Author	Reinoud Leenders
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

The conflict within Egypt can be politically explained, on the one hand, by the persistent refusal of the Egyptian government since the 1950s to allow the Islamic opposition to fully participate in the country's constitutional political life and, on the other hand, by the Islamic movement's ambiguity in denouncing the use of violence in achieving its aim of 'islamising' society. Moreover, the escalation of the conflict is closely related to socio-economic imbalances and the continuing failure of the state to address widespread poverty and relative deprivation.
Following the 1952 revolution by the 'Free Officers', a state of emergency was proclaimed and all political parties were banned in 1953-54. The leader of the Free Officers, Mohamad Naguib, was deposed in 1954 and Egypt's new president, Gamal Abdul-Nasser, launched a one-party political system that from 1962 transformed into the Egyptian 'Arab socialist Republic'. While all 'acceptable' political and social forces were supposed to be represented in the 'National Rally', later renamed the 'Socialist Union', the Muslim Brotherhood, a large movement with several hundreds of thousand members, became the target of political exclusion and state repression. Thousands of alleged members of the group were imprisoned for allegedly wanting to overthrow the regime by participating in the movement's 'secret cells'. Most of them remained in prison until the early 1970s when Abdul-Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, initiated his 'Reform Movement' that aimed at boosting economic growth and partly reversing the authoritarian policies of the former era.
In 1966, the Muslim Brotherhood's spiritual leader Sayyid al-Qutb and other activists were executed on charges of treason for conspiring against the state. As a result, important sections of the Brotherhood radicalised and split from the mainstream Islamic movement. The main source of disagreement within the Egyptian Islamic movement has since been the use of force to bring about political change and the Islamisation of society. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to adhere to a gradual and non-violent approach, and enjoys support among wide sections of society, including its upper class and state bureaucrats. Among the two most important breakaway factions advocating and committing violence are the Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the Jihad movement that mostly recruit from lower middle class sections of society and students at Egypt's universities and technical scientific institutions. Both radical groups are also reported to have recruited members in the army and security forces.
Under the new regime of Anwar al-Sadat, these factions formed clandestine organisations aiming at the violent ousting of what they perceived as a 'secular' and 'infidel' regime. Sadat calculated that some truce had to be reached with the more moderate factions, not least to counter the strong leftist opposition to his policies of economic liberalisation. To achieve this goal, several accommodating measures were taken, including banning 'reformist' books, novels and other publications on Islam or referring to Islamic themes. Even English translations of the Koran were banned, including the translation by UK publishing house Penguin which is allowed in conservative Moslim countries like Saudi Arabia.
Sadat also allowed a few political currents to organise themselves as political parties, some of them incorporating Islamic activists. But Sadat found himself under mounting criticism from the secular and Islamic opposition for his peace overtures towards Israel, his friendly foreign policies towards the West, continuing violations of the freedom of speech and freedom of association, widening income inequalities, and the regime's perceived 'secular' character. Sadat responded with repression and the arrest of over a thousand leading opposition figures. Many newspapers and magazines were closed and over a hundred journalists were dismissed. In 1981 Sadat was killed by a member of al-Jihad. Attempts by other Jihad members to capitalise on the resulting chaos in the country and to overthrow the regime failed and hundreds of militant activists were arrested.
The new president, Hosni Mubarak, soon restored the accommodation policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood and secular opposition forces. Muslim Brothers were allowed to participate and ultimately take over the leadership of several professional syndicates, which, with parliamentary life more heavily controlled, increasingly began to operate as an alternative platform for political expression. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood was tolerated in setting up alliances with legal parties, currently the Labour Party, thus enabling it to occupy a limited number of seats in parliament.
The tendency of more lenience towards individual political activists of the Muslim Brotherhood began to be reversed from the late 1980s when more militant Islamic groupings increasingly made themselves heard through their spectacular attacks on state symbols and leading politicians. In 1987, two assassination attempts, one against the Interior minister and a second against a director of a state-owned publishing house, failed. In 1990, Rifa'at al-Mahjub, the speaker of the Parliament, and his body-guards were killed in an attack by armed Islamic activists. Another assassination attempt was carried out, but failed, against hard-line Interior minister Zaki Badr. Some clashes, although limited in scale, broke out in the south and, closer to Cairo, Fayum. Gradually, political liberties became increasingly restricted and the government began justifying its ban on political gatherings, conferences and publications by referring to the uneasy security situation.

