Author	Nick Lewer and Joe William
Publication	Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia
Year	2002

Summary

The island of Sri Lanka is situated in the Indian Ocean just twenty miles off the southeastern tip of India, with whom it has strong historical and cultural connections. For the last twenty years or so it has experienced a series of violent and bloody conflicts, which have mostly gone unnoticed by the international community. These include two uprisings by a Sinhalese group, the JVP, in 1971 and 1987-1989, and a war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. It is on the latter that we will concentrate in this chapter. The causes of the conflict are hotly contested, and it has been referred to variously as a terrorist problem, a war of secession, a protracted social conflict, an ethnic conflict, and a complex political emergency. But there is no doubt that the war has had a massively destructive impact on Sri Lanka's human, social, and economic capacities, and its infrastructure. There have been many attempts at official and unofficial levels to bring peace to the country.

Compared with other parts of the British colonial empire, the transition to independence for Ceylon in 1948 (in 1972 Ceylon became Sri Lanka) was comparatively peaceful. The type of democracy introduced by the British led to a majority system in which the Sinhalese would always control the country's parliament. Subsequent policies, especially with regard to language and access to education by successive Sri Lankan (Sinhalese-dominated) governments, and the reactions to these by the Tamil people, sowed the seeds of what has become a protracted and violent conflict that was particularly exacerbated by anti-Tamil riots in 1958, 1977–1978, and 1983.
The conflict, which has been raging at varying intensities since the 1983 attacks against the Tamil population, can be described as being between the largest, and now the most militarily effective Tamil militant group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sinhalese government of Sri Lanka. The situation has been further inflamed by two violent insurrections in 1971 and 1987–1989 by the Janatha Vimukth Peramuna (JVP), a group made up mostly from disaffected Sinhalese youth, which combined a potent mixture of Marxism and nationalism. The second JVP insurrection was in part triggered by the arrival of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987. The rebellion by the JVP during this time had an important influence on the course of events. How the war is understood and labeled by the various actors is important when considering peace interventions. For example, many Sinhalese talk in terms of a "terrorist problem," while supporters of the LTTE may see it as a war of secession—for Tamil Eelam. It also has the characteristics of a "complex political emergency" in that it is multidimensional with profound human suffering, has roots that are in part political, and there is a challenge to the state.
Sri Lanka has become a highly militarized society where the use of violence is widespread, not only in the war zones but also in the rest of the country where, for example, election violence has become endemic. Although many analysts describe the current situation as an "ethnic war," it is also a crisis of the state in that the LTTE and JVP conflicts are both symptomatic of broader issues concerning the identity, policies, and legitimacy of the state. The legitimacy of the state itself is questioned by some because of corruption and abuses of power, and the disputed and flawed nature of elections in past years.
Internationally, the key influence on Sri Lanka has been India, who has intervened through diplomatic and political initiatives (Indo-Lanka Accord), by sending an IPKF in 1987 and, during the late 1980s and early 1990s when Indian intelligence agencies trained and equipped Tamil militants. The southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu has played an important role in the conflict, especially after riots in 1983 when thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils fled there. This had two effects: first, it "internationalized" the conflict, and second, it raised strong emotions among the Tamils of Tamil Nadu, which put pressure both on Tamil Nadu and national politicians to do something on behalf of the Sri Lankan Tamils. The role of the Tamil diaspora has been influential in helping to raise large amounts of funding for the LTTE.
The LTTE, formed in 1976 from the Tamil New Tigers, consider themselves to be the sole representatives of Sri Lankan Tamils, with operational cadre strength of over 5,500. They are highly motivated and well organized, and have proven themselves to be extremely adaptable, having moved from guerrilla actions to conventional battles at different stages of the war. They also maintain a naval arm, the "Sea Tigers," and a suicide force, the "Black Tigers."

Characteristics of the LTTE

• The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is an armed group capable of sustainable guerrilla actions, terrorist attacks, and also fighting large conventional battles. It has a tight organizational structure (military and political) under the control of one person, and it is completely disciplined.
• It has systematically eliminated other Tamil militant groups, controls territory in the north and east of Sri Lanka, and runs a parallel government (with a police force, judicial system, and other structures).
• It is the only organization that has consistently stood for the right of national self-determination of the Tamil nation as defined in the Vaddukkodai Resolution (1976), and mandated by some 85 percent of the Tamil-speaking population in the 1977 general election.
• It has consistently demanded that the government offer an alternative to a separate state (based on the 1985 Thimpu Principles), which various administrations have failed to address. But, while it has secessionist ambitions and a political perspective, it has not specifically articulated its own alternative to Tamil Eelam.
• It has extensive international linkages and has created a worldwide business empire. For example, the LTTE has extensive shipping interests that are used for the delivery of weapons to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
• It has broad support from Tamil people living in Sri Lanka, and from the Tamil Diaspora. It has an effective publicity and propaganda program, which can rapidly mobilize political, economic, and financial support of the Tamil diaspora.
• It is proscribed as a terrorist organization in Sri Lanka, and by a few other countries.
• It has a culture of martyrdom symbolized through a cyanide capsule worn around the neck by LTTE fighters.

