Author	Hans van de Veen
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	1999

Summary

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with borders that touch Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo, Central African Republic, and Libya. It's size, along with its strategic location straddling the Nile River and abutting the Red Sea, made it a prominent target of revolving-door superpower intervention and massive arms transfers throughout the Cold War. As unstable civilian governments alternated with governments installed by military coups after independence in 1956, the country slid deeper into an economic malaise and social crisis, which has been accentuated by lengthy outbreaks of civil war.
The US alone provided successive Khartoum governments with close to US$1 billion in arms in the late 1970s and 1980s. For its part, the Soviet Union provided arms to Sudan in the early 1970s. As the Horn of Africa lost significance to the departing superpowers in the early 1990s, Sudan was allowed to wither in arms-bloated poverty.
Sudan is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa, with a population estimated at close to 28 million, from 19 major linguistic groups and nearly sixhundred subgroups. Those who identify themselves as Arabs make up the largest group (40%), followed by the southern Dinka (12%), the Bejas of the north-east (7%), and West African immigrants (6%).
Like most of the former European colonies along the Sahara's southern rim - the Sahel - Sudan comprises an Arabic-speaking Muslim north and an African south which is inhabited by ethnically-diverse Christians and practitioners of traditional religions.
Since the north attained a higher level of economic development in colonial times and is home to about three-quarters of the country's population, the south feels itself to be marginalized and the victim of discrimination. Successive governments have done extremely little to ease the grievances of the south. Turning the entire country into an Islamic republic was probably the surest way to perpetuate the civil war.
In the central, eastern and western parts of the country there are numerous politically and economically marginalised groups which have not been completely Arabised or Islamicised. Since independence, rival northern parties have vied to control the country and to dominate these regions.
Sudan has known only a short period of peace since achieving independence on January 1, 1956. A mutiny in the army in the south led to the outbreak of the first civil war, which held the country in its grip from 1955 to 1972. In 1969, a military coup brought to power General Numeiry, who promised to grant limited autonomy to the south and signed a peace accord in Addis Ababa in 1972. The accord granted regional autonomy to the three southern states. In 1983 new tensions between the south and north emerged after Numeiry announced the introduction of Islamic legislation, the Sharia. Shortly thereafter the transfer of southern garrisons to the north resulted in mutiny. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was set up and the second civil war began.
In 1985 Numeiry was ousted in a military coup brought about by a peaceful popular uprising. A coalition government with Umma leader Sadiq al-Mahdi as prime minister came to power after elections in 1986. An agreement with the SPLA was then concluded which included a cease-fire. Suspension of the Sharia was one of the conditions agreed upon. The National Islamic Front, which had joined the coalition in the meantime, was the first to reject the agreement. A new coalition was on the point of beginning discussions on the implementation of the agreement when the government was overthrown by Lieutenant-General Omar Hassan al Bashir on 30 June 1989.
It soon became clear that, from that moment onwards, NIF ideology was directing political developments. Support from Iran, which rushed to strengthen relations with its first sub-Saharan ally, enabled the NIF-controlled government to make massive arms purchase from China and the former Soviet republics, which it used to step up the war in the south. Ethnic militia and breakaway factions of the SPLA also received support in an effort to divide the southern opposition against itself.
In 1991 the SPLA split into two factions: the SPLA-mainstream led by John Garang de Mabior and the SPLA-United led by Riek Machar. The SPLA-United has since undergone further rifts (partly as result of Dinka-Nuer clashes). As a result of the southern rebel inter-factional fighting, government forces managed to recapture a number of garrison towns and to regain the use of some roads and communication infrastructure in 1992.
A series of cease-fires brought some respite in 1995, but negotiations to end the fighting failed to get off the ground. In April 1996, the government of Sudan entered into a political charter with six southern rebel groups. Under the terms of the accord the north and the south would remain together in a unitary state and the Sharia and local customs would become the main sources of law.
Several leaders of rebel groups were rewarded with top government posts. However, in January 1998, one of them, Kerubino Bol, with his Dinka-based militia, defected from the government side, realigned with SPLA forces, and launched a number of surprise attacks on government forces in the Bahr al Ghazal province. In 1999 Kerubino rejoined the Sudanese government. ce process.

