Author	David Lewis
Publication	Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia
Year	2002

Summary

Uzbekistan's regime has promoted political stability above political or economic reform. Paradoxically, its repressive policies and its failing economy have produced a situation in which internal conflict is now a serious threat. The official policy of a strong political center and gradual economic reform has stagnated into a repressive regime in which security forces play a powerful role and the economy is governed by a small corrupt clique of vested interests. Its pivotal role in the region, as the major military power in Central Asia, ensures that its policies have a major impact on its neighbors. External military and financial support by the international community is only likely to increase tensions, as the government uses security issues to avoid vital economic and political liberalization.

The present Uzbek state is a largely artificial creation, containing large numbers of ethnic minorities, and with ill-defined borders in many regions. Prior to the Soviet period there was no unified Uzbek state, and throughout its history regional loyalties have been more important than national identities.
The heart of the territory of present-day Uzbekistan is formed by the region between the two great rivers of the Central Asian region: the Amu-Darya and the Syr-Darya. This area, known to ancient historians as Transoxiana, has been inhabited for thousands of years. Islam came to the region in the seventh century, and over the next four hundred years a high level of scholarship and learning developed, particularly in cities such as Bukhara and Khorezm.
Much of this civilization—including elaborate irrigation systems and great oasis cities—was destroyed by the invasions of Genghis Khan in the thirteenth century. One of Genghis Khan's descendents, Timur the Lame (Timurelane), united much of central Asia from his base in Samarkand. Following his rule, however, his empire gradually declined into more or less independent principalities and city-states. By the early sixteenth century, Uzbek tribes from the north took control of many of these autonomous kingdoms. The Uzbek kingdom also fragmented and by the eighteenth century, a number of powerful principalities or khanates had emerged on its territory. Foremost among them were the khanates of Bukhara, in the Zeravshan Valley, Khiva in the northwest, and Kokand in the Ferghana Valley.
There were early failed attempts by the Russians to expand into the region in the eighteenth century, but Russian imperialism gained a firm hold in Turkestan in the midnineteenth century. In 1865 Russian troops seized Tashkent, and by 1876 Russia had turned Khiva and Bukhara into protectorates, and absorbed Kokand into the empire. Many of the significant socioeconomic features of the present began under Russian colonial rule. Foremost among them was the establishment of widespread cotton production, based on the rehabilitation of irrigation systems. Railways were built from the Russian heartland to Tashkent, to allow for cotton exports. Tashkent became the center of Russian power in the region, and an increasing number of Slavs emigrated to the city.
With the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, a Tashkent Soviet formally seized power and suppressed nascent nationalist movements based in Kokand and elsewhere. A guerrilla war ensued between so-called basmachi rebels and Soviet forces, but by late 1919 the Soviets controlled most of what is now Uzbekistan. In 1924 an Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was formed, consisting largely of the territories of the three former khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, but also including the territory of present-day Tajikistan as an autonomous republic. In 1929 Tajikistan was given the status of a full union republic, and in 1936 the present-day boundaries of Uzbekistan were established, when Karakalpakstan was incorporated as an autonomous republic.
Soviet colonial policy imitated prerevolutionary rule in many ways, expanding cotton production and importing greater numbers of Slavs to run new industry and to control parts of the political and security apparatus. However, the Soviet regime also strongly promoted ethnic Uzbeks into the elite. In the 1930s, many of this new leadership were executed or imprisoned in the Stalinist purges, labeled as nationalists. Moscow never entirely rooted out nationalist elites from Uzbekistan, and in the 1970s the Uzbek leadership had considerable autonomy in its rule. Under Sharif Rashadov, leader of the Uzbek Communist Party from 1954 to 1983, the elite gained considerable control over local policy and over the local economy. This permitted the growth of huge levels of corruption, notably in the cotton sector. High levels of falsification led to a major anticorruption drive in the 1980s, in which many senior officials were dismissed.
By the late 1980s social discontent was making itself felt through increasing interethnic tension. In June 1989 Meskhetian Turks were the targets of riots in the Ferghana Valley and elsewhere, and there were further outbreaks of disorder in the Tashkent region in March 1990. In 1989 Islam Karimov was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party, and given a mandate to restore order in the republic. In March 1990 Karimov was elected to the position of executive president of the republic by the Supreme Soviet (legislature). On 31 August 1991 the Supreme Soviet voted to declare Uzbekistan an independent state.
In the first decade of independence, Karimov intensified his control over all aspects of political life. On the surface, the political situation has been largely stable, and the government has sought strong relations with the West and foreign investment. However, a combination of inept economic policy, social problems, and political repression has provoked radical opposition to the regime, undermined international relations, and made any succession to Karimov fraught with danger.
In particular, the state initiated serious repression of Muslim believers, particularly after a series of violent incidents linked to the armed militant group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 1998–1999. Uzbekistan has claimed that actions against the IMU have been part of a legitimate antiterrorism policy, but many innocent believers have been caught up in government repressions, and the hard-line policy has only engendered more support for the radical opposition.

Conflict Dynamics

That the conflict in Uzbekistan poses a threat is largely a result of government policies that have led to a combination of authoritarian rule, economic decline, social discontent, and a polarized political arena in which radical Islamist groups have begun to occupy an important underground role. These domestic pressures are played against a backdrop of poor relations with neighboring states, and in a region characterized by instability.

