Author	Albana Shala and Daniel Chavez
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

For almost five decades Albania had the most autarchic dictatorship in postwar Europe. After the fall of the communist regime in 1991, the country embarked on a radical program of market reforms with profound social and political impacts, and in 1997 the state experienced a virtual meltdown. About two thousand people were killed in the social and political upheaval triggered by the collapse of pyramid investment schemes. Given pervasive developmental problems and the weakness of state institutions, despite some grounds for optimism regarding political stabilization, the establishment of a stable and resilient peace in Albania, located as it is in a conflict-ridden region, remains highly unlikely in the immediate future.

When Albania opened its doors in 1991, the world discovered a landscape of widespread poverty, due to the country's isolation, heavy military spending, and an archaic and rural-based economy. In 1990, the residents in rural areas accounted for 64 percent of the country's population. The demise of the old regime led to the manifestation of long-repressed tensions loosely based on traditional alliances. When the violent crisis erupted in 1997, some media coverage portrayed these tensions as the real cause of the conflict, with frequent references to the north-south cleavage, and even to a purported ethnic divide between the ghegs (northern people) and the tosks (southern people). Differences do exist between the different regions of Albania—as well as between urban and rural areas, and between highlands and lowlands. However, unlike other contemporary conflicts, the essence of internal disturbances is not primarily linked to ethnic, regional, cultural, or religious divisions, but to the flaws and contradictions inherent to the economic and political transition.

Albania experienced two periods of acute internal conflict in the 1990s. On the first occasion, the "years of anarchy" of 1990–1992 were characterized by political violence and social disorder accompanying the fall of the communist regime. Following the elections of May 1996, denounced as irregular by independent analysts, Albania was once again on the road to social and political violence.

Seeking political benefits, the government of the Democratic Party (DP) allowed the rise of pyramid investment schemes. In 1996 these get-rich-quick plots "infected" most of the social tissue. It is estimated that close to $1.5 billion were invested in companies offering monthly interest rates ranging from 10 to 25 percent, while the average monthly income was around $80. About a fifth of the population invested in the schemes. People sold their homes to invest the proceeds, and emigrants working in Greece and Italy transferred additional resources to the schemes back home. The opposition lacked an alternative economic policy and the population was satisfied with the unexpected wealth. The authorities were conscious of the risks, and even forced the governor of the National Bank to stop warning investors. International agencies were also aware of the danger, but the IMF waited until October 1996 to issue an admonition.

In December 1996 the whole system began to crumble. Having been assured of the legality of the schemes, the people lost confidence in the government. On January 1997, angry investors threw the first stones. As protests spread across the country, the Socialist Party (SP, former communists) attempted to take control of civil discontent. The government responded with a policy of violent repression and the deployment of the military. As the situation worsened, the government declared a state of emergency and cut off Albanian communications, banning radio and press and taking control of TV stations. The offices of the biggest newspaper, Koha Jone, were burned down by the secret police.

Between March and April, Albania descended into anarchy. Foreign "war correspondents" contributed to the rise and spread of the conflict by presenting images of violence and destruction, and drawing maps of a country allegedly divided between "North" and "South." The government lost control of most of the country. Many public buildings and private businesses were damaged or destroyed, and practically every state function was severely hampered. The cities of Vlore, Gjirokaster, and Sarande were run by self-styled "Salvation Committees," where SP leaders had some influence, but with politics in fact subject to the interests of competing criminal gangs.

In the meantime, Western governments appeared more concerned with the threat of massive emigration and the rising importance of Albania as a center for European criminal networks than with political conflict. As the crisis spun out of control, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) sent former Austrian prime minister Franz Vranitzky as an envoy to negotiate an agreement between the president and the opposition. Both sides agreed to a government of national reconciliation under a socialist prime minister, as well as to early elections and the request for a multinational stabilization force. By then, images of insurrection and the exodus of refugees had become a constant in prime-time international news.

The Western European Union (WEU) and NATO declined to intervene. Italy and Greece, the states primarily affected by the Albanian crisis, proposed an EU operation, but were only able to achieve an ambiguous commitment for the provision of emergency humanitarian aid. The lack of regional solidarity moved Italy to pursue crisis management unilaterally, and to seek United Nations authority. In late March 1997, the UN Security Council approved the deployment of an Italian-led coalition, codenamed Alba (Italian for "dawn"). Some 7,000 soldiers from nine countries participated in the first conflict management mission conducted in Europe by a military force composed exclusively of Europeans.

