Author	Jos van Beurden
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Ethiopia and Eritrea have had long-standing, strong economic, political and cultural ties. Before gaining its independence in 1991, Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia for four decades. An account of the background and causes of their conflict can most usefully begin with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia
Ethiopia is landlocked. It has a 1,000 kilometre long, imprecisely demarcated border with Eritrea in the north and northeast, and elsewhere shares borders with Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan. The country has a diversity of peoples, cultures and religions. It lies at two crossroads: that of the Arab world and Africa and that of the Christian and Muslim world. About forty percent of the population is Muslim, while half is Christian, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church is the most important religious institution. There are no serious religious tensions.
Since the centralisation of the administration (from 1850 onwards) most Ethiopian rulers have faced the same challenges: they have tried to further centralise their administration and expand their territory. Ethiopia has rarely presented a united front in fights with foreign aggressors and its rulers have usually combined a policy of divide and rule with a culture of intolerance and violence. Ethnic differences have often accentuated these tensions.
According to the most recent census (1984) there are 76 ethnic groups in Ethiopia. These include the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, and Somali. Ethiopia's traditional ruling class is drawn from the Amhara and Tigray groups who have often fought each other. The Oromo, by far the largest ethnic group in the country, have traditionally felt themselves to be oppressed by the Amhara rulers. Much of the area they inhabit was conquered by the Amhara around 1850. Some Oromo also feel oppressed by the Tigray, who dominate the presently ruling Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) government. Others have little trouble accepting the 'ethnic federalism', the decentralisation and regionalisation of power in the country, which was introduced after 1991.

Eritrea
At the end of the nineteenth century Eritrea was colonised by Italy. In 1941 the British assumed the role of the Italians. In 1952, endorsed by a resolution, Eritrea was put into a federation with Ethiopia on an equal footing. Ten years later it was brutally annexed by Emperor Haile Selassie. This act of aggression marked the beginning of a war which was to last for three decades. During a National Convention in Ethiopia in 1991 the new Ethiopian government, led by Meles Zenawi, accepted the 'de facto' independence of Eritrea. Following an UN-supervised referendum the State of Eritrea formally acceded to independence on May 24, 1993.
Eritrea has nine ethnic groups, the Tigrinya being the largest. The population is equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Ethnic and religious tensions are negligible. The country borders Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti. The Eritrean port of Assab, with its oil refinery, was a free port for Ethiopia until the border crisis. Eritrea's long coastline has enabled it to develop close ties with the Arab world over the centuries.
As long as they found a common enemy in the Mengitsu Haile Mariam administration, relations between the rebel organisations in Tigray/Ethiopia and Eritrea were close. After 1991 both countries continued to be led by former rebel leaders, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Isayas Afewerki in Eritrea. They were personal friends. However, their friendship could not prevent the continuation of the underlying tensions created by the differing aspirations of their organisations. These tensions surfaced in 1997 when Eritrea introduced its own currency, the nacfa. Previously the Ethiopian birr had been the common currency. The new currency came to be seen as an expression of Eritrea's sovereignty and an indication of economic differences between the two countries. Ethiopia believed that the nacfa had been overvalued by Eritrea, and demanded that all financial transactions between the two countries be expressed in American dollars.
This was a serious setback for the traditionally close trading relations between the two countries. Migrants and small traders from both sides had crossed the border freely for centuries and Eritrean merchants were used to buying large parts of the coffee-harvest in Ethiopia and transporting it to one of the Red Sea ports for export. This trade ended with the de facto closure of the border. Poor families on both sides suffered severely, some losing half of their income and being forced to become dependent on relief. On both sides of the frontier police and military patrols were stepped-up and occasional armed exchanges were reported. This was the situation in early 1998.

Ethiopia - International Relations
Ethiopia's relations with its other neighbours have also been strained. Credible sources report that Ethiopian troops have been raiding the Gedo Region in south-west Somalia since 1996. Ethiopia justifies these incursions as responses to AlIttihad AlIslam, a Somali Muslim-militant group, accused of bomb attacks in Addis Ababa. In 1999 Ethiopia and Eritrea expanded their border conflict into Somalia, initially by arming a number of local warlords. Ethiopia then captured several towns. In June 1999 the Ethiopians captured Baidoa to the north west of Mogadishu. Baidoa had previously been held by the warlord Hussein Aideed, an ally of Eritrea.
Ethiopia's relation with Sudan remains complex. Both countries support each other's rebel factions. After the outbreak of the border conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan tried to normalise their relationship.
In Ethiopia's relations with its neighbours different issues are at stake. Ideology and stability seem to be central to the conflicts with the radical-Muslim government of Sudan and militant-Muslim groups in Somalia. In the conflict with Eritrea it is the demarcation of borders which is critical with economic motives also playing an important role. Many Ethiopians had great difficulty accepting the secession of their Northern Province in 1991.

