Author	Jos Havermans
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

The civil war in Rwanda began in 1990 with an invasion of Tutsi rebels from Uganda. The armed Tutsi, who had organised themselves into the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), were the sons and daughters of Tutsi exiles who had been chased from Rwanda in 1959. The Tutsi exiles had been waiting for a chance to return to their country for a long time. A first attempt to return and stage a coup against the Hutu majority regime failed in 1963, shortly after Rwanda gained independence from Belgium. The Tutsi exiles and their allies within Rwanda had to wait until 1990 to stage another, more successful, offensive.
In August 1993, the civil war into which the offensive had developed appeared to come to an end. Under international pressure, the government of president Habyarimana and the RPF rebel movement had opened negotiations in the Tanzanian town of Arusha and reached a political agreement. The accords provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government, the repatriation of refugees, the integration of all military forces into one national army and the holding of democratic elections. The implementation of the peace accord was to be supervised by a UN force (UNAMIR), which was deployed in Rwanda.
However, extremists in the Hutu camp refused to accept the formulated power-sharing proposal and prepared a genocidal plan to eliminate all of the RPF's potential supporters. The plan started to unfold on April 6, 1994 after the shooting down of the presidential aircraft which killed president Habyarimana. A major role in the genocide was assigned to the Interahamwe militias, consisting of young Hutu men armed with machetes and clubs. While Hutu militia and armed civilians perpetrated the killings, the RPF stepped up its military campaign. The rebel movement succeeded in quickly conquering the country and seized control of the state in July 1994. Within a few weeks the genocidal killings stopped.
However, the violent conflict between the now Tutsi-led national army and Hutu-militias continues. In the second half of 1997 Hutu rebels from Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo entered into an alliance and began infiltrating Rwanda from across the border with the aim of attacking the national army and civilians. In the second half of 1997 alone, an estimated 5,000 people were killed in these attacks. These incursions continue. A harsh repression of Hutu civilians, who are perceived as potential allies of the new rebellion, has been imposed by the Rwandan army, particularly in the north-west.
The conflict in Rwanda can be interpreted as a power struggle along predominantly ethnic lines between the Hutu majority, constituting 85 percent of the population, and the Tutsi minority which comprises 14 percent of the total population. The roots of this rivalry lie for a large part in the colonial era when Belgian authorities exacerbated ethnic divisions. The foreign power perceived the Tutsi minority as an aristocratic people with a natural aptitude for ruling and nominated large numbers of Tutsis to leading positions within the administration. The Hutu majority was perceived as a class of workers and farmers.
This division between Hutus and Tutsi is still perceived as a reality, but is not the only clue to understanding the conflict.
Firstly, there are other affiliations and rivalries, mostly within the Hutu majority, which add a more refined raster to the rough Hutu-Tutsi divide. Under the autocratic regime of Habyarimana, a Hutu opposition had already developed, with the Republican Democratic Movement (MDR) as its major political force. This Hutu movement opposed Habyarimana's Hutu-led National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND). Later, divisions also developed between, on the one hand, radical elements who were against democratisation, power sharing and the Arusha Peace Accords, and, on the other hand, moderate forces who supported a peaceful solution to the conflict and were open to power sharing with the RPF. These divisions partly crossed the ethnic lines. Analysts suggest that the downing of Habyarimana's plane in April 1994, the event that triggered the mass killings, may have been perpetrated by radical Hutu groups who wanted to block the Arusha Peace Accords from being implemented, instead of by the Tutsi-led RPF, as the then government claimed.
Secondly, behind the ethnic strife between Hutus and Tutsis lies a conflict between elites over access to the country's scarce resources. Since the scarce resources are most easily accessible for those Rwandans who control state power, the struggle has developed into a violent political conflict about government control in which the radical parties adopted an 'all-or-nothing' approach. The political affiliations of the rival groups are closely intertwined with their business relations and interests and also with their ethnic identity, but not to the full extent.
Thirdly, on the level of the general population, the Rwandan conflict is also to a large extent about access to land, housing and jobs, a conflict deeply immersed in sentiments of ethnic belonging. Tutsi exiles who returned to Rwanda as RPF fighters claimed a place for themselves. In many cases they were able to occupy land and houses of Hutus who had fled Rwanda ahead of the RPF offensive, but when these Hutu refugees returned in large numbers in 1996 they reclaimed their possessions. The massive wandering of people, including the migrations of internally displaced persons, created a complicated Gordian knot of land claims. Nevertheless, the Rwandan conflict should probably not be interpreted as being triggered by demographic pressure, as some analysts and media have suggested. Research has shown that the relationship between demographic pressure and genocide is much more indirect and complex than outside observers tend to believe.

