Author	Jos van Beurden
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Somalia is situated along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It faces the Arabian peninsula with which it has had commercial and cultural contacts for centuries. It borders Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya. Most people are nomadic pastoralists, whose livelihood is dependent on dromedaries. Cultivation is practised between the Juba and Shebelle rivers in the south. Fishing is an important source of income. According to a UN estimate 10.7 million people are presently living in Somalia. Aid-agencies put the total at less than seven million, based on the number of people who receive assistance.
The Somali people speak the same language, Somali, and adhere to the same religion, the Sunni-variation of Islam. They can be subdivided into six major clan families: the Darod, Hawiye, Issaq and Dir, which are all predominantly nomadic, and the Digil and Rahawayn in the inter-riverine south, who are more agricultural. Most issues revolve around this genealogically clan-based system with its temporary alliances and coalitions. The Somali clan system has at times been a source of conflict, e.g. over water and livestock, while at other times it has provided a basis for reconciliation.
The partition of Africa divided the greater Somali nomadic community over five countries: French Somaliland (now Djibouti), British Somaliland (now Somaliland) and North-east Kenya, Italian Somaliland (now Somalia), and the Ethiopian Ogaden. In 1960 the French, Ethiopian and Kenyan-British parts of the Somali people remained outside the new state which was created: the Somali Republic.
Initially a coalition government gave a more or less balanced representation to the different clans, but soon clan-based jealousies began to create splits. In the ensuing vacuum of power, general Mohamed Siad Barre seized control in 1969. He professed an anti-tribalist 'scientific socialism' and received support from the then Soviet Union. In 1977, during the war with the pro-US Ethiopia, the two neighbours switched sides. The strongly anti-communist US administration could no longer tolerate Ethiopia's new Marxist rulers and Washington became Barre's new supporter. Moscow, which was no longer needed in Mogadishu, filled the vacuum and chose Mengistu Haile Mariam's side. Barre's capricious despotism evoked more and more opposition. Opposition groups formed a coalition in 1990 and began fighting in many corners of the country. They defeated Barre, who fled the country in early 1991. That same year another autocratic leader in north-east Africa was forced to step down, Mengistu of Ethiopia, while Ethiopia's northern province of Eritrea became de facto independent.
Soon the thirty year-old Somali nation state began to fall apart, and it has subsequently been dominated by conflict and chaos. One major opposition faction, the USC, appointed its own chairman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, as interim-president. This move was rejected by the other members of the anti-Barre coalition, some of whom began to fight the USC. The SNM in the north-west declared the self-styled Somaliland Republic. Following a major split within the USC two factions emerged, one led by Ali Mahdi, the other by general Mohamed Farah Aideed. These two factions have subsequently been engaged in a bitter struggle for the control of Mogadishu. Both warlords have a policy of arming their supporters, without providing leadership or a programme for securing discipline and peace. This resulted in a state of anarchy and terror which was most acutely felt in the capital and surrounding areas. In most factions members of the old Barre-regime remained active. The dominance of warlords strongly diminished the influence of the traditionally important elders.
The main causes for conflict and anarchy in Somalia can be found in the clash between the traditional, mostly pastoral society, which is strongly characterised by clan-individualism, and the straitjacket of the modern state. Because of Barre's culture of militarism this clash resulted in considerable violence. It became more serious because natural resources were scarce, and the lack of justice, good governance and education were strongly felt.
Despite their occasional talk of peace, the issues at stake for the warlords in Somalia, are power, money, land and other natural resources. These natural resources include pastures, water points, urban property and markets. The control of the capital and other cities, of ports and airports, of export crops such as cattle and bananas have been permanently contested.
Many Somali refugees returned home under UNHCR-auspices, however, this UN Agency rarely achieves its targets. For 1998 the target was 50,000, most of whom were supposed to return to the self-styled Somaliland Republic. According to the World Food Programme (WFP) the harvest will be poor in 1999 and many people will be in need of food aid.

