Author	Bram Posthumus
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2001

Summary

Sierra Leone owes its name to the Portuguese explorers and conquerors who first came to the land in the late fifteenth century when it was under the influence of the Malian Empire. The Portuguese, and later the British, were engaged in the trade of slaves and local commodities. Having dominated the slave trade, the British banned it in 1807 and began resettling slaves from Canada, Jamaica and the United Kingdom itself to a new town, appropriately named Freetown. The British navy at sea also recaptured slaves from other parts of West Africa and set them ashore. These various groups coalesced into a community that came to be known by its language: Krio. Freetown flourished and became a centre of education. The Krio ruled supremely and complacently until independence from Britain in 1961.
The post-independence governments were characterised by ever increasing levels of corruption and nepotism. The first democratically elected government was replaced by a military regime, which proceeded to take corruption to previously unimagined levels. The late 1960s saw a number of elections, two coups and finally the installation of the third government, headed by the former Freetown mayor, Siaka Stevens. He ushered in a period of one-party rule, which in the view of the analyst Lansana Gberie, sowed the seeds of Sierra Leone's present troubles by its tendency to exclude the majority of Sierra Leoneans from the political and economic mainstream. Joseph Momoh, who took over in 1985, headed the fourth in the series of kleptocratic governments. Momoh was forced by donors to carry out a structural adjustment programme that brought what remained of the country's economy crashing to its knees. He also announced a return to multiparty-ism, thus fulfilling the second major donor demand.
In December 1989, a conflict broke out in neighbouring Liberia between the military dictator there and a movement calling itself the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by Charles Taylor, currently the president of Liberia. This conflict was soon to spill over into Sierra Leone.
In March 1991, the first incursion took place, allegedly by Taylor's forces in retaliation for the fact that Sierra Leone had participated in the Nigerian-led West African intervention force, which at the time was acting as an anti-Taylor army in Liberia. Momoh enlisted the aid of Guinea-Conakry and Nigeria and sent his ill-equipped and poorly trained army to the border area. By June, the failure of the army intervention became apparent.
By this time it was also clear that there was a Sierra Leonean dimension to the rebellion. The rebels had set up base in Pendembu, in the north-east of the country and had named themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The RUF had its roots in a radical student movement in the 1980s, which had denounced government corruption and demanded change. They were headed by Foday Sankoh, an ex-army corporal who had been jailed in 1971 for a minor part in an alleged coup against Momoh's predecessor.
The RUF's political programme extended little further than the overthrow of Momoh - a desire which was by now universal in Sierra Leone - although Sankoh's remarks to the effect that the RUF believed in a multiparty democracy and free trade might be construed as a kind of political agenda. Whatever its political character, the RUF was able to capitalise on the widespread and deep-seated frustration in the Sierra Leonian population, particularly among the many young people who felt short-changed in their education, employment and living standards. Whether abducted or serving as volunteers, disenchanted youngsters provided the core of the RUF fighting force. The RUF developed a strategy of conducting a reign of terror in the areas they controlled, for which they would become notorious.
Before independence, the British colonisers created an artificial division between the coast and the interior with positions of power and influence going to members of the coastal community. However, the corrupt cliques who came into power after independence have been predominantly from the interior. The new elites in Freetown stripped the country bare leaving the rest of the population with little apart from their frustration. Paul Richards argues that 'frustration' is a key word for understanding the conflict in Sierra Leone. However, it should also be said that, for the average Sierra Leonean, the 'issues' of this struggle seem pretty indistinguishable. Both sides have shown themselves adept at the profession of lofty ideals - perhaps a legacy of Freetown's distinguished educational past - but the problem is that the ideals proclaimed by both sides are constantly betrayed.
Hundreds of thousands have voted with their feet and left the country until such time as the violence comes to an end.

Conflict Dynamics

The coup that brought 27 year-old captain Valentine Strasser to power on April 29, 1992 will probably be remembered as the action of a young man who came to collect his wages and found himself in charge of a country. Strasser and his men had not been paid and were frustrated by the lack of progress made by the counter-insurgency measures. Strasser set up the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), which consisted of six civilians and seventeen members of the military. It was hoped that the NPRC would change the old corrupt ways and end the conflict through dialogue as Strasser had promised. However, in late 1992, RUF forces overran Kono, the country's main diamond area, dealing a further blow to the already crippled economy. The RUF continued to receive assistance from Liberia but there was also evidence of local support, particularly from some traditional chiefs.