Conflict Dynamics

Since the RPF take-over in Kigali in 1994, the movement is still the principal political force in Rwanda. It controls a government of national unity which has both Hutus and Tutsi in its ranks. Pasteur Bizimungu, an ethnic Hutu, is president, but vice president and minister of defence Paul Kagame, an ethnic Tutsi, is the strongman. Pierre Célestin Rwigyema, an ethnic Hutu, is prime minister. A large majority of deputy ministers are ethnic Tutsi. However, despite the presence of Hutu officials in the government, many Hutus still consider the RPF leaders as foreign occupiers.
The current government has demonstrated a lack of interest in establishing a broad political power base and in processes leading to power-sharing. Instead, gradual exclusion of Hutu, and also Tutsi, opponents from the top political levels, as well as in the administration and in the judiciary, in addition to the continued mono-ethnic nature of the national armed forces, add to the current conflict potential. International conflict mediation efforts have tended to ignore this key issue.
This autocratic tendency within the government may have impaired its policy of playing down the Hutu-Tutsi divide, restoring law and order and prosecution of genocide perpetrators, which have been stated as its main priorities for the first years after the genocide trauma.
One of the means to get over the traumatic past and to create conditions for reconciliation are the trials of suspects in the genocide. In November 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the UN, and Rwandan courts also try genocide suspects. The judicial system is overwhelmed with more than 125,000 genocide suspects, detained in overcrowded jails. Several suspects have been sentenced to death by domestic Rwandan courts and have been executed. The International Tribunal, located in Arusha, has convicted a small number of high-ranking suspects. It abstains from capital punishment.
One of the main threats to stability in Rwanda is the Hutu insurgency in the north-west of the country. The attackers are members of the defeated army (the former Rwandan Armed Forces, ex-FAR) and Interahamwe-militias ('Those who work together'). Their hit-and- run actions are targeted against Tutsi survivors of the genocide, local Hutu politicians, foreign human rights monitors and aid workers. The insurgents operate under the name of the Liberation Army of Rwanda (ALIR). Their political wing, formed in June 1996, is known as the Armed People for the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR). Together they have tried to create a power base in the north-west, the cradle of hard-line Hutu extremism, from where they seek to overthrow the present government or at least to force it to enter into negotiations. The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which confronts the rebels, has been accused of using excessive force in its attempt to suppress the insurgency. Indiscriminate killings appear to be designed to force the Hutu population to 'choose sides'.
In 1997, Rwandan government forces actively participated in the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in neighbouring Congo/Zaire. Soon after this campaign had led to military victory in May 1997, a rift developed between Laurent Kabila, the new president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the government in Kigali. In August 1998, Rwanda decided to support a second military campaign aimed at overthrowing the government in Kinshasa. There are strong indications that Kabila now supports FAR soldiers and the Interahamwe and helps them stage incursions into Rwanda.
The internationalisation of the conflict has coincided with increased international support for both camps, enhancing their ability to keep up their fight for a longer period of time. Additionally, linkages between the domestic Rwandan conflict and other conflicts in the Central African region make it more difficult to reach a peaceful political solution.
Rwanda is trying to recover from one of the worst and most lethal post World War II genocides. The traumatised country is rife with paranoia and suspicion. Much of the nation's physical infrastructure was damaged, while human resources -skilled and educated labour- disappeared. Seventy per cent of the population lives in poverty.
The exact number of people killed in 1994 may never be known but is estimated at 800,000. The genocide led about 1.5 million Rwandans to flee to neighbouring countries, where they were housed in refugee camps set up by the UNHCR and supplied by UN agencies and international humanitarian aid NGOs. In 1996, hundreds of thousands of (mainly Hutu) refugees were forced to return to Rwanda after Zairean rebels backed by Rwandan troops attacked the refugee camps. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were displaced internally, including about 200,000 Tutsi genocide survivors who form one of the most vulnerable groups in the country.
As a result of the intensification of the violence in 1997, a new pattern of internal displacement unfolded, especially in the north-west regions of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. According to an international survey, there were a total of 180,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. The government has prevented the establishment of camps or concentrations of internally displaced persons. Guerrilla activity and direct attacks on foreigners forced international NGOs to withdraw personnel and suspend activities in the north-western region.
Despite the ongoing tension and violence in the north-western provinces, Rwanda is making a post-genocidal comeback that has surprised international officials. The government has enabled a gradual return to normality in most parts of the country, partly thanks to massive international aid. Rwanda received more than US$ 2 billion in aid between 1994 and 1999. Two-thirds of the state budget is financed by foreign donors. The conflict in the north-west and Rwanda's involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is still a drain on the economy, however. An estimated two-thirds of the internal revenue of the government is spent on the military. Also, allegations of corruption at the top administrative and political levels have become more numerous and better documented during 1998 and 1999.

