhattarai, his close associate, split away from the UPF and approached the election commission for recognition. The recognition, however, was given to the main UPF group and Prachananda then called for a boycott of the elections, an action that at that time was perceived as a face-saving measure. In March 1995, his group was renamed the CPN (Maoist) and a decision was taken to start an armed rebellion. On 13 February 1996, less than one year later after the leaders had applied for recognition as an electoral party, the People's War was declared as the sole aim of the party.
In early February 1996, a charter with forty demands had been submitted to the government headed by Sher Bahadur Deuba. These demands called for the drafting of a new republican constitution by an elected constituent assembly, the abrogation of a number of treaties with India, the nationalization and redistribution of land and property, and the fulfillment of the social and economic needs of the people. It warned that it would take to the path of armed revolution unless the government discontinued oppression. Within two weeks, even before the deadline had expired, the Maoists struck in six districts. Observers have pointed out that the Maoist leaders have never been serious on negotiations and only believe in a nonnegotiable revolutionary takeover of the state. The demands function as mobilizing slogans rather than as concrete issues that can come up for political pressure on the government and negotiations with the government.
In the years thereafter, the Maoists have often been victims of violent attacks. The government has used local Nepali Congress Party cadres, police, and administration to suppress them. The worsening situation in the western hills around Rukum and Rolpa districts was due also to the narrow political aims
of the Nepali Congress in its attempt to eliminate the communist movement. Particularly, Prime Minister Girja Prasad Koirala, with his strong antipathy for communists, has done little to control the harassment and terror by the local police and party activists. On the other hand, the Maoists have also engaged in indiscriminate killing. Political revenge marked by revenge killings of those involved on the government side became the standard answer of the Maoists and the area ultimately became embroiled in a cycle of ransacking, looting, and killing.
In the areas concerned, the mainstream communist parties had a strong following, and the Maoist terror campaign has also been directed against the communist cadres. In the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) Yearbook (2000), the CPN (Masal), the mother organization to which the Maoists once belonged, accuses the Maoist groups of behaving in exactly the same way as their opponents, the government, feudal gangs, and hooligans. In sharp language, they are accused of threatening, robbing, kidnapping, and even killing ordinary people, especially if they belong to other political parties: "Such actions from Maoists are not appropriate steps in the People's War; these are cases of human rights violation. Their activities suggest that the Maoist party is gradually transforming itself into a fascist party and no longer has the character of a revolutionary party." Of all the people killed in the war, the Maoists have killed one-third. Only around 40 percent of the people killed by them were (low-ranking) police personnel; the rest were civilian victims.
Many gruesome incidents have taken place during the five years of the People's War. The most remarkable offensive took place in November 2001. On the night of 23 November, unilaterally breaking a cease-fire that had been in place since July, the Maoists staged simultaneous attacks in a number of places, using cooking-gas cylinders, pressure cookers, and pipes filled with dynamite, and inflicting large-scale human casualties and damages to the infrastructures. Two days later, about two thousand Maoists reportedly raided Salleri, the headquarters of the Solokhumbu district, and destroyed the Paphlu Airport tower and several police and government offices. They took control of the airport and then attacked police posts and unsuccessfully tried to occupy the army barracks. Solokhumbu is the main tourist area, the location of Mt. Everest, the tallest mountain peak in the world. The army rushed reinforcements to Salleri in helicopters and, in the ensuing battles, claim to have killed over two hundred Maoists. Following the Salleri incidents, the government of Prime Minister Deuba, after consultation with the king, decided to declare a state of emergency in all seventy-five districts of the country. The emergency was partially lifted in early April 2002. Journalists are still required to restrain their reports on the Maoist insurgency and political parties can again hold political meetings, albeit with the permission of local authorities.
In the weeks following the lifting of emergency, the Maoists struck heavily. In a single day, in the second week of April 2002, more than two hundred policemen and soldiers were reported to have been killed in a surprise attack in Dang district. Retaliatory action by the army caused heavy casualties on the Maoist side. Such surprise attacks and counterinsurgency operations occur regularly, and have claimed victims on all sides: Maoist guerrillas, police officers, alleged police informers, and innocent civilians. The combination of an inability to contain and address Maoist violence and the tendency of the police to violate human rights has done little to improve the standing of the authorities among the citizens.