The parliamentary elections of June 1997 ultimately led to the restoration of a degree of political stability (though of a delicate nature) that has been maintained in the intervening years. The most dangerous threat to this stability emerged in September 1998, when a failed coup staged by the DP exposed the fragility of Albania's democracy.

In late 1998, the Kosovo conflict and the growing influx of refugees created a new crisis for the government, threatening internal security and stretching administrative capacity. During 1998–1999, as many as 460,000 refugees flooded into Albania. The majority were accommodated with local families, but 300 camps or shelter sites were established throughout the country to house the overflow of refugees. Most Kosovars returned home toward the end of 1999. In the past two years, Albania's political development has once again been challenged by regional instability after the uprising of ethnic Albanian militants in neighboring Macedonia. The government and the people of Albania have managed to remain relatively neutral in this conflict.

Conflict Dynamics

Weak governance capacity threatens to undermine Albania's socioeconomic and political recovery. References to rising criminality, governmental corruption, permanent political tensions between the two opposing parties, and the destabilizing effect of armed conflict in neighboring countries have been constant in practically every policy report on Albania since 1997. Looking back, the events of 1997 cannot be attributed solely to the sudden loss of savings. The roots of the conflict lay in the generalized disenchantment with the economic and political transition. Even before the upheaval, the government had taken control of the electronic media, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary with persistent disregard for human rights, democracy, and public affairs.

Approximately two thousand Albanians lost their lives in the unrest from March through June 1997. Most of the casualties originated in the arming of the population. Official statistics from the Ministry of Defense, as reported in a 1999 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) paper, indicate that during the first two weeks of March, 656,000 weapons of various types were looted from army depots, together with 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition, 3.5 million hand grenades, and 1 million land mines.¹ To date there are no exact figures on the total number of casualties and weapons looted during the crisis, and nobody seems to know how many arms are still missing. However, most analysts agree that the events of 1997 left deep scars on the face of public order, as many arms ended up in the hands of criminal gangs or in the illegal trade associated with Kosovo and other armed conflicts throughout the Balkans.

Besides the dramatic impact in terms of the loss of human lives, the violent social upheaval of 1997 eroded much of the economic and social achievements Albania had made during the early years of transition. Regardless of the quality and nature of earlier gains, the macroeconomic indicators showed that after a sharp contraction between 1990 and 1992, the GDP had increased by around 9 percent annually for four consecutive years between 1993 and 1996. The official unemployment rate had been halved to 12 percent in 1996, per capita consumption had recovered, and inflation had fallen from 240 percent per year in 1992 to only 6 percent in 1995. Immediately after the crisis, the GDP declined 7 percent, inflation reached over 40 percent, and the exchange rate depreciated by one-third. Albania's GDP per capita at the end of 1997 had fallen to US$735. At its height, the nominal liabilities of pyramid schemes reached 50 percent of the GDP. Poverty, already endemic in the country, rose significantly as result of the crisis, according to a 1998 World Bank report.²

In the aftermath of the upheaval, good progress was made toward restoring macroeconomic stability and advancing structural and institutional reforms, as acknowledged by the EU, the World Bank, and other donors. However, the donor community cautioned that further progress is at risk unless Albania addresses its structural weakness, enhances governance and rule of law, and improves the functioning of public administration and the judiciary.³

During the past three years (1998–2001), Albania has tried to restore some semblance of political stability. The general elections of 1997 were considered acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances. In November 1999 the Albanian citizenry adopted by referendum a new constitution that provided for the establishment of an ombudsman and other legal measures for the protection of human rights.

In October 2000, Albania held local elections, and despite some irregularities and isolated incidents of political violence, the OSCE reported that they represented "significant progress" toward meeting international standards. Parliamentary elections took place in June 2001. However, this latest parliamentary election turned into a political marathon that lasted almost two months, as there was a need for extra rounds in nearly 40 percent of the electoral districts and demands of reruns posted by the opposition. The winning force was the ruling Socialist Party and its allies. Ilir Meta was reelected as prime minister after harsh debate within the party. Despite the peaceful nature of the electoral campaign, the opposition Democratic Party is still boycotting the parliament. OSCE and other international organizations are demanding the complete functioning of a legislative power including the opposition, as well as the creation of a political space for further discussion and consensus building. This is unlikely to work, and if it does could run the risk of undermining the role of the parliament.