Official Conflict Management

In the study The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, a team of independent investigators concluded that three months before the beginning of the genocide the UN, Belgium, France and the United States had been informed about the impending genocide, but decided not to act upon this information. Non-intervention clearly characterised the attitude of multilateral organisations and foreign powers towards the sudden escalation of the Rwandan conflict. However, they felt compelled to act after the genocide had taken place at which point their energy was spent on humanitarian aid and reconstruction.
The main United Nations actors that were active in the immediate aftermath of the mass killings were the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the UNAMIR military force, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA; later dubbed OCHA), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WPF).
In the absence of a clear international mandate for Internally Displaced Persons, the UN-DHA established the Integrated Operations Centre (IOC), a coordinating body in the Rwandan Ministry of Rehabilitation in Kigali. The IOC, consisting of representatives of UN agencies, NGOs, major donors and the Rwandan government, attempted to foster dialogue and compromise to solve the IDP problem and served as a focal point for repatriation.
One of the major UN contributions to creating a climate for reconciliation was undoubtedly the establishment, in November 1994, of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based on a UN Security Council resolution. This court initially planned to bring an estimated 400 suspected ringleaders of the genocide to trial but later had to scale down its ambitions. In early 1999, approximately 35 indictments had been issued. The maximum sentence it can impose is life imprisonment. The first sentencing took place in September 1998.
The UN, in collaboration with the OAU, also appointed a special UN/OAU representative for the Great Lakes region who is charged with the task of promoting initiatives for peace and rehabilitation. The representative's efforts are mainly directed towards ending the conflict in neighbouring Burundi and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which Rwanda has a great stake.
Many of the UN's activities, such as human rights monitoring and sustaining the development process by UNDP and other agencies, were hindered by sour relations with the Rwandan government. On July 16, 1998, the UN announced it would pull its human rights mission out of Rwanda because an agreement could not be reached with the Rwandan government on a new mandate for the mission. The Rwandan government accused the UN mission of an unbalanced approach by focusing too much on violations by the government army.
Since 1998, the World Bank has supported a project run by the Rwandan government intended to help communities absorb the returning refugees. The initiative, which consists of a large number of local development projects, was spearheaded by the bank's Post-Conflict Unit, created in 1997 to oversee the institution's work to help countries rebuild after violent conflict.
UNICEF is involved in programmes aimed at helping orphans and other children to cope with their trauma and to enable them to participate in education programmes.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was unable to respond efficiently to the Rwandan crisis. It only became involved after the genocide had taken place. In June 1998, the OAU decided to open an investigation into the Rwanda massacre, in order to draw lessons for future conflict resolution and prevention efforts. The OAU assigned an International Panel of Eminent Personalities, presided over by former president of Botswana Ketumile Masire, to execute the inquiry. It is expected to be published end 1999 or early 2000.