Official Conflict Management

The state of emergency has resulted in more powers being given to the army and the curtailment of press and political freedom. The various legislative measures have given wide-ranging powers to the police, the army, and the intelligence agencies, which, because of Nepal's peculiar political arrangement, means ultimately more power has been given to the royal palace. Some commentators have suggested that some factions in the government and in the royal palace may be intent on keeping Maoism alive in the remote hill areas by continuing a crackdown on the grassroots cadres while giving free play to the top leadership.
The government has never been serious about tackling the three major issues that affect the people and that were raised by the UPF when the Maoists were still in parliament: inflation, poverty, and unemployment. Maoist violence has erupted each time the NCP have come to power, particularly when Girija P. Koirala became prime minister. During his first tenure (1992–1994), the police came down heavily on a general strike called by the UPF, killing sixteen people in Kathmandu. He also started the first police retaliation (Operation Romeo) against the Maoists in Rolpa district, inflicting serious damage on people and property. It was this conflict that was later to form the feeding ground for the People's War.
The first attempt by the government to come to grips with the Maoist activities was the formation of a working group by the coalition government of the National Democratic Party and the CPN-UML, headed by Bahadur Chand in April 1997. The working group highlighted the need for dealing with the problem through a national consensus. A commission of the UML itself (the Dhami Commission) refused to see the social and economic dimensions of the conflict and clearly spelled out that the Maoist insurgency was of a terrorist nature and that antiterrorist legislation was needed to deal with it. Before such legislation could be introduced, a new government headed by the royalist leader, Thapa, took over; this government was soon followed by a new NCP government headed by Koirala (April 1998). Koirala immediately gave orders for a major police offensive (the Kilo-Sera Two operation), during which more than forty people were killed. Like the earlier offensive in his first term as prime minister, the police action signaled the beginning of an intermittent series of clashes. The conflict escalated and peace talks were abandoned.
After the formation of the NCP government headed by Bhattarai in January 2000, a high-level Maoist problem-resolution committee (the Deuba Committee) held a series of informal meetings with the Maoists and collected suggestions from different political parties and civil-society groups. In the course of his work, Deuba held several rounds of discreet talks with the underground leaders. After the committee submitted its report in November of the same year, Home Minister Paudel officially met with a senior Maoist leader, Rabindra Shrestha. The talks were facilitated by a former minister and human-rights activist, Padma Ratna Tuladhar. The dialogue was followed by both sides blaming each other for killing the peace process and buying time while preparing for a new offensive.
During the new government period of Koirala, who succeeded Bhattarai, the Maoists refused to take part in any dialogue. In March 2001, the government complied with the long-standing Maoist demand that it reveal the whereabouts of their three hundred comrades in custody. A nongovernmental peace team headed by Padma Ratna Tuladhar then took initiatives to facilitate further talks. Such a dialogue was also advocated by the CPN-UML as the main opposition party in the parliament and the official National Human Rights Commission. Immediately afterwards, the Maoists again went on a rampage and killed several policemen in Rukumkot and Dailekh.
After the gruesome killing of practically the entire royal family by the king's son on 1 July, G. P. Koirala, under heavy pressure because of corruption scandals, was brought down and on 22 June his NCP government was replaced by an NCP government led by Deuba. After Deuba reemerged as the prime minister, peace initiatives were rekindled. On the day of Deuba's election, Maoists massacred seventeen policemen at a police post in Bajuira district. Nevertheless, within twenty-four hours Deuba declared a cease-fire and the peace initiative was quickly reciprocated by Prachananda. In November, however, Prachananda, the general secretary of the CPN, announced that the peace talks were suspended and that "there was no other alternative before the Nepalese people than to continue their struggle for nationalism, democracy and livelihood."
On several occasions, the government has attempted to get parliamentary approval for antiterrorist legislation and for the commissioning of the army. An armed police ordinance had been approved by the king, but it could not be endorsed by parliament. Until the declaration of the state of emergency, the Royal Nepal Army was, by and large, kept on the sidelines of the conflict.