After the crisis, the SP-led government also broadened the freedom of the media. State television and radio tend to provide more balanced reporting of national news. Nevertheless, the opposition has reacted to allegedly biased information and harassment of media loyal to the DP. In general, most of the press is still loyal to competing political interests, and further efforts are required for the development of alternative/independent media and the depolarization of reporting.⁴

Despite postcrisis improvements, a decade after the fall of communism Albanian party politics remain pervasively confrontational and based on loyalties to personalities (namely Sali Berisha of the Democrats and Fatos Nano of the Socialists) rather than on ideological profiles. Both the DP and the SP leaderships are unlikely ever to accept the legitimacy of a government led by the other, resulting in perpetual political instability. Not surprisingly, Albanian citizens have become largely apathetic about national politics.

Albania's institutions were seriously challenged in September 1998 after the assassination of Azem Hajdari, a senior DP member of parliament. The political nature of the murder was never proven, but the opposition used this opportunity to organize a coup against the SP-led coalition. The coup failed, but within weeks the prime minister resigned and a new government was appointed. Ever since, the opposition has blamed the government for the killing of several DP members, as well as for police harassment and the dismissal of public workers for political reasons. Many of these claims have some credibility, but in the present Albanian context it is difficult to precisely delineate the border between politics and crime.

Throughout the past decade internal problems have been compounded by regional and global conflicts. Since 1994, foreign intelligence services have highlighted the threat that Albania could be transformed into an Islamic terrorist center—and have even alleged that Osama Bin Laden had established a presence in the country. During the Kosovo crisis, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) used Albania as a permanent base, raising fears about Albania becoming embroiled in some form of military confrontation with Yugoslavia. International observers reported that during the Kosovo crisis, northeastern Albania was effectively under the military control of the KLA, resulting in border skirmishes between the Yugoslav army and the guerrillas.⁵

Even before the Kosovo crisis it was feared that Tirana could become a base for the instigation of pan-Albanian initiatives. The "national question" regarding the future status of Albanians living throughout the Balkans could become a permanent source of conflict in the region. The international press renewed this threat after the outburst of warfare in Macedonia in March 2001. However, only a handful of extremists in Albania are still demanding modifications of existing national borders. At the moment of this writing, the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanian representatives seem to have reached a feasible agreement. The Albanian foreign minister, Paskal Milo, greeted the signing of Macedonia's framework agreement supporting the territorial integrity of Macedonia, while denouncing destabilization and ethnic violence. The Albanian government also rejected Macedonian accusations for supporting the "Albanian terrorists." The role of Albania during the Macedonian crisis has been acknowledged by NATO, which recognized the efforts of the Albanian government for securing peace and stability in the region.

Official Conflict Management

The conflict of 1997 revealed a postdictatorial state without adequate capacity to govern. The inability—or unwillingness—of the government to enforce its own laws allowed the pyramid schemes to mushroom to enormous proportions. The schemes contravened the banking law, but the judiciary did not take any action to prevent further damage. Since the crisis, several programs supported by various international agencies have aimed at the reconstruction of the judiciary, but its foundations are still shaky due to continued political instability, limited resources, political pressure, inexperienced and untrained personnel, and widespread corruption.

Postcrisis progress in internal security is also uncertain. The crisis of 1997 resulted in a drastic increase of every type of criminality, and in particular violent crime. In the absence of an effective legal and police system, families, gangs, and even politicians refer to a renewed and bastardized form of the archaic laws of the Kanun ⁶ as the moral justification for the escalation of cold-blooded assassinations. Moreover, Albania is now a major launchpad for drugs and economic migrants and asylum seekers coming from outside the Balkans and moving into Western Europe. A recent study estimates that more than 25 percent of young men of the eighteen to twenty-five age group are engaged in criminal activities.⁷

Police officers remain largely untrained and often unreliable, notwithstanding the support of the international community in the provision of training, advice, and equipment. The police are affected by, and also part of, Albania's culture of widespread corruption and human-rights violations. International aid toward improving the police levels of competence and combating crime is constrained by the restricted mandate granted to the Western European Union Multinational Advisory Police Element—the key international agency active in this field. This mandate excludes all participation in enforcement operations.