Conflict Dynamics

During the early 1990s, the government of Sudan opened its doors to rebel groups from other countries. These included opposition (and mostly armed) groups from the neighbouring countries Ethiopia and Uganda, and the newly independent Eritrea, as well as radical Islamic groups from the Middle East. Because of the welcome extended to these Islamic radicals, the Sudanese regime became increasingly isolated at the international level. In 1993 the United States put Sudan on its blacklist of state-supporters of international terrorism.
In the meantime, in the north, the National Islamic Front and its allies, in an effort to consolidate control of government and enforce its vision of an Islamic state, had built up a repressive police state. The resistance towards the ruling party found an outlet when in 1995 the Eritrean government opened its doors to the Sudanese opposition. At the end of 1996 the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) - composed of the two traditional northern political parties, the Sudan Communist Party as well as several ethnically based parties - became allies or at least co-belligerents of the SPLA. Their co-ordinated attacks posed the most serious threat to the government since it came to power. The neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda supported the coalition openly.
The Sudan civil war thus evolved into a multi-front war - with dangerous regional implications. In 1997 the combined Sudanese opposition launched several attacks in the areas bordering Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as Uganda, which resulted in significant advances. Sudanese government officials dispute rebel claims of credit for these military advances, alleging that the campaigns were led and waged by the armed forces of the three neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, reports of the victories encouraged other NDA parties - which had no military involvement at that time - to mobilise military units to fight government forces. For its part, the government responded to this new spate of armed incursions with a call for a national mobilisation and a renewed quest for arms from its global suppliers, while charging its neighbours with invading its territory.
For some time US attempts to overthrow the Sudanese government by covertly aiding its neighbours seemed to be meeting with success, but the policy suddenly collapsed when the United States' two chief allies - Ethiopia and Eritrea - began fighting each other in May 1998. Both countries called back troops from the Sudanese borders and made peace overtures to their former enemy, Sudan. The Sudanese government reacted immediately by launching fresh attacks against the rebel movement in the eastern part of the country.
In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in several parts of the country further deteriorated. The 1998 famine in the western province of Bahr al Ghazal - instigated by the government but made worse by the indifference and incompetence of factions of the rebel movement - affected an estimated 2.6 million people, prompting the greatest UN relief operation in human history. On July 15, the SPLA announced a three-month cease-fire in the province, and opened three corridors leading to the area. The government then implemented a one-month truce, which was later extended to April 1999. However, hundreds of thousands failed to survive the catastrophe, adding to the misery of a people who have known little if any peace in their lives. The food shortage is projected to continue until late 1999.
Another seriously affected area was the Western Upper Nile which belongs to the southern Nuer tribe. This area suffered because two pro-government Nuer forces were fighting each other over political and military control of this territory, where a government-organised international consortium is drilling for oil. Some 150,000 civilians, most of them displaced by the fighting, were put at risk. The UN relief operation was unable to reach them because of the unstable military situation. In the SPLA-held areas of the central Nuba Mountains, some 20,000 people at risk were not even included in the UN's relief operation or statistics. The government's strategy in the mountains is to starve civilians into leaving the rebel areas, so it has denied any UN access. Some small civilian relief agencies have defied the ban and are trying to help the 300,000 Nuba thought to have remained in the area.
All conflict parties in this civil war have committed war crimes. The Sudanese government has engaged in indiscriminate aerial bombardments of southern population centres and still uses scorched earth tactics. In order to quell civilian resistance to government policies, torture, disappearance and summary execution are used. The government has also severely restricted relief efforts by non-governmental and UN agencies.
For their part, the southern rebel groups have also committed human rights violations. They have abducted civilians, principally women and children, from their opponents, used starvation as a means of combat and deployed children as soldiers on a massive scale.
It has been estimated (U.S. Committee for Refugees) that at least 1.9 million people in southern and central Sudan have died during the past fifteen years as a direct result of civil war or war-related famine. It is believed that at least one out of every five southern Sudanese has died as a result of the civil war, and more than 80 per cent of southern Sudan's estimated five million population have been displaced at some time since 1983. Some four million Sudanese are internally displaced, more than any other country in the world.
The prime responsibility for the suffering of the people of Sudan is shared by the government, the SPLA, and the various other militia. All of them pursue a war that, according to almost all international experts, cannot be won. While a few profit from the conflict, many more civilians suffer. Sudan seems a level enough killing field to allow the war to continue for many years, unless both sides are persuaded that their interests lie in participation in a meaningful pea

