Author	Oliver Wolleh
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

Following the Turkish invasion in 1974, Cyprus was divided into two by and large ethnically homogenous parts. The potential for societal actors to transform the conflict has been severely limited because the actors on each side of the divide refuse to extend recognition to the other, and each avoids any contacts that could suggest "implicit recognition." Avoiding indirect recognition of the other's legality makes any cooperation between institutions and interaction between people problematic, if not impossible. A political solution is unlikely as long as both parties adhere exclusively to their legal frameworks and do nothing to create the conditions for any meaningful confidence-building measures. However, the more frequent efforts of societal actors to initiate peacebuilding projects and the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership give some reason for optimism. On the other hand, allowing the Greek part of the island to enter EU membership could provoke a fierce Turkish reaction and create another crisis.

The relationship between Greeks and Turks on Cyprus began in the sixteenth century when the Ottoman Empire conquered the island, ruled at that time by the Venetians. Greek Orthodox Christians and Muslims inhabited all parts of the island, though the two communities remained quite separate, with little intermarriage and little coeducation. Apart from the Greek Orthodox and Turkish Muslims, there have always been groups of Maronites, Armenians, and Jews on the island.

During the three hundred years of Ottoman rule peaceful coexistence prevailed. When the British landed in 1878, they formally ended the Ottoman rule and, in 1925, Cyprus became a British Crown Colony.

Colonial rule gave rise to nationalist movements that led to the independence of the island. Nationalism also engendered political visions that were incompatible with the multiethnic character of Cyprus, with its mixed settlements. At the beginning of the 1930s, the clerical and political elite of Greek Cypriots formed a movement with the aim of uniting Cyprus with the "Greek Motherland." However, the British government was not prepared, for strategic reasons, to relinquish the island and blocked what was known as the Enosis Plan by Greece and the Greek Cypriots. As a result of the Greek enosis movement and the subsequent rise of Turkish nationalism after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the idea of dividing the island into two ethnic units (taksim) developed within the Turkish Cypriot community. Another vision was the integration of the whole island with Turkey, or to divide the island and to unite it politically with Greece and Turkey respectively.

In 1955, the Greek Cypriot underground movement Ethnilci Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA; "National Organization of Cypriot Fighters") began the armed struggle for enosis against British colonial rule. In response to the armed struggle, the British used the Turkish Cypriot units against the EOKA as the Turkish community on the island opposed the union with Greece. During this time, apart from Turkish Cypriot police units, the first Turkish armed underground organizations such as Volkan and later Tòrk Mukavemet Tesil–li (Turkish Resistance Organization) were formed. With support from Turkey and the permission of the British colonial administration, they took up the fight against EOKA. As a consequence, the relations between the communities worsened significantly. Negotiations in Zurich and London in 1959 and 1960 between Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey led to the independence of Cyprus. This was considered a compromise. All three states became guarantors of the new Republic of Cyprus (RoC). However, in 1960 the majority of the island population and its political leadership found themselves in a state that did not correspond to their original political ideas. Under these circumstances, the young republic's complicated, very detailed, and clearly bicommunal constitution was very difficult to implement.

In 1963, President Makarios attempted to implement thirteen constitutional changes to overcome the internal constitutional crisis and political stalemate. On the Turkish Cypriot side, this was perceived as an attempt to change the constitutionally based distribution of power and thus triggered violent intercommunal fighting, during which about one thousand Turkish and two hundred Greek Cypriots were killed. The crisis led to the resignation of the Turkish Cypriot members of the government and to the formation of Turkish enclaves. In 1964, the previously mixed communities were divided politically and administratively. The physical separation of the communities and intercommunal violence led to the involvement of the UN Security Council and the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). This phase of the conflict is particularly painfully imprinted in the collective memory of the Turkish Cypriot community since their enclaves were partly besieged by Greek Cypriots; 361 Turkish Cypriots who vanished at the time have never been found. Following the division, the remaining Greek Cypriot administration gradually became the internationally accepted representative of the RoC.