The role of international agencies is currently crucial in Albania. The country has had nine cabinets in a decade, and political tensions often reach dangerous levels. Albania is divided around two politicians, despite the common authoritarian past of both Berisha and Nano as members of the (communist) Labor Party. In this scenario, there is practically no political debate in the parliament regarding public policy and administration. As one Western diplomat interviewed for this survey put it, "The OSCE and other agencies are the real government and opposition in Albania."⁸

It was only after 1991 that the country joined the "international community." Since then, Albania has become a member of OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace, and just recently, the WTO (World Trade Organization). The EU has stated that it sees Albania as a potential candidate for future membership, and has created an EU/Albania Steering Group to pursue the negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Eventually, Albania could benefit from regional policy initiatives such as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe—a multinational and multisectoral program established after the Kosovo conflict.

During the past four years, OSCE has been the paramount external actor in Albania. OSCE started to work in Albania in April 1997 in coordination, inter alia, with the Council of Europe, as the agency in command of the stabilization strategy. The mandate included advising and assisting the Albanian authorities with democratization issues, the development of free media, the promotion of human rights, and the preparation and monitoring of elections. During the Kosovo conflict, OSCE helped to organize the responses to the refugee crisis, and has maintained monitoring posts on Albania's borders with Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia ever since. OSCE also chairs the Friends of Albania (FOA Group), an informal platform for countries and organizations active in providing financial support, technical assistance, and other forms of aid. Since September 1998, FOA has become the principal forum for donors' coordination and international monitoring of economic and political reform in Albania.

A social response to economic and political crisis has been emigration. This practice has increased dramatically since the upheaval of 1997. The impact of migration is twofold. On the one hand, it has been good for the economy, as emigrants' remittances represent approximately one-fifth of the GDP, almost twice as much as revenues from exports. On the other hand, many of the emigrants are highly educated people, urgently needed in Albania for social and political development. During 1990–1999 about 40 percent of the overall number of professors and scientific researchers abandoned the country.⁹

Multi Track Diplomacy

A decade after the fall of the communist regime, and four years after the crisis of 1997, Albania is still trapped in a transitional phase. It is searching for a way out of its deep economic, social, and political difficulties without a clear sense of direction, and with a weakened social capital to sustain whatever policy the almost powerless government may choose. "Civil society" in Albania is a synonymous for NGOs, since there are no significant social movements or relevant community-based organizations. During the transition Albanian society shifted towards a new stratification, consisting of a newly wealthy bourgeoisie, impoverished peasants and workers intending to emigrate, small entrepreneurs, and emigrants. Albania was not able to develop a true middle class, a group which could be a key contributor to social and political stability.¹⁰

There are currently between 400 and 800 NGOs in the country, of which approximately 200 are active. The strongest are youth and women's organizations, and those engaged in advocacy and civic education. In general, the NGO sector remains highly dependent on the donor community. While there was a broadening of participation in NGOs during the Kosovo crisis, little has been done since then to strengthen the sector's capacity to serve a broader constituency. The impacts and sustainability of NGOs were further constrained after much of the funding shrank as the Kosovar refugees left.¹¹ In fact, since their appearance in the early 1990s, Albanian NGOs have been subject to ongoing crisis resulting from both a lack of resources and the polarization of the political scene. Still, under the most difficult conditions—those of spring 1997—NGOs were quick to organize new projects for the pacification of the country. These projects included public awareness and preparation for the elections, and public debates on the collection of weapons and public security concerns. Women's NGOs were particularly active throughout the crisis.

At present, the coordination between international entities and Albanian NGOs is problematic. The official discourse of Western agencies stresses the concept of "local involvement," meaning that the objectives and characteristics of each intervention should be locally determined and should involve local human resources, local leadership, and committed local NGOs. In reality, the power divide is clear. Many Albanian NGO practitioners interviewed for this survey referred to the example of the recent Kosovo crisis, when hundreds of foreign humanitarian workers landed in the country to organize the response to the influx of refugees and treated local organizations as secondary agents without significant responsibilities.