Authoritarian Rule
The government is highly centralized and personalized around President Karimov. Policies are developed largely in an informal circle of close allies of the president, rather than through the formal government and parliamentary structures. The regime is extremely authoritarian and suppresses all forms of dissent and opposition. There is widespread evidence of human-rights abuses by the security forces against political opponents of the regime.
Under this system, there is very little opportunity for dissent to be voiced. The media is strictly controlled by prepublication censorship, and by arrests and harassment of independent journalists. The press is no more open than it was under Soviet rule. Formal political mechanisms, such as elections, have little impact on the actual policymaking process. Most political disputes are conducted away from the public eye, in behind-the-scenes informal environments.
Elections have been held both to the presidency and to parliament, but none have met international standards of free and fair elections. The first elections, held in December 1991, were relatively open, with a contest between Karimov and Erk Party leader Mohammed Salih. In March 1995 Karimov cancelled the presidential elections due in 1996, and instead called a referendum to extend his term in office until 2000. In January 2000 Karimov won presidential elections with 92 percent of the vote. Even his sole opponent admitted that he had voted for Karimov. In January 2002 Karimov extended his term in office from 2005 to 2007 through a referendum.
There are virtually no legal channels for any protest against the government. The two main opposition parties that were formed in the early 1990s, Erk and Birlik, are banned, and their leaders remain in exile. There are a few Birlik members still active, and they are mainly engaged in collecting information regarding human-rights abuses. They are often members of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, which maintains a rivalry with the International Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, which is affiliated with Erk. Tense relations between the two main opposition groupings have merely facilitated the regime's control over political life.
Parliament is little more than a rubber stamp on the activities of the executive, and a bicameral legislature planned for 2002 is not expected to pose any more opposition to the regime than its predecessor. Most parliamentary deputies are elected indirectly or from party lists. The ruling People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) and a number of affiliated "official" parties dominate parliament, but the parties have little or no role in political life.
In this environment there is an obvious danger of festering discontent being channeled into illegal and violent political activity. There is no scope for public involvement in political decisionmaking through formal, constitutional means. Even traditional community leaderships, such as the mahalla (community) chairmen, have been increasingly taken under the control of the state, and appointed rather than elected by local people. This all-embracing authoritarianism has provoked the growing memberships of groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, as one of the few channels for the expression of dissatisfaction with
the regime. The lack of openness has also badly affected the efficiency of governance. With no opposition or critical media, there is little incentive
for officials to do much except use their positions for self-advancement and self-enrichment.

Radical Islam
Since the suppression of virtually all secular political opposition, radical Islam has become the only nationwide grassroots opposition movement. According to official figures, 88 percent of the population is Muslim, and Islam in Uzbekistan has revived significantly since independence in 1991. In the late 1980s and early 1990s in particular, foreign Islamic groups funded the rebuilding of mosques, provided Islamic education, and funded education for young people in Islamic schools abroad. Radical Islamic ideas gained some following, particularly among young people, and particularly in areas such as the eastern Ferghana Valley, which has always been a center of Islamic piety in the region, and rural parts of southern Uzbekistan, such as the Surkhan-Darya region.
Since 1992 the government has led a campaign against independent Islamic and Islamist groups, while providing support for loyal Islamic structures. The government strictly controls the Muslim Board, which represents the official Muslim hierarchy, and has disbanded all other Islamic groups. A number of independent Islamist movements emerged in 1990–1991, advocating the introduction of an Islamic state including the imposition of sharia law. The groups were crushed by a campaign against independent Islamic groups, particularly those with political aims, in 1992. Many members of such groups fled the country, and formed the basis for radical groupings in exile such as the IMU.
It is difficult to ascertain the real level of support for radical Islamist groups. The government has been active in pursuing alleged Islamic radicals, but according to human-rights groups, many of those implicated by the security forces have been largely innocent of any attachment to radical groups, further increasing dissatisfaction with the government. There is evidence of minority support for more radical Islamist ideas, particularly in areas of the Ferghana Valley. In the present political context, there is no outlet for these ideas, but there is the potential for rapid emergence of new radical groups in the case of conflict, or indeed of liberalization of the political environment.
Two major groups opposed to the regime have been active since 1997–
1998. These are the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
The origins of the IMU lie in the Ferghana Valley, in particularly the Namangan region. In the late 1980s, probably with the support of foreign religious emissaries from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, small groups were established espousing radical Islamist ideas. Groups such as Tovba (Repentance), Adolat (Justice), and Islam Lashkalari (Warriors of Islam) had similar ideas of introducing radical Islamist principles as the basis of the state. Leaders of such groups who escaped imprisonment in the government crackdown in 1992 moved into exile, often to Tajikistan, where many fought in the civil war on the side of the United Tajik Opposition.
In 1997 some members of these groups coalesced into the IMU led by Juma Namangani and Tohir Yuldash. They were mainly based in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and became heavily involved in criminal activities, in particular narcotics smuggling. Their stated aim was overthrow of the Karimov regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in the whole Ferghana Valley region. The IMU was allegedly involved in several military actions against the regime, although the extent of its activities and its capabilities were always in doubt.
The first proof of real terrorist capabilities, allegedly carried out by the IMU, came on 16 February 1999, when seven bomb explosions were reported in Tashkent. At least 16 people were killed in the explosions, and about 150 people were injured. Fifty administrative and residential buildings were damaged, some severely. Those killed and injured in the bombings were mainly bystanders. The two initial car bombs may have been part of an attempt to assassinate Karimov. Whether the attacks were the work of the IMU remains unproven: the ease of access apparently enjoyed by the attackers to highly secure environments suggested at least a degree of involvement by elements in official structures.
In August 1999 a group of several hundred gunmen from the IMU crossed the border from Tajikistan into Kyrgyzstan and occupied several villages and mountain valleys in the southern Batken district of the Osh region. It was widely believed that the gunmen were attempting to open a corridor through to Uzbekistan, with the intention of provoking an uprising or staging a terrorist attack and cross-border incursions. During the attack the rebels kidnapped several local soldiers and officials, and four Japanese geologists. In October the rebels retreated back across the border into Tajikistan, and the Japanese nationals were released, apparently after a large ransom was paid.
A group of gunmen, claimed by the government to be linked to the IMU, attacked a police post in Yangiyabad, about 80 kilometers east of Tashkent, near the border with Tajikistan, on 15 November 1999, killing four policemen and three civilians. The attack may have been related to the Islamic militants' involvement in the drug trade. Some 1,500 troops were involved in tracking down the gunmen.
In 2000 there were incursions by small groups of IMU fighters into Uzbekistan. Fighting was reported in the hills close to Tashkent, and on a pass on the road to Ferghana. There was also fighting in the Surkhan-Darya region of southern Uzbekistan, apparently between Uzbek military forces and IMU units from Tajikistan. Uzbekistan responded by laying mines on much of its border with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have led to the deaths of scores of local people.
In 2001 there was little sign of IMU activity in Central Asia, and they seem to have become closely involved in the Taliban campaign against the Northern Alliance inside Afghanistan. Many members of the IMU are believed to have been killed in military action in Afghanistan, and their leader, Namangani, was reportedly killed during fighting in Kunduz. This does not necessarily mean that Uzbekistan has rid itself of the IMU. Remnants will no doubt return to Central Asia. More importantly, the preconditions that gave rise to the IMU—socioeconomic decline, government repression, and a search for identity—remain in place.