After the military coup in mainland Greece in 1967, the demand for enosis among the island Greeks increasingly lost political support, but the Greek Cypriot government and the developing Turkish Cypriot administration in the enclaves were unable to resolve the constitutional crisis.

On 20 July 1974, Turkish troops landed in response to a coup against president Makarios, supported by the Greek Junta, with the aim of enosis. During the two-staged invasion approximately 45,000 Turkish Cypriots fled from their enclaves to the north of the island controlled by the Turkish army, while 160,000 Greek Cypriots fled to the south. To this day, 1,619 Greek Cypriots, including civilians, are still missing. Since 1974, between 30,000 and 35,000 Turkish troops have been stationed in the north. The United Nations has demanded their withdrawal in numerous resolutions.

In 1975, the Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Federal State, and in 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but to date Turkey is the only country that has extended recognition.

Conflict Dynamics

The status quo on Cyprus is marked by a geographical separation of the Turkish and Greek ethnic groups into ethnically homogeneous areas. A buffer zone controlled by UNFICYP divides the Greek Cypriot southern part of the island from the Turkish northern part. There are very few direct lines of communication between these two parts, nor any official economic relationships.

For the Greek-Cypriot community, the Cyprus question is mainly viewed as an international problem related to the Turkish invasion and occupation. The intercommunal level of the conflict has been downplayed or completely denied. As a consequence, the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops and the unrestricted return of refugees are the central demands of the Greek Cypriots. The settlement by mainland Turks is also a contentious issue.

The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, emphasize the intercommunal character of the conflict and insist on their right to self-determination as an ethnic group. The coup against Makarios and the taking over of the government by the notorious EOKA terrorist Nicos Sampson are considered to have been a fundamental threat to the Turkish Cypriot community. According to this interpretation, Turkey intervened to enforce peace. For that reason the Turkish Cypriot side pleads for a presence of Turkish troops and settlers and, at the very most, only very limited resettlement of Greek Cypriots. Both sides are supported unconditionally by their "mother countries," Greece and Turkey.

A key factor in understanding the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict, both on the level of formal negotiations and at the level of civil society, is the status of the RoC and of the TRNC.

Since the Turkish Cypriot community has abandoned the state institutions of the RoC, the state is controlled, for all practical purposes, by island Greeks. According to the Greek Cypriots, the RoC has never ceased to exist, a position that corresponds to the international legal position. Based on this, the Greek Cypriot government claims to be the sole and rightful representative of Cyprus. This claim is refuted by the Turkish Cypriots on the grounds that the Constitution of 1960 was rendered invalid with the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from all state institutions.

For their part, the Turkish Cypriots have made every effort to achieve equal status. In international negotiations and practical dealings concerning the Cyprus conflict, two linked demands are raised repeatedly: either the Greek Cypriots downgrade their claim to be the sole representatives, or the status of Turkish Cypriots is upgraded. So far, the Greek Cypriots have rejected all attempts by the island Turks to upgrade their status. This was the case in 1975 at the declaration of the Turkish Federal State and at the unilateral declaration of independence of the TRNC in 1983. The island Greeks consider their status as the sole representatives of the recognized government as their only advantage compared to the military superiority of Turkey and its support of the island Turks. To abandon this status in order to enter into open negotiations is generally considered unacceptable.

Decades of separation have cemented the rift between the communities. The economic gap between the North and the South has widened to the disadvantage of the north. Apart from the embargo imposed by the island Greeks, there is also an EU embargo on the North, which severely limits the North's ability to export. In 1994, the embargo was tightened by the European Court of Justice after an application by the Greek Cypriot government.

When the Greek Cypriot government applied for EU membership, this created additional controversy. Since 1990, when the EU approved the application of the Cyprus government for membership, the TRNC has been invited to participate as part of the official Cypriot delegation at the acceleration talks. However, the North has stated that it will only participate as an independent political unit or state and not as a part of the RoC.

