Author	Reinoud Leenders
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

Following mass rioting in 1988, triggered by the failure of the state to address a widespread socio-economic malaise, by 1990 Algeria had developed from an authoritarian state into an - albeit restricted - multiparty system under reforms carried out by President Chadli Bendjadid. The first municipal and provincial elections held in 1990 were won by the Front islamique du salut (FIS), an Islamic party, while the Front de liberation national (FLN), previously the ruling party, obtained only 28 per cent of the votes. In December 1991, the FIS obtained 47 per cent of the votes in the first round of the first free parliamentary elections held since independence in 1962. Shocked by this result, the military subsequently cancelled the second round of the elections and arrested thousands of FIS supporters and their leaders.
The High State Council, comprising military officers and political appointees, was formed to formally rule the country. Mohamad Boudiaf presided over the council but was killed in June 1992 by a member of the security forces, allegedly because he intended to crack-down on widespread state corruption. He was succeeded by Ali Kafi (July 1992-January 1994) and Liamine Zeroual. Due to the political clampdown, some Islamic groups opted for armed strategies while other groups that had already carried out armed operations earlier became more prominent. When one radical wing of the FIS declared a Jihad against the military regime and the latter refused to reverse its decisions concerning the elections, a war broke out that, to date, continues to claim the lives of government personnel, Islamic gunmen and civilians.
Although observers disagree in their analyses about the causes of the outbreak of hostilities or place differing emphases on particular factors, the main reason for the conflict can perhaps best be summarised by pointing out the deficiencies of political institutionalisation since 1962. In the words of one observer, Hugh Roberts, post-independence Algeria has been marked by the fact that the 'formal distribution of political responsibility does not correspond to the actual distribution of power'.
The failure of state-building had its roots in the political set-up which emerged immediately after independence when the historical leadership of the resistance against French colonial rule was outmanoeuvred by the military. The latter formed a coalition with state bureaucrats and the remains of the FLN which became Algeria's sole political party. Rampant corruption and conflicts between different clans rendered state institutions practically dysfunctional, contributing to the failure of development policies. This problem became particularly acute with the fall in gas- and oil prices in 1986 as hydrocarbons accounted for 57 per cent of government revenues. The collapse of the oil price and ineffective measures to remedy the crisis caused a dramatic fall in living standards, increasing unemployment (it was estimated that by 1990, seventy per cent of the labour force under thirty years was out of work), and shortages in adequate and affordable housing. A package of economic reform policies to relieve the state's debt burden, initiated in collaboration with the IMF in 1989, disproportionately hit the poor and exacerbated the atmosphere of general crisis. In these circumstances, another issue that was left unresolved by the country's ruling coalition, the role of Islam, gained political significance.
Islam had played an important factor in the struggle for independence against the French as witnessed by the close relationship between the FLN and the Association of Reformist Ulama, a grouping of Muslim clerics founded in 1931. Following independence, the FLN disassociated itself from this Islamic-nationalist current and began advocating a largely secularist and 'socialist' state ideology. When the revolutionary legitimacy of the ruling elite began to fade, many began to feel alienated from the political system. The slowly emerging fault line between a secularist elite and under-privileged groups was accentuated by a school and university system that, in terms of job opportunities and social status, privileged those educated in French and deprived others who were educated in Arabic from real prospects of social mobility.
In the late 1980s, the FIS effectively capitalised on all of these different sources of discontent with the regime. Operating a network of mosques and Islamic centres, the FIS also increased its popularity by providing an alternative to cash-starved state institutions in offering social services. However, the rising power of the FIS, and symbolic concessions made by the regime such as the Arabisation of the education system, alarmed the Berber minority that forms about 20 to 25 per cent of the total population and is concentrated in the Kabylia region. Berber political and cultural organisations have subsequently stepped up their campaigns for the recognition of their main language, Tamazight, and opposed the Islamic movement that has explicitly linked its drive for Islamisation to further Arabisation.
The main adversaries in the armed conflict are, on the one hand, numerous armed Islamic groups and, on the other hand, the security forces and armed civilian groups allied with them. The two most powerful men in the military are believed to be Lt. General Mohammad Lamari and the head of the military security forces, Mohammad Mediene. The FIS has been increasingly marginalised following the arrest of its long-time leaders Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj in June 1991. Armed Islamic groups include the Armee islamique du salut (AIS), the military wing of the FIS comprising an estimated 10,000 men, and a loose organisation of different militant and armed groups known as the Groupes islamiques armes (GIA), comprising an estimated 2,500 to 10,000 men. The groups falling under the umbrella of the GIA are usually headed by an 'Emir', a military commander, and a 'Caliph', his political guide. They target state officials, journalists, artists, musicians and other civilians. The GIA are reported to engage in black-market operations and mafia practices which enable them to sustain their military activities. Armed groups are also believed to be involved in private corporations that replaced privatised and/or destroyed state-run enterprises, in order to finance their operations. Some of the armed groups' members, the 'Mudjahedin', are believed to have received military training during the war in Afghanistan. They have also reportedly been involved in armed operations in Morocco, Bosnia and Yemen.
Apart from the FLN, political parties with some significant following include the Front des forces socialistes (FFS), a secularist and mainly Berber-supported party revived in 1989 and led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, the Mouvement pour la Democratie en Algerie (MDA), created in 1985 by exiled FLN-leader and former President Ahmed Ben Bella, and the Rassemblement pour la culture et la democratie (RCD), a Berber party with minor support led by Said Saadi and legalised in 1989, and two legalised Islamic parties that are more or less loyal to the regime.