The ousted prime minister, Koirala, is reported to be using the new spate of Maoist attacks to involve the king and the army in a new political arrangement.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Concerns have been expressed on different occasions by Indian, European, and U.S. government officials, but no international initiatives to contain the conflict have been undertaken. India is particularly ill-placed to assist Nepal in restoring peace. The people in general and the Maoist supporters in particular regard India as an imperialist country intent on suffocating Nepal and restricting its access to the outside world. Requests for help from the government of Nepal have taken the form of appeals for more development aid and for more military hardware without involving any foreign country directly. Amnesty International has raised the issue of the need for a dialogue between the government and the Maoists and has issued three situation reports documenting the violations of human rights by both sides. In the latest of these—the report of April 2002—Amnesty International notes "a complete lack of accountability in relation to alleged unlawful killings, including extrajudicial executions and indeed in relation to many other forms of human right violations. . . . This lack of accountability has contributed to a prevailing sense of impunity." The International Red Cross has been mainly concerned with the conditions of detainees and the application of international humanitarian law standards.
Some international organizations and NGOs have organized discussion groups. The UNDP has held a workshop and now heads the Peace Support Group. The UN has sponsored the Harvard Online Conference. The Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research organized its first part of a web site, Online Conference in Nepal, from 25 January to 1 February 2001. The conference provided a broad platform to around eighty scholars, NGO activists, and officials to discuss conflict-related issues and suggest priorities for preventive action. The main aim of the conference was to exchange information for preventive action and to improve the understanding of the sources of social, political, and economic insecurity and their linkages. The Nepali and Western participants offered comprehensive and specific recommendations for the prevention of the current conflict and insecurity in Nepal.
A number of NGOs, such as the Rastriya Sarokar Samaj, a national network of movements and activists sympathetic to the Maoist cause, have been active in holding regular public forums as well as street meetings in Kathmandu. Many reports brought out by these like-minded NGOs have documented police involvement in cases of extrajudicial killings and the disappearance of individuals in their custody. The police have also been accused of concerted repression and discrimination against peasants and ethnic minorities. These NGOs operate in isolation from the other organizations in civil society, including the political parties, and gloss over the reports of indiscriminatory violent attacks by Maoists on police officers, suspected informants, and even ordinary citizens. Various other NGOs, such as the South Asia Partnership–Nepal (SAP–Nepal), have organized a series of district, regional, and national-level consultation meetings and have suggested various short-term and long-term strategies. Its main objective has been to mobilize grassroots civil-society groups toward conflict resolution in the context of the social and economic development needs of the country.
The Washington-based Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy and the Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution held a workshop on "Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in Nepal" in June 2001. The workshop, organized in cooperation with the local South Asian Institute for Peace Studies, INSEC, and the Center for Economic and Social Development, provided training in conflict management and resolution skills for some local participants. The result of the workshop has been the start of a new campaign whereby all communities in Nepal are working together on peacebuilding. INSEC has done a particularly professional job, with a well-documented yearbook on human-rights violations and a comprehensive network for monitoring human-rights abuses.
The restoration of the multiparty system in 1990 has led to the mushrooming of Western-style NGOs, particularly in the field of human rights, democracy, and development. A handful of NGOs are genuinely active in peace and human-rights issues, but a weakness of all interventions is that trying to address the Maoist conflict without addressing the root causes will only have partial results in terms of conflict management. The initiatives are often in the form of, and limited to, conferences and discussions by professionals on aspects of human rights and the restoration of peace.
Yet these initiatives, taken together, after the advent of democracy, have increased the awareness of the people. Through election manifestos, political rallies, and interparty debates, people have become aware of the political and socioeconomic affairs around them. They have been able to distinguish between the potential contribution of parliamentary democracy and the actual factionalism and opportunism of most political parties. Following the restoration of democracy, civil society has played a key role in educating the people about the government's accountability to the people and about equality and exploitation. Similarly, development NGOs have involved people in piloting small schemes that aim at environmental protection, community health and sanitation, forest conservation, poverty elimination, and so on. These model projects have also helped them understand the dynamics of poverty and exploitation and the need for transparency.

Prospects

In the five years up to November 2001, some 2,000 people were killed in this civil war. There were another 2,000 deaths in the following five months, to the end of April 2002. That is a major escalation. The war is heating up tremendously, partly due to the fact that the army is now fully involved. There have been some talks between the government and the rebels, but the latter have doggedly persisted in mounting terrorist attacks. Peace talks usually appear to have been delaying tactics in preparation for new attacks and massacres. Both the government and the Maoists have declared themselves open to the possibility of dialogue, but these calls for "dialogue" may be a mere political slogan to which the main actors periodically pay lip service. The unwillingness of the government side to really come to effective negotiations is related to the fairly radical demands presented by the Maoists as prerequisites for dialogue. Yet, potentially, dialogue could bring about agreement on key issues such as the control of corruption and the commencement of a discussion on the development of concrete strategies to address fundamental economic, social, and ethnic problems.