In 1948 the newly formed state did not give minorities, including Tamils, real protection against majority Sinhalese rule. Later changes in the constitution gave a preeminent position to Buddhism and the Sinhala language (the 1956 Official Languages Act—the "Sinhala-Only" Bill—of Prime Minister S. W. Bandaranaike). This affected all areas of life including education, government services, the security forces, and how Sri Lankan citizenship was defined. Power was concentrated in the Sinhala-dominated legislature. In the view of the Sinhalese, this was necessary because Tamils had been overrepresented in professional occupations such as medicine, engineering, police, judiciary, and in the universities in relation to their percentage of the total population. A new republican constitution was adopted in May 1972, strengthening Sinhala-Buddhist ideology. The constitution afforded Buddhism the "foremost place" in the state and confirmed Sinhala as the only official language. It further specified that Sinhala would be the language of the legislature, courts, and related institutions throughout the island. The new constitution also removed Article 29 of the previous constitution, which had provided at least minimal guarantees to minorities. Because of the electoral and representational system, the Tamils felt that they were excluded from having any real influence on political legislation and decisionmaking.
In response to the 1972 Constitution, the main Tamil opposition party at the time, the Tamil United Liberation Front, called for the self-determination of the Tamil people of Sri Lanka and their own "homeland" (Tamil Eelam) in the Vaddukkodai Resolution of 1976. It could be argued that this marked the end of attempts to create a multiethnic Sri Lankan state.
Several state instruments give the government considerable power during emergencies. The Sri Lankan constitution (Article 155) and the Public Security Ordinance (No. 25 of 1947) empower the president to declare a state of emergency, and in July 1979 the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1979 (PTA) was enacted. This is still in force. The PTA has allowed successive Sri Lankan governments to arrest and detain people without proper judicial inquiries. Prisoners have been subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and many have "disappeared," and some analysts argue that this PTA is the "engine of state terrorism." Similar stories are heard in relation to prisoners held by the LTTE. Perpetrators of human-rights abuses seemed to act with impunity, confident that no serious inquiries would follow. Denial of justice and abuse of police power in Sri Lanka is often justified by reference to the ongoing civil war, and in relation to human-rights abuses committed by the LTTE insurgents. It should be noted that human-rights cases against members of the security forces, including the police, rarely result in a successful prosecution. This climate of impunity encourages local politicians, members of the security forces, and other armed groups to pursue personal agendas and engage in corrupt practices. This connection between military and civil "war economy" interests contributes to the tensions in the conflict-affected areas of the island.
In analyzing the conflict, reference must also be made to the "double minority" factor—both Sinhalese and Tamil perceive themselves to be minority populations under threat, the former in relation to the Tamil population in South India, and the latter in relation to the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. This sense of being an embattled minority has fuelled competing Sinhala and Tamil nationalist perceptions that have become entwined with religious and cultural discourses. Both draw on a mythical history, which emphasizes ancient enmities between the Sinhala and Tamil kingdoms. The political map is, however, far more complex than a simplistic division between competing Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms. For example, growing poverty in areas of the south, political and social exclusion, an inability of the state to deliver political and economic promises, and corruption are all factors that have fuelled the conflicts. Long-term structural stability in Sri Lanka depends on fundamental reforms of the state.
The land colonization policy of successive Sri Lankan governments has caused much resentment. It has been Sinhalese policy to establish "colonies" of Sinhalese settlers (mostly farmers) in the eastern province especially, an area traditionally viewed by Tamil nationalists as theirs. The role of foreign aid was instrumental in this, particularly through their support of the Mahaweli and Galoya irrigation schemes. The government explained that these was to populate uninhabited areas and relieve overpopulation in more crowded areas of the island. Tamils say that the real objective is to dominate, and change, the ethnic demography of Tamil areas.
Views differ over the importance religion has played in the conflict, and some say that historically there was not "religious" conflict per se. The religious element seen in the conflict today is influenced by a twentieth-century interpretation of Buddhism (as promulgated by Dharmapala), which began to explicitly link Sinhala nationalism and Buddhism.
The Muslim community in Sri Lanka has also been on the receiving end (and participated in) acts of violence. During the mid-1980s there were violent clashes between the LTTE and the Muslim communities in the north and east of Sri Lanka. The most serious of these included the massacre of 120 Muslim worshippers at a mosque in Batticaloa in August 1990, and the forced expulsion of the Muslim population by the LTTE from the Jaffna and Mannar districts in October 1990. A subsequent rise in Muslim activism and militancy, and tensions between the Muslim and Tamil communities in the east (with an associated demand for a separate Muslim administrative district) highlight another fault line in the Sri Lankan conflict map. One community that has been caught in the middle between the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils is the plantation Tamil community of Indian origin. This community, largely marginalized from mainstream government development projects, but maintaining a distinctly separate identity and culture from their Sri Lankan Tamil-speaking brethren, has often been at the receiving end of violence directed against Tamils in general—as was seen in 1958, 1977, 1981, 1983, and thereafter.

Conflict Dynamics

The demands of the Tamils are summarized in the four Thimbu Principles articulated by Tamil negotiators with the government at the Thimpu Talks of 1985.

• Recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation
• Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon
• Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation
• Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils in Ceylon

These demands were unacceptable to the government negotiators. While the LTTE position has now shifted and they are talking in terms of an alternative to a separate state on the basis of recognition of Tamil nationhood derived from a historic homeland, the Thimpu Principles have basically remained the core of Tamil demands. The first three of the four principles still remain divisive issues. On their side, the government is now willing to go as far as considering a devolution of power to regional councils. The failure to incorporate the interests and needs of the minority identity groups, systematic discrimination, and the attitude of chauvinistic elements within the majority community have been at the root of the Sri Lankan crisis since independence. The very fabric of society has been ripped apart by combustible factors of ethnic relations fuelled by language, religion, and negative historical memories, and fanned by political violence and brutal acts of terror. Political and criminal violence is common in much of Sri Lanka and the livelihoods of ordinary people are blighted by hardship, insecurity, and death. 1983 brought Sri Lanka to the crossroads of history. It brought out the truth about the complexity of its society along with a portentous message. Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka were fated by history and geography to coexist in close proximity and while this could have been cordial and amicable, as it often was, what has been witnessed is a vortex of rancor and violence that has made the restoration of harmony a persistently elusive goal.
Sri Lanka's ongoing ethnic conflict, and the separatist war it has given rise to, can be described as the country's most intractable and destructive problem. The war that has raged between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE has caused nearly 65,000 deaths and incalculable damage to personal and public property. According to UNHCR, a total of 1.5 million persons have been uprooted and displaced internally within Sri Lanka or have taken refuge in Europe, North America, and Australia.
Parts of the northern and eastern provinces of the island are either under effective military rule or under the control of the LTTE. One feature of the Sri Lankan conflict is the shifting control over territory between the protagonists. What is common under the different security regimes of the government and the LTTE is a limited respect for human rights and humanitarian norms.
How Sri Lankans perceive peacefulness differs between the north, east, central, and southern parts of the country. The search for peace has taken many forms; from the government strategy of "War for Peace" and elimination of terrorism by the Sri Lankan military, to a war of liberation as espoused by the LTTE. The perception of the "other"—the Sinhalese of the Tamils, the Tamils of the Sinhalese, the Tamils and Sinhalese of the Muslims, further reinforced by religious differences—has contributed to suspicion and distrust between and among the different ethnic and religious communities. Polarization of communities continues with little contact with one another, beginning from preschool through to university education. Disparities in access to employment provide little scope for communities to come together. Grievances felt by all sides are heavily loaded by history and, it would seem, manipulated by ethnically motivated interests to keep these grievances alive and to maintain the polarized and vindictive narrative.
In 1994 the Peoples Alliance (PA) government under President Kumaratunga was elected on a peace platform, but despite early enthusiasm her position was undermined both by opposition from within her own government and from the United National Party (UNP) opposition. On the other hand, all but one of the Tamil political parties, despite their many differences, aligned themselves by accepting the leadership of the LTTE to negotiate on behalf of the Tamil people. While there was recognition that neither side could achieve a military victory, the concept of military dominance (by both sides) persisted. The war has generated an economy of its own and it is not certain that military expenditure will necessarily decline with the cessation of hostilities. The total strength of Sri Lanka's security forces (including the police) was approximately 235,000 in 1996, an increase of 400 percent over a ten-year period. Estimates of active members of the LTTE vary widely between five and twenty thousand people. The common feature of most of the combatants on both sides is that they are from economically poor rural backgrounds. With an end to the war, they have little to look forward to in terms of employment—their own homes are mostly in areas already suffering from high youth unemployment.
The LTTE made a unilateral declaration of a month-long cease-fire in December 2000, which was extended by them on three occasions. Given the poor track record of the LTTE in abrogating cease-fire agreements in the past, the government was reluctant to seize the opportunity offered by the LTTE. De-escalation leading to cease-fire is an indispensable component of any meaningful process that aims at a negotiated settlement. In December 2001, after general elections marred by extensive violence, a new government, the United National Front (consisting of the UNP, defecting Peoples Alliance MPs, and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress) was elected to power. Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe quickly initiated a new round of peace negotiations based around a reinvigorated Norwegian process.