Among individual states France, the United States, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and Congo/Zaire played major roles with respect to military and humanitarian efforts related to Rwanda. Belgium was amongst countries that offered a battalion of 400 troops for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Its troops were withdrawn when the crisis escalated. Since the RPF take-over, Belgium is now pursuing a policy of maintaining influence from a distance. Along with the Netherlands, Belgium is a leading donor to the region.
Canada has been actively involved in peacekeeping in Rwanda and was at the forefront of a diplomatic initiative to lead an intervention force to ex-Zaire in 1996. It played a crucial role, along with the Netherlands, in generating support for a Multi-National Force (MNF) to protect Rwandan refugees. However, it was humiliated internationally as events in then Zaïre changed course and the MNF failed to materialise.
France was regarded by many Rwandans as an ally of the Hutus and is known to have supported the Habyarimana regime, providing it with military equipment and support. Paris played a crucial role in staging the UN-supported 'Operation Turquoise' in the summer of 1994, in which 2,500 French troops were dispatched to Rwanda to protect Hutu refugees. It is believed that the French also used the save havens they created to house ex-government and military personnel and allowed the flow of arms into these havens, thus enabling the Hutu militias to counterattack later. A parliamentary inquiry into the tragedy clarified that France helped the Rwandan regime that prepared and executed the genocide. A telegram from the French ambassador in Kigali to the French government clearly shows that it was well informed at an early stage about the preparations for the mass murder.
The Swiss government ordered an inquiry into the Swiss role in the events. The Swiss enquiry commission came to the conclusion that the dominance of aid and development interests in its relations with Rwanda caused lack of awareness of political developments. In response, Switzerland has decided to nominate a new coordinator for the Swiss development and humanitarian activities who has also been instructed to report on political developments in Rwanda.
The US government was reluctant to intervene during the first weeks of the genocide, fearing another Somalia, where more than twenty American soldiers were killed. However, Washington reacted swiftly once the crisis in Goma (ex-Zaire) broke out and mobilised the US air force to deliver supplies. Since then, the US has established close ties with the Rwandan government and stated promotion of trade, democracy and conflict prevention as its policy objectives in the region. In 1998, the US joined other western donors in providing financial support for strengthening the judicial system in Rwanda and its neighbouring countries, through its 'Great Lakes Justice Initiative'.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Rwanda's relations with international organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, before, during and after the genocide have been characterised by severe frictions. The Rwandan government strongly resents the international community's failure to prevent and stop the genocide. It has also severely criticised the priorities chosen by international relief organisations. Over the years the government has tried to maintain control over NGOs by forcing them to sign strict working agreements. More than 140 non-governmental organisations entered Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. In December 1995, the government expelled 38 NGOs, freezing their bank accounts and cutting their phone lines. Most of the foreign NGOs work spans humanitarian relief, reconstruction, development, and advocacy activities.
Domestic NGOs faced the same, if not stricter, control by the Rwandan authorities. However, a lively variety of domestic NGOs exist, especially church groups, human rights organisations and civil society debate forums. The foreign NGOs are in the majority of cases working with domestic partners to support their efforts to build peace, justice, and stability.