Conflict Dynamics

In 1992, intense armed conflicts broke out, with thousands of troops fighting numerous secret Islamic groupings. These clashes took place mainly in Upper Egypt and have continued, with varying degrees of intensity, up to the present day. In many respects the conflict has gained alarming proportions (see: Tawfiz Ibrahim, 1994).
Firstly, the scale of armed conflicts widened with the army and security forces using helicopters, heavy armour and more troops to repress or retaliate against violent attacks by Islamic armed groups. Especially in 1993, major army operations were carried out in Imbaba (a poor neighbourhood of Cairo), Asyut, Dayrut and in the Aswan area, followed by mass arrests of suspected Islamic militants. Secondly, whereas the clashes were formerly confined to certain restricted areas (Cairo, Giza, Bani Swayf, Asyut, Minya, Fayum and Suhaq), the conflict now spread throughout virtually the whole country. Thirdly, while the Gama'a and al-Jihad had initially restricted their targets to security and police forces, and politicians, they now broadened their range of targets to include tourists, intellectuals and members of Egypt's Coptic minority.
In June 1992, Farag Fawda, a secularist writer, was killed because he was suspected of having ties with Israel. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by al-Jihad. In May 1992, armed Islamic activists also killed thirteen Copts in the Asyut province. Failed assassination attempts were carried out against Safwat al-Sharif (the minister of Information), in April 1993, and Hassan al-Alfi (the minister of Interior), in August 1993. Fourthly, Egyptian volunteers who had joined the Mujahidin guerrilla war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan returned to Egypt where they joined the ranks of armed Islamic groups. This led to a professionalisation of their operations. Fifthly, the government demanded more powers to fight the 'terrorism' it was facing. Thus, in addition to the already sweeping powers given to security and army forces by the prolonged state of emergency, in 1992 an 'anti-terrorism' law (Law 97) was promulgated. The law introduced the death penalty for members of 'terrorist organisations' and gave additional powers to the security forces to fight 'terrorism' with all means.
The main victims of the armed operations undertaken by Islamic militants have been security personnel, some members of Egypt's Coptic minority, state officials, and foreign tourists, all targeted in hit-and-run assaults. Human rights concerns have also been voiced about the security forces' operations to counter 'terrorism' which include imposing 'collective punishment' on villages allegedly sheltering Islamic militants. Trials have been grossly unfair and failed to meet both Egyptian and international legal standards. In these circumstances, human rights organisations are especially concerned over the death sentences imposed on 85 'terrorists' since 1992, of which 64 executions have been carried out. During the same period, approximately 20,000 other alleged Islamic activists have been held as political prisoners.
In 1994 the Egyptian Human Rights Organisation documented twenty cases of 'disappearances', cases of torture, police brutality, incommunicado detention, and the arrest of family members of suspected Islamic activists. Extra-judicial executions by police forces were also reported. For example, in 1993 eight suspected Islamic activists were shot dead after being captured during a police raid on a mosque in Aswan. Many attacks carried out by armed Islamic groups were in direct response to such practices. On the other hand, killings and violence by Islamic armed groups of innocent civilians have been equally denounced as gross violations of human rights.
Following the killing of 58 tourists in Luxor in the south of Egypt, in November 1997, for which responsibility was claimed by the Gama'a, the state stepped up its security campaign against Islamic armed groups and slowly gained the upper-hand in the conflict. The number of armed attacks has since decreased while al-Jihad and the Gama'a are believed to have failed to recruit new members. Consequently, imprisoned leaders of both groups have been forced to indirectly acknowledge military defeat and denounce the use of further violence.
In 1997, for the first time, imprisoned Islamic leaders called for a general cease-fire and negotiations with the government. This call was publicly supported in October 1998 by Sheikh 'Omar 'Abd al-Rahman, the spiritual leader of the Gama'a who was serving a prison term in the United States. Although the government has denied any rapprochement, in 1998 it silently freed 5,000 imprisoned members of the Gama'a. In April 1999 it released another 1,200 members, among whom several senior activists.
However, the position taken on the use of violence by splinter groups of the Gama'a based in Europe and Afghanistan has remained ambiguous. Shortly after the cease-fire initiative of the Gama'a, supporters of Al-Jihad in exile issued a statement saying it will continue its armed struggle to turn Egypt into a strict Islamic state. In December 1998, al-Jihad even promised to wage a 'long battle' against the United States which it sees as an enemy of Islam. Such reluctance to surrender may explain why these activists continue to be sentenced to death, as illustrated last April when nine al-Jihad members, all residing outside Egypt, were given the death sentence while 107 others, half of them in absentia, received life sentences. With measures in force to curb the armed Islamic opposition, the government increasingly took repressive measures against the Muslim Brotherhood. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections held in 1995, hundreds of alleged Muslim Brothers were arrested and dozens of them received prison sentences of up to five years. New mass arrests took place in 1999. Hundreds of alleged Muslim Brothers were held in so-called preventive detention without trial while others still await prosecution. In May 2000, the government ordered the closure of the Islamic Labour party and its mouthpiece As-Sha'ab. Three journalists of As-Sha'ab were convicted in August 1999 on charges of libel and have since been regarded by Amnesty International as Prisoners of Conscience. In the months preceeding the parliamentary elections of October and November 2000, approximately 1,000 alleged Muslim Brothers were arrested, including numerous 'independent' candidates for the elections.