Official Conflict Management

Over the past fifty years several political initiatives within Sri Lanka have attempted to address the root causes of Tamil discontent with legislative and constitutional processes within the contexts of attempts to reform the state. There have also been direct negotiations between the government and the LTTE. Over the years, Sinhalese-dominated governments have also included non-LTTE Tamil political parties in strategic alliances at different times. Other attempts at political accommodation include the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (1957) and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact (1965). These pacts tackled the issues of resettlement of Sinhalese on land that Tamils considered their traditional places, some devolution of power to Tamil-speaking regional councils, and recognition of Tamil as a national minority language. On both occasions, the agreements were ignored and not implemented by the government of the time, causing anger and increasing frustration amongst the Tamils, who responded with nonviolent campaigns of civil disobedience. There were also an increasing number of Tamil youths who, impatient with their elders, were turning to armed insurrection. However, progress was made with the proposal for the District Development Councils as described in the Annxure C Proposals to the constitution (1983). But, later in 1983, events took a turn again for the worse when the UNP government of the time added the Sixth Amendment to the constitution, which imposed a ban on all political parties and individuals that advocated separatism. Talks at Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan, in 1985 under the auspices of the Indian government, also failed. There was limited success of these talks in that the fourth demand (of granting citizenship to 96,000 Tamils of Indian origin) was met in January 1986. India continued to facilitate talks, and as a result of the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord (1987) an IPKF was dispatched to Sri Lanka with the objectives of: supervising a cease-fire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army; accepting the surrender of LTTE and other Tamil militants' weapons (and if they refused to do so, disarm them by force); and policing the northeast whilse an interim Tamil administration was established to prepare for elections for a North Eastern Provincial Council, which would enable some devolution of power from Colombo to the predominantly Tamil regions. Three years later the IPKF was forced to leave Sri Lanka after suffering military defeats by the LTTE, and also because the government of Sri Lanka no longer wanted their presence on the island. Talks between the UNP and the LTTE were held in Colombo toward the end of the IPKF presence. These continued after the departure of the IPKF but broke down, and war resumed.
The election of the PA, led by Chandrika Kumaratunga, in 1994 brought new hopes for a peace settlement. Three rounds of talks were held in Jaffna between October 1994 and April 1995. During the talks the four pillars of the government of Sri Lanka's strategy were (1) establishing rapport with the Tamil people; (2) a commitment to maintaining the "cessation of hostilities"; (3) implementing programs for rehabilitation and reconstruction; and (4) formulating a political package. There were problems from Sinhalese nationalists and LTTE hard-liners. The negotiations broke down after the LTTE withdrew, and the government pursued a twin-track strategy of political devolution (a plan that granted a degree of autonomy, but not a separate state, to the Tamils) and military operations (with the objective of bringing the LTTE to the negotiating table in a weak position). This was known as "War for Peace" (peace through war). Some commentators believed that the manner in which the devolution package was presented was deliberately intended by the PA to politically marginalize and isolate the LTTE even further. Toward the end of 2000, the LTTE announced a unilateral cease-fire, which was rejected by the government. More recently, the Norwegians (1999–2001) have been working to promote a peace process through their "shuttle" facilitator, Eric Solheim. While supported in principle by the PA, UNP, and the LTTE leaderships, there is considerable opposition to this process from Sinhalese political and religious chauvinistic groups. Solheim's role diminished (the government complaining about his too "public" approach and to what was perceived as his own agenda), and the Norwegian facilitation was upgraded to the direct involvement of the Norwegian foreign minister. As previously mentioned, the Norwegian peace process continued after the election of the UNF government, finally culminating in the signing of an "Agreement for a Cease-Fire" between the government and LTTE in February 2002. One of the elements of this agreement was the provision of international monitoring from Scandinavian countries.
A range of diplomatic initiatives is under way to bring the nation closer to sustaining peace. Internationally, the government and the LTTE are coming under increasing pressure for a permanent political settlement. As we have already mentioned, in all this, India's role as mediator/facilitator is critical. India's proximity to Sri Lanka and the language and cultural links between the two countries (especially that of Tamil Nadu) exacerbated the conflict at the initial stages. India banned the LTTE following the findings of the Jain Report on the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. The official Indian line on Sri Lanka is that the Tamil-majority areas ought to have a large measure of autonomy in newly demarcated provinces. Following the military gains made by the LTTE in April–May 2000, some Tamil allies of the BJP government in Tamil Nadu openly supported secession, the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, and military help for the LTTE. As for the government, after these serious military reverses, it approached India for help in May 2000. It was widely thought this request pertained to military assistance in the contingency that the Sri Lankan army had to be evacuated from Jaffna. India's publicly proffered "humanitarian aid," the offer of $2 million to meet urgent fiscal needs of the government of Sri Lanka, was of some consolation. India is aware that it has some influence with both the government and the LTTE, and can enable and facilitate third-country "intervention" or "mediation" without actually getting sucked into the conflict itself. India is also aware that sentiments of regional parties in Tamil Nadu must be taken into account. The sum and substance of policy statements from New Delhi may be categorized into four "Nos": no military intervention, no military assistance, no mediation unless both sides request it, and no to Tamil Eelam.
Some European governments have persistently promoted peacemaking initiatives. For example, Norway has a track record of brokering peace accords, the most notable one being the Oslo Process in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine. The arrival of Norway as facilitator in 1999 marked a major initiative. Norway's facilitation is acceptable to India because it is being kept informed at every stage, and it is also acceptable to both Colombo and the LTTE. Norway has proved hospitable to Sri Lankan Tamils, including refugees, and has built an excellent rapport with Tamils who have trusted lines of communication to the LTTE. Before the renewed outbreak of the fighting in April–May 2001, there was some optimism over the prospects of the Norway-brokered peace talks. Unfortunately, neither the government nor the LTTE were prepared to set aside conditionalities, as each sought to strengthen its military bargaining power before going to Oslo. Instead of agreeing to commence the dialogue immediately, both the PA government and the LTTE stipulated parallel preconditions. The PA government demanded a complete cessation of LTTE's operations, whereas the LTTE demanded the cessation of the Sri Lankan military offensive and the withdrawal of Sri Lankan forces from the north. Given the political and military orientations of both sides, it was obvious that these demands would not be met.