Eritrea - International Relations
Eritrea has had poor relations with Sudan since 1993 when armed Muslim-radicals were reported to have entered Eritrea from Sudan. In late 1995 the two countries accused each other of harbouring and training each other's rebels. Khartoum was upset about Eritrea's decision to host the Sudanese oppositional NDA (National Democratic Alliance) in Asmara. The NDA is a coalition of the southern and northern opposition groups in Sudan. Another strain on the relation has been the continuing presence of some 320,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan.
In late 1995 Eritrea sent troops to some of the Hanish-islands in the Red Sea, claiming they were not Yemenite but Eritrean territory. Yemen and Eritrea finally agreed to seek a decision from the Permanent Court for Arbitration. In 1998 the Court declared some islands as Yemenite, and others as Eritrean. The two parties reconciled themselves to the decision. In this conflict Eritrea combined a show of military force with willingness to accept the decisions of an internationally recognised body.
Several issues, apart from power and politics, are at stake in Eritrea's relations with its neighbours. Ideology has been at the centre of the conflict with Sudan. Eritrea adheres to a strict demarcation between state and religion. Eritrea accused Sudan of trying to export its fundamentalist revolution. After mediation by Qatar however, since May 1999 the two countries have begun to restore diplomatic relations, to live peacefully together and to refrain from adopting a policy of exporting ideologies.
In the clashes with Yemen, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the demarcation of borders has been the issue. Economic motives are also important. For example, in the conflict with Yemen, the possibility of discovering oil in the Red Sea and the potential for tourism, were contributing factors. In general, the Eritreans whose fight for independence lasted three decades, are very sensitive about any threat to their sovereignty.

Conflict Dynamics

On May 8 1998, Eritrean members of a Joint Commission, set up in 1994 to deal with border problems, arrived in Addis Ababa. They left the following day having made no progress. On May 12 a clash took place close to Badme and Shiraro in the 400 km2 agricultural region, the Yirga-triangle, as a result of which Eritrea recaptured areas which it claimed Ethiopia had taken ten months earlier. Ethiopia demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Eritrean troops from an area it considered its own territory. According to Eritrea, Ethiopian government troops had occupied this Eritrean owned area in July 1997, and replaced the Eritrean administration by an Ethiopian one.
According to the Eritrean government, Ethiopian military units had invaded Eritrean territory on earlier occasions, although on a much smaller scale. Eritrea claimed that it had not mentioned these incursions and occupation earlier as they were regarded as a crisis between brothers.
A short while later fighting broke out on two further fronts outside the Yirga-triangle region: one near the border town of Zalembessa and another near Buri on the road to Assab. From September until the beginning of 1999 fighting was sporadic and international pressure and several mediation initiatives helped transform the conflict into a propaganda war. In the UN General Assembly, Ethiopian foreign minister Mesfin Seyoum spoke of the Eritrean leaders' 'known irrationality bordering on the insane'. Ethiopian propaganda is mostly directed towards Eritrean president Isayas Afewerki. The Eritrean propaganda is intended to isolate the Tigrayans from the other peoples in Ethiopia. It describes Ethiopia's participation in the war as a purely 'TPLF-affair' and asserts that the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) wants to undo Eritrea's independence. In both countries the population's initial reaction of disbelief soon changed into outspoken hostility and hatred.
In late February 1999 the conflict entered a second phase. Ethiopian ground forces, supported by warplanes, mounted an offensive against Eritrean positions as a result of which Eritrea was forced to withdraw from the Yirga-triangle. Losses on both sides were much heavier. Eritrea, for example, claimed to have killed 10,000 Ethiopian combatants during a three-day battle in March 1999. In June 1999 Ethiopia claimed to have killed, wounded or captured more than 20,000 Eritrean ground troops.
The position of President Isayas Afewerki and his Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) - formerly EPLF - has remained unchallenged. The Presidential Office, which includes his closest associates, is the most influential body in the country. The launch of the Eritrean National Forces Alliance (ENFA) in March 1999, backed by both Ethiopia and Sudan will not prove a threat in the immediate future.