NPRC and RUF forces were dragging the country into a vicious circle of violence, as was illustrated in the July-September 1993 issue of the BBC's Focus on Africa magazine. One picture showed a head on a pole, surrounded by smiling soldiers. 'Government handiwork', the caption read. The other showed three corpses that had spilled out of a car. 'Rebel handiwork', this caption read. Soldiers and rebels both engaged in extensive looting of the countryside, they illegally harvested cocoa and coffee, illicitly mined gold and diamonds and committed acts of terror against the population. Reports suggested that they actually worked in unison, in order to prolong the war. The people could no longer make any distinction between the two and gave the English language a new word for this phenomenon: 'sobel'.
In the first half of 1993, the government regained most of the territory it had lost and the rebels retreated to Kailahun in the north-east. The rise of an anti-Taylor faction in the part of Liberia bordering Sierra Leone cut off most supply lines, making the RUF more dependent on gathering what it needed from the local population. In 1994, the Sierra Leonean and Nigerian governments established a defence pact. Meanwhile the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) extended the mandate of peacekeeping troops in Liberia to include Sierra Leone. These troops are known by their acronym: ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group).
Strasser was ousted by his second-in-command, brigadier Julius Maade Bio in January 1996. Bio opened direct talks with Foday Sankoh and promised elections. Strasser had never initiated the promised dialogue with the RUF; instead he had enlisted the military assistance of the Nepalese crack fighters, the Ghurkhas. When this failed, he had hired the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) in May 1995, in order to dislodge the rebels who were by then on the outskirts of Freetown. EO forced the RUF into retreat and was paid handsomely in diamond-mining concessions for its efforts. The South Africans also started training a new anti-rebel force that was to emerge in the course of 1996: the Kamajors. These are traditional hunters, mainly of Mende origin, and surrounded by a degree of mythology about their invulnerability.
Thanks to this outside help, the elections could be held as planned in February 1996. They were won by Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a retired UN official. Following more talks that were facilitated by both official and non-governmental mediators (see Conflict Management), Kabbah and Sankoh signed a peace agreement in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, on November 30, 1996. The agreement provided for the demobilisation of the fighting forces, the recognition of the RUF as a political force, and the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes, a key demand made by Sankoh.
However, it became increasingly apparent that President Kabbah did not represent a radical departure from the old ways, despite protestations that his government was tackling corruption. Moreover, the war did not end. In breach of the Abidjan agreement, Kabbah intensified his Cupertino with Executive Outcomes. The IMF blocked further financial support, effectively stating that it was not prepared to pay for privately hired state-security. EO had to leave in January 1997. Five months later, on May 24 1997, major Johnny Paul Koroma staged a coup and chased Kabbah out of the country. Koroma set up a junta called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The coup was intensely unpopular among the civilian population. The international community slapped an economic and military embargo on Sierra Leone. Koroma invited the RUF into Freetown and for the first time the rebels visited their brand of terrorism on the capital, putting thousands to flight. The RUF/AFRC were dislodged in a major ECOMOG operation in February 1998. There was again mercenary involvement in the restoration of Kabbah to power: the British mercenary outfit Sandline International supplied arms to the Kabbah government.
The RUF/AFRC force and their leaders went back into the bush, pursued by ECOMOG and the Kamajors, now officially regrouped into the Civil Defence Force. According to CDF leader (now Deputy Defence Minister) Hinga Norman, his forces also incorporated traditional hunters from non-Mende origin. Kabbah returned in March. His government showed no appetite for dialogue, deciding to rely instead on a triumphalist attitude and sheer force. Sankoh, who had been arrested while on a visit to Nigeria, was handed over to the government by the Nigerian authorities. He was tried, found guilty of treason and sentenced to death in October. Twenty-four other executions were carried out during 1998. The rebels developed their own tactics in the wake of this reversal: West Africa magazine claims to have seen a report in which the RUF vowed to wreak havoc on the Sierra Leonean people in an operation dubbed Disrupt Civil Life. Sankoh's sentence incensed them into taking parts of Freetown, which they lost again in an extremely messy and ugly battle in January and February 1999, which left up to 6,000 people dead and half the city in ruins.
The Kabbah government and the RUF, once again led by Sankoh who had secured his release, signed a peace deal in the Togolese capital Lomé on July 7, 1999 which incorporated amnesty for the RUF, four cabinet posts for the rebels and further talks on the position of Sankoh. On October 22, the UN Security Council decided to send a 6,000 strong force to Sierra Leone, to monitor the peace and oversee disarmament. But it soon became clear that there were now rebel factions, some of which had no intention to stop the war. In November, a group led by Sam 'Mosquito' Bockarie declared the diamond zone it controlled off-limits for the UN.