Official Conflict Management

There is still no end in sight to Sudan's conflict after more than thirty years of fighting. As the war and the humanitarian crisis continue, there is little momentum for serious negotiations. Both the government and the SPLA seem to have settled into a brutal routine of accepting limited cease-fires which 'buy time' for both sides. They do not necessarily represent a commitment to peace by any party. The war rages on, perpetuating the conditions for famine.
In May 1998 the Sudanese government agreed with the SPLA on a referendum that could, in theory, lead to independence. However, no attempt has been made to allow the electorate to vote on the issue. In February 1999, President Bashir once again offered independence to the south but most of those closest to the situation remain sceptical. Their scepticism is fed by the continuing delays in setting dates for a fresh round of peace negotiations in Nairobi under the auspices of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
Most African diplomats emphasise the importance of an African solution for the problems in Sudan. From non-African countries they expect pressure on the Sudanese government to return to the negotiating table and keep its promises. The IGAD mediation efforts, involving neighbouring countries Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, as well as the support from the (western) IGAD Partners Forum, are in line with this.
In September 1993, the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) launched a first peace initiative and agreement was reached between the Sudanese government and the two SPLA factions for talks later that year. Renewed talks between the government and the rebels began in May 1994 but ended in deadlock in September that year when the Sudanese government rejected a Declaration of Principles out of hand. There were two breaking points: the principle of separation between state and religion and the rights of self-determination of southern Sudan and other marginalised areas.
In July 1997, the government stated that the 1994 Declaration of Principles could be taken as 'a starting point for further discussions'. At the end of the year the government and the SPLA returned to the IGAD negotiating table, but shortly afterwards the talks were postponed.
Following a proposal by the US government, a Western support group for IGAD was initiated in 1995: the Friends of IGAD. Members included the US, Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands. The group has been involved in discrete diplomatic peacemaking efforts and foresees an important role for itself when peace is agreed upon and reconciliation and reconstruction become the priority. At the beginning of 1997 the Friends of IGAD was transformed into the IGAD Partners Forum, part of the overall IGAD Partners Committee (principally formed by the northern donors of the countries in the region). The EU and France are new members of the Partners Forum Committee, which is presently co-chaired by Italy and Norway.
International pressure on the warring parties has increased in recent years. Practically all donors have frozen their aid to Sudan, except for emergency relief. The European Parliament dispatched a fact-finding mission in 1995. In the same year both the UN and the Commission on Human and People's Rights of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) called for improved human rights monitoring.
Millions of people in south Sudan are extremely vulnerable because of the war and crop failures. International food relief has become an important element in the subsistence economy of southern Sudan. However, it is also seen as an asset to be taxed, confiscated, expropriated, or otherwise taken for the war effort by both the government forces and the guerrillas. Food is power in Sudan.
Since 1989 Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), co-ordinated from Nairobi, Kenya, has provided the umbrella for relief activities from the UN and over 30 international NGOs. OLS has become the largest air relief in history. Its overall costs since 1989 are estimated at US$3 billion. Yet, the people of southern Sudan are no better protected against famine than they were in 1989.
The root cause of this anomaly lies in the OLS agreement itself, and in the principle of 'negotiated access' that underlies all NGO operations on the ground in southern Sudan. The UN and the aid agencies are bound to seek permission from the Khartoum government and the SPLA before delivering food. The positive aspect is of course that in this way a possibility is created to distribute food in rebel-held areas. However, the destination and the quantity of food has to be cleared with both sides.
The UN is anxious to stay on good terms with both sides and is unwilling to criticise when aid is blocked. February and March 1998 were critical months for the hungry people in Bahr el Ghazal but the government refused the UN access. UN officials complained, but not too loudly. Only in April, when television began to show the horror, did the government allow the delivery of food to resume.
Donor countries face another request from the World Food Program for 1999. Many are exasperated, believing they are financing an endless war in the name of feeding the hungry. Consequently, western countries are once again searching for a political way out.
Since the American search for a 'peaceful solution' collapsed together with the outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, the IGAD Partners Forum is once more at the forefront. Their representatives recently visited Khartoum as well as Nairobi, where the SPLA has its office. It is hoped that the present cease-fire in the south-west can be prolonged and extended towards other southern areas. The European members of the IGAD Partners Forum are hoping that a referendum on South-Sudan's future could break the present stalemate. At a meeting in Oslo in March 1999, the IGAD Partners Forum discussed the provision of financial support to a new Kenyan special envoy to 'mount a concentrated and continuous mediation effort'.
A recent review of the Kenya-led IGAD Sudan peace process, sponsored by the US Institute for Peace, suggested however that the four main IGAD-countries (Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda) disagree about the best overall solution. The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, and shifting regional and international alliances 'may have paralysed the IGAD secretariat', the report says. Privately, representatives of the IGAD Partners Forum express frustration about what they see as a lack of genuine commitment from the IGAD-members. Interchurch Aid, Cordaid and Novib (Netherlands).