Domestic
Activities to improve the living conditions of women have been embarked on by several domestic groups. One of these groups is AVEGA, an organisation set up in 1997 by Rwandan widows. It aims to give mutual support and help women to re-build their lives in large parts of the country.
Church members' role in the crisis in Rwanda has been both consoling and accessory to the killings. The church in Rwanda is now fighting to wash off the stigma it suffered for turning a blind eye to the 1994 genocide. The Rwandan Anglican Church, which is part of the Nairobi-based Council of the Anglican Provinces of Africa (CAPA) set up departments of reconciliation in all dioceses in the course of 1997. They are holding seminars, inviting people from Europe, America and Africa to speak on the necessity of forgiveness and peaceful co- existence.
Church groups run many of the non-governmental reconciliatory activities. Most domestic church groups active in reconciliatory work are organised in ACOREB, the Association des Conferences Episcopales du Rwanda et du Burundi, and in the CPR, the Conseil Protestant du Rwanda.
Civil society forums have played an extensive role in increasing awareness of human rights violations. Local organisations such as the Collective of Leagues and Associations for the Defence of Human Rights (CLADHO) and the Association Kanyarwanda, commissioned an International Investigative Commission into the gross and systematic violations of human rights in Rwanda since October 1990. It played an important role in collecting facts and evidence for the International War Crimes Tribunal. Other forums, such as Profemme-Tsesehamwe and AVEGA, already mentioned above, contribute to the debate on human rights protection and reconciliation.

International
One of the first international NGOs specialised in the field of peace building that started to work in Rwanda was International Alert. Since 1995, International Alert has worked on a Great Lakes Conflict Resolution Programme that includes Rwanda. In cooperation with domestic and international partners, the London-based organisation has developed initiatives to encourage dialogue at all levels of Rwandan society. International Alert especially supports the role of women in peace building. On the level of political infrastructure,
International Alert has been trying to boost the functioning of the National Assembly, the Rwandan parliament. It provided computer equipment and training for the legislature's staff. It has also provided support for such simple but indispensable moves as giving parliament members subscriptions to national and international journals. It also supported the establishment of the Assembly's own parliamentary journal. In February 1998, International Alert facilitated a regional conference for parliamentarians on the role of parliaments in conflict resolution. This meeting led to the formation of a regional follow-up committee of regional MPs. International Alert provided the committee with information on constitution-making and different forms of local government, as part of a capacity-building strategy. The initiatives were aimed at strengthening both professional capacity and democratic allegiance, including acceptance of power sharing and the non-violent settlement of disputes.
The UK-based international aid organisation Oxfam has addressed gender issues as part of a reconciliation and rehabilitation process in Rwanda. Immediately after the genocide in 1994, Oxfam reopened its office in Kigali and rebuilt its programmes on the principle of working in a way that seeks to bridge the gaps between different groups and to minimise further conflict. Its projects target vulnerable women (survivors and women headed households) and support national advocacy initiatives that promote women's basic rights.
Among the thousands of war refugees now returning to Rwanda are many lost or orphaned children who are suffering great distress. In coordination with UNICEF, several aid agencies, such as Save the Children, are offering special psychological support, including play therapy.
In the realm of media, a sector which is of crucial importance considering the dark role played by radio stations in inciting the ethnic violence, the BBC has deployed reconciliatory activities in Rwanda. It has broadcast programmes in the local language aimed at strengthening mutual understanding and reuniting those who survived. Other local radio stations, some of them run with support of foreign religious organisations, also disseminate messages aimed at encouraging peace and the prevalence of reason over hatred.
Activities in the realm of advocacy are concentrated in the Great Lakes Policy Forum, a unique platform for discussion and exchange of information of international NGOs from various fields, including humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution, and government officials from African and western countries. The Forum, established in 1995, puts its focus in the entire Great Lakes region, including Rwanda.
In the field of mediation, some attempts have been made by The Carter Center. During summits in Cairo in November 1995 and Tunis in March 1996, former US President Jimmy Carter brought together heads of state of all countries in the region to address the on-going violence in the region and the need to repatriate 1.7 million Rwandan refugees.