The year 2000 saw the gradual unravelling of the peace accord and the further splintering of the rebel force. When the ECOMOG force began to make way for the UN troops the rebels were clearly bent on testing the mettle of the new international force. This had started as early as December 1999 when the RUF attacked departing ECOMOG troops and the UN had to warn it for the consequences of cease-fire violations. The rebels upped the ante. In February, Guinean and Kenyan troops were robbed of their weapons. In May, shortly after the last ECOMOG troops had left, RUF fighters took up to 500 UN troops hostage. More than 250 were released through the intervention of the Liberian president Charles Taylor; 222 had to wait until mid-July when the UN force finally showed its teeth and mounted a successful rescue operation.
It was in the month of May that the peace accord looked shakier than ever. On May 8, Sankoh disappeared after a shootout at his Freetown residence which left scores of civilians dead who had come to petition for peace. Rumours of an impending rebel raid on Freetown were rife. But nine days later Sankoh reappeared, only to be captured by government forces. He has been in government custody ever since. In August, he was reported to have been replaced by his field commander Issa Sesay as leader of the RUF. Most Sierra Leoneans want to see him put on trial as a war criminal. A more robust and enlarged UN force also took on another rebel group known as the West Side Boys (see below) but not with a great deal of success. Instead, the 'Boys' almost dealt a body blow to a British force which had come in during May to evacuate British subjects in the event of a rebel assault on Freetown. However, the British soldiers got more and more involved in peace enforcement and 11 of them were taken hostage on August 25, while on patrol. Six of them had to be freed in a pre-dawn raid on September 10 which left one British soldier and 25 West Side Boys dead.
The rebel force, meanwhile, has splintered into four different factions. First there was a highly public falling out between Sankoh and one of his most fearsome field commanders, Bockarie. He fled to Liberia in December 1999 and has since been involved in training a new rebel force, allegedly out of the Liberian army base in Gbatala and with the aid of a former South African army colonel, Fred Rindle, who previously helped the Unita rebels in Angola. Towards the end of June, troop movements were reported from Liberia into Sierra Leone's diamond areas. The Liberian government hotly denies any involvement and continues to state its commitment to peace in Sierra Leone. Second, the AFRC/RUF alliance disintegrated when the former coup leader Johnny Paul Koroma announced he would be working with the Kabbah government. Since then, RUF rebels have been beaten back further into the interior but no one is taking them on in their strongholds. Even while Koroma spoke, some of his troops were involved in the abduction of UN personnel but the fault lines in the group he used to control have now become clearer. This is the third faction: a section of the former AFRC has split off and renamed itself the West Side Boys. They control some jungle areas some 80 kilometres from Freetown and have proved a force to be reckoned with. The fourth group is of course the RUF itself, which remains in control of vast areas of Sierra Leone's interior.
Against this collection there is an equally unclear assembly of anti-rebel forces, consisting of the Kamajors, some groups that together might be termed the Sierra Leonean army and the soldiers loyal to Koroma. Some army units are trained by the British.
Outside forces also consist of the massive UN force of up to 13,000 and 3,000 returned West African soldiers. Some progress against rebel forces has been made but until the September raid against the West Side Boys by British forces there was hardly any military movement. As Africa Confidential put it in June: 'The real battles lie ahead.'
The people, in whose name the conflict is taking place continue to be its victims. They have fled into the countryside, and across the border to Liberia and Guinea-Conakry in their hundreds of thousands, finding sanctuary in camps or among relatives and taking with them countless tales of starvation, rape, murder, gruesome mutilations and pillage, committed mainly but certainly not exclusively by the RUF. The perpetrators are predominantly uprooted undisciplined teenagers under the influence of hard drugs. Weapons flow freely around the country; in 1993 an AK47 could be bought for US$ 40. The relative popularity of the anti-rebel side among the population seems to reside largely in the fact that they are perceived as the lesser of two evils. As one man told the International Herald Tribune in an article published February 1, 1999: 'The politicians do their own, the rebels do their own, and you're caught in the middle.' Rebels also take their war into Guinea. In September 2000 up to 80 people were killed inside Guinea, prompting the government to pronounce a crackdown on what it claimed were rebel infiltrators among the refugees. Scenes of panic ensued in the capital Conakry where security personnel and freelance gangs rounded up thousands of refugees. Some 2,000 fled into the Sierra Leone embassy compound.