Hizb ut-Tahrir
One of the fastest-growing political groups in Uzbekistan is Hizb ut-Tahrir, a clandestine organization founded in the Middle East in the early 1960s. It aims to establish a borderless Islamic caliphate in the region. The group is banned in many Middle Eastern countries, but has a considerable following throughout the Muslim world, including in Western countries.
Hizb ut-Tahrir has a very different ideology from that of the IMU. It is based on a particular interpretation of Islamic history that is opposed in principle to the division of Islamic peoples into nation-states. Instead it advocates the re-creation of the Islamic caliphate throughout the region. Hizb ut-Tahrir would be largely a fringe party in any normally functioning democracy, but in repressive states they have gained influence through their underground cell structure and their strong campaigns against corruption and injustice.
The extent of support for the movement is unknown, though some sources have suggested that membership in the region may have reached 12,000–
15,000. Its own leaders have alleged that it has up to 80,000 supporters, including senior officials. Most of its work takes place in secret, but it has staged occasional demonstrations. In July 2001 several hundred activists were arrested after staging demonstrations in Tashkent against the arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir members.
Hizb ut-Tahrir concentrates on propaganda activities, as opposed to the overt armed struggle conducted by the IMU. Its aversion to violence is both ideological and tactical—it has observed the lack of success enjoyed by the IMU against the regime through armed struggle. Its opposition to violence is not absolute—its members are free to take part in jihad against anti-Islamic aggressors, for example. But it seems unlikely that it will resort to terrorist activity against the Uzbek regime in the short term. It probably has more to gain by building up a wide support base and attempting to infiltrate the regime from within.
Whatever regime is in power in Uzbekistan, radical Islamist ideas will be part of the political spectrum. However, in a pluralistic society, they are unlikely to gain the support of more than a small minority of the population. High levels of government repression, socioeconomic decline, and the lack of freedom provided to authoritative Islamic teachers and scholars have all contributed to the growth of radical Islamism. The lack of viable alternative political opposition groups has also contributed to rapid growth, and Islamist groups will now be a major player in any potential conflict scenario.

Regional Divisions
Clan networks and regional groupings play an important role in Uzbek politics, although the exact nature of these networks is much disputed by scholars. In the most simplistic form, there are four important clans, based on particular regions. These are the Samarkand-Bukhara clan, the Tashkent clan, the Ferghana clan, and the Kashkadar clan. These clans continued to exert influence throughout the Soviet period, and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s when ethnic Uzbeks gained more influence in the political elite.
Karimov came to power in 1989 as a result of a compromise among different clan leaders. However, his roots are in Samarkand, and his rise to power owed much to a leader of the Samarkand clan, I. Jurabekov. Since 1992, when the leader of the Tashkent clan, Shukrullo Mirsaidov, attempted to oust Karimov, rival clans have not dared to challenge the supremacy of the Samarkand clan in politics.
Karimov has attempted to achieve a certain balance among the rival groupings, while ensuring the preeminence of the Samarkand grouping. Prime Minister Utkur Sultanov is a representative of the Tashkent clan, though he does not wield significant authority in the government. Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulaziz Komolov is also from the Tashkent clan, and is believed to be a close ally of Karimov and to wield considerable influence in the inner circles of power. The Ferghana and Kashkadar clans wield largely regional authority. Clan representatives excluded from political power have achieved influence in business and economics, which has somewhat lessened tension in the political sphere.
In the long term, Karimov seems intent on reducing the influence of clans in politics. He rotates personnel with considerable frequency, both in the central government and in the regions, aiming to avoid any regional leaders building up their own power bases and networks that could challenge his central authority. However, clan allegiances and loyalties are firmly rooted, and there is a danger that clans who feel excluded from political and economic power will attempt to regain political influence by other means. Such a scenario would be particularly pertinent in any succession struggle.
The most dangerous scenario is an unholy alliance of excluded regional leaders and radical forces outside the state, including Islamic radical forces. There is some suspicion that just such an alliance was behind the Tashkent bombings in 1999. Whether true or not, there is clearly the scope for a very complex alliance of opposition to the present regime that would include disaffected regions.