The highest proportion of the Sri Lankan diaspora lives in Commonwealth countries. Individually and collectively, these governments have been consistent in their call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and have made repeated offers of international mediation. The government of Sri Lanka favors "facilitation" rather than "mediation" and has rejected such offers.
Britain has had a long and close relationship with Sri Lanka for more than two hundred years, with bilateral links in many areas. In 1998 the Conservative government facilitated the signing of the Liam Fox Agreement to promote a bipartisan approach between the PA and the opposition UNP to help design a unified approach in negotiating with the LTTE, but neither the PA government nor the opposition UNP translated it into action. The Country Strategy of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for Sri Lanka emphasizes that finding a lasting solution to the war is a major priority of eliminating poverty in Sri Lanka. While acknowledging that the path to peace will be difficult and complex, it states that a political solution offers the only prospect for a long-term resolution of the conflict.
Canada has been active in promoting peaceful solutions, and frequently raises issues in appropriate international settings. Canada regards dialogue, respect for human rights, and the condemnation of terrorist actions as central to furthering peace in Sri Lanka. The Canadian government, through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), supports a range of activities to strengthen governance mechanisms and promote human rights, peace, and the empowerment of women in Sri Lanka. A Peace Fund created by CIDA in 1995 is designed to promote peace by supporting efforts at more broadly based dialogue and exchanges between the various ethnic and religious communities in Sri Lanka. Canada is also engaged in the Lysoen process of dialogue between the foreign ministers of various countries, including Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa, as a conceptual framework for the inclusion of nonstate actors in multi-track diplomacy (especially representatives of armed belligerents), in examining human-security issues. The Lysoen process could provide the enabling environment in which state and parastate actors could engage with each other outside of a formal peace process.
India and the United States have the shared objective of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka, with agreed respect for the rights of the Tamil minority. After an appeal made by the government of Sri Lanka, following the attack on the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, the Clinton administration formally designated the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 1997. This prevents any official dialogue with representatives of the LTTE and fund-raising on behalf of the organization in the United States. According to media reports, the Clinton administration was fully aware of Indian sensitivities on Sri Lanka and the many complex considerations that drive India's policy toward it.
Some analysts in Sri Lanka would claim that the above picture paints a rather rosy picture of Western governments as a bunch of altruistic do-gooders intervening into Sri Lanka. While foreign governments have been calling for peace, they have also been providing weapons and other assistance to allow the government to pursue the war. A recent contextual interpretation notes a connection between a Western-style liberalized economy (promoted among others by the IMF in return for structural adjustment loans) linked into world capitalism, and the ongoing civil conflict. The authoritarian war climate has been used by the government to push through economic reforms, such as privatization, demanded by such donors. The argument continues that the resulting support from Western agencies and governments has helped the Sinhala elite to continue to fight the war.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has consistently called on the Sri Lankan government to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. International donors, while remaining detached from the course of the armed conflict, put on intermittent pressure by linking peace and human-rights issues to their aid provision. UNICEF has promoted and organized cease-fires on "Days of Tranquility" during national polio immunization campaigns, and also promoted children as "Zones of Peace."
The European Parliament in May 2000 called for European members of the United Nations to introduce the issue of Sri Lanka for discussion before the Security Council of the UN. The European Union (EU) was reported to have reminded both the government and the LTTE of their responsibility to ensure the safety of the civilian population in conflict zones, particularly on the Jaffna peninsula. The EU joined the UN Secretary-General in urging both parties to cooperate with the Norwegian government in their endeavors to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the conflict, and expressed concern about the humanitarian consequences of the recent upsurge in fighting. The EU also sent a team of election monitors to observe the 2000 general elections. Also, Sri Lankan organizations such as the Centre for Monitoring Elections Violence was established at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, and Peoples' Forum for Free and Fair Elections was set up at the Marga Institute to record and observe the elections process.
The Sri Lanka Development Forum meets periodically in Paris under the auspices of the World Bank, when the government presents its polices to the donor community. At the meeting held in October 2000, President Kumaratunga defined the government's priorities as: (1) rebuilding democracy and democratic institutions; (2) rebuilding the economy and improving the quality of life; and (3) reestablishing peace. The key message from the donors was that development and economic growth could not happen with the war continuing, and that links between conflict and poverty were self-evident. The Japanese delegation emphasized that the time had come to go beyond rhetoric and to solve the conflict, and the Canadians stressed that it was time to translate good intentions into action plans.
The government is leading the effort to develop the Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconciliation (3Rs) Framework, whose objectives are to help strengthen Sri Lanka's capacity to: (1) ensure that basic needs of the people affected by conflict are met; (2) rebuild productive lives where feasible; and (3) facilitate reconciliation and partnership across ethnic lines. With the bulk of funding coming from the Dutch government and administered by UNDP, the 3Rs Framework process is a catalytic dialogue eliciting contributions from key stakeholders on how the government, civil society, and donors could work together in promoting peace and reconstruction. Within the 3Rs Framework, a series of district consultations were held with local NGOs, local government officials, and other civil-society elements. Also, a number of sectoral consultations were held including those concerning education, language, and religion. Findings from the district and sectoral consultations were fed back into four working groups (Aid Modalities, Institutional Building and Donor Coordination, Reconciliation and Peacebuilding, and Programmatic Priorities) of the 3R Framework whose task was to look at ways of operationalizing a wide range of recommendations. Following a joint meeting of the working groups, a further small group consisting of members drawn from each of the working groups is preparing a consolidated document of recommendations to be submitted to the government of Sri Lanka for early implementation. It is hoped that government acceptance of the 3Rs Framework recommendations will help eliminate policy and operational obstacles in relief, rehabilitation, and reconciliation and also help reduce constant tensions between humanitarian concerns and security concerns.