Official Conflict Management

The United Nations Secretary General sent a representative to Sierra Leone in 1995 to help mediate a peace deal between the government and rebels. UN representatives also played a mediating role during the talks in Ivory Coast in 1996 and again, in February 1999, when Secretary General Kofi Annan instructed his envoy, now Special Representative Francis Okelo, to help start a new dialogue between government and rebels. Okelo was present at the talks in Lomé.
When the Abidjan peace agreement was signed, Annan requested a small peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone. The Security Council failed to consider his request, following objections voiced by the RUF and lack of appetite on the part of the United States.
Two years later, acting on a proposal of the Secretary General, the Security Council created the UN Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) on July 13, 1998. It was tasked with monitoring the demobilisation and disarmament of former combatants and training and restructuring the police force. The mission has 61 personnel, a US$ 22.6 million budget and was expected to run until March 13, 1999. UNOMSIL has had little chance to carry out most of its mandate and it had to withdraw its personnel in January 1999. Rebels torched the UNOMSIL headquarters in the same month. Following the return of the Kabbah government and the ensuing peace talks, UNOMSIL also returned. Since then it has grown into the largest UN operation in the world. In February 2000 it was expanded to 11,500. In May, Kofi Annan requested the force to be increased to 16,500 and two months later he asked for another increase, to 20,500. At present, there are 13,500 blue helmets in Sierra Leone. In the areas where it has been able to operate the UN has certainly made a difference; life has been able to return to some form of normality. But it is unclear how a large conventional peacekeeping force can actually enforce peace throughout the country when it has not got the mandate to do so and it is up against rebels who know the terrain far better than the UN soldiers, many of whom are from India, Kenya and Jordan.
Other UN representatives have visited the country, for instance in 1998 to assess relief needs after ECOMOG had run the RUF/AFRC junta out of Freetown. In June 1999, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, visited Sierra Leone and called the human rights violations committed in the country 'the worst in the world'. Her remarks briefly turned the spotlight of media attention from Kosovo to Sierra Leone.
The UN Security Council imposed military sanctions, an oil embargo and travel restrictions on the RUF/AFRC junta on October 10, 1997. It also took the unprecedented step of authorising ECOMOG to enforce the embargo. After the violent removal of the junta in February 1998, it lifted the embargo on March 13, 1998. In July, 2000, the Security Council attempted to isolate the rebels from international markets by banning all diamond sales from Sierra Leone until a certification system would be in place. Most significantly, the UN took a clear step towards introducing international justice to Sierra Leone when on August 14 the Security Council voted to install a war crimes tribunal. This effectively removed the amnesty clause from the Lomé agreement, at least for Foday Sankoh who is one of the most likely candidates to be tried by such a tribunal. However, the technicalities still have to be worked out and Kofi Annan was given until the end of September to produce a blueprint for a war crimes court. In January 1998, the Sierra Leone government had already announced that it was compiling data on people who had committed crimes against humanity and would present these to an international court for prosecution.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) authorised ECOWAS states to bring back the Kabbah government after it had been ousted in May 1997. Previously, the OAU had played a mediating role in the government-RUF talks in Ivory Coast and was doing so again in the Lomé talks in June 1999. The OAU has also contributed US$ 250,000 for disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation programs and for the treatment of amputees.
In 1998, the OAU created an advisory body called the African Women Committee on Peace and Development. Its aim is to foster full participation of women in the continent's efforts to prevent, manage or resolve conflicts. On February 4, 1999 the group issued a statement condemning human rights abuses in Sierra Leone and strongly endorsing both Kabbah's government's efforts to resolve the crisis and the initiatives taken by an organisation called the West African Women's Crusade for Peace and the various Sierra Leonean women's groups.
The Commonwealth played a mediating role in the government-RUF talks in Ivory Coast.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has played a pivotal role in efforts to bring the conflict to an end, using a mix of military and non-military means. It gave the Nigerian peace-troops, already in Sierra Leone since 1991, increased legitimacy by affording them the same status as those operational in Liberia, under the banner of ECOMOG. This was done in 1994. ECOMOG enjoyed a virtually unlimited mandate, enabling it to wage war against the rebels on behalf of the government of Sierra Leone.
Following the May 1997 coup, ECOWAS adopted a three-pronged strategy to restore the elected government to power: the imposition of regional sanctions against the junta in Freetown, continued support for the ECOMOG forces that were enforcing the ban, and talks with the junta. This resulted in the Conakry peace plan, agreed between ECOWAS and the junta in the Guinean capital on October 23, 1997. It provided for the hand-over of power to the Kabbah government on April 22, 1998, a deal the junta proceeded to ignore.
The Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG has also been engaged in training what should eventually become the new Sierra Leonean army. ECOMOG was also asked to provide security for UN personnel working in the country for UNOMSIL. On the negative side, the UN accused ECOMOG of summarily executing citizens during the battle for Freetown in February 1999 and some ECOMOG human rights violations were recorded in Sorious Samura's celebrated documentary 'Cry Freetown'. However, most, if not all reports continue to blame on RUF rebels and the UN has continued to advocate support for ECOMOG. Nigeria carried the lion's share of the burden of the 15,000-strong ECOMOG force, in terms of manpower and cost, estimated by diplomats to be around US$ 1 million per day.
However, when on May 29, 1999, a civilian government took over after 15 years of military dictatorship it was clear that changes were on the cards. Nigeria had already indicated that it wanted a radical redistribution of the burden to be shared both within ECOWAS and with the international community. Under its new president Olesegun Obasanjo, Nigerian troops started pulling out to make way for UNOMSIL. However, under pressure from the RUF, the UN asked for the return of some West African troops, in effect marking the comeback of ECOMOG- be it under UN command. This last has led to serious tensions between Nigerian generals and the UN. The tension erupted at the very same time that British soldiers were freeing their colleagues captured by the West Side Boys. A leaked memo from the Indian UN force commander Vijay Jetley accused the Nigerians of undermining his authority, which immediately prompted the Nigerian army commander General Victor Malu to call for Jetley's dismissal.
West African governments have been involved in the various series of peace talks as mediators. Between May 1996, when it hosted peace talks in Yamoussoukro, and November 1996, when the peace agreement was signed in Abidjan, the government of Ivory Coast acted as a facilitator and a mediator in the talks between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. This role was then taken over by Togo in 1999. The Mano River Union groups Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea together for the purpose of expanding trade among the three and promoting joint security. This last means that the heads of state of the three countries meet at regular intervals and sometimes in between as well to discuss security matters. Lately, this has taken the shape of accusations and counter accusations of cross-border invasions. While the first of these went from Liberia into Sierra Leone, the year 2000 has seen incursions from Liberia into Guinea and vice-versa and from Sierra Leone into Guinea, prompting the big security crackdown on refugees in Guinea, in September. The Mano River Union is regularly invoked in order to reduce tensions but it has not proved to be the instrument to reduce the high levels of volatility currently existing, especially in the border areas.
Various governments in Europe and North America have provided financial support to the ECOMOG effort: the United States (close to US$ 4 million in 1998), Britain (US$ 6.5 million in all), the Netherlands (US$ 10 million), Canada (under US$ 1 million) among them. Britain has pledged US$ 10 million for a projected Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme, on which the participants in the Lomé talks were briefed by World Bank officials in late June 1999. The Bank has pledged US$ 9 million and manages the trust fund that will pay for DDR. Jesse Jackson, US President Bill Clinton's special envoy for the promotion of democracy in Africa, can be credited with having played a major role in brokering the May 1999 cease-fire and securing the release of 2,000 prisoners of war, mostly children. He had already prepared some of the ground in November 1998, when he tried to persuade the Kabbah government into talks with the rebels, with apparent success. In August 2000, the US announced that it would train and equip seven West African battalions (five Nigerian, one Ghanaian and one from a Francophone country, possibly Senegal) and send a US$ 20m military aid package, for peacekeeping work in Sierra Leone.
Arguably the country most deeply involved in matters Sierra Leonean is Britain. First, one of its diplomats, the then High Commissioner Peter Penfold, was closely connected with the restoration to power of Kabbah in February 1998. His role became controversial when the British government found itself in a full-blown political row over alleged Foreign Office knowledge of a US$ 10 million arms delivery to the Kabbah government by Sandline International. Investigations made public in February 1999 established the fact that the United Kingdom had breached the UN arms embargo against Sierra Leone, in order to restore Kabbah to power. No ministerial heads rolled. In May 2000 there followed an announcement that British troops were to train the yet-to-be-formed Sierra Leone army, helping it to become a creditable fighting force, capable of wresting the diamond fields from the rebels. At the same time, troops were flown in 'for a few days'. They were to remain a standby force for the purpose of evacuating British citizens, should the need arise. They were also to hold on to Lungi International Airport, so UN troops could land there. But 'a few days' turned into weeks and months and the mission of the soldiers did not become any clearer. This probably was also behind the capture of 11 troops, much to the embarrassment of the British government, which had to mount an extensive rescue operation on the 10th of September. Investigations will have to clarify what the British soldiers were doing there. British police are involved in training their Sierra Leone colleagues, helping them to weed out corruption which is endemic in the force and to install discipline.