Human-Rights Abuses
There is considerable evidence of widespread abuses of human rights by the security forces. According to information collected by local and international human-rights groups, there are about seven thousand possible political prisoners in Uzbekistan. Not only are many of those arrested and sentenced innocent of involvement in violent activity against the state, but many of those arrested are beaten or otherwise abused while in police custody. Mass arrests of men believed to be part of independent Islamic movements peaked in 1998, and again in 1999 after the Tashkent bombings. There is no sign that government repression has lessened following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States: if anything the government seems to be even less concerned by criticism by the international community.
Human-rights abuses not only undermine the legitimacy of the government; in Uzbekistan, they are also direct contributors to instability. Many members of the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir have been radicalized by the actions of the government against friends and relatives. Severe government repression has been one of the key elements of conflict promotion. The sentences given to prisoners accused of acting against the regime tend to be long and arduous. Several prison camps are believed to exist in which political prisoners are kept. Amnesty International has confirmed the existence of one of these prison camps—Yaslik—located in a former Soviet army barracks in the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic. Conditions are said to be cruel, inhuman, and degrading. The treatment of prisoners in such conditions inevitably produces further radicalization and anger. Whatever their views when sentenced, prisoners released after spending time in an Uzbek prison are unlikely to take up moderate political positions.

Socioeconomic Decline
Most opposition to the regime in the early 1990s came from intellectuals in Tashkent or from young people drawn to Islamist ideas in the cities of the Ferghana Valley. As the economic situation has declined, there is evidence of growing dissatisfaction among other social groups, notably agricultural workers and the rural poor, who are suffering disproportionately from the state's failure to improve living standards for the mass of the population.
Uzbekistan has failed to develop a serious reform program to achieve the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Uzbekistan has significant precious-metal resources, including gold and platinum. Its substantial gas and oil reserves—it is the tenth-largest gas exporter in the world—have prompted the government to make self-sufficiency in energy a strategic priority. These resources, and comparative agricultural wealth, did much to ensure that the economy did not contract as much as the other postindependence former Soviet economies. In some ways this lessened the initial shock of economic transition, but ten years later it is clear that this economic policy is no longer sustainable, and is contributing directly to instability.
The growth of corruption at all levels of the government and ill-advised, grandiose construction projects in the capital have prevented a fair distribution of what wealth is being generated. Recent plans to diversify agriculture with a view to increasing self-sufficiency in staple products such as grain have suffered from poor weather conditions and inadequately maintained irrigation and distribution networks. Surveys aimed at identifying further reserves of gold and other minerals have met with discouraging results. Meanwhile, the narcotics trade has grown enormously, with production increasing massively in Tajikistan, and gradually increasing in Uzbekistan.
Government policy has aimed at ensuring political stability by avoiding "shock therapy." This has preserved a role for domestic producers and avoided too cataclysmic a fall in people's incomes. However, this policy is not compatible with long-term aims of developing the economy. Many domestic producers are unviable in the long term, and structural readjustment will be necessary. Little real economic reform has been carried out, and there is little encouragement for private enterprise or individual initiative. The bureaucracy is overstaffed, and many officials retain a Soviet-era approach to economic problems. High levels of regulation, lack of legislative reform, and widespread corruption have limited the development of an open economy, while government policy has not yet achieved significant liberalization of exchange controls or other elements of state intervention. The lack of convertibility of the currency has discouraged significant foreign investment and made regional economic cooperation even more difficult.
Without new government policies on the economy, there will be no reversal in the present decline in living standards, particularly in rural areas. Conditions in many regions of the country are now worse than in neighboring states, despite Uzbekistan's significant advantages in industrial development and in resources. Karakalpakstan and Khorezm have undergone one of the worst droughts in recent memory. In 2001 there were substantial crop losses, and a severe impact on animal husbandry. In both these regions, economic problems have been accompanied by serious problems in environmental matters and in health. Other areas, notably in southern Uzbekistan, are also facing serious economic difficulty that is leading to social discontent.
Even if the government discovers the political will to implement the changes urged by international financial institutions, it will face serious obstacles. Implementing currency convertibility would inevitably lead to a sharp fall in the value of the som, a rise in prices on many basic goods, and a lowering of living standards for much of the population. The government is understandably concerned that this will increase social discontent and political opposition. Yet doing nothing is equally dangerous. An almost unprecedented protest organized by farmers in Jizzakh province in July 2001 could be the precursor of future unrest unless major changes in policy are made.