Despite the outlawed OLF calling upon the Oromo not to join the fighting 'among highlanders in the North', the conflict seems to have strengthened the position of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his government. More than 200,000 Ethiopians have joined the army. Among the new recruits are 31 former political detainees who, as military specialists under the previous Mengistu-regime, were released on condition that they joined the EPRD-Farmy. Outlawed opposition groups such as the OLF and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are discussing the possibility of a coalition of the oppressed peoples of the Ethiopian Empire, a move which may have been inspired by Eritrea.
Both countries have well-trained ground forces and both air forces have recently been modernised although training pilots remains a problem. Because it is landlocked, Ethiopia has greater difficulty securing a fuel supply for its aircraft. It is unlikely that this conflict can be solved by military means.
Eritrea's Achilles' heel is Assab, which is virtually inaccessible by road. Until the conflict it was a free port for Ethiopia, where thousands of Ethiopians were employed. By far the largest part of Assab's traffic - estimated value of US$ 300,000 per day in port fees - was transit cargo from and to Ethiopia. The port of Djibouti and, to a lesser extent, that of Berbera in Somaliland, has profited from this situation. Relations between Eritrea and Djibouti have been strained since Eritrean accusations that Djibouti has allowed Ethiopia to use its port as a conduit for arms.
Since the conflict began there has been a significant exodus of Eritreans from Ethiopia and Ethiopians from Eritrea. Eritrea has accused Ethiopia of the forcible detention and expulsion of over 60,000 Eritreans.
Ethiopia claims the number of expulsions was lower and that most were 'rank and file members of the EPLF'. The mistreatment of Eritreans in Ethiopia has been substantiated by reports from Amnesty International and UN-agencies. Ethiopia claims that an equal number of Ethiopians have been forced to leave Eritrea and that Eritrea is guilty of the random imprisonment and mistreatment of Ethiopian residents and of taking their properties. Independent foreign observers have not substantiated this claim. Eritrea claims that some 22,000 Ethiopians left Eritrea as they could no longer find employment particularly in the harbour of Assab.
Throughout the conflict there have been civilian casualties on both sides. In May and June 1998 the Eritrean airforce bombed two towns in the Tigray Region, leaving 55 dead and 164 wounded, among whom, a large number of primary school pupils. Eritrea apologised for the civilian casualties. Ethiopia bombed Asmara airport in May/June 1998 and in May/June 2000 and several South-Eritrean villages in February 1999 and again in May/June 2000, causing a number of civilian deaths.
Military losses are considerable. Although it is impossible to present precise figures, several observers estimate the number of dead soldiers to be around 100,000. During the first phase (May/June 1998) thousands of soldiers died at the three fronts of Badme, Zalambessa and south of the Eritrean port of Assab. During a battle near Buri intense man to man fighting was reported. During the second phase (from February 1999 onwards) losses were much more serious. According to several independent observers there were tens of thousands of deaths on both sides. Ethiopia lost thousands of recruits during a battle near Tzerona in March 1999. Eritrea suffered heavy losses near Badme in February 1999 and near Bure in June. During the third phase (May/June 2000), thousands of soldiers were again killed, especially on the Eritrean side of each of the three fronts.
In villages on both sides of the border, houses, shops and government buildings have been demolished. Although the actual extent of the economic damage remains to be calculated, a few indications can be given. Hundreds of thousands of people in the border area, who used to cross regularly as migrants or small traders have lost their livelihood. Tens of thousands of workers who have been called up for armed service are no longer employed productively. Both governments have adjusted their budgets in order to meet the costs of armed conflict. The port authorities in Assab have lost about US $ 1 billion in port fees annually. Both countries have spent considerable sums on the purchase of new military equipment from Russia, China, France, Bulgaria and the Ukraine, mostly light armaments, tanks and warplanes. More generally, most of the energy devoted to national development since independence has been diverted towards the war effort.