Somaliland
Civil strife in Somalia began in 1988 in the north-west region, when the SNM took control of the area. Within two years, and after many aerial bombardments and other atrocities, some 50,000 people had died. As warlords, especially in the south, continued fighting for power after the overthrow of the Barre regime, the north-west set up its own administration and proclaimed the Somaliland Republic. [kader]
While international recognition was withheld for the new republic, it was from the beginning relatively peaceful. The traditional elders and community-based peace committees brought most of the armed militia under control. Each community registered the number and kind of arms in their possession and began to control their movements. In addition, a crucial initiative was taken. Practising their traditional peace-making methods, religious leaders, politicians, intellectuals, social groups, businessmen and women's groups, gathered from all over Somaliland to initiate a peace process. Between 1991 and 1993, 48 mini-conferences were held, followed by three more extensive conferences aimed at ensuring reconciliation. Somaliland has since had a central government and a social development programme has been implemented. This whole effort has been a purely local initiative, with the role of outsiders being restricted to the provision of incidental funding and acting as observers.
However, in Somaliland too, the clan question has not been fully resolved. Clans living in the Somaliland districts of Elayo and Laascano, which border north-east Somalia, feel themselves to be the victims of discrimination by the government in Hargeisa, which in their opinion is Issaq dominated. Some of them would prefer not to be part of Somaliland.

Conflict Dynamics

In many parts of the country the balance between warlords, their militias and other allies on the one hand, and the traditional elders and their sympathisers on the other, has begun to favour the latter. The USC of Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the SNA of Hussain Mohamed Aideed are each keeping control of their part of Mogadishu and its hinterland. In 1998 the two set up a joint administration for Mogadishu and began to demobilise the capital city. According to reports from the capital, the number of arms in the streets diminished visibly after religious leaders, backed by the business community, had closed down check points across Mogadishu, arresting and imprisoning militiamen as they passed. Reports from southern and central Somalia were less positive. While people suffered from drought and diseases, outlawed militiamen extorted money from them by setting up checkpoints and charging for drinking water.
The continuing violence and anarchy provided leaders in other regions of Somalia with the impetus to go their own way. In north-east Somalia this led to elections in June 1998, where a non-secessionist, regional administration for the Puntland State of Somalia was elected. Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed was chosen as president. SPM-Chairman General Morgan and clan elders in south-west Somalia are trying to set up their own administration in Jubaland. A constitutional conference was planned for 1999.
Thus, until recently the focus in the Somali peace and reconciliation efforts had moved from the national to the regions level. This did not imply that Somalis wanted to see the disintegration of their country, but that, for the time being, they had no wish for a centralised government, preferring instead regional cooperation and regional co-existence, possibly leading to a federal state based on several clan-based states. In certain areas the elders recovered some of their power, although both in Puntland and Jubaland a warlord became the leader of the region. This new trend was accepted and confirmed during conferences held in Ethiopia and Egypt, in 1996 and 1997.
There are no reliable national figures for current casualties and economic damage. Some approximate figures are available for earlier stages in the conflict. In the north-west, in the early days of the war, there were some 50,000 fatalities while, in only four months of fighting in Mogadishu between 1991 and 1992 some 30,000 people were killed. In total, a quarter of a million people may have died. To this we can add 300,000 people who died during the famine of 1992, which was significantly aggravated by the civil war. Among the wounded can be reckoned thousands of people who have survived landmine-explosions. Currently, the number of dead is relatively low.
Because of their registration by the UNHCR and the distribution of ration-cards by NGOs the number of refugees and internally displaced people is better known. Around 1990, 600,000 people had fled to Ethiopia and other countries. In 1992, their number had increased to 800,000. During the 1992 famine period between 1.5 and 2 million people were internally displaced. Many Somali, who had been residing for decades in Mogadishu returned to their villages and towns.
In the absence of a centralised administration, taxes were collected by clans. In some regions they were used for maintenance, rehabilitation or development purposes, in others the revenue went into the war effort or was used to pay the militias. Several currencies were used in different regions of the country.
Especially in the south, traditional commercial networks between rural areas and cities or ports suffered continual disruptions. The arrival of large-scale food aid in the early 1990s had a profound impact on the markets in the major urban centres, but much aid has subsequently disappeared. The ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu were mostly out of operation, while the docks in Berbera and Bosaso took over part of their tasks. The port of Bosaso which in 1991 was defunct has since grown into a thriving city with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, attracting migrant workers from as far as Tanzania. However, Somalia's territorial waters have been consistently over-fished by foreign, often highly mechanised, fishing boats. Traditional fishermen have frequently seen their boats and nets destroyed and their fish factories looted. Occasionally, pirates have concluded deals with warlords and divided their profits. In general, insecurity is an important obstacle for food production and economic activity.
The national reconciliation conference in Baidoa, planned for February 1998 was postponed several times, and by the end of 1998 it seemed unlikely to be held. Militias, loyal to Hussein Aideed, continued to occupy Baidoa. The same factions reported to have received arms from Ethiopia accused Eritrea of supplying arms to the faction of Hussain Mohamed Aideed who could distribute them among Ethiopian dissidents. In June 1999 Ethiopia was accused of invading Baidoa and helping to chase away Aideed. This was not Ethiopia's first incursion. In August 1996 it had sent troops to defeat the Muslim-radical Al-Itahad al-Islami and occupied sites in the border areas of Gedo. In January 1998 it withdrew 500 men together with their armoured personnel carriers and tanks, but left behind a well armed SNF. By doing so Ethiopia sharpened factional splits without defeating Al-Itahad. Nor did Ethiopian arms deliveries to General Morgan (SNF), the Rahenweyne Resistance Army (centre) and Ali Mahdi (Mogadishu) help to defeat the Muslim-radicals. Hussein Aideed, who often works in coalition with the Muslim-radical Al-Itehad, condemned this Ethiopian involvement. Ethiopia has regularly sent Special Envoys to Somaliland and Puntland.
The general insecurity and shortage of water and food in central and southern Somalia resulted in the movement of thousands of people. Since November 1998 some 5,000 Somali's have gone to the Kenyan border leading Kenya to close its border with Somalia. According to official Ethiopian sources 10,000 people crossed the border with Ethiopia. In the coastal town of Bossaso an unidentified number of internally displaced people arrived.