Interstate Relations
Many of the problems faced by Uzbekistan are difficult to resolve on a national basis. Economic, security, environmental issues, and disputes over water and energy supplies, all have a regional dimension. However, Uzbekistan has tended to shun regional organizations, and attempted to achieve results in interstate relations largely on a bilateral basis.
Following the bombings in February 1999, Uzbekistan took on an even more isolationist line. When IMU militants invaded southern Kyrgyzstan in August 1999, the Uzbek air force bombed a village in Kyrgyzstan, and mounted several raids into Tajikistan. It has also mined much of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and sharply increased border security, badly damaging regional trade. Such actions have severely limited regional cooperation, and hamper any regional efforts at overcoming conflict pressures.
Other regional issues also leave cause for concern. Disputes over natural-resource allocation, notably water, pose a major threat for the future. While Kyrgyzstan produces much of the water used in Uzbekistan's irrigation systems, it receives no compensation for the reservoir network that it maintains. Kyrgyzstan has attempted to increase the amount of water it can use under old Soviet allocation allowances, both for hydroelectric power and for irrigation. But increased use in upstream countries badly affects the amounts available for irrigation downstream, particularly for the vital cotton harvest. As a result, there have been frequent tensions between the two countries. A barter agreement is supposed to provide Kyrgyzstan with gas, to limit its need to generate electricity, while Uzbekistan receives adequate water. In practice, neither side has adequately fulfilled the agreement. The issue is unlikely to lead to interstate conflict, but it creates local tensions and worsens relations between the two countries. Similar problems are evident between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over water sharing and borders.
The increasing support for Uzbekistan by the international community may make international cooperation even more difficult. Its Central Asian neighbors are concerned that increased financial and military support for Uzbekistan will provoke a more aggressive policy in the region, and lessen its need for regional cooperation. The international community needs to emphasize the dangers of unilateral policymaking in conflict areas, while remaining realistic about the potential for successful regional conflict-prevention programs.

Official Conflict Management

The nature of potential conflict in Uzbekistan makes official conflict management policies particularly difficult. The government remains convinced that its official policy of strong security measures and tight government control over society is the most effective means for preventing conflict. It seeks assistance on a bilateral basis, largely in the field of security cooperation, where its main partners have been the United States, Israel, and Turkey.
Regional efforts at conflict management have revolved almost exclusively around security developments. Uzbekistan has been wary of any organizations that seem to act as channels for Russian influence in the region, notably the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States Security Pact (which it left in 1999) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which unites the central Asian states (except Turkmenistan), Russia, and China. The SCO is based almost exclusively on security cooperation, with the political philosophies of Russian and China being most prevalent. A joint peacekeeping force formed by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan has hardly been functional.
Russian involvement in Uzbekistan's policymaking has sharply declined, and relations between the two countries are often difficult. Russia shares Uzbekistan's fear of Islamist extremist groups undermining stability in the region, but differing geostrategic positions have limited their cooperation. Uzbekistan has largely sought Western assistance in its security policies, but until September 2001, this assistance has been limited to occasional aid and some political support. Relations with China are good, based largely on similar attitudes to what both states view as a security threat from Islamist groups. This confluence of views on the "Islamist threat" has only increased since 11 September, with Uzbekistan enjoying greater international support, including from Western countries.
U.S. policies on human rights and broader approaches to security have often been viewed by local leaders as mere rhetoric since there has been little linkage between U.S. economic and military assistance and human rights or democratic progress. During an official visit in 2000, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was extremely critical of the government's record on human rights, and stressed the need for a distinction between Islamic extremists and innocent believers. Since 11 September, there has been a downplaying of U.S. concern over human rights, although the U.S. embassy in Tashkent has been attempting to keep the issue on the agenda. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited in December 2001, but in the context of the international campaign against terrorism, the U.S. agenda seemed to be set by Department of Defense representatives emphasizing military and security cooperation. Other international governments have also been largely silent about the failings of Uzbekistan's policy toward its religious and political opposition.
Neither the UN nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has been able to engage Uzbekistan successfully with regard to conflict management programs. UN agencies have been criticized for their failure to stress democratization and rule of law as critical to development and security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been particularly weak in this regard. Its main emphasis, understandably, has been on socioeconomic development, but it has been criticized in the past for lacking any overall political view, and for becoming too closely entwined with the authorities. In 2000 the UNDP was strongly criticized in a report by independent consultants, who objected to its exclusion of independent human-rights groups from projects, and its contributions of some $2 million to official human-rights bodies. These attempts to bolster its position vis-à-vis the authorities have not given it any useful leverage. In 1998 the UNDP attempted to develop a program in the Ferghana Valley, involving Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but it was largely blocked by the Uzbek authorities, which feared that it impinged on their sovereignty. The program has a strong conflict-
prevention element, and would have offered some real cross-border projects in the area for the first time. This was only the most obvious example of the reluctance of Uzbekistan to become involved in regional programs, and its failure has marred further development of cross-border contacts.
The OSCE's work on human rights and democratic development is viewed with suspicion by the Uzbek government, and it has faced considerable difficulties in expanding its work. In contrast to the UNDP, it is respected by local human-rights organizations, and is the one international organization that has consistently supported independent groups. Its initial work stressed its Human Dimension priorities—human rights and democratization—but since the late 1990s it has attempted to expand other areas of its mandate, including security issues and environmental and economic aspects of security. Its attempts to become involved in regional mediation, in water for example, have largely failed, and it has not been involved in any of the interstate disputes in the region over borders or other issues.
The European Union (EU) has played a fairly weak role in Uzbekistan, limiting itself to a small Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States program. It did attempt to begin a wider political dialogue with Uzbekistan under negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1999. But the EU's attempt to link the PCA to improvements in human rights and political and economic reform have failed. The PCA has been only implemented formally, with some discussions on trade and finance, but has had no discernible impact upon government policy in the area of human rights. The Cooperation Council of the PCA was suspended in 2000, but was revived in January 2002, with the EU promising to raise issues of human rights and democracy, alongside security concerns.
NATO's Partnership for Peace program includes elements of preventive diplomacy and confidence building, but most of its work is focused on formal exchanges and education. In the absence of any understanding from the authorities of the dangers of such policies, the international community needs to act in ways that bolster stability largely independent of government policy.