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
Surprisingly enough, after almost forty years of war, indigenous conflict management mechanisms are still operational in Sudan. Traditional, tribal structures are the oldest institutions of civil society for peace-making mediation and conflict resolution. The conflicts usually centre around cattle or pastures.
In a study for the Swedish Life & Peace Institute, Dr Raphael K. Badal found that the institutions of elders and chiefs have managed to retain their status as important socio-political factors, influencing and guiding everyday social and economic interactions within and between groups at the grassroots level. 'They appear to be the principal instruments for reconciling ethnic groups who contest such issues as grazing land, water holes, and instances of livestock raiding.' This suggests that these structures constitute a basis upon which a new civil society can be built. 'These structures might be strengthened or empowered to be more effective both in the local context with possible effect upon the nation as a whole.'
Besides these traditional structures, churches, women groups and local NGOs have a special role to play in situations where government and the international NGOs either cannot or prefer not to act. Several peace conferences and agreements have been organised in recent years by churches, women groups and community leaders, mostly to address serious intra-tribal fighting or to promote emwara (reconciliation). It is important that those seeking peace in Sudan take note of this conclusion for it is obvious that the large-scale conflict cannot be resolved without a significant broadening of the peace process to include all segments of society. The fact that it has not been possible to stop this war, which has been going on for so long, is a very strong indication of the weaknesses of conventional diplomatic approaches that try to address peace issues exclusively through military and political leaders. It is this context that the peace endeavours of the churches in both the north - the Sudan Council of Churches - and in the south - the New Sudan Council of Churches - as well as NGOs are important.
In March 1999 the Sudan Council of Churches facilitated a successful Dinka-Nuer West Bank Peace and Reconciliation Conference, held in Bahr el Ghazal. The Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant was signed by more than 300 Dinka and Nuer chiefs, community and church leaders, women and youth. It boldly promises an end to seven and half years of conflict between the two groups and declared a permanent cease-fire with immediate effect (the full text of the agreement is available through Sudan Infonet on its Internet Website).
The Sudan Working Group under the All African Conference of Churches (AACC) - based in Nairobi - monitors all peace efforts in Sudan and fulfils a special, co-ordinating role in the peace efforts of the churches.
The Ecumenical Forum on Sudan under the World Council of Churches (Geneva) monitors and co-ordinates all efforts by the Sudanese churches and church-based development agencies concerning peace in Sudan. Already in 1972, the Addis Ababa agreement was achieved through the mediation of the AACC and the World Council of Churches. Both organisations signed the agreement as guarantors of peace, but failed to follow through this commitment.
The Sudanese Catholic Information Office (SCIO) is the Press Office of the Sudanese Catholic Bishops, working in the nongovernment controlled areas of Sudan. It started in April 1995 and is located in Nairobi. SCIO disseminates information on Sudan through the publication of documents, articles, videos and radio programmes. The Sudan Monthly Report is distributed by email.
One of the most active indigenous NGOs is the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP), which is involved in several peace activities from women's perspectives entailing the creation of mutual bonds between women in the communities and various traditional institutions in the war-torn areas in the south. SWVP organises peace-building training, creates peace-demonstration centres in southern villages and supports small-scale local development projects. The organisation is based in Nairobi, Kenya, but has many active members in southern Sudan. SWVP cooperates with churches, NGOs such as Pax Christi and other women's groups.
The Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN), an organisation of women refugees from different ethnic and political groupings, aims for reconciliation and respect for human rights within the Sudanese refugee camps in Kenya. SWAN aims to contribute to the political empowerment of Sudanese women.
The New Sudan Women Federation (NSWF) aims to improve the human rights situation of women in the liberated areas in the south.
The Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society (NRRDS) published an open letter in February 1999 addressed to UN's secretary-general Kofi Annan on the situation in the Nuba Mountains, where an estimated 200,000 people have already been denied the right of humanitarian assistance for ten years.
The Khartoum-based Disaster Management and Refugees Studies Institute (DIMARSI) aims 'to advocate awareness and capacity building of community leaders at grass root level on conflict resolution, peace building and human rights.' Through its peace support programme, DIMARSI is targeting local leaders for peace training. The organisation also started a national campaign to ban landmines. DIMARSI cooperates with the US Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy and International Alert (UK).