Somaliland
In the much more stable Somaliland Republic the Government introduced tax, banking and customs systems in 1993. The administration worked reasonably well and did its utmost to gain international recognition but with no success. As a result, its funding for reconstruction and rehabilitation is at a far lower level than in Somalia. It has, however, been visited by representatives of UN and EU-institutions, Western donors and neighbouring states.
In 1998, President Egal opposed the creation of Puntland on the grounds that its precise demarcation was not yet clear. Apart from the Bari, Nugaal and Mudug regions it might comprise the Sanaag and Sool regions of Somaliland. Early in 1999 some border clashes were reported and some hard words were exchanged between Somaliland and Puntland.

Official Conflict Management

In the last eight years, twelve peace initiatives have taken place. The first one was attended by sixteen warlords, the last one by 87. They enjoyed little success. Only a few of these initiatives concentrated on re-empowering clan elders, enlightened intellectuals and other local leaders. Some of these offered a more hopeful prospect.
From the early 1990s the United Nations has tried to mediate and soften the consequences of the conflict. In April 1992 UN-representative Mohamed Sahnoun arrived in Mogadishu, starting UN operations in Somalia (UNOSOM). His approach was to seek a political settlement and national reconciliation through the traditional elder-based structures. He concluded that in six months a good atmosphere had been created and many intractable issues were resolved. A cease-fire was largely respected. Ports and airports had been reopened. A chain of solidarity had begun to materialise. Moreover, Sahnoun came to a separate agreement with Somaliland and discussed an operation to reconcile the faction leaders with Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi.
Inside the UN a debate was started on the best way forward for Somalia. The UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, the US and some other member states pointed to the then reigning famine and favoured a rapid intervention, while others like Sahnoun continued to support a gradual approach. The result was the replacement of Sahnoun, and the landing by 28,000 American and 1,700 French troops near Mogadishu on December 9, 1992. In Operation Restore Hope military units from Belgium, Italy, Canada, New Zealand and Australia followed soon. Later, troops jfrom Pakistan, Botswana, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Djibouti joined the force. The UK sent cargo planes.
The Somali and the international community differ widely in their assessment of the UN operation which ended in 1995. The Somali were particularly critical of the UN's failure to disarm the militias, and consult the local inhabitants about the UN's plans to set up District Councils. This criticism was shared by a large number of foreign NGOs in Somalia. In addition they argued that in December 1992, when the American troops landed in Somalia, the worst of the food shortage was over.
Hussain Aideed and representatives of 25 other factions attended a peace conference in Cairo in December 1997. Inspired by the ethnic federalism and division into regions of Ethiopia, they opted for the principle of regional self-administration. They planned a national peace conference in the southern city of Baidoa for February 1998. The conference in Cairo had been preceded by a meeting in Sodere, Ethiopia, under InterGovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD) auspices in late 1996. A National Salvation Council was set up, but Husain Mohamed Aideed's group did not participate.
In the summer of 1998 the UN adopted this regional approach and further shifted its attention from warlords to peace-seeking civilian leaders, involving the development of regional administrations. Emerging administrations, such as those in Puntland or Jubaland, could get assistance, with the aim of finally bringing the whole country into a federal structure.
In July 1998 an international meeting was organised by the Somali Aid Coordination Body under the auspices of the Forum of Partners of the IGAD in Addis Ababa. Participants were mostly representatives of UN organisations, European Union member states and IGAD itself. They registered their scepticism about a July 1998 Libyan peace initiative among factions in Mogadishu and praised the Somaliland administration for its effective government, while they hailed the Puntland autonomous civilian administration as 'the most desirable option' for Somalia. On 2 May, 2000 this regional approach was turned into a national initiative one again. The newly elected president of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh, opened the Somali National Peace Conference which brought together two thousand participants. It was the first such conference where warlords did not have control of the conference agenda. The conference accepted the disarmament of clan militias and an economic recovery programme.
Somalia will become a federal state. On the 26th of August a 245-strong Transitional National Assembly elected Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia. The next day he was sworn in. The celebration was attended by the heads of state of the neighbouring countries and representatives of international organisations. In November 2000 the new government began registering former national army members. The disarmament of former militiamen still had to begin.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