Local NGOs identify the rising social exclusion as a major potential source of conflict. They feel that programs implemented by UN agencies, the World Bank, the EU, and other international entities have failed to address the needs of wide segments of the population in critical distress. They argue for vigorous external intervention running in parallel with the creation of accountable and responsive structures, both official and nongovernmental. External assistance in devising and implementing such a strategy is made critical by the weakness of central and local governments and Albania's meager fiscal resources.

The traumatic transition from communism to a criminalized market economy increased social conflict. In the countryside, the majority of violent disputes originate over land and water rights. After the abolition of collective ownership of the land, pre-1994 owners reclaimed their properties in a context of an acute shortage of productive land, high demographic growth, and dissolution of law and order. In the cities, conflicts arise as result of overpopulation and rapid urbanization following the granting of internal freedom of movement. However, social conflict resolution is not a priority area for either Albanian NGOs or governmental bodies.

One of the few organizations working in this field is the Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes. This organization was founded in December 1995 by a group of experts in the fields of social sciences and jurisprudence. It works toward the resolution of conflicts emerging among individuals and social groups on account of economic, property, or family disputes, as well as around problems inherited from the authoritarian Albanian past, especially in terms of intolerance and the recent revival of blood feuds. The foundation also runs volunteer-based "mediation centers" actively involved in decentralized conflict prevention focused on public awareness and resolution of disputes. According to the foundation's records, most of the conflicts solved by mediation between January and December 2000 concerned property (33.7 percent) and criminal (25.5 percent) disputes.

A few other local organizations and individuals based in the northern city of Shkodra run reconciliation programs among families subject to blood feuds. The return of interfactional conflict and traditional revenge is putting young men at increased risk of violence as they arm themselves to protect their families or communities. A 1999 survey by an Albanian NGO indicated that 50 percent of teenagers responded that they respected the Kanun and would be willing to engage in vendettas, and concluded that thousands of young Albanian men are forcibly locked at home under the threat of revenge.¹²

A significant initiative toward pacification of the country is the ongoing Weapons for Development program run by the UNDP in coordination with local NGOs and CBOs (community-based organizations). The program developed after a exploratory mission concluded in June 1998 that a weapons-buying program was not feasible in Albania, mainly for economic reasons, and proposed instead a weapons collection program with development initiatives benefiting communities as a whole. The program began with a pilot project in the Gramshi district south of Tirana, and after this proved successful, expanded to four other districts. Currently, the UNDP and potential donors are evaluating its expansion into a nationwide program.¹³

Another initiative specifically focused on conflict prevention has been the development of a National Early Warning System (NEWS), building on and following a Bulgarian project launched in 1997. The UNDP and several Albanian research-oriented NGOs—principally the Institute for Contemporary Studies—have promoted the construction of a model for monitoring events or processes indicative of potential conflict. This model would be based on a series of social, economic, and political indicators such as income, labor indexes, macroeconomic environment, political and institutional stability, ethnic relations, and personal security. NEWS was conceived of as a system to provide input to the Albanian government, civil-society organizations, and international agencies to assist in decisionmaking processes. However, in spite of the successful publication of a yearly report for 1999 (UNDP-ICS, 2000),¹⁴ this important project has not yet secured enough funding to assure its long-term sustainability.

Prospects

Albania remains the most backward country in Europe in terms of economic development and physical and social infrastructure, akin to the poorest and conflict-ridden areas in the world. Not surprisingly, the aforementioned NEWS survey (see note 14 below) showed that the population has mixed opinions about the future and the recent past. The most sensitive issues are family income and crime, while there seems to be almost no concern for conflicts of an ethnic or religious nature. Regarding the public perception of state institutions, the survey found that most Albanians support the strengthening of the army and the police after the 1997 upheaval, but that confidence in the judiciary, political parties, and the parliament continues to decline.

Nevertheless, most of the population, as well as practically every local NGO and international agency in the country, agree that the chaos of 1997 will never be repeated. The material conditions that triggered the crisis of 1997 are no longer present. Unlike 1997, a massive and sudden impoverishment is not a current menace, since most people have already lost their savings. And more important, as the NEWS survey showed, the Albanian people have thought over the consequences of violence and institutional collapse.

Over the long term, Albania's stabilization will not be secured unless the issue of rising social exclusion is addressed. The events of 1997 showed how political interests could manipulate vulnerable social groups. Responding to social needs is not only imperative for national development, but also for the stability of other countries in the region that receive a massive influx of Albanian immigrants, many of whom become associated with—or are exploited by—organized crime.