The Sierra Leone government was a partner in the peace talks in Ivory Coast in 1996 and a signatory to the peace accord that was signed in November of that year.
In January 1999, when Kabbah and Sankoh were both at Lungi International Airport from where they could see Freetown burn, they agreed to try and re-institute the Abidjan agreement.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
There has been a great deal of civil action aimed at persuading the country's warmongers to find more peaceful ways to settle their differences. During the February 1996 elections, which were held under extremely difficult circumstances, people literally risked their lives to go and vote by disregarding a RUF threat to kill anyone seen in or near a voting station. The turnout was understandably low, but the RUF goal of enforcing a boycott certainly failed. Civilians protected the ballot boxes with their bodies as they were transported to the counting centres, preventing rebels from taking and destroying them. One report called these actions 'an impressive demonstration of their desire for peace'.
It was by no means the only action. Sierra Leonean trade unions, women's groups, students, clerks, civil servants and many others have been very active in the civil disobedience movement that brought the entire country to a standstill in protest against the May 1997 coup of Koroma. Various groups sprang up, including those with self-explanatory names such as the National Movement for the Restoration of Democracy and the National Salvation Front.
There have been other local peace initiatives and those undertaken by women's groups merit special attention. Since 1994 women's groups have been holding peace demonstrations and prayer sessions and have had a number of meetings with representatives from both sides, in an effort to persuade them to reach a negotiated settlement. In January 1995 they formed the Women's Movement for Peace. Women were critical contributors to the relative success of the 1996 presidential election and the massive civil disobedience against the Koroma junta. In as much as they have been able to keep an organisation together, they are very strong advocates for peace and a representative government. Those who have survived the Freetown mayhem in 1999 will be crucial in the reconstruction of the nation.
Sierra Leone has an impressive list of local human rights and other organisations, which, depending on the state of the conflict, have worked either from within the country or from abroad, in an effort to promote human rights and/or a peaceful solution to the conflict. They include the local chapter of Amnesty International, the Civil Liberties Congress, Prison Watch, the National Forum for Human Rights, Movement to Unite People, the Society for the Advancement of Civil Rights and the Campaign for Good Governance.
The Christian Welfare and Social Relief Organisation is a rural development organisation which has worked in many conflict-affected areas. Inside the conflict areas it runs mainly relief programmes but it also has a Department of Education in Conflict Prevention.
The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) is a coalition of religious communities in Sierra Leone, which was launched on April 1, 1997. The group is engaged in peace building work through dialogue, in the country itself - both at the highest level and within local communities - and regionally/internationally. It actively promoted dialogue between President Kabbah and corporal Sankoh, when it was still believed that this could lead to peace. It also facilitated the release of 54 children abducted by the RUF. The IRCSL wants to continue to use its good offices to promote peace throughout the country.
Given the chaos prevailing in the aftermath of the second battle for Freetown, it remains difficult to say which of these organisations is still active at present. Work of this nature can be life-threatening. The same can be said of the media: the death penalty spree of the Kabbah regime in late 1997 and the rebel onslaught in Freetown led to the death or disappearance of at least eight journalists. International media and individual journalists have played a role, however small, in bringing the situation to international attention.
A special place may be reserved for the more mystically grounded movements, including the hunter-militias, which have in some places succeeded - albeit temporarily - in fending off both rebel advances and government troop movements by claiming supernatural powers, which are deeply respected by all sides in the conflict. One remarkable example is that of 72 year-old female magician, Marama Keira, who is highly regarded locally and who claimed to have retaken her birthplace, Koidu Town, with her Tambaboroh fighters, using juju. The Kamajors are a similar group but on a larger scale. A number of these groups have been merged into the Civil Defence Force.

International
In early 1995, the Sierra Leone government invited the International Committee of the Red Cross to mediate in the conflict. The ICRC played a key role in the release of a number of European hostages. The RUF had taken to abducting Europeans in order to ensure that the conflict was put on the political agenda outside Africa. The ICRC accompanied the hostages to Guinea following protracted negotiations.