The history of indigenous NGOs in Somalia goes back to the early 1980's. During this period they emerged in the wake of the international NGOs which had entered the country to help with the influx of refugees from Ethiopia as a result of the 1977 Ogaden war. In 1988 the World Bank established a US$ 3 million fund as seed money to encourage local NGOs to implement social projects. It was administered by the Ministry of Planning. The Bank tried to diminish the hardships arising from its Structural Adjustment Programme for Somalia but due to their limited capacity few local NGOs used the fund. In the same period USAID established a Management Unit for Supervision and Training (MUST) to support those local NGOs which were implementing agency-funded projects. Training, research, monitoring and evaluation were MUST's main tasks.
During this period and during the later civil strife, the collapse of government, public services and civic structures led to their further growth. It also caused many educated and qualified people to return from Mogadishu to their home villages and towns. The destruction they encountered was so extensive that they had little choice other than to participate in the reconstruction. This led to the birth of a variety of local NGOs. Many of them quickly disappeared, while others turned out to be more enduring.
Those which continue to operate are reported to have a relatively positive record in relief and rehabilitation. It is also remarkable that they are often focused on women. Women-owned NGOs were more visible and energetic in working for peace, building coalitions across faction lines and supporting health and nutrition programmes. In Mogadishu and Hargeisa women leaders set up extensive networks which had some impact in solving local conflicts, helped build bridges between hostile clan groups and encouraged the men to stop fighting and find alternative means of solving disputes. These initiatives were respected by both men and women.
The Coalition of Grassroot Women's Organisations (COGWO) is working for peace via various women's organisations in Somalia, thus crossing faction lines and linking up grassroots women's groups at many levels. Working with the displaced and with those who have lost access to income and basic resources, these organisations also worked to mitigate the negative effects of conflict on communities.
NGOs in Somalia have certain weaknesses. Most are new and inexperienced. They urgently need training in setting up an organisation, bookkeeping, etc. Some are built around individuals and their immediate relatives and are more focused on offering employment than setting up development programmes. Others are effectively cover operations for warlords and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between genuine and fake grassroots-organisations. As is to be expected, the development of most of these organisations has occurred on a regional basis. Most show an urban bias.
The wide range of their activities is a clear indication of the existing needs and the absence of any other bodies to fulfil these tasks. The range of concerns includes: preventive health care, growing vegetables by women, water, education, reintegration of returned female refugees, establishment of local structures, credit programmes, training fishermen, research into fish stock, conflict resolution and advocacy.
The Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) based in Mogadishu is worthy of special mention. This non-clan based organisation came into being in February 1997 when some twenty organisations attended a workshop in order to analyse the conflict situation. Among the participants were human rights organisations, the Somali Olympic Committee, other NGOs, journalists, teachers, community leaders and ex-militia members. They decided on the spot to form this network organisation. Their most conspicuous activity so far has been the organisation of a peace demonstration on March 8, 1998 which was attended by one hundred thousand people.
Given that civil society is usually thought to act as a counterbalance to the state, it is questionable whether there can be a civil society without a state. In the case of Somalia and Somaliland, however, there is a civil society and it consists of all those, who do not belong to a warlord, his militias and sympathisers and who are part of formal or informal networks.
A positive aspect of the strong (clan) individualism is the Somali people's tradition of speaking frankly on any issue. They are also willing to take sufficient time to fully discuss an issue. The final negotiations in Garowe, which led to the creation of the Puntland self-administration area, lasted two months and brought 300 clan elders and other local leaders together. It had been preceded by years of consultations and meetings.
Clan elders, traders, women's groups and NGOs have already been mentioned, but an important group are the media. Since the mid-1990s the presence of all sorts of archaic mimeographs and radio broadcast installations combined with the availability of computer technology and skilled journalists was a fresh impetus for this tradition. Papers and radio broadcasts were often critical and were well read or listened to. To mention an example, Radio Voice of Peace/Somalia (RVOP) broadcasts to Somalia, Somaliland and the Somali diaspora in some ten other countries. It is non-political and aims at strengthening civil society.
The strength of elders, organised traders, women, NGOs and media differs per region. In the north-east, presently Puntland, for example, traders have been reasonably supportive of efforts to stop all fighting and help build the self-administration. They need stability in order to be able to export cattle, and have an interest in reconciliation efforts. Such traders are almost absent in southern Somalia, where cultivation is the main mode of production.
In Mogadishu several informal newspapers encourage a lively debate on the future of the capital and Somalia. They bring new ideas and voice opposition to the practices of some warlords or other leaders. In Somaliland the elders are playing a vital role in the continuation of the national debate which finally led to the current situation of relative stability. The elders in the south often belong to the rich land-owning class who do not represent constituencies of small-holders.