Multi Track Diplomacy

NGOs have faced considerable problems in establishing any level of conflict-prevention capability. The lack of government recognition of the problem, and a latent suspicion toward nonofficial actors, have combined to limit NGOs largely to the sphere of social and economic development. Even in these fields, it has sometimes been difficult for NGOs to obtain legal registration, although attitudes in government structures are changing, and NGOs are becoming more sophisticated, with training from organizations such as Counterpart Consortium. In many areas, the government has become more willing to contemplate cooperation, and some local governments have become active in attracting NGO involvement.
Nevertheless, in such an environment, it seems unlikely that a successful multi-track diplomacy approach could work. The best hope is that a range of projects aimed at social activism, civil-society building, economic development, education, and information provision will be able to strengthen society to ensure that future stresses and potential conflicts are resolved peacefully. The Soros Foundation runs a number of projects of this nature, ranging from education and academic exchanges, to economic development programs. One of the most promising Soros programs is an Internet access project that will develop wider and better access to the Web outside the capital. This program is also supported by UNDP and NATO, which is offering satellite and communications assistance. The Internet is becoming one of the key tools in countering government censorship, and many Uzbek sites are emerging. The government still blocks opposition sites, where it is able, but it is also supportive of wider expansion of the Internet for educational purposes. It has yet to resolve these two contradictory impulses, and there may be further clampdowns on Internet provision in the future.
Despite such programs, Internet access will remain unavailable to much of the population, and there is still a need for much more open media, in print, radio, and television. One of the few successful NGOs working in this area is Internews, which runs training for journalists and also has a team producing weekly programs for independent television stations. This is a useful combination since much training for journalists does not give them an outlet for their skills. Internews gives them an opportunity to produce their own programs, but there is no similar program for radio or print. CIMERA runs training programs for print journalists, but faces the problem of limited outlets for their work.
Social activism is now a core aim of UNDP programs, and this area offers some hope for the development of grassroots decisionmaking. The aim is to include local communities in the decisionmaking process. In many ways this involves working through the mahalla institution. The mahalla is a traditional form of local government in which all the local population have some say. In practice, the mahalla has often been taken over by the state and democracy is limited, but it still provides a potentially useful forum for grassroots activism. Counterpart Consortium is also active in developing grassroots participation. Its mahalla development program provides grants to local communities of up to $5,000. The grants are awarded on the basis of local collective decisionmaking on priorities for a local community. As a sideline, Counterpart also supports local NGOs in advocacy programs, providing them with skills in lobbying local government for local needs. This kind of program is a useful form of proto-politics from below, with local communities hopefully becoming more aware and protective of their rights.
Nevertheless, where NGOs have attempted to become involved in political activity, they have inevitably faced strong opposition from the state. In monitoring human-rights violations, the most active groups are the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU) and the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU). Neither is officially registered, and their members often face harassment, detention, or other forms of police persecution. Their main activity is producing accounts of police ill-treatment, unlawful arrest, assistance to families of prisoners, and advice on legal rights. Some other legal-advice centers are beginning, and the American Bar Association has had some projects in this field. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International are both active in monitoring human rights, and also in advocacy toward Western governments on their policies toward Uzbekistan. HRW, in particular, has been consistently pressing the U.S. government to attach more conditionality and consistency to its relationships with the government.
In a separate category, the International Crisis Group (ICG) produces regular reports on the political and socioeconomic situation in Uzbekistan from the point of view of conflict prevention. A considerable part of the work of ICG is spent in advocacy in Europe, Japan, and North America, with a focus on UN, OSCE, and other international institutions, as well as major governments. ICG produces some of the few in-depth reports on the region that address issues from the policymakers' perspective, and they are also active in advocacy within the region.
There is little NGO activity on issues of economic reform, but considerable interest in business development and poverty-alleviation programs. The local Association of Businesswomen has advice and consultancy services for women in business, while Counterpart also supports NGOs active in these fields. Among the most promising poverty-alleviation programs are microcredit schemes, such as those run by the UNDP in Karakalpakistan or Mercy Corps in Namangan. These provide ways for the poor to achieve income generation without resorting to predatory banks or high interest rates from unofficial moneylenders. In most cases, these offer small loans of $50–$150 to women, with groups of women banding together to guarantee each others' loans. Most of these are small-scale pilot schemes, and there is huge room for expansion. Mercy Corps is already expanding its existing scheme to four new offices, and considering similar projects in the vulnerable southern region of Surkhan Darya.
In regions such as Karakalpakistan, environmental and health problems are major promoters of emigration and social degradation. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and others have significant projects here, but many projects associated with the Aral Sea have been failures, owing to lack of coordination between agencies and a failure to involve local people.
Following the failure of the UNDP program in the Ferghana Valley, few NGOs have been able to build up regional linkages. However, the United States Agency for Intenational Development (USAID) has funded a major Ferghana Valley program based in Andijan, the Peaceful Communities Initiative, which is run by Mercy Corps. It will attempt to establish cross-border cooperation in neutral areas, such as sports; includes similar local community initiatives to those promoted by Counterpart, including small grants for projects implementing solutions to basic problems of access to water, food security, sanitation, and hygiene; and address other problems identified by the communities themselves. This type of creative program offers a real chance for intercommunity relations to develop, initially at a low level, and provides financial incentives for interethnic cooperation.
Most NGOs have noticed an improvement in the environment in the past two to three years, as local governments come to understand the advantages that their programs can offer. Yet there is a long way to go. Government bureaucracy, corruption, and state interference pose major challenges. Local NGOs are still relatively weak, compared with neighboring Kyrgyzstan, and require further training and support. Competition between them for grants can give rise to an unhealthy rivalry, and there is sometimes a lack of coordination between international NGOs. Yet the sector is growing, and it is no longer true to say that there is no capacity for further international assistance. The main problem is that without major policy change, the NGO sector can still only have a very limited impact on democratization and economic prospects.