Official Conflict Management

Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities attempts were made to resolve the border dispute. The first one was a US-Rwandan peace plan which contained four points: Commitment by both parties to resolving this and any other disputes by peaceful means and renouncing force as a means of imposing solutions; Deployment of a small observer mission to Badme, while Eritrean forces should redeploy from Badme to positions held before May 6, 1998; Agreement to a swift and binding delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border; Demilitarisation of the entire common border.
This plan became the basis for most other mediation efforts. It was accepted by Ethiopia, while the unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Badme to positions held before hostilities broke out, remained a stumbling block for Eritrea.
After deliberations with Italy's Secretary of State for Africa Affairs, Rino Serri, and US President, Bill Clinton, Ethiopia and Eritrea decided on June 15, 1998 to suspend air raids.
The Arab world, particularly Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, has also tried to bring an end to hostilities. A proposal by Libya called for a cease-fire and the deployment of an African peacekeeping force to separate the belligerents. It did not call for the withdrawal of Eritrea's troops from the contested Yirga-triangle. Eritrea welcomed the proposal, while Ethiopia clung to the terms of the US-Rwanda peace proposal. This agreement had in the interim been endorsed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), while the UN Security Council had in turn endorsed the OAU efforts to find a peaceful solution.
In June an OAU delegation with Secretary Salim Ahmed Salim and the presidents of Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Zimbabwe visited both capitals and once more tried to convince the two governments to accept the peace plan. In October US Special Envoy Anthony Lake met with the presidents of both countries. Both leaders told him they would not change their positions but agreed to continue the cease-fire until the OAU had finished its efforts.
A high powered OAU delegation again met with the leaders of both countries in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso in November, 1998. The delegation brought to the table a proposal for 'A Framework Agreement for a Peaceful Settlement of the Dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia'. Again this was rejected by Eritrea and accepted by Ethiopia. For Eritrea the main stumbling block remained 'Ethiopia's precondition of an unconditional Eritrean withdrawal' from the Yirga-triangle.
While Ethiopia blamed the Eritreans for not accepting this proposal, Ethiopia in turn rejected Eritrea's proposals for a direct meeting between the leaders of the two countries. Meles Zenawi was pressurised by the hawks in the EPRDF into taking a tougher stand towards the Eritreans.
A further attempt at mediation by the OAU took place in December 1998, again in Ouagadougou. Eritrea still had a number of questions and consequently, no progress could be made. Ethiopia's minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyoum Mesfin, concluded that the peace effort 'could be considered dead' unless the US was to bring effective pressure on the Eritrean leadership. The Eritrean authorities received an answer to their questions in late January 1999. After heavy military losses the Eritreans accepted the OAU peace framework in late February 1999.
In July 1999 the OAU, then chaired by Algeria, the UN, USA and the European Union brought the two parties together in Algiers, and a three-tier peace proposal was formulated. The first part is the OAU peace proposal, the second and third contain modalities and technical arrangements for implementation. Eritrea has accepted all three elements. Ethiopia still had questions about the technical arrangements. The war dragged on while the same parties continued to mediate. Both sides have purchased large quantities of new weapon and ammunitions. In the meantime, since the end of 1990 both countries have been facing famine.
May and June 2000 saw the third phase of this devastating war. On May 12, 2000, Ethiopia launched a major new offensive and causing heavy Eritrean losses. Thousands of Eritrean civilians fled the border area. In a reaction the UN Security Council voted for an arms embargo against both sides. In the meantime Ethiopian troops have penetrated deep into Eritrean territory. On May 25 Eritrea announced it would pull back from the areas it had seized at the outbreak of the war. After an Ethiopian bombardment of Asmara airport on the May 29, indirect talks began on the May 30 in Algiers. On June 18, 2000 both parties accepted an immediate cessation of hostilities and the deployment of 4,200 UN peacekeeping troops.
The mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is to monitor the cessation of hostilities, the redeployment of Ethiopian troops from Eritrean territory and the temporary security zone. This zone extends 25 kilometres the length of the thousand kilometre border, mostly inside Eritrea. In Addis Ababa and Asmara UNMEE has opened liaison offices. Following, on December 12, 2000 the two countries signed a peace agreement in the Algerian capital Alger. Two commissions will be set up to demarcate the border and to deal with claims for compensation. Prisoners of war will be exchanged. An OAU commission will investigate the root causes of the conflict. At the occasion UN Secretary General Kofi Annan praised the efforts of Algerian President Abdelaziz Boutefklika. Dispelling 'the remaining distrust between the two countries' remains a key challenge, Annan said. In the meantime a 4,000 soldiers strong UN peace keeping force has taken up positions in the border area.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Compared with countries such as Kenya or Uganda, civil society in Ethiopia in general and the NGO-sector in particular is underdeveloped. It is however stronger than in neighbouring Djibouti, Somalia, Somaliland and Sudan. Eritrea has a comparatively small civil society and a limited number of NGOs with a restricted operational scope. In early 1999 the government in Asmara requested that some NGOs, which had previously been forced to leave Eritrea, return to the country.
To date the only public criticism of the war has come from the religious leaders in both countries. On a number of occasions they have spoken jointly with their Islamic and Christian colleagues in the opposing camp, on other occasions they have acted separately.
In early June 1998, the Ethiopian and Eritrean bishops' conference made a common appeal to their governments to halt any armed conflict that could lead to all-out war, and to settle their differences 'peacefully and expeditiously'. One week earlier, Pope John Paul had expressed his deep concern about the dispute.
Separate appeals followed slightly later. The leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Supreme Council of Ethiopian Muslim Affairs, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane, as well as a number of eminent Ethiopian elders held a joint peace meeting where they called for a peaceful solution to the conflict and asked the Eritrean government to accept the US-Rwandan Peace Proposal. In August their colleagues in Eritrea held a similar meeting which called upon the Ethiopian leaders to let innocent Eritreans in Ethiopia live in peace.
In late October and early November 1998, church leaders and imams from both countries met for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict. In Oslo they made a common appeal for a peaceful solution.
Eritrean Christian and Muslim leaders formed a joint committee in Eritrea with the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (ERREC) in order to help the internally displaced and the Eritrean deportees from Ethiopia. They received assistance from international NGOs such as USAID, the ICRC and Norwegian Church Aid. The possibilities for co-operation of this sort already existed in Ethiopia which has a greater number of NGOs.
An Eritrean journalist, residing in the Netherlands and supported by Dutch NGO, Interchurch Aid, has organised a petition signed by a significant number of well known figures including Nobel Prize Winners. The call for peace was published in the International Herald Tribune on December 17, 1998.
There have been a number of informal initiatives to encourage dialogue between citizens from both countries. To mention some examples: Ethiopian and Eritrean journalists met in Germany. Academics from both countries have had several meetings in western countries. In Nairobi, young Eritreans and Ethiopians sat down to discuss how they would solve the border dispute. After June 18, religious leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea issued a joint statement in which they urged for a swift implementation of the Agreement. One of the leaders asked the people of the two countries to forgive one another.