International
International NGOs played an important role in the earlier years of the civil war. They were mostly involved in the distribution of emergency assistance. In order to do their work they were often involved in immediate conflict solving. Although there were many failures, one has to realise that they had to work under extremely difficult circumstances. A few of them deserve special mention.
From May 1991 until December 1992 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the only major relief organisation operating in Somalia. Its programme was wide-ranging. Execution and control were largely in Somali hands. The ICRC often had to negotiate levels of payment that seemed excessive to outsiders. When it started a kitchen programme for the most needy, even its own field staff estimated a loss of 50 per cent before cooking. Yet independent evaluators doubted whether ICRC could have operated in any other way.
As the war had cut off large parts of the country from its ports and overland transport, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) began an airlift of food aid in 1992. The LWF had gained wide experience in this type of operation from Ethiopia/Eritrea in the 1980's and Southern Sudan in the 1980's and 1990's. Food, medicines and other goods were flown in from Nairobi and Mombasa. Unfortunately, the needs assessment lacked an inventory of specific needs and there was insufficient co-ordination with other agencies.
The Irish NGO Concern arrived in Somalia in 1987, was forced in January 1991 to withdraw its expatriate field staff but returned in early 1992 because of the famine. It quickly started a supplementary feeding programme which began in Mogadishu and was later extended to other parts of the country. The food they distributed however was rather expensive and not very suitable for therapeutic feeding. Yet the building of an experienced senior local staff and the training of hundreds of local medical volunteers was a successful aspect of the programme.
Due to the continuing insecurity many international NGOs have withdrawn from Somalia and Somaliland or have never entered the area. The absence of an emergency situation and the increase in the number of local NGOs have also encouraged this 'avoidance factor'. Some foreign NGOs are restricting themselves to financing local initiatives.
Since 1992 the Life & Peace Institute, an international and ecumenical peace research institute, has supported locally based peace processes in Somalia, to begin with in a consultative role together with the UN. However, when UNOSOM left in 1995, the Institute had established an ongoing support and capacity building program all over Somalia, which later came to be extended also to Somaliland. LPI supported the so-called Boroma conference, where all clans of Somaliland were represented through their elders which - in a remarkable Somali and participatory way - elected a government and a president. In the last few years the role of international organisations has been diminished in favour of local ones. International organisations are now more on funding local programmes and projects than on implementing them.