A difficulty is that the Maoists claim exclusiveness on these issues. They see themselves as the only political movement fighting for social change. Any truce with mainstream political forces is considered impermissible revisionism and class betrayal. On the side of the forces of law and order, it is not always clear whether all actors involved are united on the issue of fighting Maoism. Some tacit support may exist. The royal house and the various factions of the NCP and the two republican (royalist) parties have often given the impression of being more interested in their own power politics. The "root cause" of the guerrilla warfare may have a hidden relationship to this wider political power game. As the conflict is also defined as the by-product of corruption and failed development of the past fifty years, movements of dissent can be expected to emerge again and again. The civil-society efforts are also weak in the sense that they are limited to small meetings and media publicity.

Recommendations

With a substantial increase in police expenditure and the declaration of the state of emergency in late 2001, the government seems to be equipped to tackle the Maoist conflict as a law-and-order problem. Given the peculiarly guerrilla-friendly terrain, and the many circumstances that have remained unchanged, Maoism, however, is not likely to be eliminated by military means. Suppressive measures will only have a temporary effect. Peace talks and political negotiations therefore remain the best option. This process should involve civil-society negotiators and left-wing parties as well as government representatives.
Nepal has a number of mainstream communist parties who, like the present-day Maoists, have been involved in armed revolution in the past. Prachananda and Baburam Bhattarai, the two main Maoist leaders, could be enticed to make a similar "safe landing" in the field of aboveground politics. This compromise solution may bring them greater rewards if they really have the support of the people. For such an escape route to materialize, the government of Nepal and the royal house should accept some changes in the constitution, which have already been requested by other left-wing parties.
Amnesty for all Maoists may become a difficult but necessary measure, but it may be a price worth paying while the demands that have been raised by the movement are taken seriously.
The two-pronged strategy will also require an economic package, including the bringing down of moneylending rates (the Maoists have brought down interest rates in some areas they control from over 50 percent to 18 percent). There is an urgent need for the extension of education, health care, food, housing, and social security for all, especially to the ethnic minorities whose neglect now forms the natural environment for the Maoists. Unless the stark polarization in Nepal is reduced and the state is seen to show concern for the majority of the rural poor, radical agrarian movements will erupt again and again. The Maoists have accused the government of buttressing social and ethnic hierarchies, and have come forward as defenders of victims of state discrimination. This fact in certain regions is reflected in a high level of support among the lower castes and the more disadvantaged ethnic groups. Consequently, economic and social development should be concentrated on the rights and needs of these groups. There should be a specific focus on the discrimination of women, who in present-day Nepal largely cannot inherit property (the 1990 Constitution provides equal rights for women to property inheritance, but there are no specific laws to enforce this).
Politics in Nepal has degenerated into a process of jockeying for power and money. The current need is for a national front of parties committed to pro-poor politics and honesty. Improvement in the legitimacy and credibility of politicians and bureaucracy, including investigation and punishment of past corruption to gain public confidence, is needed to restore the legitimacy of the political system. The organizations of civil society and the media may be expected to highlight these issues and gradually improve the democratic environment.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	HIMAL magazine, Kathmandu.