Multi Track Diplomacy

While Sri Lanka has a diverse and articulate civil-society sector, it should not be assumed that all civil-society actors are benign and act as constructive forces for peace. Certain elements of civil society are promoters of the conflict. For example, nationalist groups such as the National Movement Against Terrorism (NMAT) and elements of the Buddhist Sangha could be said to have fuelled the conflict. Also, as elsewhere, it must be remembered that the NGO community in Sri Lanka is not a homogenous one, but fragmented and spanning a broad spectrum of interests. Coordination of NGOs has always been problematic, and to help promote this the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) was formed in 1997. The CHA sponsored other coordinating bodies, which included the Emergency Group (EG), the Northern Task Group (NTG), and the Eastern Forum. There are also smaller and more localized NGO fora (whose relationships are at times antagonistic to each other). The peace movement is constrained by internal debates and intergroup rivalries. But civil-society groups such as the Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), INFORM—a human rights documentation centre based in Colombo—and the National Peace Council can be effective in mobilizing support for the peace process, as was the case in 1994.
During 2000 a group of civil-society leaders from leading peace organizations began meeting regularly under the name of the Peace Support Group. They have issued joint statements and placed media advertisements advocating pro-peace positions. For the past two years the business community has been increasingly active in the area of promoting peace. Initially, a group of business leaders made a highly publicized effort to get the government and the opposition parties to agree on a bipartisan approach to finding a political solution to the conflict. This was followed by the "Sri Lanka First Campaign," organized by another group of business leaders, who launched a major media campaign and also organized a mass "holding of hands for peace" campaign in September 2001. Political attempts to involve civil society have also been made by the government. After peace talks broke down in 1995, the PA government attempted to mobilize civil society in support of their peace initiatives through the Sudu Nellum ("White Lotus") Movement, an effort to "wage the battle for peace." Also, leaders of the Christian and Buddhist clergy traveled to the Vanni (an area controlled by the LTTE), under the auspices of the Inter-Religious Alliance for Peace, to meet leaders of the LTTE and local civil-society groups.
Within Sri Lanka, NGOs have had a long history of being involved in the broad spectrum of activities that fall under the aegis of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, including the promotion of dialogue and communication between the different groups. Much of this activity has been undertaken under the label of training by organizations such as International Alert (IA) and Quaker Peace and Service (QPS), and Sri Lankan NGOs such as the National Peace Council (NPC), Samadana/M, and Ahimsa. IA has also facilitated meetings for politicians from all parties at venues out of Sri Lanka, and has been involved in exchanges for professional groups, such as journalists, to other countries (such as Northern Ireland) who have experienced internal conflict.
Local NGOs and research organizations are playing an increasingly important part in catalyzing democratic discussion and debate. These have included the Marga Institute, the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), the Law and Society Trust (LST), Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA), Sarvodaya, Social and Economic Development Centre (SEDEC), Centre for Society and Religion (CSR), and Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). All these organizations have been active in trying to inform and educate people about elements that contribute to a strong civic society, and have been working to improve public awareness about civil, political, cultural and socioeconomic rights, and equal access to justice. Many NGOs have also begun to incorporate a peacebuilding and conflict-resolution focus to their activities. According to the CHA, "a widening rippling of peace constituency is observable," and there is a sense of war weariness and a yearning for peace and stability among the actors and the sufferers. Exchanges of workers, women, youth, and schoolchildren between the northeast and the south have been promoted by the government and NGOs to encourage better understanding and to remove prejudices.
One visible actor has been the NPC, established in February 1995 to coordinate nonviolent peace initiatives and be a catalytic body to facilitate peace and conflict resolution. The NPC's primary goal is to facilitate an attitudinal shift in selected constituencies of the population who are either opinion formers (media, local politicians), or stakeholders (disabled soldiers, Muslim refugees). Based upon this attitudinal shift, NPC seeks to empower and mobilize the democratic participation of citizens' groups and organizations, strengthen the building of a people's movement for peace and reconciliation, and promote respect for human rights. The programs NPC has undertaken range from multimedia campaigns opposing the war—for example, promoting the theme "Peace for Children"; advocacy campaigns based on the cost of war; building grassroots peace constituencies in strategic districts and sectoral groups (disabled soldiers, internally displaced persons); media and reporting on the conflict; peace rallies and conventions; and meetings between local Sinhalese and Tamil government officials from different districts. At a political level, NPC has brought together Sri Lankan members of parliament from different political parties to meet parliamentarians and peace activists from South Africa, Northern Ireland, Philippines, and Bangladesh in order to help forge relationships across ethnic and political-party lines.
PRASANNI (Praja Sanwada Saha Sannivedana Kendraya, or Centre for Community Dialogue and Communication) is a Sri Lankan NGO working to mobilize grassroots rural constituencies and urban working-class sectors through a nationwide program called the "Citizens Initiative for Constitutional Change." PRASANNI's strategy was to mobilize a national peace constituency by bringing together all the major communities and sectors in Sri Lanka to build an "informed democratic consensus for a constitutional framework for a democratic and pluralist political settlement to the conflict." A national convention in 2000 was attended by 1,800 delegates from all over the country.
Interreligious groups, such as the Inter-Religious Peace Foundation (IRPF), led by clergy and laypersons from Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, and Islamic faiths, are an emerging force in the peacebuilding arena. In addition to dialogue among themselves, they spread messages of peace and harmony through the essential unity advocated by all religions.
At a South Asian regional level, the Kathmandu-based South Asia Forum for Human Rights (SAFHR) has supported the peaceful resolution of conflicts through a mechanism of people-to-people dialogue. These dialogues have become catalysts for generating networks of regional constituencies to address the challenges of militarization, within the context of intrastate and interstate conflicts. SAFHR's peace studies and peace audit program aims at exploring an alternative paradigm for peace that asserts people's absolute right to peace.
International NGOs have been involved in a myriad of initiatives associated with nonviolent conflict resolution, and in efforts to encourage communication, understanding, and collaboration between and within communities. International NGOs have provided key channels of communication between the conflict zones and the outside world, and prevented what could otherwise have become major humanitarian tragedies, while working within narrow humanitarian mandates. CARE International and Oxfam are among NGOs that have introduced attempts to mainstream relationship building as part of their programs in Sri Lanka. The ICRC continues to play its usual protection role in Sri Lanka, treating war victims, visiting prisoners, and promoting the Geneva Conventions. The International Working Group on Sri Lanka (IWG), an informal network of nongovernment agencies from Europe, North America, and Australia, promotes respect for human rights and humanitarian law as instruments of peacebuilding. Through high-level political and NGO contacts in their respective countries, IWG members are in a position to lobby governments, the UN, donor governments, and institutions on a range of issues concerning Sri Lanka.
Relations between the government and NGOs have been difficult at times, a relationship that has been described as one of "suspicious cooperation." It seems that some sections of the government and the general population have the view that international NGOs are pro-LTTE, that the LTTE exploits naive NGOs, and that the LTTE uses humanitarian aid to support their military efforts. This perception is supported by media often hostile toward NGOs. There is a continual tension between the NGOs' determination to keep their independence, and the government's requirement that they are accountable, operate within the prescribed guidelines, and work in areas indicated by the government.
NGOs, especially international NGOs, can themselves only be part of the overall process of creating a peaceful and just society. The bottom line is that the people and their government themselves must ultimately be responsible for sustainable peace and development.