Conflict Dynamics

The Algerian government has persisted in regarding the conflict solely as a 'security problem' posed by the challenge of 'terrorist groups' that have to be eradicated by all necessary means. At the same time, the government has claimed that the security situation is 'under control' and that the violence is 'residual'. However, within the armed forces there are splits between 'eradicateurs', favouring the hard-line position, and those in favour of guided negotiations with opponents of the regime to stop the violence. These splits have been complicated by divisions between clans and officers with their own supporters, as shown by accusations between several factions reported in the Algerian press since the summer of 1998. The FIS has advocated the establishment of an 'Islamic state', in line with Islamic law, but has made statements in favour of parliamentary democracy, although its adherence to liberal principles remains ambiguous. It took part in the 'National Contract', negotiated in Rome (see below), that offered a blue-print for a peaceful transition to democracy. The GIA have opposed any form of reconciliation and aim at the violent overthrow of the state but, with little prospect of achieving this aim, seem to be content with exploiting the situation in their own interests. The FFS and MDA oppose the military regime, criticise its violations of human rights and public liberties and have pressed for recognition of the FIS as a condition of normalisation. The RCD initially adopted a stance in line with that of the 'eradicateurs' but seems to have opted for a more reconciliatory approach since it participated in the 'National Contract'.
Although individual killings by both government forces and armed groups have been responsible for most of the casualties, since the beginning of 1997 massacres of innocent civilians have become systematic, thereby transforming the conflict into one of indiscriminate and self-perpetuating violence. Most of the massacres were committed in a systematic and organised manner in villages in areas around the capital, in the Algiers, Blida and Medeain regions. The largest massacres occurred in Sidi Rais, south of Algiers, in August 1997, claiming the lives of up to 300 people, and in Relizane, in December 1997, claiming the lives of over 400 people. Little is known about the reasons for these acts of violence, or the identity of their perpetrators. They may have resulted from GIA members' frustration at their inability to continue hitting state targets. Others have explained the massacres as being land grabs, banditry, local vendettas or the settling of old scores. Often the massacres took place in close proximity to government forces who failed to intervene and let the perpetuators leave the scene after they committed their crimes. This has fed suspicions that security forces, for one reason or another, were actually actively involved in the killings. In another development, armed groups have started to fight each other, possibly in bids to control certain areas and to raise illegal 'taxes' and generate other economic gains. The proliferation of Islamic armed factions and sub-factions, armed gangs, and paramilitary 'self-defence units' has further contributed to a situation where it is no longer clear which aims are being pursued or for what reasons groups have fallen out amongst each other. Since his election as president in November 1995, and bolstered in his powers by constitutional amendments in 1996, Zeroual seems to have followed a three-track strategy to restore a minimum of stability within the conditions set by the military. Firstly, the government has initiated a major economic reform programme by privatising state enterprises, cutting expenditure on state subsidies and creating favourable conditions for foreign investments to increase economic growth and living standards. Secondly, the government stepped up its security measures against Islamic insurgents, arresting and killing thousands of its armed opponents. Thirdly, Zeroual initiated a dialogue with 'acceptable' opposition parties and made provision for new local and parliamentary elections that provided a minimum of political participation. In September 1996, these efforts resulted in a 'national reconciliation pact', boycotted by the FFS. Probably as a result of pressure by more hard-line army officers, the dialogue excluded the FIS and the GIA.
Parliamentary elections took place in June 1997 with a majority of seats being gained by the FLN and another pro-government party. Legalised Islamic parties (the FIS was again excluded) gained about 25 per cent of the seats. The elections were widely believed to have been rigged. In July 1997, FIS-leader Abbasi Madani was released from prison but was again placed under house arrest two months later after he had sent an open letter to the UN Secretary-General. Abdelkader Hachani, another detained FIS-leader, was released in July 1997 after being sentenced to five and a half years, the term he had already served. In response to Zeroual's limited political opening, the AIS declared a unilateral truce in September 1997 and started joint military operations with the army against the GIA. In November local elections took place, resulting in a distribution of power similar to that of the parliamentary elections. Some observers speculated that Zeroual wanted to allow for a limited degree of pluralism within a framework controlled by the government parties and continuing military tutelage. However, the major power-holders within the military seem to have disapproved of this strategy. Frustrated by the obstacles the military put in his way, Zeroual announced his resignation in September 1998. Shortly before the presidential elections held on April 15, 1999, six candidates, mostly from the opposition, withdrew in protest against alleged vote rigging and election fraud. Consequently, the only remaining candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a former foreign affairs minister, was elected but voter turnout seems to have been extremely low. Bouteflika, reportedly supported by the more moderate factions in the army and by the FLN, immediately promised to hold a 'dialogue excluding nobody' and to steer the country towards 'national reconciliation'. Six weeks after his appointment, Bouteflika hinted on May 29, 1999 that he would support a national referendum on reconciliation and a general amnesty for those involved in the conflict, excluding those charged with murder. In reply, the leadership of both the FIS and AIS expressed their 'total and unconditional support to stop the battle', leaving members of the GIA and other armed groups as the main actors in their armed conflict with the security forces and the government at large.
Government sources estimated the number of fatalities as 26,000. However, Amnesty International's figure of 80,000 killed has been widely accepted as more realistic. According to Amnesty International, in 1996 the victims included over 100 foreign nationals. Most of the casualties were civilian victims of arbitrary killings, massacres and extra-judicial executions. The only estimate of material damage currently available refers to an unspecified but large number of factories being destroyed by 1995, resulting in 45,000 workers losing their jobs. Other victims include those tortured by government forces, 'disappeared' persons (estimated by Amnesty International in 1999 to number 3,000), imprisoned journalists, about sixty journalists killed by Islamic groups since 1993, and detainees killed in prison. Tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forced to flee or to go into hiding out of fear of arrest or violence by the parties involved in the conflict.