REPORTS:	Amnesty International: Nepal: Human Rights and Security, February 2000. Nepal: A Spiralling Human Rights Crisis, April 2002. Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, edited by Dhurba Kumar, Kathmandu, 2000. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Nepal, Country Study on Conflict Transformation and Peace Building. Eschborn, Germany, 2002. Harvard School of Public Health, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Setting Priorities for Preventive Action in Nepal. Final Report of the Web Conference, 25 January to 1 February 2001. (www.preventconflict.org/portal/nepal) . Informal Sector Service Centre, Human Rights Yearbook 2001, Kathmandu, 2001. Ministry of Home Affairs, Nepal: Dhami Report, Report of the Working Group on Maoist Activities and Appropriate Resolution, Kathmandu, August 1997. Recommendations on the Resolution of Maoist Problems. Report of High Level Committee on Recommendations for the Resolution of Maoist Problems, Kathmandu, November 2000. South Asia Forum for Human Rights, E-Briefs: People War in Nepal 1(3), July 2000. South Asia Partnership-Nepal, The Features of 'People's War' and the Peace Prospects and Peace and Good Governance: Problems and Resolutions, Kathmandu, February 2001.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Class, State and Struggle in Nepal, by Mikesell and Stephen Lawrence. New Delhi, Manohar, 1999. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Major Powers and Nepal, by Khadka Narayan. New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1997. Nepal in Crisis: Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery, by Blaikie Piers, John Cameron, and David Seddon. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982. People, Politics and Ideology: Democracy and Political Change in Nepal, by Martin Hoftun et al. Kathmandu, Mandala, 1999. 'The Maoist Insurgence and Crisis of Governability in Nepal', by Panchan Maharjan. In Dhurba Kumar (ed.), Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000, pp. 163-196. Women, Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War, by Baburam Bhattarai. Kathmandu, Utprerak Prakashan, 1998. Women, War and Peace in South Asia, by Rita Manchanda. New Delhi, Sage, 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://nepalresearch.com/politics/background/maodem.htm (Nepal research web site; has, for example, the Maoists 40 Point Demands); www.himalmag.com/ (Direct access to the HIMAL fortnightly, which has good analytical pieces on the conflict); www.hsph.ed/hpcr/cpi_portals_nepal.htm (A conflict-prevention initiative by Harvard scholars with a detailed data base of summarized articles and links); www.inhured.org (Inhured International-one of the NGOs working on human rights, education, and development; a member of the Him-Rights association of human-rights organizations; its web site also has the Maoist demands); www.insec-nepal.com (Informal Sector Service Centre); www.nepalhomepage.com/dir/politics/politics.php (Nepal home page; government and politics directory); www.nepalnews.com.np/ (Links to news resources and newspapers in Nepal); www.rwor.org/home-e.htm (Revolutionary Worker Online); www.safhr.org (South Asia Forum for Human Rights); www.yomari.net/p-review/ (People's Review);
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Shiva Hari Dahal, National Peace Campaign, e-mail: npcpeace@ntc.net.np; Daman Nath Dhunganga, former Speaker, House of Representatives, and member of Peace Dialogue Facilitating Committee, Kathmandu. Tel: +977-1-430414 ; Dipak Gyawali, Interdisciplinary Analysts, e-mail: ida@wlink.com.np; Dhruba Kumar, Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University, GPO Box 3757, Kathmandu, Nepal; Rita Manchanda, South Asian Forum for Human Rights, e-mail: south@safhr.wlink.com.np; Pancha Maharjan, scholar at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu; John McDonald, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, e-mail: imtd@imtd.org; Gauri Pradhan, President CWIN, e-mail: cwin@mos.com.np; Chitra Tiwari, Nepalese professor, e-mail: cktiwari@erols.com; Padma Ratna Tuladhar, coordinator, Peace Dialogue Facilitating Committee, Kathmandu, Nepal. Tel: +977-1-411664;
ORGANIZATIONS:	National Human Rights Commission, Pulchowk, Lalitpur, Nepal, Tel: +977-1-547974. Nepal Bar Association-Human Rights and Public Concerns Committee, Bar Bhavan, Supreme Court Complex, Kathmandu, Nepal. Data on the following organizations can be found in the Directory section: In Nepal: Forum for Protection of Human Rights; Group for International Solidarity; Human Rights and Peace Campaign Nepal; Human Rights and Peace Society; Human Rights Organisation of Nepal; Informal Sector Service Centre; Institute of Human Rights Communication; International Institute for Human Rights, Environment and Development; National Peace Campaign; South Asia Forum for Human Rights; South Asia Human Development Forum Network; South Asian Institute for Peace Studies; South Asia Partnership–Nepal. In the United States: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy.

About the author

Kristoffel Lieten (Belgium, 1946) is an associate professor at the Amsterdam School of Social Sciences of the University of Amsterdam (lieten@pscw.uva.nl). Since his studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi in the early 1970s, he has done extensive research on political and social developments in South Asia. He has worked as the South Asia correspondent of the Dutch and Belgian Radio and has become a regular media commentator. He has cofounded the Dutch National India Committee and has written several books on various aspects of politics, history, and rural development in India.