Somaliland
The situation for local NGOs in Somaliland differs from that of their colleagues in Somalia in that they have more difficulty in getting foreign funding and support. The disadvantage is that capacity building is slow, and that more NGOs disappear due to lack of funds. An advantage of this scarcity is that NGOs in Somaliland learn better to solve their own problems.

Prospects

Experts have different opinions on the prospects of peace in Somalia and Somaliland. Some take encouragement from the absence of the state in Somalia: the space for peace initiatives from below and for a very strongly decentralised administration. This would fit in with the pre-colonial nomadic traditions of the country.
At the same time it is argued that there is a danger that warlords will try to take advantage of these initiatives. In Puntland the SSDF was marginalised for a time allowing the clan elders, grassroots organisations and local leaders to take the initiative. The SSDF then suddenly returned and initiated a platform with these civil society organisations and itself. In Jubaland General Morgan's SPM is even more closely allied with the initiative for regional self-administration.
For mediating countries such as Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya the main counterpart continues to be the warlord, as he represents power. They continue to focus on the national level of the state, i.e. a group of ministers and a president. Experts think this strategy has proven mistaken. In the most stable areas of Somalia there is no centralised administration, while new structures are arising outside the traditional patterns. Most multilateral organisations or international NGOs no longer look for a state in the first place.
All argue, that a solution to the problems should come from the Somalis themselves. Some believe that neighbouring countries should be excluded from the peace process, as they have demonstrated that they have their own agenda and interest in this conflict. The peace conference in Djibouti which resulted in a new national government still has to prove the durability of the new Somalia. According to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 'recent political changes have demonstrated a commitment to re-establishing the rule of law and promoting responsible public administration. On the other hand although the political authority of many faction leaders appears to be wanting, there remains a lack of order and a potential for renewed violence in many areas, particularly in central and southern Somalia'.

Recommendations

To present the civil war as a conflict between clan-based factions and their leaders is an oversimplification, argues African Rights in its report Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A preliminary assessment (May 1993). Disputes over land-ownership were a central factor in the outbreak of war and famine. They still play a role. In the case of Somalia reconciliation also means looking into contradictions between rich landowners and the landless people. In southern Somalia particularly, several minority clans are severely disadvantaged in terms of their social status. Warlords control most of the land. Some clan elders represent the interests of the rich.
A guiding principle to peace-building in Somalia is 'to empower individuals and groups within the society (...) and to mobilise indigenous capacities for peace-building', writes Wolfgang Heinrich in Building the Peace. He mentions the example of a reconciliation conference in 1993, where the UN representatives weakened the influence of civilian representatives by having the agreement signed only by the representatives of the factions, 'who - as became evident very soon - were not the least committed to this agreement'.
In its Editorial of Nov-Dec 1998 'Somalia goes Regional', the Horn of Africa Bulletin writes that 'a closer look shows that the main Somali actors remain the same and we have not yet seen whether their aims and objectives have truly changed'. They fear that some old faction leaders have found a new and more becoming 'costume'.
Bringing peace to Somalia is not a quick fix. If outsiders are to be involved, they can do useful work under certain conditions. They must have a long-term commitment and willingness to give priority to indigenous conflict prevention and management. They need a thorough understanding and extensive knowledge of the local situation. They should build up relations of trust with groups and people from below, who are to carry on the peace process.