International
Sudan Focal Point is a network of church-based development agencies which collects all kinds of information on and from Sudan. Until May 1997 it was based in Copenhagen, since then, the Life & Peace Institute has been the lead agency for the network. Project officers working in Europe and in the region itself monitor the situation in Sudan and the Horn region and support the churches on advocacy issues on peace, human rights, etc.
Through its Horn of Africa programme, the Swedish Life & Peace Institute has been at the forefront of efforts to fashion new and creative approaches to peace building in the region. The organisation supports grassroots peace-building initiatives in Sudan (churches, women's organisations), in the north as well as in the south. It also publishes the bimonthly Horn of Africa Bulletin and commissions research on issues such as the role of local traditional structures in peace efforts.
The International Resource Group of Disarmament and Demobilization (IRG) aims to stimulate a more focused and sustained exploration of alternative security structures and disarmament measures for the Horn of Africa region as a whole, including Sudan. The work of the organisation is based on the assumption that the long-term stability and prosperity of the Horn region depends on the integration of security, humanitarian, political and economic development measures. The secretariat is constituted by Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kirchlicher Entwicklungsdienst (AGKED) in Germany, Project Ploughshares at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Canada, the All African Conference of Churches - Peace Consultancy in Nairobi and the Life & Peace Institute, Sweden.
Through its Conflict Resolution Program The Carter Center, established by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, closely monitors conflicts in several countries. In Sudan the organisation has been involved in dispute resolution since 1989. In March 1995, all major Sudanese parties agreed to a four-month partial cease-fire, negotiated by the Carter Center, which enabled relief workers to conduct an extensive vaccination campaign.
The U.S. Committee for Refugees has facilitated meetings to discuss prospects for peace in which the main Sudanese rebel leaders took part. The organisation has also regularly conducted public and private policy discussions with US officials regarding policy options vis-à-vis Sudan. In March 1999, the organisation urged the UN's Security Council to act decisively to schedule a specific date for the people of southern Sudan to vote within three years on their own political independence.
Pax Christi International has published several reports on Sudan, based partly on its own research. Its Dutch section supports local and regional peace initiatives through the Sudanese NGO Women's Voice for Peace and the New Sudanese Council of Churches. Local capacities for peace are supported through integral programmes in which self-generating income processes are linked with trauma counselling.
The Centre for Strategic Initiatives of Women (CISW) joined with African women's coalitions in 1995 to found SIHA, Strategic Initiative for the Horn of Africa. CSIW organises conflict management training programmes in the Horn, focusing on negotiation, mediation, consensus-building, resources for peace building and follow-up actions to implement agreements. It also works to establish community peace centres where local residents of diverse backgrounds can gather to identify common objectives and plan local peace projects.
Sudan Update, an UK-based centre, publishes the Sudan Update Newsletter, but also compiles background documents for advocacy purposes and conducts research and liaison work for the media, NGOs, lawyers, parliamentarians, academics and human rights bodies.
Christian Solidarity International, an UK-based NGO, involved in a controversy over Sudan's slave trade, claims to have ransomed over 9,000 Sudanese slaves since the start of its campaign in 1995. Organisations including Human Rights Watch and Unicef have warned that the ransoming of slaves offers no solution and even makes the problem worse.
At the end of 1998, four large relief organisations, all of them with projects in Sudan, co-ordinated their efforts to advocate for a more practical approach to tackling the civil war. Aid alone, they say, will not end the disasters that have cost so many lives. Instead, a forceful and positive lobby for peace should be generated. Representatives of Oxfam, CARE International, Médicins sans Frontières and Save the Children met with Security Council members at Sweden's UN mission to press their campaign. 'Humanitarian assistance alone, in a political vacuum, will not solve Sudan's problems nor stop the next famine. What we need is the political will to end the war', said Guy Tousignant, secretary-general of CARE International.
The Inter-Africa Group organised a conference in Kampala, Uganda in February 1999 on 'Human Rights in Sudan in the Transitional Period'. Some other NGOs with (limited) activities related to the Sudan conflict are Norwegian Church Aid, the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, the Institute for African Alternatives (London, UK), Lutheran World Relief, Nairobi Peace Initiative, Project Ploughshares, Dutch.