Official Conflict Management

Following five years of inaction, the United Nations expressed its desire to become involved in efforts to manage the conflict when, in August 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that 'words are no longer enough' to bring about a peaceful solution in Algeria. However, in March 1998, urgent requests by Annan and the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to the Algerian government to allow an investigative mission by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture were rejected. Neither rapporteurs has succeeded in gaining access to Algeria since 1993. In the 1998 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights - a body of eighteen independent experts - the situation in Algeria was discussed for the first time after the Algerian state submitted a report on its obligations concerning civil and political rights. As a result of mounting pressure, in July 1998 the Algerian government invited a UN team headed by former Portuguese President Mario Soares to visit the country, but denied it an 'investigative or fact-finding mandate'. Lacking a clearly defined mandate, the team stayed for about two weeks in the country and talked to trade union leaders, opposition parties, women's groups, lawyers and a small number of victims of the conflict.
Meanwhile, the Human Rights' Commission concluded in a report issued in August 1998 that allegations of the involvement of security forces in the massacres were persistent enough to warrant an international inquiry. The Commission also condemned grave violations of human rights by government forces. One month later, Soares and his panel had toned-down the language of their report considerably. It repeated the government's talk of 'terrorism' and failed to condemn violations by the government. Only the report's calls for reform of the security forces and the judiciary indicated indirectly that along with armed groups, the Algerian government bears responsibility for human rights abuses. The UN panel report was blasted by Amnesty International as a 'whitewash'. Other UN organisations to have taken a stand on the crisis in Algeria include UNICEF which, in November 1997, condemned the 'relentless civilian killings in Algeria' with specific reference to children. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), of which Algeria is historically a highly influential member, has failed to play any role in efforts to stop the violence. In November 1994, its African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted a resolution on Algeria, expressing concern about extra-judicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention and calling upon the world community to 'mobilize and support democratic forces in Algeria and abroad in their efforts to restore peace, the rule of law, and respect for human rights in Algeria'. However, this resolution was dropped in March 1995, undoubtedly as a result of Algerian pressure not to intervene in its domestic affairs. The Arab League has also refrained from making any attempt at conflict resolution. Instead, it has merely supported the Algerian government and accepted its stress on combating 'terrorism' with all means.
The European Union temporarily froze its economic and humanitarian assistance to Algeria following the abrogation of the 1992 elections but the freeze was short-lived. Negotiations, ongoing since 1995, concerning the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement (EUROMED), which contains a clause on human rights, failed to discuss issues related to conflict management and human rights in the Algerian crisis. In 1996 and 1997 the EU called for a 'political dialogue' and 'condemnation of terrorism' from the UN Human Rights Commission, but refrained from referring to the Algerian state's responsibility for human rights violations. Since 1997 the EU seems to have sought a more active role. In September 1997, the European Parliament (EP) recommended 'international protection' for Algerian asylum-seekers who would be at risk if they were forced to return to their country. However, EU members continue to reject Algerian asylumseekers on the basis that 'it could not be proved that they were in danger' or that 'it could not be proved that they could not obtain protection from the authorities of their country'. An exact number of Algerians having requested and/or granted political asylum in member-states of the EU has not been made public.
In November 1997, the EP organised a closed hearing on the conflict and the human rights situation in Algeria which was attended by Algerian lawyers, journalists and relatives of the 'disappeared'. In January 1998, three EU foreign ministers visited Algiers and called upon the Algerian government to allow UN Special Rapporteurs to visit the country. In February 1998, a delegation of the EP went to Algeria in a visit that was carefully programmed by the Algerian authorities. Surprisingly, the delegation failed to call for an international investigation into the violence nor did it condemn human rights abuses by government forces. What was left of the delegation's credibility was lost when its members refused to open a letter sent by the FIS during a press conference and set fire to it in their hotel toilet.