Ethiopia: Domestic Organisations
Ethiopians ascribe Ethiopia's meagre tradition of civil society organisations to their pronounced lack of interpersonal trust and their difficulty in organising co-operative institutions. This attitude is described as 'parochialism' and continues to feed the existing culture of intolerance, exclusion and violence. The importance of values such as tolerance and trust has been frequently emphasised. Giday Koraro has made a study of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution among Amhara, Oromo and Tigray people.
The achievements of the EPRDF-government in developing civil society have met with little acclaim. After 1991 the new government enacted laws and regulations that guaranteed respect for human rights, civil liberties and the independence of the judiciary and the press. Free universal suffrage and freedom to form parties meant that, for the first time in the country's history, competitive elections were held in Ethiopia. Ethnically-based fronts, opposition parties and civil groups occupied the new areas of the political landscape opened up by democracy.
But the new freedom did not last long, nor was it as extensive as many had hoped. Human Rights Watch/Africa published the following indictment in December 1997: 'The ruling EPRDF dominated the political system by favouring regional parties affiliated with it and clamping down on opposition groups. It also sought to dominate the emerging civil society through bureaucratic and legal restrictions and various forms of harassment of activists.' This condition remained essentially unchanged during the national, regional and municipal elections in May 2000.
At times the EPRDF-government has showed the same tendency towards oppression and parochialism as it predecessors. In the conflict with Eritrea the government offers civil society organisations little alternative other than accepting the government's position.
A major conference of the Human Rights Council and Ombudsman in May 1998 typified the government's attitude. The Council and Ombudsman were acceptable as long as the government could exert some control over their activities. That the European Union paid for the conference indicates the faith of Western donors in the government's democratic intentions. The conference's conclusions were tabled for public debate from late April 1999 onwards.
In 1998 some 240 NGOs were registered. Since then a few more have been added. Almost half were national organisations. Due to the hostile policy environment during the previous regimes most are rather ineffective. Since 1991 several NGOs have been searching for ways of including advocacy, human rights issues and conflict prevention and management in their activities. They do so through civic education, teaching legal literacy, and providing seminars and workshops. The Ethiopian Peace and Development Committee is one example and there are several others.
Initially, the new leaders of the country and the NGOs had much in common, sharing in particular a focus on grassroots participation. Soon, however, the government began to voice its criticism of both national and international NGOs (too affluent, too many overheads, too inefficient) and to tighten its grip on them.
The government began to use registration as a tool to control NGOs and other civil organisations. In 1993 all NGOs were instructed to re-register with the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC). In practice this enabled the government to get rid of some NGOs with which it seriously disagreed. One of the victims was the Ethiopian Human Rights Organisation (EHRCO). Some other NGOs whose registrations have also been refused, have had their activities brought to a virtual standstill. In 1995 the government moved the registration mandate from the DPPC to the Ministry of Justice. In the process the registration applications of a further 46 NGOs were refused. Early in 1998 the registration complications were eased somewhat. The EHRCO won its case and was re-registered. The government's difficulty in accepting dissenting opinions is clear from its attitude towards the independent media. According to Reporters sans Frontieres, some 160 journalists have been detained since 199 and several magazines have been forced to close their premises. In late 2000 eight journalists were being detained, four of them since 1997.
There exists a crucial disagreement between the government and many NGOs about the definition of grassroots organisations. According to the government, the kebele or lowest administrational unit is defined as CBO (community based organisation). It plays a central role in the decentralised development plans. All development plans are to be discussed at the kebele level, and information should go from there upwards. Yet this new role of the kebele has not been formulated in the constitution.
For many NGOs, kebele are too deeply implicated in the topdown power structure to be regarded as genuine, independent grassroots organisations. In some places the friction between the two concepts is negligible, but frequently it takes both NGOs and local officials much patience and diplomacy to work in the same area.
In order to streamline development efforts the government has encouraged the creation of Development Associations such as the Tigray Development Association (TDA), Amhara Development Association (ADA), Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Development Association (SEPDA) and Oromo Development Association (ODA). The government regards these as typical NGOs. Their main advantage over other NGOs is that they avoid aid-dependency. Since they are partially funded by the contributions of individual members, while their activities conform precisely to Federal and Regional development strategies. In the opinion of many NGOs less closely aligned with the government, these Development Associations are effectively 'parastatals'.
The history of the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) is typical of the Ethiopian situation. In 1998 this large umbrella-organisation had a membership of 140 registered NGOs, almost half of all officially registered NGOs in Ethiopia. Formerly dominated by international NGOs, today half the membership comprises local organisations and church agencies. The CRDA wants to forge a stronger and more productive partnership between government organisations and NGOs. It has set up an NGO-Government Task Force.
So far only a few initiatives have been taken by civil society organisations or NGOs inside Ethiopia in response to the border conflict. Those of the religious leaders, mentioned above, are the most significant to date. Some of these initiatives adhere closely to the government position, calling for the unconditional withdrawal of the Eritrean forces from the Yirga-triangle. Others include more general calls for peace made in co-operation with Eritrean colleagues. An example is the Ethiopian Peace and Development Committee. Its core activities have shifted more and more towards conflict prevention and resolution, mainly in Ethiopia's marginal areas. Training, research and education are main activities.