One of the more eye-catching efforts at conflict-resolution was undertaken by International Alert (IA). IA originally became involved in 1995, also as a result of the hostage crisis. IA's role in the release of the hostages has been controversial: the organisation claims it helped bring about their release while others maintain that IA's involvement has merely complicated negotiations already under way. By the time the hostages were freed, IA was deeply involved in mediation efforts between Strasser and Sankoh. Originally intended as a 'multi-track' effort, its focus came to rest almost exclusively on moving the negotiations forward. The special envoy of IA developed a special relationship with Foday Sankoh, and these efforts are likely to have played an important role in bringing the RUF to the negotiations that led to the November 1996 peace agreement.
IA's role has been severely criticised by a team of researchers from the Chr. Michelsen Institute based in Bergen, Norway, which was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to evaluate the work of IA in three selected countries, including Sierra Leone. The researchers commended IA for being in Sierra Leone at a critical juncture, but contended that - while IA may have had a point in agreeing that the RUF had a political agenda to pursue - the position the organisation took on matters during the negotiations made it vulnerable to accusations that it was not an 'honest broker' but played an advisory role and was even on the side of the RUF. IA has admitted to having made mistakes.
The Swiss-based organisation Africa Women Solidarity (FAS), which is closely linked to Synergies Africa, has conducted training sessions with conflict settlement techniques, at the invitation of Sierra Leonean women's organisations. The organisation has also contributed to the OAU-linked African Women Committee on Peace and Development.
The International Crisis Group helped fundraising efforts to finance the 1996 elections that brought Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power. The ICG has supported civil campaigns for good governance and regularly publishes situation analyses of Sierra Leone with recommendations aimed at actors in the conflict.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, although not directly involved in mediation, continue to report on human rights abuses committed by all sides in the conflict. More specifically, Amnesty has publicly deplored the evacuation of UNOMSIL in January 1999, as a result of the assault on Freetown and has urged the continuation of the work of the human rights officers who are part of the UN mission. It has also commented on continued human rights violations after the signing of the Lomé peace accord. Human Rights Watch has urged an end to the use of child soldiers in the conflict and has also urged the UNHCR to move refugees inside Guinea away from the border area, for pressing safety reasons. On July 8, 1999 HRW issued a statement severely criticising the UN for endorsing the peace deal signed the day before. It said that the kind of atrocities committed by the RUF should never have been pardoned in a general amnesty as per the deal. Human Rights Watch continues to report violations of the peace accord.
FORUT is a Norwegian-based NGO which runs programmes in Freetown, for instance with disabled street children. In 1998, FORUT stated its intention to get involved in conflict resolution through peace education, training, community-based trauma healing and reconciliation. IFOR, the Fnternational Fellowship of Reconciliation conducted three five-day workshops in Conakry in April 2000, aimed at the refugee community there. its purpose was to look at non-violent conflict resolution, stress and possible repatriation.
Other internationally connected groups, such as the Netherlands Christian Women Farmers Association have invited people from Sierra Leone over to inform the world about what was going on there. In November 1977, at the invitation of the Women Farmers group, two female teachers made the perilous journey to the Netherlands, and described not only the harrowing atrocities in the country, but also the groundswell of support for the civil disobediencecampaign that was at that time being waged against the Koroma-RUF junta.

Prospects

Recommendations

The researchers who evaluated the work of International Alert made a number of recommendations to the organisation. Having indicated that IA's problem in Sierra Leone lay in the fact that its actions lacked transparency, the researchers recommend that IA create space for dialogue by developing and strengthening local peace constituencies, rather than facilitating dialogue itself. They also recommend that IA be engaged in advocacy and lobbying around issues of political, social and economic justice - the absence of which breeds conflicts, as the Sierra Leone example amply demonstrates. Finally they recommend that IA maximises the use of the rather limited resources it has and concentrate its actions geographically.
The Centre for Democracy and Development Briefing paper states quite clearly that the lifting of the arms embargo against Sierra Leone following the return of Kabbah was a mistake. All transfers of weapons to Sierra Leone should be immediately stopped, it urges. It also urges dialogue between the two main parties in the conflict, to be guaranteed by OAU and UN. These talks should basically constitute the reactivation of the Abidjan and Conakry peace agreements and involve a cease-fire, the release of Foday Sankoh (in order to avoid him becoming a martyr for his cause), a broadening of the base of the Kabbah government to include more ethnic groups and civil society, an internationally supervised demobilisation process, national reconciliation and elections.
The International Crisis Group has made it clear that the vacuum created by the absence of a reliable professional army must be filled. Furthermore, the civil society sector needs expansion, since it contributes to reconciliation and finally, there needs to be an improvement in the quality of governance in the country.