After the November 1995 election of President Zeroual, the Algerian government initiated a dialogue with several secular and legalised Islamic political parties, excluding the FIS and GIA, in an attempt to bolster its credibility. These efforts led to a unilateral truce by the AIS in September 1997. However, the dialogues failed to bring about meaningful political participation, let alone a peaceful solution, and there are suspicions that these efforts merely served to outmanoeuvre or divide the regime's opponents. The government established in 1992 the Observatoire nationale des droits de l'homme to report on human rights violations in the country. However, the Observatoire seems to view its role largely as defending the government rather than human rights. It has repeatedly stated that human rights violations by government forces have been limited in number and that these incidents were immediately followed up by judiciary action. The government also opened centres run by the National Commission for the Preservation and promotion of Women for victims of rape by 'terrorists'. Moreover, since 1998 citizens can report the 'disappearance' of their relatives at offices established all over the country.
Other 'NGOs' set up and sponsored by the government are those that purport to speak in the name of victims of 'terrorism'. These organisations include Djezairouna, Sumoud and the Association nationale des familles victimes de terrorisme. In a controversial move to enable citizens to defend themselves against 'terrorists', the state has since 1995 set up civilian militias comprising some 150 to 200,000 armed citizens. But rather than managing the conflict, this move severely exacerbated the situation resulting in the proliferation of armed groups settling scores in local and tribal disputes, extra-judicial killings and complete anarchy.
Until 1995, France largely subscribed to the view of the Algerian government that the conflict can only be addressed by ruthlessly repressing the violence of Islamic groups. This stand was reflected in France's own crackdown on suspected Islamic militants residing in France following the hijacking of an aircraft of Air France in December 1994, resulting in three casualties, and the bombings by the GIA in Paris in 1995-6, which killed twelve civilians. However, at the end of 1994, the late French President François Mitterrand proposed a EU-sponsored peace conference. The Algerian government's rejection of this proposal on the grounds that it constituted an interference in its domestic affairs made France adopt a more careful and distanced approach, claiming neutrality in the conflict. France says it no longer supplies weapons to Algeria although bilateral credits and loans amounting to about US$ 1 billion per year have continued. Since 1996 France has appeared to acknowledge that there is no military solution to the conflict but it has continued to prevent the EU formulating more active policies towards the Algerian crisis.
The United States has developed a closer interest in Algeria since American companies stepped up their investments in the Algerian oil and gas sectors in 1994. In 1995, the GIA was added to the blacklist of 'terrorist organisations' prepared by the US State Department. In February 1998, Algerian MPs were invited by the US Congress to receive training in parliamentary democracy. In Spring 1998, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Martin Indyk went to Algiers and called upon the Algerian government to allow access for UN rapporteurs to investigate the massacres. The US threatened to support a resolution in the UN Human Rights' Commission critical of the Algerian government. Following a strong rebuff from the Algerian government, calls for an international inquiry have not been pursued. Meanwhile, the US seems to have tightened its relations with the Algerian government as illustrated by joint US-Algerian military exercises at the end of 1998.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Although the 1989 Constitution allows NGOs, under some conditions, to operate freely, in practice NGOs, even when legalised, have been severely hindered if not blocked in their efforts to manage the conflict. The Roman Catholic Sant 'Egidio community in Rome undertook a major attempt to facilitate peace talks between all parties involved and to act as an intermediary in their conflicts. International NGOs also suffered from the lack of civil liberties as they were particularly targeted by the government's hostile attitude towards any external intervention in the conflict. Under these difficult circumstances some Algerian NGOs continued to operate, largely by advocating a peaceful solution to the conflict. They were supported by international NGOs which conducted fact-finding missions when possible, sent delegations and urged, on the one hand, the Algerian government and armed groups to respect basic human rights and, on the other hand, called upon the international community to launch an international inquiry into the violence.