Eritrea: Domestic Organisations
During the famine of 1973 the Orthodox Church, the Roman-Catholic Church and other churches became involved in relief work in Eritrea. During the thirty years war these church-linked organisations were mostly active in government-held areas. In the EPLF-areas, unions for workers, women and some professionals arose as well as one local NGO: the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA). This was responsible for raising funds amongst donors for food aid and development projects among the civilian population. ERA played a crucial role during the war of liberation and continues operating today as the Eritrean Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (ERREC).
After the EPLF-victory in 1991, the NGOs in both the government and rebel-held areas continued functioning. At the same time the government was keen to define their relation to the state and the framework within which they were to function. President Afewerki considers the state as a 'facilitator'. When the state has to approve of everything, he said in an interview in the German magazine EPD/Entwicklungshilfe, (9/98), then 'every participatory process in society becomes meaningless... We are a liberal disciplined society'. According to Afewerki no one in Eritrea is told what he should or should not do. 'The people here... know what they do. There is discipline, while there is also self-consciousness. This discipline is not ordered by the government, police or military, but the result of a long history'.
Eritreans know all too well what is 'done' and what is 'not done'. Those who fail to tread the line can expect heavy government censure. In fact, the governing principles of Eritrea are derived not only from the 'long history' of the region but from the wartime experience when, effectively, the same government was in power. The Presidential Office is much stronger than President Afewerki suggests above.
On several occasions the Eritrean leadership has shown itself to be highly principled. Their self-reliance and dislike of dependency upon foreign assistance have become proverbial. In the conflict with Yemen over the Hanish-islands they refused to withdraw their troops but also agreed upon arbitration and accepted the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. In the border dispute with Ethiopia this attitude can be invoked as a confidence-building measure.
NGOs based on religion or ethnicity are forbidden. Such organisations are divisive, it is argued. To support this claim the Eritreans point to Sudan, where the ruling Muslim-militants ensure that the country is kept divided. Eritrea offers almost no scope for independent civil society organisations in the field of advocacy, human rights and democracy. A few years ago the National Union of Eritrean Women became formally independent from the ruling PFDJ-party, but it maintains close relations with the top of the PFDJ. In June 1998 a new organisation was created, Citizens for Peace. It publishes background information on the border conflict with Ethiopia. However, it works so closely with the Department of Information, that for an outsider it is difficult to consider it as a fully independent initiative. The organisation has been particularly concerned with documenting the forced deportation of Eritreans from Ethiopia and other Ethiopian offences.
The already limited scope for local organisations, groups or individuals, to express individual opinions has been further restricted since the outbreak of the border conflict. This restriction extends even to the Eritreans in the diaspora. Eritreans who do not accept the government's policy on the border dispute can easily become outcasts in their own community.

Ethiopia: International Organisations
So far NGO-initiatives, whether Ethiopian or international, have had little impact. National NGOs have mostly repeated government policy while international NGOs have tended to concentrate exclusively on sustainable development. Some foreign NGOs with a long history in Tigray and a close relationship with the ruling circle have spoken informally and critically with top politicians. A few have even withdrawn part of their financial support. Yet the atmosphere in which they have to work is not conducive to direct intervention.
The Inter Africa Group, which aims to be the voice of the citizens of Northeast Africa, is based in Addis Ababa. So far the civil war in Sudan, the conditions of NGOs and the civil society in Ethiopia and an analysis of the border conflict have been the main themes.