Evaluation
The massive international relief effort triggered by the 1994 genocide has been evaluated in several studies aimed at improving NGO operating procedures and standards. The most comprehensive is The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. While this study, facilitated by the Danish government, evaluates the (failed) conflict management and preventive efforts of international official diplomacy, its analyses of the role of non-governmental organisations is, understandably, very much focused on the humanitarian activities most NGOs were engaged in. The study calls for a role for NGOs, especially human rights organisations, in early warning, but within a UN-led and coordinated network.
As one study by Taylor B. Seybolt on the problem of the coordination of the various responses by different organisations concluded, the case of Rwanda indicates that 'a consensus process aimed at achieving shared information and analysis, common representation, and a common framework for action is the most desirable form of humanitarian coordination in a complex emergency.' All coordination efforts for the first ten months following the 1994 genocide were made by international agencies and organisations rather than the government of Rwanda, reportedly due to lack of competence and resources.
One of the most important lessons learned from the Rwandan experience is that the intermingling of humanitarian and military issues can put NGOs in hazardous situations that should be avoided at all costs. Some analysts claim that international mediation efforts failed to address the alleged tendency of the curent government to exclude Hutu, but also Tutsi opponnents, from top positions, a development they say could add to the current conflict potential.

Prospects

Following the severe setbacks for the Hutu extremists in the second half of 1998, it remains to be seen whether they will be able to sustain their military campaign. This will be highly dependent on fresh supplies of arms, regional alliances and the continued possibility of relying on their bases in northern Kivu in neighbouring Congo/Zaire.
Many observers hold that the insurgency in Rwanda, and those in neighbouring countries can only be tackled through a regional strategy. The significant internationalisation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, has created a very murky situation which makes prediction about a likely outcome almost impossible.
Domestically, the legitimacy of the minority-led government is still fragile. It is undermined by the continuing defections of its Hutu members. If this process continues, the RPF will find it even more difficult to broaden its political base and increase its chances of survival in future elections.
An ominous development is the deteriorating discipline within the armed forces which tripled in size to 55,000 men in 1997. Not only have soldiers begun to kill out of personal revenge, they have also begun killing for purely criminal motives.
In addition to coping with external factors such as weapon supplies and training, any outcome of the conflict will be dependent on eradicating the hate propaganda spread by the Hutu insurgents.
The handling of the problem of the vulnerable Tutsi genocide survivors creates another dilemma for the government. The government feels restricted in trying to step up the aid to this minority as it cannot afford to be seen as favouring one ethnic group over the other.
The danger of Rwanda is that, as one observer concluded, it may start to resemble Burundi, where a simmering civil war has been going on since 1993.