Official Conflict Management

United Nations efforts to contribute to conflict management have been limited to monitoring the human rights situation in Egypt and pressing the Egyptian government to comply with international standards of basic human rights. In 1993, the UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture called upon the Egyptian government to lift the state of emergency in force since 1981 which gives exceptional powers to security forces and special courts. In May 2000, the UN Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights called for the amendment or repeal of the NGO Law in accordance with Egypt's international obligations regarding human rights.
Both European official donors and the United States have largely refrained from linking their aid to and cooperation with Egypt to an improvement in the country's human rights record or to the formulation of any policies of conflict management. This runs counter to the recently adopted Common Strategy on the Mediterranean in which it is stressed that the European Union will work with its Mediterranean partners to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also contradicts the forthcoming Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt, which contains references to human rights principles. The United States has similarly refrained from making its aid to Egypt (amounting to US$ 1.3 billion worth of arms and military training annually for 20 years in addition to US$ 775 million in economic aid in 1998) conditional on human rights improvements. However, during an official visit by Egypt's president Hosni Mubarak to Washington, June 1999, the Clinton administration put some pressure on Egypt by describing its new restrictive law on NGOs (see below) as 'a step in the wrong direction'.
Regionally, two initiatives have been taken to combat 'terrorism' in Egypt, both of which see the challenge of Islamic fundamentalism merely as a security issue. Firstly, Egypt is an active and founding member of a summit organisation set up by the ministers of the Interior of several Arab countries which was developed in the early 1990s. The aim is to achieve closer coordination between security services and exchanging information on the activities and whereabouts of Islamic activists. In practice, cooperation has been extended to include taking a common stand against international human rights organisations that criticised Egypt's and other countries' internal security policies. In line with these attempts at closer cooperation, 1,000 suspected Islamic activists were reportedly extradited to Egypt in 1998 by other Arab member states of the summit organisation.
Secondly, in 1996 a conference was held in Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt), the 'Summit of Peacemakers', following several bomb attacks in Jerusalem by Palestinian Islamic groups. Participants included most Arab countries and Israel, the EU and the US. Here too, preparations were made for closer coordination of intelligence and security operations to curb 'terrorist' organisations, including Egyptian groups, which oppose the current Middle East peace process and their architects.
The Egyptian government continues to stress that local armed Islamic groups are being sponsored and trained by neighbouring countries including Sudan and Iran. Semi-official Egyptian newspapers have also laid similar charges against groups based in Saudi Arabia. Such allegations have seriously disturbed Egypt's relations with these countries. No concrete evidence of these foreign links has been made public. In October 1998 an attempt was made to overcome major differences with Sudan, including the latter's alleged support of armed Islamic groups, by way of several meetings between the Egyptian and Sudanese ministers of Foreign Affairs. It was agreed as a first step in further confidence-building to refrain from raising media campaigns against each other. However, Egyptian-Sudanese relations remain strained.
In a further development, in September 1998, the British government adopted a law banning refugees, including Egyptian Islamic activists, from raising funds and/or organising their armed activities on British soil. Extradition of Islamic suspects residing mainly in the UK and France, as generally but not explicitly demanded by Egypt, has not been considered. However, other governments have become more cooperative since al-Jihad members are believed to have been involved in 1998's bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Dozens of suspects were handed over to the Egyptian government by Albania, Azerbadjian, Ecuador, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Libya. Most of those extradited received harsh sentences, largely following unfair trials. More generally, the Egyptian government does not seem to be prepared to open up the political process to opposition forces, including more moderate Islamic groups.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Local NGOs in Egypt have been relatively free to operate for a long time, despite the fact that the state has maintained its powers to curb their activities and carry out arbitrary arrests of activists associated with NGOs. However, since 1998 the government has stepped up its campaign to muzzle human rights defenders and pro-democracy activists on the pretext that they violated regulations regarding foreign funding and criminal law. Although the government already has ample legal instruments at hand to control or shut down NGOs on political grounds, the Egyptian parliament passed a new law (Law 153) in May 1999 that further encroached upon the NGOs freedom to organise and act. Ambiguously, the new law banned private groups from working to influence government policy or union activity. It gave the Ministry of Social Affairs powers to disband boards of directors while NGOs have to seek permission from the government before accepting foreign donations. The new law sets prison terms of up to two years for violations of vaguely formulated offences such as 'threatening law, public morality, order and national unity'. Following a wave of protest of both Egyptian and International NGOs, the law was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on procedural grounds and suspended. The country's older law on NGOs (Law 32 of 1964), which is seen as equally repressive, remains in force.
Few NGOs, either internationally or locally, have tried to contribute directly to conflict management and/or prevention in Egypt. But strategies of advocacy, primarily by raising awareness of human rights and calling on all parties to the conflict to refrain from violence, have been undertaken by several local human rights groups, at least one private think-tank, professional syndicates, and secularist political parties.