Taking up that point, Kamar Yousuf, a research intern at ACCORD in South Africa, recommends a comprehensive government strategy aimed at improving the quality of administration, economic revival (especially in the areas of financial accountability, investment and employment creation) and nation-building through a South African-style truth and reconciliation process, with the international community at the ready to promote human rights and the rule of law. The London-based Law Society hosted a policy meeting on the conflict in Sierra Leone in March 2000. Interrights and Alliances for Africa were among the participating organisations. The meeting came up with a wide range of recommendations. They counselled that a comparative analysis should be made with successful transitions from war to peace in Africa, all rebel assistance should be ended, a truth, justice and reconciliation commission should be set up, there should be more and more robust international involvement in Sierra Leone including more support for ECOMOG and respect for human rights should be instilled in the country.
It was Jesse Jackson who highlighted the disparity between the world's response to the crises in the Balkans and West Africa. 'It is a tale of two continents. There has been no budgetary commitment to rebuilding this war-torn nation as we heard in Europe.' The International Herald Tribune picked up that point in an editorial entitled 'Kosovo and Sierra Leone' in its June 16, 1999 edition: 'The contrast can be explained by circumstances, but that is not good enough. A fair and sustainable policy must tap the energies and resources that ease rather than aggravate the lingering question of why the United States sometimes appears readier to help a distressed white country than a distressed black one.'

Service Information

REPORTS:	Amnesty International: Sierra Leone Reports. London 1995, 1996; Sierra Leone - A disastrous setback for human rights. London, 1997; Centre for Democracy and Development: Briefing paper on current developments in Sierra Leone. Kampala, 1999; Conciliation Resources: Paying the Price: the Sierra Leone Peace Process, ACCORD Series No. 9. London, August 2000; http://www.c-r.org/accord9/index.htm; FAS (Femmes Africa Solidarité: Women's participation in the peace process of Sierra Leone. Geneva, 1997; International Alert: Peace Mission to Sierra Leone - Taking steps to advance the peace process, London, 1996; International Crisis Group: Sierra Leone - Report to the Japanese Government. 1996; Partnership Africa Canada: The Heart of the Matter - Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security. January 2000; http://www.partnershipafricacanada.org/english/esierra.html.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	War and State collapse - The case of Sierra Leone, by Lansana Gberie. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1998; African weak states and commercial alliances, by William Reno. In: African Affairs vol. 96 no. 383, April 1997; Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, by William Reno, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Fighting for the Rain Forest - War, youth and resources in Sierra Leone, by Paul Richards. London, 1997; NGOs in conflict - An evaluation of International Alert, by Sorbe et al. Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway (incorporates International Alert's response to the case study), 1997; Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Sierra Leone, by Kamar Yusuf, research intern at ACCORD, Durban, South Africa; Kamajors, 'sobel' and the Militariat - Civil society and the return of the military in Sierra Leonean politics, by Zack-Williams. In: Review of African political economy, no. 73, 1997.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	http://www.prairienet.org/acas/panafrican.html (Centre for Democracy and Development); http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/sierra/reports (International Crisis Group); http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/sierral/Default.htm/ (extensive information on the current situation in the country); http://www.fasngo.org (African Women Solidarity); http://www.unorg/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unomsil (UN mission in Sierra Leone).
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Paul Richards - University of London, Department of Anthropology. Email paul.richards@tao.tct.wau.nl; Bineta Diop - Africa Women Solidarity; Addai Sebbo - former program manager Int. Alert;
ORGANISATIONS:	Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, c/o Council of Churches in Sierra Leone, 4A Kingharman Road, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Tel. +232 22 240554, Fax +232 22 241109, National Forum for Human Rights, 29 Big Waterloo Street, PMB 1297, Freetown, Sierra Leone, Tel. +232 22 220396, Fax +232 22 220406, Email: NFHR@sierratel.sl or nfhrsierraleone@hotmail.com. Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: FORUT; Campaign for Good Governance; Africa Women Solidarity/Femmes Africa Solidarité; International Alert; International Crisis Group; Human Rights Watch; ACCORD.

About the author

Bram Posthumus has worked as a freelance journalist since 1990. Before that he was a teacher of English language and literature in Nyanga, Zimbabwe. His work in journalism concentrates mainly on West and southern Africa and on the themes of conflict and post-conflict situations and migration. He has travelled extensively in both regions, visiting among others Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Zambia and Guinea, with Mali, Senegal and Chad planned for the near future. He publishes in a variety of international magazines (African Business, New African, EU-ACP Courier) and other monthlies and weeklies in the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and South Africa.