Recommendations

Integration and coordination are the keywords in the recommendations made by experts and NGOs that have analysed the Rwandan crisis.
The Great Lakes Early Warning Project, a project organised by FEWER, recommends that the three east African Community members Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania should admit Rwanda (and Burundi) into this economic network. 'A regional integration framework would provide a forum wherein security issues could be addressed and commitments made, monitored and implemented,' the Project said in a report published in September 1998.
A group of NGOs evaluating Rwandan developments at a seminar in April 1998 (Challenges in Rwanda. Seminar on the dilemmas faced by NGOs and donors. April 28, 1998, The Hague, Netherlands) recommended the development of cooperation between domestic and international NGOs in order to be able to influence the Rwandan government, a task that is considered to be of high priority given the strained relationship between Kigali and NGOs. They also said trauma counselling and education still require more attention as a means to contribute to reconciliation.
Most organisations also agree that land reform is required in order to create equal access to land, preventing one group from getting preferential treatment over others. Adoption of such a reform policy would be enhanced by efficient advocacy of domestic and foreign organisations in Rwandan government quarters. Most experts also consider a dialogue between the moderates of the different parties as of utmost important and see a role for NGOs in defining people who represent the various groups in society.
CARE International urged the international community and the leaders of the Great Lakes region to begin a new process to achieve peace, rehabilitation and development. The organisation refers to similar, encouraging, initiatives in Central America that resulted in peace accords. CARE specifically urges the UN to promote efforts by presidents in the region to meet and develop a strategy to reduce conflict.
Another call for a coordinated and coherent approach in dealing with domestic conflicts such as in Rwanda was issued by the UN's Lessons Learned Unit. In a report evaluating the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda from 1993 to 1996, the unit advised setting up a joint civilian-military operations centre for any future peacekeeping missions, in order to achieve coordination between the military and humanitarian community.
In a report issued in April 1999 evaluating the quest for restoring justice in Rwanda, the International Crisis Group recommends that the international community continues to support the Rwandan justice system for at least another three years and that it support and facilitate debate on how to deal with the 125,000 detainees, including alternative forms of justice, particularly the setting up of so called arbitration tribunals. The ICG also calls for more attention to be paid to the psychological situation of survivors and the compensation of victims.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Dialogue (Belgium-based monthly produced by Rwandan refugees and exiles providing broad-ranging information on current developments);
REPORTS:	Danish Foreign Ministry: The International Response to Conflict and Genocide - Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. 1996; International Crisis Group: Five Years After the Genocide in Rwanda: Justice in Question. April 1999; Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: People in Peril. Human Rights, Humanitarian Action, and Preventing Deadly Conflict. John Stremlau. New York, 1998. (Includes chapter on Rwanda/eastern Zaïre); Preventing Genocide. How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda, by Scott R. Feil. April 1998; Lessons Learned Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations: Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), October 1993 - April 1996. December 1996; Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration, Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Unit (HACU): Humanitarian Aid - Results of Non-Governmental Organisation Action in Rwanda (July 1994 - February 1996). 1996; Human Rights Watch: 'Leave none to tell the story.' Washington/New York, 1999; Article 19: Broadcasting Genocide. Censorship, Propaganda & State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994. London, 1996; African Rights: The Insurgency in the Northwest. London, 1998;
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families, by Philip Gourevitch. 1998; Seasons of Blood - A Rwandan Journey, by Fergal Keane. 1997; The Angels Have Left Us - The Rwanda Crisis and the Churches, by Hugh McCullum. 1995; The Cohesion of Oppression - Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, by Catharine Newbury. 1993; The Rwanda Crisis - History of a Genocide, by Gerard Prunier. 1997; Analyse des crises et pistes pour une prévention - Conflits en Afrique. Dossiers du GRIP 215/217. GRIP, Brussels 1997 (with a case-study on Rwanda); The End of a Culture of Impunity in Rwanda? Prosecution of Genocide and War Crimes before Rwandan Courts and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, by C. Cissé. In: Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 1998. The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999; The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda, by A.J. Klinghoffer. Macmillan, 1998;
SELECTED INTERNETSITES:	http://persoweb.francenet.fr/~intermed/ (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); http://www.inter-media.org (regular coverage of the International Criminal Tribunal Africa for Rwanda, in English and French); http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/2/2rwanda.html (site of the French parliament containing elaborate information on the French role in the 1994 genocide); http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/policy/pb025.htm (the full 1996 report from the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, the indispensable source on the international reaction to the genocide and its aftermath. Also available at http://www.ing.dk/danida/rwanda.html;
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Filip Reyntjens - Scholar and Central African Expert at University of Antwerp, Belgium, Email freyntje@ruca.ua.ac.be; Colette Braeckman - Journalist of the Belgian daily Le Soir, 21 Place de Louvain, 1000 Brussel Belgie, fax +32 2 225 59 14; Bernardin Ndashimye - Coordinator of the Rwandan umbrella human rights organisator Collectif des Ligues et Associations des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda (CLADHO), via NCOS Brussels, Belgium; Jan van Criekinge - NCOS, Belgium, e-mail jan.vancriekinge@ncos.ngonet.be;
ORGANISATIONS:	AVEGA;B.P. 1535, Kigali, Rwanda, tel + 250 75124; Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Collective of Leagues and Associations for the Defence of Human Rights (CLADHO); International Alert; Great Lakes Policy Forum; The Carter Center; Oxfam; FEWER; International Crisis Group.

About the author

Jos Havermans is an historian and freelance journalist covering international developments for several Dutch and international magazines. He has written extensively on Sub-Saharan Africa. In recent years his coverage of Africa has included reports on peace efforts and conflict prevention in Burundi, the decay of the central government in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the democratisation process in Malawi.