Prospects

Scenarios for potential conflict are largely on two levels. At the highest political level, the most likely sources of conflict will be concerned with future succession to President Karimov, and the role of regional groupings that have been largely excluded from power. The latter aspect may be manageable if the economy is sufficiently successful to provide all regional leaders with some rewards from economic activity. If the economic situation worsens, tensions between rival regional groupings over limited resources will grow and could lead to high-level political conflict.
At the lower level, the greatest danger is of social and civil unrest, prompted by economic decline. Such protests have been occurring very sporadically and at a very limited level. Without political leadership, civil unrest is unlikely to challenge the state, but it could be used by dissatisfied elites to their own advantage. The state is clearly willing to contemplate repressive measures where necessary, but it is unlikely to be successful in the long term if serious unrest develops.
Between these two extremes, there is a continuing danger of terrorist groups developing on the basis of Islamist radicalism and finding support from the socially excluded and economically deprived. Hizb ut-Tahrir does not pose a threat of violence at present, but some of its members may potentially turn to arms if repression continues. The destruction of many of the IMU in Afghanistan does not mean the end of that organization, and it may return in a more dangerous mode, using small cells and classic terrorist techniques.
On the level of civil society, the challenge will be to challenge mentalities and develop grassroots activism. Some developments in this field are evident, with community involvement in micro projects, but much more is possible. Despite the difficulties that NGOs find in working in Uzbekistan, experience demonstrates that progress can be made, particularly in developing social activism at a grassroots level.

Recommendations

The main issues facing the international community are centered around how to conduct conflict-prevention programs in their widest understanding under a government that refuses to recognize the concept. The problems facing Western relations with Uzbekistan have become yet more difficult following U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan. The United States and other states have offered financial support in exchange for Uzbekistan's cooperation in providing air bases and support for the military campaign in Afghanistan. This support has few conditions attached, and may provide the government with yet another breathing space that will allow it to avoid making difficult decisions regarding economic reform or political liberalization.
It is vital that the international community does not provide funds and support that would enable the government merely to prolong its present policies. There is a danger that announcements in December 2001 of increased bilateral support by the United States will merely cushion the government temporarily from the consequences of its ill-advised economic policies. This may provide some respite in the short term, but the longer reform is delayed, the worse the accompanying difficulties in terms of social unrest or political upheaval are likely to be. All aid to Uzbekistan should be provided with conditions attached. Otherwise, it will merely heighten the risk of future social upheaval and civil unrest.
The challenge for the international community should focus on three areas:

1. Economic development and poverty alleviation. In this sphere, much depends on government policy, although there are some areas where the international community can do more without government assistance. At the top of the agenda will be the attempts by Western governments and the international financial institutions (IFIs) to encourage structural reform. Although there have been serious problems with the IFIs' reform plans for many post-Soviet states, in general their ideas for Uzbekistan are realistic and necessary. Primarily, this involves the increasing liberalization of the economy from state control. One of the first policies that will be advocated will be the move toward a liberalization of exchange controls, which are blocking inward investment and making it difficult for Uzbekistan to maintain constructive economic relations with its neighbors. The main players in this program will be the IMF and the World Bank. A proposed IMF reform program could attract the support of the World Bank and other IFIs to support moves toward currency convertibility and structural reform. This needs to be pushed politically by the United States and other parties, while offering financial support to counteract negative consequences. Without significant support, any moves toward major reforms are likely to spark social unrest.
   
2. Social infrastructure development, including health and education. Although not normally a priority in conflict-prevention programs, in Uzbekistan it is partly the decline in social infrastructure that is producing a new generation, disillusioned, ill-educated, and lacking in employment skills. It is this generation that poses the greatest danger of involvement in criminal activities, including drug trafficking, and radical political and religious groups. These areas are easier for the international community to operate in: about half of USAID's budget goes to health programs, and there are successful projects being implemented by MSF and others. Poverty, lack of government attention, and a stress on ideological training are all taking their toll on the effectiveness of national education. In many areas of development work, the local community organizations—mahallas—have been used as channels by international organizations. As the basic building block of society and the political system, this approach makes sense. But in many cases, mahallas have become extensions of government control over society, and are often used by the security forces to maintain surveillance and limit the activities of political opponents. When aid focuses on mahallas, it is important that it be channeled in ways that supports the mahalla as a potential component in civil society rather than as an instrument of the state or the security forces.
   