Eritrea: International Organisations
Eritrean government policy with respect to foreign NGOs is very strict. President Afewerki has said repeatedly, that his government has its own development programme and a clear policy towards foreign aid, gifts and loans. Aid is regarded as an 'intervention mechanism' that should enable government and citizens to solve problems themselves. Eritrea prefers fair trade and soft loans.
In 1996 foreign aid organisations received a letter in which the government announced that the period of relief and rehabilitation was over and that future projects and programmes should be geared towards development. In February 1997 the ERREC instructed foreign NGOs to run projects only in the fields of education and health, and in close co-operation with the Ministries concerned. Each NGO was asked to place its jeeps, machinery and other equipment into a pool, and the authorities would then decide who was entitled to use what. Early in 1998 foreign NGOs were told to close their offices. By then the UNHCR, the American CRS and World Vision had already left the country. Others were to follow.
In 1998 the border conflict forced the Eritrean government to relax the rules for foreign NGOs. It has invited both UNHCR and the International Red Cross Committee to help with the management of the 275,000 internally displaced people and the 58,000 Eritreans deported from Ethiopia. In 1999 it invited some international NGOs, which had earlier been requested to leave the country, to return to Eritrea.
International NGOs have avoided any critical public utterances about the conflict and have concentrated exclusively on their development activities. Their failure to make a consolidated appeal for a peaceful solution is in line with their policy of avoiding open criticism of the Eritrean government. Some NGOs, which were active in EPLF-held territory during the war against the Mengistu-regime, may have held private talks with Eritrean officials about the conflict.
One of the best known international NGOs is the US-based Grassroots International, which was set up in 1983 to provide material aid and other forms of solidarity to the then EPLF and Eritrea. Grassroots projects have included an organising and job-training programme for women. Grassroots has extensive information on Eritrea.

Prospects

International pressure on the two countries to solve their conflict peacefully has been immense and has been decisive in the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. Most experts fear that the negotiations for an endurable peace will drag on for quite some time.
Some experts note that Ethiopia is less unified behind its leadership than Eritrea. The TPLF from Tigray, involved in a fight with its former brother with an intensity reminiscent of the bloody war in the early 1980s between the EPLF and the then Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), might be satisfied if the border areas they claim, will be really theirs. Many Amhara-supporters of the former Mengistu regime have always regretted the secession of Eritrea. They will want to recapture Assab at the very least. Those among the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, who sympathise with the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) do not want to be involved in the border dispute. These experts also argue, that apart from the OLF-factor the border conflict has not created extra (ethnic) tensions inside Ethiopia.
Ethiopia has a rich tradition of diplomacy and is using it effectively. Eritrea's aversion to diplomacy and principled attitude is working against the interests of this foundling state. Its failure to mention Ethiopia's incursions of July 1997 until much later was a blunder.
In the opinion of most experts, the atmosphere in which NGOs work in Ethiopia or Eritrea is not conducive to involvement in such sensitive matters as the border dispute. At the same time there has been a signal lack of co-ordinated and consolidated efforts from international NGOs, both inside Ethiopia and Eritrea with like-minded organisations in the other country, to prevent the conflict from escalating into a full-scale war. Some international NGOs are so close to the former liberation movements, i.e. the TPLF in Tigray and the EPLF in Eritrea, that they are unable to recognise their weaknesses and have turned a blind eye to the lack of democracy after 1991. It took some time before they acknowledged the inability of both regimes to solve this conflict peacefully.
Some experts compare Eritrea's attitude in this conflict with its approach to the Hanish-islands dispute. In both cases Eritrea first made a display of military force yet eventually accepted international arbitration. If it comes to arbitration in this conflict with Ethiopia, these experts believe Eritrea will accept the conclusion.
Fears are rising that the border conflict will spread beyond the two countries. The conflict has already increased tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti. France has warned both countries that it will invoke its military agreements with Djibouti if Djibouti becomes a military target for either Eritrea or Ethiopia. The two belligerents have been distributing arms to factions in Somalia. In June 1999 Ethiopian troops helped capture the strategic town of Baidoa, previously held by the Eritrean ally Hussein Aideed. Ethiopia has helped Eritrean opposition groups to form a front and take action against the Government in Asmara, while Eritrea has made similar overtures to the oppositional OLF in Ethiopia. The latter resulted in an Ethiopian army attack on OLF-units in Kenyan territory.

Recommendations

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea are taking a culture of intolerance into the 21st century. This is a root cause of the present border conflict and of both countries' inability to solve it by non-military means. Much more should be done to promote a culture of peace and reconciliation in both countries. Existing local opportunities can be used for this. Both countries have a legacy of traditional methods of conflict resolution. For example, in Ethiopia a host of new, informal, amateur theatre groups sprang up after 1991. They often put on a mixture of popular plays and pieces devised on the basis of local problems.
Religious and other leaders from both countries should be encouraged by supporters outside Northeast Africa to continue their calls for a peaceful solution. International NGOs in both countries should be encouraged to formulate common recommendations and to put pressure on the leadership of both countries.