Service Information

Newsletters:	Monthly newsletter of Arab Organisation for Human Rights, Cairo/Egypt; Horn of Africa Bulletin, bi-monthly newsletter published by the Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala/Sweden; Indian Ocean Newsletter, weekly published by Indigo Publications Group, Paris/France; Inter-Africa Group News and Networking Service, monthly update, Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa/Ethiopia; Focus on the European Union and Peace-Building Efforts in the Horn of Africa, newsletter published by Saferworld/London.
Reports:	Catholic Institute for International Relations: Building Partnerships for Participatory Development. Reports of workshops held in Hargeisa and Boroma. London, 1996; United States Institute for Peace: Removing Barricades in Somalia - Options for Peace and Rehabilitation, by Hussain Adam & Richard Ford. Washington DC, October 1998; Bonn International Center for Conversion: Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Conflict Prevention in the Horn of Africa - Discussion Paper, by Kees Kingma & Kiflenariam Gebrewold. July 1998; Saferworld: Undermining Development - The European Arms Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa, by William Benson. London, 1998: Prevention of Violent Conflict and the Coherence of EU Policies towards the Horn of Africa, by Emma Visman & Emery Brusset. London, April 1998; WSP Info/UNRISD: War-torn Societies Project in Somalia, prepared by Martin Doornbos. Geneva/Switzerland, 1998
Other publications:	Somalia - The Missed Opportunities, by Mohamed Sahnoun. Washington DC, USIP, 1994; Humanitarian Aid to Somalia - Evaluation Report. Netherlands Development Cooperation. The Hague, 1994; Building the Peace - Experiences of Collaborative Peacebuilding in Somalia: 1993-1996, by Wolfgang Heinrich. LPI, Uppsala, 1997; Learning from Somalia - The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, by W. Clarke, J. Herbst (Eds.). Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1997; Humanitarian BandAids in Sudan and Somalia Crisis Response, by J. Prendergast. London, Pluto Press, 1997; Somalia: When two Anarchies meet, by Kenneth D. Bush. In: Canada and Missions for Peace - Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia and Somalia. Eds. G. Wirick and R. Miller. Ottawa/Canada, International Development Research Centre. 1997.
Selected Internet Sites:	http://www.somali.com/ (Somalia On Line); http://www.etek.chalmers.se/~e3hassan/news.html (Somali News Page); http://www.somalilandnet.com/Somaliland Net; http://members.tripod.com/~sepado/ (Somali NGO based in United Arab Emirates); http://www.arab.net/somalia/somalia_contents.html (ArabNet on Somalia);
Resource Contacts:	Jalal Abdul Latif - Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa; Abdullah Mahmoud - Department Political Science, University of Amsterdam, fax +31 20 525 2086. Email mohamoud@pscw.uva.nl; Ahmed M. Haji-Jama - expert in Somalian affairs, notably Puntland, Toronto/Canada. Email ahajijama@globalserve.net; Rakiya Omaar - African Rights. Email omaar@global.net.co.uk; Karthi Govender - ACCORD. Email karthig@accord.org.uk; Mohamed Salih - Institute of Social Studies, The Hague/the Netherlands, fax +31 70 426 0799. Email salih@iss.nl; Dorothé Appels, NOVIB, The Hague\The Netherlands, fax +31 70 361 4461, Email dorothe.appels@novib.nl
Organisations:	COGWO;P.O. Box 71135; Nairobi; Kenya; tel +252 121 5292; fax +252 121 5048; email cogwo@compuserve.com Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Peace and Human Rights Network; Life and Peace Institute; Inter Africa Group; Nairobi Peace Initiative; African Rights Arab Organisation for Human Rights

About the author

Jos van Beurden studied Law and Peace at the Universities of Utrecht, Amsterdam and Groningen in the Netherlands. He has studied Northeast Africa since 1977, paying regular visits to Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea since 1985. He has also visited Somalia and Djibouti. He is the author of country studies on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan for the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, and of an Ethiopia NGO Country Profile for the Dutch Co-Financing Agencies.