Prospects

Several key questions remained unanswered. Would the LTTE really be prepared to settle for anything less than Tamil Eelam, after twenty-five years of violent struggle during which time thousands of cadres had been killed? A generation of Tamil fighters had grown up with this objective as their sole aim, and with no experience of contact or cooperation with the Sinhalese side. Can the government concede to the LTTE's demands, and survive politically? Also impacting on the peace process are southern politics and the capacity of the present government to carry through required reforms. The concept of the defense of the unitary state is still paramount, and the Sinhalese have also suffered many dead and injured in their battle against what most perceive as a terrorist organization. The degree of mistrust between both sides is deep and ingrained. Questions about a postconflict role for the LTTE have yet to be tackled. For example, what is the political role for the LTTE leadership? There will also be considerable problems of demobilization, demilitarization, and reconstruction within the constraints of a stretched and overdrawn budget. In this there will be a vital role for the international community to help Sri Lanka rebuild its social infrastructure.
What can be noted over the last five years are two qualitative changes in perception. First, there seems to be agreement sometimes wavering on the need for a consensus position between the PA and the UNP. Second, the government, the opposition UNP, and the LTTE have accepted the role of a third-party facilitator. In the final analysis, Sri Lanka needs a peace based on equal recognition and justice for all of Sri Lanka's ethnic groups as the moral basis for any resolution to this multilayered and factorially complex conflict.