At least one regional NGO and two Egyptian NGO have been involved in capacity-building by providing human rights courses to lawyers, police officers and children, and facilitating the reintegration of former armed Islamic activists into society. At least one international NGO has been involved in attempts to introduce conflict resolution methods to local NGOs. More moderate Islamic forces have tried to mediate, via discreet diplomacy, between armed Islamic groups and the government. International human rights organisations have undertaken numerous fact-finding missions, registering gross human rights violations by both sides in the conflict, resulting in detailed and comprehensive reports.
The most active exponent of Egypt's human rights movement is the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR). The EOHR was established in 1985 as an affiliate to the Arab Organisation for Human Rights (AOHR) and conducts excellent research on human rights issues, publishes reports and assists victims of human rights abuses and their lawyers. Although the EOHR did not receive a formal status as NGO, the government largely tolerated its activities. However, since November 1998, the government stepped up its campaign against the EOHR after the latter had published a report on human rights violations in the predominantly Coptic Christian village of al-Kushh, Upper Egypt. The Secretary-General of the EOHR, Hafez Abu Sa'ada, was accused of illegally accepting funds from the British embassy without giving required notification to the authorities, and briefly detained. In February 2000, the General Prosecution Office referred the case to the (Emergency) Supreme State Security Court under charges which carry a minumum of seven years imprisonment. The case is still pending.
Other human rights organisations include the Centre for Human Rights and Legal Aid, established in 1994, which provides free legal assistance and representation to victims of human rights abuses. The Legal Reserach and Resource Center for Human Rights, established in 1991, organised human rights education programmes for lawyers and school pupils in various regions of the country. Other human rights organisations include the El Nadim Centre for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, the Centre of Women's Issues, the Association of Human Rights Advocates, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, the Regional Program for Human Rights Activists and the Land Centre for Human Rights.
Most promising, perhaps, have been the activities of the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldun Centre, established in 1988. It publishes a magazine called Civil Society and is involved in local development projects and democracy awareness campaigns. The Centre advocates a 'peaceful and constructive way of dealing with Islamic militants through a strategy of 'inclusion'. The Centre has provided former Islamic militants with financial aid and guidance to set up their own small-scale businesses and facilitate their reintegration into society. In Spring 2000, the Centre produced a video urging voters to participate in the parliamentary elections, touching upon the restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression and organisation. This initiative triggered off the arrest of several staff members of the Centre, including its director Sa'ad Eddin Ibrahim, on charges of accepting unauthorised foreign funding and unspecified charges of embezzlement which carry penalties of up to 15 years imprisonment. Following several extensions of their detention, the 28 defendants were released on bail. Their trial is scheduled to take place on 18 November 2000.
Some of Egypt's 'semi-NGOs', the professional syndicates, have long been among the most active groups advocating respect for human rights. But since the government promulgated a law setting tight restrictions on their internal election procedures in 1993, the syndicates have increasingly been taken over by government appointees or have become paralysed due to internal divisions caused by the government's infiltration of their administrative boards. In October 1999, 20 leading activists in the syndicates were arrested and brought to trial on charges of their affiliation to an illegal organisation (the Muslim Brotherhood). The arrests occurred a few days after a court had cleared the way for long-delayed board elections in the Bar Association. Three of the defendants would have stood as candidates during these elections were it not for their arrest. Their case is still pending.
Some of Egypt's political parties have also been involved in human rights advocacy and have called for a peaceful solution of the conflict. A leftist coalition of secular opposition forces, the Tagammu party, has organised symposia and raised awareness campaigns on human rights and the use of non-violent means to achieve political ends. It has also expressed its strong opposition to the state's Islamisation of society which it views as playing into the hands of violent Islamic groups. On several occasions, Egypt's legalised opposition parties, have made joint appeals to the government to address the country's over-stretched crisis of political participation. In 1997, opposition parties released 'the Programme for Democratic, Political and Constitutional Reforms' which centred around the need to adopt a political system that ensures a peaceful sharing and transfer of power. In April 1999, four licensed parties in addition to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party released a joint petition stressing the need to introduce urgent and basic political reforms, especially with regard to the method of electing the head of state.
The officially banned Muslim Brotherhood is reported to have brokered local cease-fires between militant Islamic groups and security forces, mainly in the early 1990s. Possibly as a result of the mediation efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood, informal contacts with the government were established in 1993. However, militant Muslims reportedly interpreted this attempt at rapprochement as a sign of weakness on the part of the government and, subsequently, stepped up their violent attacks.
The Muslim Brotherhood is also involved in the activities of a think-tank run by the prominent Islamic judge Tariq al-Bishri. It publishes an annual report on human rights and democracy in Egypt, the 'Nation in a Year', modelled on a similar annual report by the semi-state sponsored Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. More recently, the Muslim Brotherhood has begun publishing leaflets advocating the use of non-violent means to bring about social change.