In brief, the prospects for conflict prevention and conflict management in Albania are highly dependent on the nature and extent of the involvement of external forces and institutions. The profound fragility and limited accountability of public institutions contribute to the recurrence of conflict. A coherent and purposeful strategy agreed to by the several and highly influential international agencies is essential in this case.

Recommendations

The key Albanian challenge is the reconstruction of an accountable, efficient, and transparent state. Most international agencies agree that Albania needs to make substantial progress in this area in order to move forward in social, economic, and political terms. This is not an easy task. The main question is how to develop further trust in the state among the Albanian people, who moved in a few years from an authoritarian state to the collapse of public institutions. The reconstruction of trust should be built upon family and local loyalties that already exist, but in ways designed to promote broader networks of interdependence and trust.

Recurring recommendations in policy reports, from the perspective of conflict prevention and with the objective of furthering Albania's integration into European structures, refer to the improvement of public order. This should be accomplished by combatting crime and fighting corruption; the deepening of institutional reforms, mainly by securing the independence of the judiciary; and the improvement of macroeconomic indicators with international support. However, the last Albanian Human Development report argues that concentrating on these reforms at the expense of poverty reduction programs could leave the country exposed to more instability in the future.

Last but not least, external and internal efforts should focus on the reconstruction of Albanian politics, including moving away from the present situation of permanent confrontation and absence of debate. The establishment of a civil society based on modern and strong state institutions will not be achieved until Albanians are encouraged to shift away from political loyalties associated with personalities, and toward loyalties to democratic and accountable political institutions.

Miscellaneous

1. UNDP, Albanian Human Development Report 1998. Tirana: United Nations Development Program, 1999.
   
2. World Bank, Albania Beyond the Crisis: A Strategy for Recovery and Growth. Report No. 18658-ALB. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998.
   
3. Friends of Albania Group, Final Conclusions of the 5th International Conference of the Friends of Albania Group. Brussels: FOA Group, 2 March 2001.
   
4. Albana Shala, "Why Independent Media Should Be Supported in Countries in Transition," in Albana Shala (ed.), Free Press in South-Eastern Europe: Top Priority, Amsterdam: Press Now, 1998.
   
5. ICG, The State of Albania, ICG Balkans Report No. 54. Tirana: International Crisis Group, 1999.
   
6. The Kanun of Lek Dukagjini (S. Gjecov and L. Fox [eds.], Kanuni I Lekë Dukagjinit: The Code of Lekë Dukagjini, New York: Gjonlekaj Publishing Co., 1989) is a compilation of customary law established in the fifteenth century. This northern Albanian code, heavily repressed by the communist regime, has been transmitted orally through generations as a legal set concerning almost every social practice: birth, death, marriage, land and property administration, hospitality, and the resolution of blood feuds.
   
7. G. La Cava and R. Y. Nanetti, Albania. Filling the Vulnerability Gap. World Bank Technical Paper No. 460. New York: World Bank, 2000.
   
8. During the crisis of 1997 some independent Albanian analysts argued that the international community had played an active role in the unfolding of the conflict. According to Fron Nazi (N. Nazi,. "Albania: West's Blind Eye To Berisha's Abuses Fostered Crisis," London: IPS, 5 March 1997, available at: http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/mae/albania.html), "the West was willing to forsake civil rights in Albania for the sake of maintaining regional stability, while Berisha was willing to forsake the same to preserve his own power under the guise of a so-called communist threat."
   
9. UNDP, Albanian Human Development Report 2000. Tirana: United Nations Development Program, 2001.
   
10. UNDP, Albanian Human Development Report 1998. Tirana: United Nations Development Program, 1999.
    
11. USAID, The 2000 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Washington, DC: United States Agency for Intenational Development, 2001.
    
12. Eureka, Survey Report. Tirana: Independent Social Center Eureka, 1999.
    
13. Offering development projects in exchange for arms is an innovative approach. The only examples comparable to this Albanian program are the provision of sewing machines in Mozambique, or the offering of jobs or training attempted in some other countries. Most buy-back programs failed because they rather create new arms trade with weapons coming from other places rather than reducing the weapons among the civilian population. Food-for-weapons programs have failed as well by not creating great incentives for returning arms (UNDP, Weapons for Development: Report of the UNDP Mission for an Arms Collection Pilot Program in the Gramsh District, Albania, Tirana: United Nations Development Program, 1998).
    