Prospects

At the beginning of 1998, the government of Sudan seemed to be completely isolated and inaccesible: besieged by its neighbours, attacked by increasingly confident rebels, the target of UN sanctions for sponsoring terrorism, and almost friendless. All that has changed. With luck, and skilful diplomacy, Sudan's Islamic government has begun to end its isolation and to win back the political initiative in the civil war.
The luck was in the discovery of oil and in the outbreak of fortuitous foreign wars. Sudan recently exported its first ever oil and hopes to its import bills by a quarter. Sudan's neighbours are now caught up in their own conflicts: Eritrea and Ethiopia with each other, and Uganda in Congo. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are now trying to make peace with the government in Khartoum. And the Sudanese government has seized the chance to improve its image and is trying to lure leading opponents back from exile. A recent decision to allow legal opposition parties hints at a new willingness to contemplate change. On the question of southern self-determination president Bashir stated that he prefers southern secession to a continuation of the war.
So, is peace within reach? Far from it. First of all, the new regional truces are tactical, and likely to wither as old animosities resurface. Uganda still supports the southerners and the Khartoum government will continue to support Ugandan dissidents. Eritrea too, is convinced that Sudan supports its rebels as part of the Islamic agenda.
At least two fundamental internal controversies remain. The first one concerns the character of the Sudanese state. The opposition, headed by Sadiq el Mahdi, the ousted prime minister, wants a democratic, secular Sudan. The NIF-government rejects secularism and wants Islamic law to prevail.
The split between the north and the south is now probably unbridgeable, and some day a referendum on the status of the south might be held. But what south? In the beginning of 1999 the Khartoum-regime launched a major new offensive against the SPLA in the Nuba Mountains. 'Their intention is to cut us from the world so that the Nuba are not on the agenda at the coming IGAD-talks, and they can just talk about the problem of southern Sudan', a local SPLA-commander commented. He is probably right. Both the government and the opposition in the north are determined not to let the Nuba secede. Their fear is that any concession to the Nuba would encourage rebellion among the north's other marginalised peoples in Darfur (western Sudan), the Red Sea Hills and the Blue Nile province.
The leaders of these areas want to ensure a process that would result in regional self-government with a federal system for Sudan. The federal system would recognise and protect the religions, cultures, and languages of these regions, the right of people to own their own land, and other civil and political rights. As long as these demands are not recognised, even self-determination for the south would not end the war in the rest of Sudan.