International
The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), founded in Cyprus in 1983, provides technical assistance and training facilities to lawyers and a platform for discussing human rights and the legal profession in Arab countries, including Egypt. Following many unsuccesful attempts to legalise the organisation, it was finally granted formal recognition by the government in early 2000. In June and July 2000, the AOHR provided training courses in human rights to police officers and prosecutors. The project was coordinated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and financed by the Dutch government. The Arab Lawyers' Union is engaged in similar activities.
Search For Common Ground in the Middle East, an international NGO with its head office in Washington, has tried to introduce conflict resolution methods to local NGOs and other groups in civil society. In 1997 it launched a Conflict Resolution Working Group in Egypt, providing training for journalists, social workers, students and lecturers and labour activists. Follow-up workshops were held in 1998. Search for Common Ground closely cooperates with an Egyptian NGO, the National Center for Middle East Studies.
Fact-finding missions were undertaken by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, collecting testimonies from victims of violence committed by government forces, including torture and mass-reprisals following Islamic attacks, and of violence committed by armed Islamic groups. Together with other human rights organisations, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch issued joint statements, one in July 2000 concerning the arrest of staff members of the Ibn Khaldun Centre, and another in August 2000, calling upon the EU to 'break its silence and strongly condemn the attack on civil society' in Egypt. In February 2000, Amnesty International also asked the Egyptian government to consider not renewing the state of emergency that was routinously extended two months later.
In the United States, American Coptic organisations and right wing Christian groups, working with conservative congressional sponsors of the Freedom from Religious Persecution Act, sent a strongly worded letter in February 1999 signed by 93 American legislators, calling the Egyptian government to set up an independent investigation into allegations of torture of Coptic Egyptians arrested in a small village in the Nile delta in August 1998. These demands were supported by other human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch. However, unlike American Christian activists, most human rights organisations tend to see the conflict in Egypt more as a general human rights crisis than as a clear case of religious persecution.
Generally, the potentially positive effects of most of these and other NGO activities have been severely curtailed by repressive policies carried out by the Egyptian government that continues to regard the conflict as a mere security problem. According to one observer, the government's hostile attitude to private initiatives has also been fed by its fear of mass-scale protests against the socio-economic consequences of its economic liberalisation programme. (see: Kienle, 1998)
Most NGOs therefore have encountered government efforts to obstruct their activities. On the one hand, Egypt's human rights movement has been described by Human Rights Watch as 'one of the most dynamic and sophisticated in the Arab world'. But the government increasingly took repressive measures against NGOs advocating human rights and democracy, as witnessed by the case of the EOHR and the Ibn Khaldun Centre. Due to the government's renewed application of a military decree of 1992 (Military Decree 4), that bans unauthorised foreign funding, many Egyptian NGOs now face severe financial difficulties.
The influence of political parties have been similarly curtailed, by arbitrary and discriminatory legalisation of their formal status, vote-rigging and 'preventive' arrests during elections and by financial superiority of the government party NDP, limiting the audience reached by alternative voices. Regionally, the AOHR has become increasingly a target of the Arab governments' policies that rely on force rather than on peaceful methods of conflict resolution. The Egyptian government's attitude towards more moderate Islamic members of the Muslim Brotherhood has obstructed the latter's mediation attempts. The government continued to reject the Muslim Brotherhood's requests to become a legal political party. In 1996, a group of young dissidents within the Muslim Brotherhood set up the Wassat party, which stressed liberal-democratic principles, apparently in a quest to leave behind the Muslim Brotherhood's ambiguous reputation concerning respect for democratic rules and principles. The party was not legalised, however, and its members were prosecuted.