3. Political pluralism and human-rights activity, including support for independent media. This is a much more difficult area in which to work, but it is vital for future conflict prevention. Without increased information about the world, some groups in the population are vulnerable to manipulation by extremist forces. The United States and other governments provide some support in this area, but U.S. funding for democracy programs has been cut in recent years. The OSCE's program is relatively small, and other agencies, such as the UNDP, have very little impact with their good governance and similar programs. NGOs such as Internews provide a vital service in supporting semi-independent media, and should be strongly supported. Human-rights groups are also worthy of support, despite their internal differences. Above all, the international community needs to remind the Uzbek government constantly that its present policies are not producing long-term political stability and are unacceptable to other states with interests in the region. It may seem to be politically expedient to downplay differences over political pluralism and rule of law for short-term gains in the campaign in Afghanistan, but in the long term international indifference to the internal situation in Uzbekistan will come back to haunt Western policymakers in the future.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of Social and Political Studies. Information and Analytical Center, Sweden. Central Asia--Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia--Caucasus Institute of the Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Central Asia Monitor.
REPORTS:	International Crisis Group: Uzbekistan at Ten--Repression and Instability, Brussels/Osh, 21 August 2001. The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, Brussels/Osh, 30 January 2002. U.S. Department of State, Uzbekistan Country Report on Human Rights Practices (2000). See also reports on Uzbekistan by Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org)
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change, edited by Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower. Washington, DC: The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, January 1995: www.cpss.org/cabook.htm. Central Asian Security: The New International Context, edited by Roy Allison and Lena Jonson. London, RIIA, 2001. Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, by Martha Brill Olcott. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997. Civil Society in Central Asia, edited by M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh. Seattle, Center for Civil Society International, 1999. Islam and Central Asia, edited by Susan Eisenhower and Roald Sagdeev. Washington, DC, The Eisenhower Institute, 2000. Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization? by William Fierman. In Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, edited by Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth. London, RIIA, 2001. The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present: A Cultural History, by Edward Allworth. Stanford, CA, Hoover Press Publications, 1990. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations, by Olivier Roy. London, I. B. Tauris, 2000. The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? by Ahmad Rashid. London, Zed Books, 1999. Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy, by Annette Bohr. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998. Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road, by Neil J. Melvin. Amsterdam, Harwood, 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.birlik.net (Opposition party web site) www.cango.net.uz (Counterpart Consortium web site of Uzbekistan's NGOs) www.crisisweb.org (Contains International Crisis Group reports on Central Asia) www.eurasianet.org (Analytical coverage of Uzbekistan) www.fewer.org (Reports on conflict prevention in Central Asia) www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org (Official web site of the transnational Islamist group) www.internews.uz (Internews programs and information on electronic media) www.mercycorps.org (Wide range of programs in Uzbekistan, including conflict prevention) www.msf.org/aralsea (Information on Médecins Sans Frontières programs and state of Aral Sea) www.osce.org (OCSE Centre in Tashkent) www.preventconflict.org/portal/centralasia/ (A conflict-prevention initiative by Harvard scholars with a detailed data base of summarized articles and links) www.rferl.org (Daily news and analysis) www.soros.org/osi.html (Open Society Institute programs in Uzbekistan) www.undp.uz (Information on UNDP programs in Uzbekistan) www.usaid.gov/country/ee/uz/ (USAID's program in Uzbekistan) www.uzbekistanerk.org (Opposition party web site) www.uznews.com (Official government site) www.worldbank.org (Information on programs, economic situation)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Mikhail Ardzinov, Independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, e-mail: iron@mik.silk.org Richard Conroy, Country Representative UNDP, e-mail: Richard.Conroy@undp.org Alisher Ilkhanov, Open Society Institute, e-mail: osi@osi.uz Soroush Javadi, Counterpart Consortium, e-mail: soroush@cpart.uz Annette Legutke, OSCE Centre in Tashkent, e-mail: alegutke@osce.sand.uz David Lewis, International Crisis Group, Central Asia Project, e-mail: icgosh@crisisweb.org Joshua Machleder, Country Representative Internews, e-mail: Josh@internews.uz Roy Male, Médecins Sans Frontières, e-mail: cm@msfh-tashkent.uz Murat Mirzaev, Swiss Cooperation Office, e-mail: Murat.Mirzaev@tas.rep.admin.ch Susan Savage, Mercy Corps International, e-mail: savage@naytov.com Jon Thiele, Eurasia Foundation Tashkent Regional Office, e-mail: jont@ef.freenet.uz Tolib Yakubov, Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, e-mail support@hrsu.uz
ORGANIZATIONS:	DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: In Uzbekistan: Association of Uzbekistan for Sustainable Water Resources Development; Union for Defence of the Aral Sea and the Amudarya. Outside Uzbekistan: Central Asia and the Caucasus Information and Analytical Center; Center for Conflict Management; EastWest Institute; Human Rights Watch; Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy; International Crisis Group; Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities; Open Society Institute; OSCE; United States Institute of Peace

About the author

David Lewis is director of the International Crisis Group's Central Asia Project, based in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The project produces analytical reports on the political and socioeconomic situation in the region, and conducts advocacy programs among policymakers from its offices in Brussels, New York, and Washington, DC.