Recommendations

On January 14, 1999 the United States Institute for Peace convened a consultation on Sudan to generate recommendations for strengthening the negotiating process and to help refine some of the issues. Representatives of the main political parties and factions in Sudan attended the meeting, although a high-level delegation representing the government in Khartoum was unable to attain visas to the US. The consultation concluded that:

• The IGAD process needs to remain the vehicle for mediation and negotiation, with Kenya continuing to take the lead.
• The process must be strengthened through international assistance to permit more effective and sustained negotiations.
• The countries of the IGAD Partners Forum including the US, along with the UN and the Organisation of African Unity, need to give the financial and technical support to make the IGAD process more effective.
• The Declaration of Principles agreed by both parties needs to frame the negotiations. By giving particular attention to the principle of self-determination for the South, the process might make more significant progress. Ambassador Francis M. Deng, Sudan's former minister of state, added that the northern opposition parties should be included in the IGAD negotiations, which should also address the most pressing needs in the north.

Local conflicts are on the rise in Sudan. To avoid a further 'Afghanisation' of the country, local reconciliation is of the utmost importance to create the basis for a future national reconciliation. Representation of civil actors in the IGAD negotiations seems a prerequisite. Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace, Bishop Taban of the Diocese of Torit, and the new Sudan Council of Churches have started a lobby for this integration of the civil sector within the IGAD peace process. They are supported, amongst others, by Pax Christi International, Sudan Focal Point and the Life and Peace Institute.