Prospects

Most independent observers have stressed that the Egyptian government's reliance on military force to fight 'terrorism' is in the long run likely to be counter-productive. Excluding any Islamic tendency from the country's constitutional politics will only invite them to opt for less peaceful means to advocate their aim of Islamizing society.
Furthermore, the government's strategy of paying lip-service to certain Islamic party principles, such as raising obstacles for women wanting to play an active role in civil society on perceived 'Islamic' grounds, has actually increased the popular appeal of Islamic hard-liners, making further ideological concessions difficult to avoid. (Karam, 1998) For example, by banning secular women's organisations, like Nawal al-Sa'dawi's Arab Women's Solidarity Association, which campaigned against the country's women-unfriendly personal status law, the state has actively contributed to the Islamisation of the women's debate.
A consensus has emerged that the current status-quo wherein Islamic armed groups are less able to launch new attacks will produce some degree of armoured political stability, at least temporarily. Armed Islamic groups have also been reported to have lost support among their earlier constituencies. However, in the long term, most observers emphasise that Egypt should come to terms with its crises of political participation and the negative socio-economic effects of economic liberalisation if the country is ever to solve the armed conflict between the state and Islamic armed groups. However, immediate solutions for both crises do not seem likely. Pressure by Western donors to speed up economic liberalisation and a retreat of the state from its welfare functions is likely to further exacerbate income disparities. According to one observer, the government's hostile attitude to private initiatives has especially been fed by its fear of mass-scale protests against the socio-economic consequences of its economic liberalisation programme. (see: Kienle, 1998). In terms of political participation, liberties continue to be curtailed and access to the decision-making centre of the presidency is more restricted than ever before. Egyptians will go to the polls in Autumn 1999 in another round of presidential 'elections' for which Mubarak is the only candidate.

Recommendations

Virtually all human rights organisations mentioned above, in particular Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Arab Organisation for Human Rights, have called upon both the Egyptian state and Islamic armed groups to immediately stop using arbitrary violence in order to achieve greater respect for human rights at large. They have equally called upon armed Islamic groups to publicly revoke all death threats without further delay.
Moreover, the Egyptian state has been called upon to harmonise its legal system with international law, particularly in the field of women's rights, to strengthen both more moderate Islamic groups and alternative voices in civil society. Likewise, NGOs active in the field of human rights should be given more freedom to operate as their activists and members may check opposition forces opting for violent methods. Some independent observers have advised the Egyptian state to allow more moderate Islamic forces, like the Muslim Brotherhood, to participate in the country's constitutional political framework in order to counter the appeal of armed opposition. It has also been stressed that the Egyptian state, and international financial organisations involved in Egypt's economic restructuring programme, should set up social funds to cushion the effects of privatisation and cuts on state subsidies on the poor.