Domestic
The International Service for Human Rights and the Latin American Federation of Associations of Relatives of Disappeared Detainees gathered with the Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared of Algeria in a workshop on the 'disappeared' in Algeria held in September 1998. They submitted 477 dossiers of documented cases of 'disappearances' to the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances. The Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared of Algeria is a loose organisation that has been active since the summer of 1998. Aided by Amnesty International and the Federation internationale des droits de l'homme (FIDH), it sent delegates to several European countries where they held conferences to draw attention to the problem of the 'disappeared'. The organisation also started to organise weekly demonstrations in Algeria which are attended by hundreds of mothers. A request by the Committee for formal recognition has been denied.
Another Algerian NGO involved in conflict management is the Rassemblement d'action jeunesse (RAJ), an organisation founded in 1992. The RAJ provided human rights education to youth all over the country, assisted them in searching for employment, and lobbied the government to start a dialogue between all the parties involved in the conflict. Following the first massacres in 1995, the RAJ produced a manifesto for peace and collected over 20,000 signatures in a few days. It has also organised an all-night concert for peace which was attended by more than 11,000 young people. The activities of the RAJ were subsequently curtailed by government forces despite its legal recognition in 1993.
Algeria has two major human rights organisations; the League algeriene pour les droits de l'homme (LADH) and the League algeriene pour la defense des droits de l'homme (LADDH). The difficult circumstances under which both organisations operate were highlighted in June 1994 when Yousef Fathallah, the president of the LADH was murdered. Both organisations claim complete independence but their members and activities are far from non-partisan. On several occasions Algerian intellectuals and politicians, including former Foreign Prime-Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, FIS-leader Abdelkader Hachani and LADDH president Ali Yahya, have made a 'call for peace' by issuing written statements. Numerous major mass demonstrations have taken place: in October 1994, in protest against the violence in general, in 1997 following the rigged local elections, and in June 1998 in protest against the murder of Berber Rai-singer Matoub Lounes.
The Algerian press has been remarkably vocal and informative, given, on the one hand, the government's harassment, prosecution, imprisonment, and monopolistic control of paper supplies and printing presses. On the other hand, journalists have been a target of deadly assaults from Islamic activists, although no new attacks have occurred since 1996. The Algerian press has been a major source of news on the conflict, but it has also been used by factions within the military and civilian government elites as a platform to promote their own views and discredit opponents. Consequently, factual news reporting is far from reliable, as illustrated by contradictions within various newspapers' accounts of major incidents of violence. International human rights activists see the daily La Tribune and El-Watan as the most reliable and non-partisan news sources from Algeria.