14. UNDP-ICS, National Early Warning for Albania. Tirana: United Nations Development Program and Institute for Contemporary Studies, 2000.

    Service Information

    NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Bulletin–Newsletter, trimonthly newsletter published by the Albanian Human Rights Group; Pajtimi (Reconciliation), quarterly sociological, juridical, and cultural journal published by the Center for Conflict Prevention.
    REPORTS:	ICG, Albania: State of the Nation, ICG Balkans Report No. 87, Tirana/London/Brussels, 2000. UNDP, Albanian Human Development Reports, various years. World Bank, Albania. Filling the Vulnerability Gap, by H. la Cava and R. Y. Nanetti, Technical Paper No. 460, Europe and Central Asia Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Series, Washington, DC, 2000.
    OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Albania's Road to Democracy: A Fascinating Country in Transition, by L. Jenkins, L.A.K. Musha, and D. Molnar. Tirana, ORT/USAID, 1998. The Albanians: A Modern History, by M. Vickers and J. Pettifer. Albany, New York University Press, 2001. The First Decade and After: Albania's Democratic Transition and Consolidation in the Context of Southeast Europe, edited by F. Tarifa and M. Spoor. The Hague, CESTRAD/Institute of Social Studies, 2001.
    SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.dds.nl/pressnow/albania.html (Press Now, Albanian media links) www.osce.org/albania (OSCE, Albania) www.seerecon.org/Albania/Albania.htm (Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe, Albania) www.undp.org.al/ (UNDP, Albania)
    RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Elsa Ballauri, executive director of the Albanian Human Rights Group, e-mail: elsa@abissnet.com.al Daniel Chavez, Ph.D. candidate, Institute of Social Studies, the Netherlands, e-mail: chavez@iss.nl Rasim Gjoka, executive director of the Albanian Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes, e-mail: gjoka@frd.tirana.al Kozara Kati, director of the Albanian Center for Human Rights, e-mail: kozi@ahrdc.tirana.al Vladimir Malkaj, project officer, UNDP Albania, e-mail: vladimir.malkaj@undp.org Fron Nazi, New York–based writer and analyst on Albanian and Balkan affairs, e-mail: nfron@aol.com Albana Shala, project officer, Press Now, the Netherlands, e-mail: shala@pressnow.nl
    ORGANIZATIONS:	Albanian Centre for Human Rights (Qendra Shqiptare për Të Drejtat e Njeriut) Rr. Kont Urani, Nr. 17 Tirana, Albania Tel.: +355 (42) 30630 Fax: +355 (42) 39363 E-mail: kozi@ahrdc.tirana.al Albanian Helsinki Committee (Komiteti Shqiptar I Helsinkit) Rr. Sami Frasheri Pall. 20/1, Hyrija B, Ap. 21 Tirana, Albania Tel/Fax: +355 (42) 33671 E-mail: helsinki@ngo.org.al www.ihf-hr.org/albhc.htm Albanian Human Rights Group (Grupi Shqiptar i të Drejtave të Njeriut) Rr. Dëshmorët e 4 Shkurtit P. 7/1, Sh. 2, Ap 1 Tirana, Albania Tel/Fax: +355 (42) 51995 E-mail: elsa@abissnet.com.al www.ahrg.org Society for Democratic Culture (Shoqata per Kulture Demokratike) Rr. Hamid Shijaku, Pall. 6, Shk. 1, Ap. 3 Tirana, Albania Tel.: +355 (42) 27674 Fax: +355(42) 30350 E-mail: monda@ndial.tirana.al UNDP (United Nations Development Programme. Mission in Albania) Rr. Dëshmoret e 4 Shkurtit Tirana, Albania Tel.: +355 (42) 33148 Fax: +355 (42) 34448 E-mail: registry.al@undp.org www.al.undp.org DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Foundation for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Disputes, Institute for Contemporary Studies

    About the author

    Albana Shala studied Foreign Languages, Law, and Development Studies in Albania and the Netherlands. Currently she works as project manager for Press Now, a Dutch foundation supporting media development in the Balkans. Daniel Chavez is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Social Studies in the Netherlands. He has worked as a free-lance researcher in South and Central America and Albania.