In addition to this, the 1990s were characterized by renewed nationalism on the island. This was apparent in the growing militarization of the Cyprus conflict (especially in the S-300 missile crisis), the Unitary Defense Dogma of Greece and the RoC, the threat of war with Turkey, and an increasing buildup of arms on both sides.

Official Conflict Management

The Turkish invasion of 1974 caused the UN's involvement in the conflict to change. In Resolution 353 (1974), the Security Council asked all member states to preserve the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Furthermore, it demanded an end to the military intervention and the withdrawal of foreign military personnel to the extent that their presence was unjustified by international agreements. Following that, a framework for negotiation was developed that gave the Secretary-General an important role to initiate negotiations described as "intercommunal talks" on the basis of his "good offices." Within this framework of negotiations, the representatives of the two communities could ostensibly face each other on equal footing.

There have been numerous attempts by succeeding UN secretaries-general to start negotiations, but none of them has led to a solution. However, some intercommunal negotiations have achieved moderate success. In 1977 and 1979, both sides agreed on a "bicommunal," "bizonal," and "federal" solution, but the positions of both parties regarding the actual implementation of this formula diverge widely. While the Greek Cypriots and the mainland government in Athens aim for a federation with a strong central government in which the Turkish population has a minority status, the Turkish Cypriot government strictly rejects the legal status as a minority. Instead it pleads for a model with a relatively weak central government and a strong federal state. This difference of opinion has not changed, except that during the 1990s it was discussed under the headings of "federation" and "confederation"—terms that then were highly charged with emotion.

In spite of the differences that remain, the results of the 1977 and 1979 intercommunal negotiations marked a milestone, since both communities at least formally abandoned their original purely nationalistic concepts (enosis and taksim). For the Greek Cypriot side, and for large parts of their population in particular, the willingness to accept a federation is considered a major compromise.

Another controversial issue, apart from the authority of the "federal government," is the proportional participation of the population in federal institutions. While the Greek Cypriot negotiators plead for a distribution of 80:20 according to the size of the respective communities, the Turkish Cypriots invariably demand an equal representation (50:50) and/or veto power. The size of the envisioned political units is also a matter of controversy.

One of the most detailed and influential moves during the negotiations was initiated by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali. He suggested a comprehensive framework of agreements with the aim of creating a holistic base to find a solution to the Cyprus conflict. The "Set of Ideas" made suggestions on all controversial issues discussed above. It also contained map-making proposals for the shape of political units. However, it did not lead to any concrete results, and in the end the Secretary-General blamed Turkish Cypriot representative R. Denktash for having rejected its basic premise.

After the "Set of Ideas" had failed, the UN aimed for the implementation of confidence-building measures. These included a drastic reduction in the number of the Turkish military units, a reduction of the Greek Cypriot defense budget, bicommunal contacts on the expert level, cooperation in questions such as the water supply (which is a problem for both sides), the reopening of the international airport at Nicosia (which has been closed since the invasion), and the return of the uninhabited town of Varosa. In spite of some hopeful developments in the beginning, these negotiations, too, did not lead to any positive results, as each side insisted on an indirect acknowledgement of its respective legal position.

This caused the suspension of the intercommunal negotiations, and they only started again in 1997 in New York. Neither the New York talks nor their continuation in Switzerland in the summer of 1997 produced a breakthrough. Rather, the Turkish Cypriot positions hardened during this time as they now demanded an explicit recognition of the TRNC as a state and proposed a confederation as the ultimate solution. Renewed negotiations beginning in 2000 have not led to any solutions as of the summer of 2001. The fact that the Turkish Cypriot side is now insisting on official recognition and that the negotiations are taking place in separate rooms give no reason for optimism.

Multi Track Diplomacy

The potential for bicommunal projects initiated by NGOs in the North as well as in the South is severely limited because of the mutual nonrecognition of the official actors. This absence of social cooperation is rooted in the desire to avoid any "implicit recognition."