Service Information

Newsletters and Periodicals:	Horn of Africa Bulletin, bimonthly newsletter published by the Life & Peace Institute, Uppsala/Sweden; Indian Ocean Newsletter, weekly published by Indigo Publications Group, Paris/France; InterAfrica Group News and Networking Service Monthly Update, InterAfrica Group, Addis Ababa/Ethiopia; Focus on the European Union and PeaceBuilding Efforts in the Horn of Africa, newsletter published by Saferworld/London;
Reports:	Amnesty International, Ethiopia and Eritrea - Human Rights Issues in a Year of Armed Conflict. London/UK. 21 May 1999; Save the Children Fund, Baseline Report - The Tigray Northern Highlands Food Economic Zone, with an Analysis of the Possible Effects of Eritrean Border Problems this Year, by T. Boudreau. Ethiopia/UK, 1998; Bonn International Center for Conversion, Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Conflict Prevention in the Horn of Africa Discussion Paper, by Kees Kingma & Kiflenariam Gebrewold. July 1998; Saferworld, Undermining Development: The European Arms Trade with the Horn of Africa and Central Africa, by William Benson. London, 1998; Prevention of Violent Conflict and the Coherence of EU Policies towards the Horn of Africa, by Emma Visman & Emery Brusset. London, April 1998; Human Rights Watch/Africa, Ethiopia - The Curtailment of Rights. New York 1997; Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, The Potential for Donor Mediation in NGO-State Relations: An Ethiopian Case Study, by W. Campbell. Working Paper 33, June 1996;
Other publications:	Traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in Ethiopia, by Giday Degefu Koraro. Addis Ababa, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, 2000; One nation, one state, Rebuilding post war Eritrea, by Janet Gruber. Oxford, UK, 2000. Info Email: janetgvonk@hotmail.com; asmara.janet@virgin.net; Networking with a view to Promoting Peace: Conflict in the Horn of Africa: What can civil society do to bring about solidarity and co-operation in the Region. Addis Ababa, H. Boll Foundation, Regional Office Africa, 1999; War in the Horn: The conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, by P. Gilkes and M. Plaut. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1999; Post-conflict Eritrea: Prospects for Reconstruction and Development, Eds. Martin Doornbos and Alemseged Tesfai. Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, NJ, 1999; Ethiopia NGO Country Profile 1998, by Jos van Beurden. GOM, Oegstgeest/The Netherlands, 1998; Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition - The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda, by N.J. Coletta, M. Kostner, I. Wiederhofer. Washington, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331, 1996; Crucible of Civilization and Conflicts - Ethiopia, by H. Assefa. In: P. Anyang'Nyong'o (ed.): Arms and Daggers in the Heart of Africa - Studies on Internal Conflicts. Nairobi, Academy Science Publishers, 1993;
Selected Internet Sites:	http://addistribune.ethiopiaonline.net/ (Addis Tribune); http://www.eritrea.org (Eritrean Network Information Centre: ENIC); http://www.ethemb.se (Embassy of Ethiopia in Sweden); http://www.visafric.com (Peace email, started by Eritreans in Canada); http://www.asmarino.com/asmarino (Asmarino);
Resource Persons:	Jalal Abdul Latif - InterAfrica group; Lebesech Tsega - consultant Addis Abeba, fax +251 1 615 076; Hizkias Assefa - expert in international peacebuilding and mediator, Nairobi. email: hizkias@africaonline.co.ke; Habtom Yohannes - Eritrean journalist, Amersfoort/The Netherlands, fax +31 33 4758 227, email: habtomy@rehaas.demon.nl; Mohamed Salih - Institute of Social Studies, The Hague/The Netherlands, fax +31 70 426 0799, email: salih@iss.nl; Bea Stolte, ACT/The Netherlands, email: b.stolte@sowkerken.nl; Dorothe Appels - Novib, Den Haag/The Netherlands, fax +31 70 3614 461, email: dorothe.appels@novib.nl;
Organisations:	Grassroots International;179 Boylston St.;Boston, MA 02130 USA;Tel. +1 617 5241 400;Fax +1 617 5245 525;Email grassroots@igc.apc.org; ERREC;P.O. Box 254;Asmara;Eritrea;Tel. +291 1 182222; Fax +291 1 182970; EHRC;P.O. Box 2432;Addis Ababa; Ethiopia;Tel. +251 1 514489; Fax +251 1 514539; Email sewr@padis.gn.apc.org; CRDA;P.O. Box 5674; Addis Ababa; Ethiopia;Tel. +251 1 650100; Email crda@telecom.net.et; Data on the following organisations can be found in the Directory section:;Ethiopian Peace and Development Committee;Inter Africa Group

About the author

Jos van Beurden studied Law and Peace at the Universities of Utrecht, Amsterdam and Groningen in the Netherlands. He has studied Northeast Africa since 1977, paying regular visits to Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea since 1985. He has also visited Somalia and Djibouti. He is the author of country studies on Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan for the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, and of an Ethiopia NGO Country Profile for the Dutch Co-Financing Agencies.