Service Information

Newsletters and periodicals:	Al-Ahram Weekly (English version of main Egyptian daily Al-Ahram); Al-Wassat (London-based Arabic weekly with excellent Egypt coverage); Civil Society Bulletin (monthly on human rights and democracy in Egypt, last issue April 2000), Ibn Khaldun Centre; Middle East International (bimonthly on regional politics incl. excellent coverage of Egypt); Middle East Report (quarterly containing semi-academic articles on regional affairs, including Egypt)
Reports:	Amnesty International; Human Rights Abuses by Armed Groups, 1998; Women targeted by Association, 1997; Indefinite Detention and Systematic Torture - the Forgotten Victims, 1996; Deaths in Custody, 1995; Human Rights Defenders under Threat, 1994;Article 19; The Egyptian predicament - Islamists, the State and Censorship, 8/97;Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights; A Crime without Punishment - Torture in Egypt, 12/93;Human Rights Watch; Hostage-Taking and Intimidation by Security Forces, 1995; Violations of Freedom of Religious Belief and Expression of the Christian Minority, 1994
Other publications:	In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, by May Kassem. Ithaca Press, 1999; Political Islam - Religion and Politics in the Arab World, by Nazih Ayubi. Routledge, 1991; Sadat and After - Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul, by Raymond W.Baker. Harvard University Press, 1990; Egypt, Islam and Democracy - Twelve critical essays, by S. Eddin Ibrahim. American University in Cairo Press, 1996; Women, Islamisms and the State - Contemporary Feminism in Egypt, by A.M. Karam. St. Martins Press, 1998; The Prophet and the Pharao - Muslim Extremism in Egypt, by Gilles Kepel. University of California Press, 1985; More than a Response to Islamism - The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s, by Eberhard Kienle. In: Middle East Journal, vol 52, no 2, Spring 1998; The Struggle of State and Civil Society in Egypt - Professional Organisations and Egypt's Careful Steps towards Democracy, by Reinoud Leenders. Middle East Associates paper series, Amsterdam, 1996; La violence Politique en Egypte, by Hasanayn Tawfiz Ibrahim. In: Le phenomene de la violence politique: perspectives comparatistes et paradigme egyptien, P. Dupret (ed), Dossiers du Cedej, Cairo, 1994; The State of Religion in Egypt, by D. Rashwan (ed). Annual report prepared by the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies; The Nation in a Year, by T. El-Bishri a.o. (eds). Annual report related to democratisation, religion and human rights in Egypt prepared by researchers close to the Muslim Brotherhood (in Arabic).
Selected Internet Sites:	http://www.geocities.com/~lrrc/ (Legal Research and Resource Centre for Human Rights); http://www.acpss.org (Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Sudies);http://www.ibnkhaldun.org/newsletter/ (Civil Society Bulletin); http://www.chrla.org/ (Egyptian Centre for Human Rights); http://www.frcu.eun.eg (Egyptian Human Rights Network homepage); http://www.derechos.org/Eohr/doc/ (for reports and news of the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights) http://www.uk.sis.gov.eg (State Information Service); http://www.menc.edu/menic/centers.htlm (Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas); http://www.mideastnet.com/ups/ (review Egyptian press); http://www.almurabeton.org/ (al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in exile); http://www.aohr.org (Arab Org. for Human Rights)
Resource Contacts:	Paul Aarts - University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, email aarts@pscw.uva.nl; Ibrahim Allam - executive director Arab organisation for Human Rights; Saad Eddin Ibrahim - American University of Cairo and director of Ibn Khaldun Center; Eberhard Kienle - School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, email ek@soas.ac.uk;Dia'a Rashwan, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies; Mustapha Kamal al-Sayyid - University of Cairo, Faculty of Economics and Political Science Gama'a Street, Giza - Cairo; Gasser Abdel-Razak -contact person of the Center for Humna Rights Legal Aid, fax +202-302 2241, email: gasser@chrla.org;
Organizations:	Legal Research and Resource Centre for Human Rights;Tel. +202-452 0977;Fax +202-259 6622 Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section:;Ibn Khaldun Centre;National Centre for Middle East Studies;Amnesty International;Human Right Watch

About the author

Reinoud Leenders is based in Beirut where he is affiliated to the American University as an associate researcher in Political Economy. He reports on Lebanese current affairs for Middle East International. He also writes for a Dutch newspaper and the Lebanese daily An-Nahar on Middle Eastern politics. He is preparing a PhD thesis on the Political Economy of Lebanon for the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). In 1996 and 1997 he worked as a researcher in the North Africa team of Amnesty International in London.