The results of this are that the vast majority of bicommunal encounters and projects are informal, such as in dialogue and discussion groups, or at cultural and musical events organized by private persons. Any cooperation, for example, between students and professors of different universities is almost impossible because both institutions operate according to the laws of "their" states and receive funds from "their" respective governments. The Greek Cypriots fear that any official contact would indirectly legitimize the existence of the TRNC. As a consequence, the island Greeks are usually only prepared to participate in informal contacts. The Turkish Cypriot side also avoids implicit recognition, but in a different form, as the basic existence of a Greek Cypriot state is not questioned. Island Turks will generally avoid anything that indirectly acknowledges the existence of the RoC with its claim of sovereignty over the entire island. For that reason, they are open to informal meetings and avenues of cooperation when both sides act as legally equal partners. The problem of recognition also has consequences for the movement of people. Island Greeks find it especially difficult to cross over into the North as they are either denied entry or have to fill out forms in order to enter the North. These are interpreted as an implicit recognition of the northern state and are therefore avoided. The majority of contacts happen in the UN-controlled buffer zone.

One of the most important social peacebuilding initiatives is associated with the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group. Through its network of facilitated bicommunal follow-up groups, a process of dialogue and encounters has been created that, since the events of 1974, is unique in its intensity and extent. The trainer group consists of thirty Greek and Turkish Cypriot members and can be defined as an internal grass-roots structure aiming to initiate a range of peacebuilding projects. Between 1994 and the end of 1997, the trainer group implemented a multi-track diplomacy approach and founded twenty-five bicommunal follow-up groups, initiated several projects, and arranged visits to the other side for citizens.

The bicommunal trainer group first began to take form in 1993 and took over two years to establish. It was the result of cooperation between committed Cypriots as well as of foreign actors. It began as two separate groups in the two communities (monocommunal phase) and developed into a group that met and acted on a bicommunal basis.

Initially, the training of the Cypriots in conflict resolution was carried out by members of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy and the National Training Laboratories, which formed the Cyprus Consortium together with the Conflict Management Group from 1994 onward. This project was sponsored by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development through Amideast. Apart from local training, the Cyprus Consortium also carried out a number of workshops with students and potentially influential partners in the United States. Over the years, the trainer group has also been supported by several Fulbright scholars.

In the first phase, several follow-up bicommunal groups were formed by the trainer group: the Educators Group, the Citizens Group, the Federation and EU Studies Group, Peace Concert, the Cultural Evening Planning Group, the Letters to the Other Side Group, the Technology for Peace Project Group, the Management Group, the Women's Group, Young Political Leaders, Young Business Leaders, Students I, and the Lawyers Group. The bicommunal follow-up groups usually meet every two to three weeks and consist of between five and thirty persons.

In the summer of 1996, all bicommunal activities came to a complete halt. In August 1996 three Greek Cypriots lost their lives in violent clashes within three days. These incidents caused an outcry among the Greek Cypriot community. Because of demonstrations on the Greek Cypriot side, meetings of the bicommunal groups were impossible. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot authorities closed off all crossings to the southern part of the island. The blockade of the meetings by the Turkish Cypriot authorities lasted until March 1997, and could only be lifted after intervention by foreign embassies and the United Nations. The influence of the Turkish Cypriot group members on their government was not sufficient. When there was access to the buffer zone, it again led to a whole series of projects and the formation of numerous new groups. During the second phase, groups such as the Citizens Group II-VII, the Students Group II, the Co-Villager Project, Youth Encounters for Peace, Young Environmentalists, the Hade magazine, the Artists Group, the Federalism Group, and the Environmental Group were founded. In addition, new forms of "cross visits" (visits crossing the de facto border) took place. Inspired by the success of the groups, the United Nations also started major bicommunal events in the buffer zone and "cross visits" to religious sites on both sides of the island.