International
In November 1994, the Sant 'Egidio community, which had earlier been involved in the peace process in Mozambique, invited all parties in the conflict, including the government and the FIS, for peace talks in Rome. Of the various parties, only the government declined the offer. In January 1995, the parties involved launched a 'National Contract' that denounced all forms of violence while calling for a cease-fire, recognition of the FIS, recognition of the Tamazight language, the release of all political detainees, and convening of a national conference to establish a transitional government in preparation of free and democratic elections. The initiative was flatly rejected by the government.
Amnesty International has taken the main initiative in exposing the scope of human rights violations by government forces and armed groups in Algeria. Until 1997, when the organisation was banned from entry, Amnesty International conducted fact-finding missions that were documented in several reports. Human Rights Watch and the FIDH also conducted visits to Algeria to record human rights violations. An attempt by the FIDH to observe a trial in July 1997 failed when they were denied access to the court. Reporters sans frontièrers (RSF) and the Committee to Protect Journalists also published reports. A delegation of the latter organisation, headed by CNN-reporter Peter Arnett, went in October 1998 on its first fact-finding mission and met with Communications' minister Habib Chawki, to discuss, amongst other cases, the 'disappearance' of two Algerian journalists and the suspension of permits for several daily newspapers. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both briefed the UN Human Rights Commission on the situation in Algeria. The organisations mentioned here issued joint statements in October 1997 and April 1998, in both cases to persuade the world community at large and the UN in particular to immediately launch an international inquiry into the violence.
In 1998 a group of leading Algerian and European intellectuals, including Pierre Bourdieu and historian Mohamed Harbi, formed the International Committee for Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Algeria. In an attempt to advise the UN panel led by Soares on which issues needed to be addressed during their visit, the Committee issued its first declaration just before the panel's departure for Algeria.
Numerous other international NGOs have called upon the Algerian government to end human rights violations and respect public liberties. They include the World Organisation against Torture, Article 19, the International Federation of Journalists, International Pen, the International Press Institute, and the World Press Freedom Committee.
The International Crisis Group began monitoring the situation in Algeria at the end of 1997 with the aim of identifying 'practical ways in which the international community can contribute to a lasting resolution of the Algerian crisis'. In March 1998 it issued its first report on Algeria. This contained a series of recommendations emphasising the importance of press freedoms.
The International Red Cross Committee has been unable to visit the country since 1992 due to restrictions imposed by the Algerian government. Other humanitarian organisations have also been denied the access needed to provide relief to victims of the conflict.

Reflection
The lack of access to Algeria and inability to freely investigate the human rights abuses have been the major obstacles to a successful intervention by international NGOs. The peace talks in Rome, and the government's refusal to accept any mediation attempts by outsiders, clearly illustrated that Algerian national pride is a serious obstacle to foreign interventions. Undoubtedly, this position has been fed by Algeria's traumatic colonial experience. It has been suggested that Algeria's excellent connections in the UN and the OAU have been an additional reason for the failure of the very few serious international attempts to manage the conflict. The country's reliance on oil- and gas reserves can be seen as a third reason of why the government has been able to lock itself off from outside critique and suggestions. However, the talks in Rome had some positive effect in that they forced the regime to initiate its own 'national reconciliation pact', even if this initiative lacked sincerity. Furthermore, in spite of the obstacles faced by human rights organisations, they have succeeded, especially since 1997, in drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis in Algeria.
More generally, the Algerian regime's hostile attitude towards outside offers of mediation has raised awareness that the conflict cannot be seen as a simple trade-off between democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. The unprecedented scale of the violence committed contributed to the fact that UN could no longer ignore the situation in Algeria. However, since the UN agreed to send a mission on terms dictated by the Algerian government, the call for an international inquiry has lost momentum. Given the lack of public liberties, Algerian NGOs have only made little achievements in their efforts to manage the conflict. An important exception is the Committee of Relatives of the Disappeared of Algeria. Since it launched its campaigns in the summer of 1998, the issue of the 'disappearances' has become much talked about in Algeria, with even the press and members of Parliament raising questions about the fate of the 'disappeared'.