Service Information

Newsletters and Periodicals:	Horn of Africa Bulletin - bimonthly newsletter published by the Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala/Sweden; Sudan Update - independent media review published twice monthly, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Newsletters/ menu_SD_Update; Sudan Monthly Report - published by the Sudanese Catholic Information Office (SCIO), http://www.peacelink.it/africa/scio/month; Sudan News and Views Newsletter (UK) - independent electronic newsletter, http://webzone1.co.uk/www/sudan/snvindex.
Reports:	African Rights: Food and Power in Sudan - A Critique of Humanitarianism, 1997; Justice in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, 1997; Amnesty International: Sudan - A new Clampdown on Political Opponents, 1997; Human Rights Watch: Sudan - Global Trade, Local Impact. Arms transfers to all sides in the civil war in Sudan. Aug. 1998; Famine in Sudan 1998 - The Human Rights Causes. March 1999; Life and Peace Institute: Local Traditional Structures in Sudan - A base for rebuilding civil society and promoting peace and reconciliation. Dr Raphael Koba Badal. 1998; Minority Rights Group International: Sudan: Conflict and Minorities. Peter Verney. 1995; Pax Christi International: The French Connection. Report on the Political, Economic and Military Collaboration between Khartoum and Paris, 1995; We have to sit down - Women, war and peace in southern Sudan. 1998; Save the Children Fund, CARE International and Oxfam GB: Sudan: Who has the will for peace? 1998; US Committee for Refugees: Quantifying Genocide in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, 1983-1998; USIP: New Approaches to Peace in Sudan - Report on a USIP Consultation. 1999;
Other Publications:	Requiem for the Sudan - War, Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile, by J. Millard Burr & Robert O. Collins. Westview Press, 1995; Their Brothers' Keepers - Regional Initiatives for Peace in Sudan, by Francis M. Deng (ed.). Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa/Ethiopia; War Of Visions - Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan, by Francis M. Deng. The Brookings Institute, 1995; Preventive Diplomacy - The Case of Sudan, by Francis M. Deng. ACCORD, 1997; Crisis Response - Humanitarian BandAids in Sudan and Somalia, by J. Prendergast. Pluto Press, 1997; The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan - An insiders view, by Peter Adwok Nyaba.
Selected Internet Sites:	http://www.members.tripod.com/~SudanInfonet (Sudan Working Group-US) http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/sudan (many more titles of publications and reports as well as addresses of NGOs) http://www.sudan.net (Sudanese links and information, news) http://members.aol.com/NewSudan (New Sudan Online: information on SPLM and their concepts of 'New Sudan') http://i-cias.com/abubakr (Nubian Home Page) http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk (UK-based Sudan Foundation) http://www.columbia.edu/~tm146/Khar/UofK.html (University of Khartoum) http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm (US Committee for Refugees)
Resource Contacts:	Alex de Waal/Rakiya Omaar - African Rights; Francis Deng - formerly Sudan's minister of State for Foreign affairs, currently senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, US. Email: fdeng@brook.edu; El Hadi Guma Gadal - Advisor for conflict resolution and human right program DIMARSI, Khartoum; Yvonne Heselmans - Pax Christi, Utrecht/The Netherlands . Email: paxchristi@antenna.nl; Bethuel Kiplagat - All African Conference of Churches, Nairobi/Kenya; Abdul Mohammed - Inter-Africa Group, Addis Ababa/Ethiopia; Jemera Rone - Sudan researcher Human Rights Watch. Email: hrwnyc@hrw.org; David R. Smock, coordinator Africa activities United States Institute for Peace. Email: ds@usip.org; Bea Stolte - Dutch Interchurch Aid, Utrecht/The Netherlands, Email: beas@dia.antenna.nl; Susanne Thurfjell - programme officer Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala/Sweden. Email: susanne.thurfjell@life-peace.org; Peter Verney - Sudan Update, West Yorkshire/UK. Email: sudanupdate@gn.apc.org.
Organisations:	New Sudan Council of Churches: P.O. Box 52802, Nairobi, Kenya, Tel: +254 2 446 966, Fax +254 2 44 715 Email: nssc-nbo@maf.org; Sudan Council of Churches: Interchurch House, St. 35, New Extension, POB 469, Khartoum Tel: +249 11 441 855/442 859; Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi: P.O. Box 67464 Nairobi, Kenya Tel. +254 2 571 726, fax +254 2 560 329; Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society: P.O. Box 27531 Nairobi, Kenya Tel/fax +254 2 448 540 Email NRRDS@maf.org Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD); All African Conference of Churches (AACC); Sudanese Catholic Information Office (SCIO); Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP); Disaster Management and Refugees Studies Institute (DIMARSI); Life and Peace Institute (LPI); International Resource Group of Disarmament and Demobilization (IRG); The Carter Center; Centre for Strategic Initiatives of Women (CISW); InterAfrica Group; Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI); United States Institute for Peace (USIP)

About the author

Hans van de Veen studied Political Science at Nijmegen University in the Netherlands. He is a senior Dutch freelance journalist, specialising in international political affairs, development issues and the environment, with a focus on Africa. He has travelled the continent many times. He is the author of several studies on tropical forestry and edited the European Platform's Directory. Presently he is coordinating and editing the Conflict Prevention Surveys on Africa.