The foundation of a common, bicommunal NGO has been on the agenda of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group for a long time but has not come to fruition, as the affiliation of an NGO with one of the two legal systems implies recognition of this particular state. The funding of bicommunal projects on the Turkish Cypriot side has turned out to be especially difficult because, on account of their nonrecognized status, the Turkish Cypriot groups have had no access to international funding.

Despite these obstacles, the trainer group did develop a network of informal citizens' groups. Coordination was very difficult because of the heterogeneity of those groups and because it would have provoked a counterreaction. The aims of this multi-track approach were to promote conflict-resolution training and to initiate a "deep dialogue" between the group members characterized by the steps "listening—understanding—acknowledging." For many Cypriots, the first encounter and consequent exchange between people of different communities is an important intellectual and emotional event. For the first time there is an opportunity to listen to the point of view of the other community in regard to historic events of the conflict as well as in regard to contemporary issues. These activities have led to a major learning process and resulted in a more balanced view of the past, a less negative image of the other community, and increased understanding and trust. Moreover, it has given hope to people that some day reconciliation can take place.

In December 1997 the Turkish Cypriot government used the decision of the EU not to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership as a pretext for a renewed blockade of all bicommunal activities in Nicosia by refusing to grant exit permits to its citizens at the local checkpoints. This blockade was to last until the EU summit in Helsinki in February 2000. Since then, the situation has improved slightly. Still, the restriction of movement is one of the main obstacles to the implementation of a comprehensive multi-track diplomatic approach. There is a meeting place in the bicommunal village of Pyla in the buffer zone to which the access has not been blocked by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. But as it is fairly difficult to reach, it is of only limited use for continuous group work. Despite its remote location, Pyla developed throughout the first half of 2001 into a meeting space for an increasing number of bicommunal citizens' groups. However, with the increased number of bicommunal activities, the Turkish Cypriot authorities also started restricting access to the village of Pyla. The problem of restricted movement applies not only to the multi-track groups of trainers but also to a number of other initiatives past and present.

The Doob Group, for example, which was funded by L. W. Doob in the 1980s, had to stop when its members launched common projects. Similarly, the initiative Citizens for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus, founded in 1989, failed when, after only a few meetings, its Turkish Cypriot members were no longer able to obtain passes.

The development of bicommunal groups was only made possible because of the support of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission, the U.S. Embassy, the United Nations, and other embassies. The establishment of the Westminster Group, named after an event sponsored by the Westminster Foundation in 1993, was only possible because its members were able to meet in the building of the British High Commission and could rely on its support.

The potential of small NGOs or groups to safeguard their freedom of movement is clearly limited on Cyprus. Those who are able to afford it prefer to meet on foreign soil. In 1997, an Initiative of Businessmen was founded by the Greek Cypriot C. G. Lordos and the Turkish Cypriot V. Chelik. During meetings in Athens, Istanbul, and Brussels (1997), two lists of projects were discussed. The group gained international attention because of the participation of Richard Holbrooke, who had organized the meetings in Brussels as well as encounters in Oslo (July 1998) and Istanbul (December 1998). When the group meets in Nicosia these days, they are facilitated by a representative of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. Though their project lists resemble each other, they have had little success in reaching agreement on implementation because of the problem of mutual recognition.

Another initiative relying on meetings abroad is the summer camp project with Cypriot adolescents in the United States (Seeds of Peace) financed by the Fulbright Commission. Since 1997, there have been two or three such camps per year during which the young people are partly looked after by members of the trainer group and are trained in communication and conflict resolution. Back on Cyprus, they hold fairly regular weekend meetings in the village of Pyla. The activities of these youth groups have increased since the beginning of 2000. In the same vein, a number of left-wing youth organizations have organized numerous meetings outside Cyprus.

Politically influential groups, on the other hand, are able to guarantee more or less regular encounters on the island itself. The representatives of the political parties, for example, meet regularly for talks in the buffer zone. They are facilitated by the Slovak Embassy, but safeguarding freedom of movement is not an issue. Two further long-standing initiatives are meetings of left-wing Greek and Turkish Cypriot trade unions as well as the cooperation of both municipalities in Nicosia within the Nicosia Master Plan.