Prospects

Partly because of the hidden nature of the conflict and the opacity of behind the scenes power struggles, analysts outline several contradictory scenarios for Algeria's future development. A genuine peace settlement has in this context only rarely been considered as realistic. Others believe that the conflict has reached a stalemate. Most observers have therefore predicted a protracted armed conflict with parts of the country controlled by armed groups and other parts by government forces. It has also been suggested that this may ultimately lead to an 'Afghan scenario'; a disintegration of the state and a division of the country into de-facto 'emirates' and state-controlled areas. Others believe it more likely that some 'Turkish scenario' will develop wherein some political participation will be allowed but with the military continuing to play a major political role. Alternatively, a 'Sudanese scenario' may evolve in which the military will strike a deal with Islamic armed groups, largely at the expense of all other parties involved.
Recent FIS and AIS support for Bouteflika's suggestions concerning a national referendum on reconciliation and an amnesty, suggest that these two groups will accept any opening even at the cost of changing their names and leaving their long-time leaders in prison or under house arrest. An alliance between Bouteflika, military moderates and these two Islamic groups may become instrumental in neutralising the violence committed by the GIA and other armed groups. However, the validity of such future projections is difficult to assess as observers already disagree over what will happen in the very near future. Some regard Bouteflika's room of manoeuvrability as equally limited due to military hard-liners who, as with their ejection of former president Zeroual, may continue to dominate the political process. Other observers, such as Ignacio Ramonet of Le Monde Diplomatique, have described Bouteflika's initiatives as serious and unprecedented.

Recommendations

International human rights organisations, including the UN Human Rights Committee, have recommended that both the Algerian government and armed groups take immediate and concrete measures to stop violations of human rights. The Algerian government has been urged to ensure that prompt, independent and impartial investigations are carried out into all cases of human rights abuses and to bring those responsible to justice. The government has also been urged to disband all paramilitary militias and ensure that all security operations are carried out only by law-enforcement personnel who have received the necessary training and who can be held accountable to their superiors. The Algerian government was also urged to lift censorship of reports on the conflict, ensure freedom of expression and to end the politically motivated financial pressure against local newspapers. One international NGO, the International Crisis Group, has urged the European to take the occasion of its negotiations with the Algerian government over EUROMED to demand an end to press restrictions and the monopolisation of printing facilities.
The UN has been advised to set up a credible, international inquiry into the massacres and other human rights abuses by using the existing UN-machinery and by appointing a Special Rapporteur on Algeria. The Organisation of African Unity has also been advised to play a more active and supporting role in this context. The EU has been advised to further distance itself from the French position towards Algeria, and start giving greater encouragement to Algerian politicians and NGOs committed to a peaceful solution, if possible under the social and humanitarian provisions of EUROMED. Others have recommended any third party wanting to contribute to conflictmanagement in Algeria to take into account the country's colonial past and related sensitivities in order to render its efforts more effective.

Service Information

Newsletters and Periodicals:

La Tribune (Algerian French-language daily): see also: latribune-online.com/; El-Watan (Algerian French-language daily): see also: http://www.elwatan.com/; Le Monde Diplomatique (much reporting by Algerian journalists and intellectuals), see also: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/;Maghreb-Machrek;Peuples Mediterranees;The Maghreb Review

About the author

Reinoud Leenders is based in Beirut where he is affiliated to the American University as an associate researcher in Political Economy. He reports on Lebanese current affairs for Middle East International. He also writes for a Dutch newspaper and the Lebanese daily An-Nahar on Middle Eastern politics. He is preparing a PhD thesis on the Political Economy of Lebanon for the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). In 1996 and 1997 he worked as a researcher in the North Africa team of Amnesty International in London.