Recommendations

While much energy has been put into bringing about peace, we would suggest that more planning is also required for a postconflict situation. This means preparing the people for peace, where a future means that deadly enemies will have to sit together and plan the future at local community and national levels. As in other postconflict situations, there will be terrible traumatic experiences and emotional hurt to come to terms with. The international community must help with the enormous cost of rebuilding all areas of Sri Lanka. Poverty, which has been exacerbated by the war, is deepening.
There are no easy prescriptions or formulas to propose. Making and building peace is complex and requires long-term patient processes, combined with complementary actions at timely moments. Some of the initiatives described in the previous sections should be encouraged, providing they have support from those most directly affected by the conflict. As for other countries affected by conflict, there needs to be more cooperation and integration between the many efforts at both official and unofficial levels. Care should be taken that interventions of good intent do not in fact do more harm than good. It is important that peacemaking and peacebuilding initiatives at all levels are linked, integrated, and coherent, and that young Sri Lankans can once again believe in a peaceful vision for Sri Lanka's future.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Newsletter, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo. Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences (SLJSS), National Science Foundation of Sri Lanka, Colombo Tamil Guardian, Tamil Guardian Limited, London.
REPORTS:	Centre for Policy Research and Analysis, Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, Lost Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka, by K. Loganathan, 1996. Conciliation Resources, Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka, by J. Armon and L. Philipson, ACCORD Series, London, 1998. Conflict Policy Research Project, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Netherlands and Sri Lanka: Dutch Policies and Interventions with Regard to the Conflict in Sri Lanka, by G. Frerks and M. van Leeuwen, The Hague, 2000. Department for International Development, Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka, by J. Goodhand, London, November 2000. International Alert, Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons, edited by K. Rupesinghe, London, 1998. International Centre for Ethnic Studies: Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka: Past Failures and Future Prospects, edited by K. M. De Silva and G. H. Peiris, Kandy/Colombo, 2000. Sri Lanka: The Devolution Debate. Colombo, 1996 and 1997. Life and Peace Institute, New Routes, A Journal on Peace Research and Action, Sri Lanka Sources and Resources of Conflict, vol. 5, nos. 1-2, Uppsala, Sweden, 2000. National Peace Council/Marga Institute, Cost of the War. Economic, Social and Human Cost of the War in Sri Lanka, Colombo, January 2001. National Steering Committee, National Framework for Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Colombo, November 2001. South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Peace Audit Report 2, April 2001.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, edited by R. Rotberg. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999. India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994, by A. Bullion. London, Pinter, 1995. 'NGO-Government Relations in Sri Lanka,' by Koenraad van Brabant. In J. Bennet (ed.), NGOs and Governments: A Review of Current Practice for Southern and Eastern NGOs, Oxford, INTRAC/ICVA, 1997. 'Sri Lanka: Civil Society, The Nation and the State-Building Challenge,' by P. Saravanamuttu. In A. Van Rooy (ed.), Civil Society and the Aid Industry: The Politics and Promise, London, Earthscan, 1998. Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, by J. Spencer. London, Routledge, 1991.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	eelamweb.com/ (Eelam Web); members.tripod.com/~fosus (Friends of Sri Lanka in the United States); ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/umberto/Tamil.htm (Eliminate LTTE terrorism); tamilnet.com/ (Tamil Net); www.apcjp.org/slforum/slforum.htm (U.S. NGO Forum on Sri Lanka); www.eelam.com/ (Tamil Eelam home page); www.icescmb.slt.lk (International Centre for Ethnic Studies); www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/srilanka.html (INCORE Conflict Data Service); www.inpact.org (Initiative for Political and Conflict Transformation); www.lacnet.org/slnet/ (Sri Lanka Net); www.lacnet.org/suntimes (Sunday Times); www.lanka.net/lakehouse/ (Daily news); www.lankaweb.com/ (LankaWeb); www.priu.gov.lk/ (Official government site); www.rcss.org (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies); www.sinhaya.com/ (SINHAYA-UK); www.slt.lk/news/ (Sri Lankan government information department); www.spur.asn.au/ (Society for Peace, Unity, and Human Rights in Sri Lanka); www.teedor.org/ (Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization); www.uthr.org (University Teachers for Human Rights—Jaffna, Sri Lanka);.
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Freddy de Alwis, Inter-Religious Peace Foundation, tel/fax: +94-1-811700. Sathivale Balakrishnan, Centre for Development Alternatives, e-mail: cadrights@ids.lk Sunil Bastian, International Centre for Ethnic Studies, e-mail: bastian@sri.lanka.net Tyrol Ferdinands, National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, e-mail: tyrol@sri.lanka.net Oswald B. Firth, Centre for Society and Religion, e-mail: csrlibra@slt.lk Kethesh Loganathan, Centre for Policy Alternatives, e-mail: cpa@sri.lanka.net Joseph Montville, Center for Strategic and International Studies, e-mail: jmontvil@csis.org Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Centre for Policy Alternatives, e-mail: cpa@sri.lanka.net Teresita C. Schaffer, Center for Strategic and International Studies, e-mail: tscaffer@csis.org
ORGANIZATIONS:	Centre for the Study of Human Rights: Faculty of Law, Reid Avenue, University of Colombo, Colombo 3, Sri Lanka. International Working Group on Sri Lanka: 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH, U.K. Movement for the Defence of Democratic Rights (MDDR): 1149 Kotte Road, Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka, E-mail: mddr@slt.lk Prasanni-Praja Sanwada Saha Sannivedana Kendraya: P.O. Box 66 Nugegoda, Sri Lanka, E-mail: prasanni@eureka.lk Social Scientists Association: 425/15 Thimbirigasaya Road, Colombo 5, Sri Lanka. Suriya Women's Development Forum: 20 Dias Lane, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka, Tel: +94-65-23 297, E-mail: suriyaw@slt.lk University Teachers for Human Rights-Jaffna: E-mail: uthr-j@sltnet.lk Data on the following organizations can be found in the Directory section: In Sri Lanka: AHIMSA-Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peace; Center for Community Dialogue and Communication; Centre for Development Alternatives; Centre for Policy Alternatives; Centre for Policy Research and Analysis; Centre for Society and Religion; Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies; INFORM; International Centre for Ethnic Studies; Inter-Religious Peace Foundation; Marga Institute; Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality; National Peace Council of Sri Lanka; People's Peace Front; Regional Centre for Strategic Studies; SAMASEVAYA; Sewa Lanka Foundation. In Nepal: South Asia Forum for Human Rights.

About the author

Joe William is an advisor attached to the Canadian High Commission and the Canadian International Development Agency in Sri Lanka. He is chair of the Management Committee of the Mine Action Resource Centre (MARC), a founding member of the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, and a member of the Peace Support Group—a local think tank set up to support the peace process. He also holds a master's degree in peace studies from the University of Bradford. Nick Lewer is a senior lecturer and director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. He has experience working in Sri Lanka on community, training, and research projects with donors and NGOs.