Since 1995 there have been several bicommunal trade union conferences in the buffer zone. Apart from this, a number of subgroups have been established that have published declarations in which the organizers advocate a future federal constitution, as well as common employment standards and social structures following the resolution of the conflict.

The Nicosia Master Plan is the oldest example of bicommunal cooperation on Cyprus. Since 1979, the municipalities of North and South Nicosia have cooperated on sewage and water-supply issues. After its launch, the project, which mainly consists of meetings of experts (e.g., architects, doctors, etc.), was extended. Originally supported by the United Nations Development Progam, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) took over as the lead party in 1986. The funds, mainly from the United States, were distributed by the UNHCR to bicommunal projects. When the UNHCR had to stop its activities on Cyprus, this function was taken over by the United Nations Organization for Project Services (UNOPS) in 1998. In contrast to the UNHCR, the UNOPS is free to fund NGO projects and has already financed extensive training in mediation in both communities, a mediation center, and a management center in the South, as well as the bicommunal choir. UNOPS also co-funds a research project carried out by the Cyprus Peace Centre in the South that deals with the attitudes and perspectives of the other community. UNOPS, with its annual budget of US$10 million, is a powerful funding agency on Cyprus. It is also fairly accessible to Turkish Cypriots and aims to promote a societal exchange at all levels.

Prospects

The decision of the EU to grant Turkey the status of an official EU candidate has shaken up the structure of the Cyprus conflict considerably. Since Helsinki (in February 2000), the Cyprus question has, more than ever, become a European problem as Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriots refer to the EU rules as their common denominator. Turkey is more and more often confronted with demands that it really can't afford to ignore to resolve the conflict peacefully.

At the same time, the traditional nationalistic social patterns of both communities are increasingly under pressure. According to the political culture of the EU, neither the Greek Cypriot demand for a central government nor the Turkish Cypriot model of two ethnically and politically separate states offers an acceptable solution.

It is unlikely that the EU will formally recognize the TRNC as an independent state. It can be hoped, though, that the EU succeeds in convincing both sides that unification of the island is impossible within the legal framework of the RoC as it exists now, or by unifying the RoC with the TRNC. A future united Cyprus will have to have a constitution going beyond the existing ones. If the negotiations can be focused on a "third" legal way, then a common legal basis can develop, even during the transitional phase, on which the civil-societal actors will be able to act without touching on the question of implicit recognition.

At present, the idea of rapprochement is more acceptable in the Greek Cypriot population than ever before. There is a fear, however, that in pursuing this approach they might lose the only trump cards they believe they possess in the conflict with the North.

Recommendations

At the end of 2001, the conditions for a comprehensive multi-track diplomatic approach to the Cyprus problem are difficult and complex. Because of the controversial question of recognition, any cooperation that goes beyond dialogue and encounters is hardly possible between state and nonstate organizations. As long as the political leaders on each side are unable to agree on a common legal framework, the inner societal actors themselves lack the legal framework for pursuing other and more extensive forms of cooperation and exchange. At present, both civil societies lack their most characteristic tool: the freedom to enter into contracts. Furthermore, the opportunities for informal encounters of civil-societal actors are also restricted. The repressive measures, especially by the Turkish Cypriot authorities, with respect to bicommunal contacts, limit the possibilities for free exchange between persons willing to enter into a dialogue. Turkish Cypriots alone have restricted freedom of movement and access to the buffer zone.

The chances that societal actors can be assured of bicommunal encounters as a way of launching common projects and engaging in planning activities depend on the political assertiveness of groups and organizations in the North. One way of exerting pressure on the Turkish Cypriot authorities is for the international community to challenge violations of civil rights in the North.

Today, both Cypriot societies have an extensive and well-qualified pool of experienced trainers and facilitators at their command, in part because of the years of training given by foreign actors. Foreign actors should now focus less on conflict-resolution training and more on fulfilling a function as an "institutional bridge" for Cypriots and NGOs willing to cooperate. Foreign NGOs can (nominally) become initiators of bicommunal projects without touching on the question of recognition. This model would give Turkish Cypriots (in cooperation with their Greek Cypriot counterparts) better access to international funding (e.g., by the EU) where that access has been severely limited because of their status as citizens of an internationally unrecognized state. However, within the moment of Cyprus's EU membership the political and legal parameters of societal actors will change significantly. It is very likely that the RoC will become an EU member within the first round of expansion in 2004.

Most probably the Cyprus problem will not be solved by then. There is a serious danger that the Turkish reaction on an EU-membership for the Greek-Cypriot part will be extremely fierce. Annexation of the TRNC or even a blockade of the island might be possible. It is also expected that the northern authorities will end all bicommunal activities, thus removing possibilities for citizens to meet in the buffer zone. Under these conditions, it is important to make stronger use of multi-track strategies, which focus on civil-society development in the North and South. The Greek-Cypriot government needs to create and open up avenues for Turkish Cypriots living in the North toward the EU and their fellow Greek Cypriots. This strategy, however, will remain under serious constraints if no way is found to loosen up the concept of implicit recognition and its restrictive consequences for civil society. Nevertheless, at the end of 2001 there are small but optimistic signs that the Cyprus government is beginning to explore this avenue.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Cyprus Bulletin, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Cyprus Mail, Greek Cypriot English-language daily, Cyprus Today, Turkish Cypriot English-language daily, Cyprus Weekly, Greek Cypriot English-language weekly, Hade: Bi-Communal Magazine, Kibris-Northern Cyprus Monthly, TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Public Information Office, The Cyprus Review,
REPORTS:	Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Local Peace Constituencies in Cyprus: Citizens' Rapprochement by the Bi-Communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group, by Oliver Wolleh, Berghof Report No. 8, Berlin, 2001.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Cyprus, A Country Study, edited by E. K. Keefe et al. Washington, D.C., American University, 1980. Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, edited by Norma Salem. New York, St. Martin´s Press, 1992. Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse, by Ronald J. Fisher. Journal of Peace Research 38, no 3, 2001. Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives, edited by Clement H. Dodd. Huntington, England, The Eothen Press, 1999. Sovereignty Divided: Essays on the International Dimensions of the Cyprus Problem, by Michael Moran. Nicosia, CYREP, 1999. The Cyprus Conspiracy, by Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 1999. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic, by Kyriacos C. Markides. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1977.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.americanembassy.org.cy/bicommun.htm www.fulbright.org.cy (Cyprus Fulbright Commission) www.peace-cyprus.org
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Nicos Anastasiou, local conflict resolution trainer, e-mail: nicosiew@spidernet.co.cy Benjamin Broome, professor at the Arizona State University, e-mail: bbroome@asu.edu Maria Hadjipavlou, local conflict resolution trainer, e-mail: mariat@zeus.cc.ucy.ac.cy Tumer Hali, Bureau of Bi-Communal Reconciliation and Strengthening of Civil Society, e-mail: tumerh@hotmail.com Niyazi Kizilürek, professor at Cyprus University, e-mail: niyazi@ucy.ac.cy Eleni Mavrou, AKEL (Communist Party of Cyprus), e-mail: emavrou@akel.org.cy Servgül Uludag, local conflict resolution trainer, e-mail: servgul@europe.com
ORGANIZATIONS	DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Conflict Management Group, Cyprus Peace Center, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, Women's Civic Initiative for Peace

About the author

Oliver Wolleh is a political scientist and associated researcher at the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin. Dr. Wolleh completed his Ph.D. on track-two strategies on Cyprus in 2000. His special interests include preventive and postwar peacebuilding, the complement between societal and governmental processes, and conflict-resolution and mediation training. His regions of interest include Cyprus and the Caucasus.