Author	Gorka Espiau Idoyaga
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

When Spain returned to democracy in 1975, it inevitably took on some of the problems that had not been solved (or had been created) during the preceding forty years of dictatorship under Generalísmo Franco. One of the most persistent problems has been the precarious relationship between the central government in the capital, Madrid, and the regions that strive for self-government. The most notable region is known as the Basque Country. Since 1958, a nationalist group calling itself ETA has waged an increasingly violent campaign for Basque independence. Initially, it was met with brutal repression, but with the advent of democracy the government's response to violent Basque nationalism has been the carrot-and-stick approach. Separate talks between ETA and the government have twice been accompanied by cease-fires. Recently, the violence has escalated once again but in spite of this, there is some optimism, albeit extremely cautious, about a nonviolent outcome. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of the people in the Basque Country have made it clear that they want the violence to stop.

Euskal Herria, Euskadi, or País Vasco: These are the local and Spanish terms that are normally used to refer to the land and its people who live there, on the coast of the Bay of Biscay and the northern and southern slopes of the western Pyrenees that separate Spain and France. About one-fifth of the Basque territory lies in France; the rest is located in Spain and divided into two units, the Basque Autonomous Community and Navarre. The people of the Basque Country share a language, a history, and a culture all their own. Euskara, the Basque language, is said to be one of the oldest pre-Indo-European languages in Europe.

Basque nationalism was born in the early twentieth century. The area already had a long tradition of administrative and mental autonomy, but there had never been a real nationalist sociopolitical movement until then. Basque nationalism was still growing when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936. The autonomous government of the time, made up of Basque nationalists, republicans, and socialists, fought against the coup d'état of the fascist army led by General Francisco Franco. The civil war ended with the victory of the Fascist rebels, and a dictatorship was put in place that was to last for forty years. During this period, a very strong repression took place against any Basque-identifying sentiment: language, culture, self-government, and so on.

Franco died on 20 November 1975. His death gave way to the monarchy of Juan Carlos I de Borbón. The new head of state appointed a government that was charged with transforming the Spanish political regime into a Western-style democracy. The challenges for the new dispensation included dealing with claims for basic democratic freedoms, amnesty for political prisoners, and the demands for sovereignty from the nations within the state, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country. Both had been in the front line of the political struggle during Franco's regime.

A new Spanish constitution was approved in a referendum on 6 December 1978. Spain was constituted as a democratic state under the rule of law; it assumed parliamentary monarchy as its political form and recognized and guaranteed the right to autonomy of its nationalities and regions. As far as the Basque Country was concerned, the constitution protected and respected its historical rights, but obviously within the framework of the constitution.

The constitution, however, did not succeed in satisfying the claims of the more hard-line Basque nationalists, whose amendments to the new constitution had been rejected. With regard to the referendum, they proposed abstention or a vote against. In the event, 38.66 percent of Basques voted for the constitution and the rest either voted against it (11.21 percent) or abstained (46.61 percent). The key to this rejection lay, according to the critics, in the fact that the right to self-determination of the different nations that make up the Spanish state had not been recognized. An additional bone of contention was that according to the constitution the army was tasked with guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Spain—the army, had, after all, produced Franco.

Later, a system of self-government was negotiated for the three territories that were to become the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. A similar status was arranged for the region of Navarre. These two statutes certify the administrative distinction of the Basque territories within the Spanish state. This decision continues to give rise to controversy because despite the fact that most citizens in Navarre express a Navarrese and Spanish sense of identity, there is a large minority that considers itself Navarrese and Basque.

The Statute of Autonomy of Gernika and the Ley de Amejoramiento Foral (Law Developing the Charter) for Navarre established the official status of the Basque and Spanish languages, as well as the local powers and institutions: the parliaments, the governments, and their presidents. Among the powers that were transferred to the Autonomous Community at the time, the following stand out: the economic agreement regulating contributions to the central state exchequer after collecting the main taxes directly, the autonomous police force, the creation of the Basque radio/TV station, and education and health systems. This effectively meant one of the highest levels of self-government in Europe. At the same time, the "Additional Disposition of the Statute" laid down that the acceptance of the autonomous system "does not imply that the Basque People would renounce any rights they may have by virtue of their history."

All Basque political parties took part in the negotiation except the pro-independence left, which recommended abstention because they considered the content of the statute insufficient. But this time, 53 percent of the citizens voted in favor, and 41 percent abstained.

Conflict Dynamics

Euskadi Ta Askatsuna (ETA; "Basque Country and Freedom") was formed in December 1958. It was born out of discontent among certain nationalist sectors with what they considered a passive attitude by moderate nationalists in defending Basque culture. It was also aimed against the Franco dictatorship. Initially, it was a political group that restricted its activity to propaganda. Slowly, however, violence became part of its methodology. ETA's first actions were limited to bombs, robberies, and sabotage that only caused damage to property. The police arrested ETA members on several occasions. The first death as a result of an action by ETA occurred on 2 August 1968. During the time of the Franco dictatorship, the ETA action that caused the greatest repercussion was the attack that killed Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, president of the Spanish government and virtual successor to Franco.

The state responded likewise. Many ETA members died and were arrested during this period and the repercussions did not end when Franco died. One notable event was the kidnapping by the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL; "Antiterrorist and Liberation Groups"), a paramilitary police organization, of the Basque exiles Joxi Zabala and Josean Lasa in October 1983. Their bodies, with signs of brutal torture, were finally found in the spring of 1995. During this period, senior figures in the Spanish Ministry of the Interior were involved and a total of twenty-seven people were killed as a result of its armed operations.

In the course of the 1970s and 1980s, there were a series of tentative initiatives and contacts between ETA and the Spanish government. First, there was the publication of the so-called Koordinadora Abertcale Socialista (KAS; "Nationalist and Socialist Movement") alternative in 1975. This was a document detailing minimum requirements established by the Basque pro-independence left, which had to be met if they were to accept a process of reform in the Basque Country. The first contacts date from this time.

From 1977 onward, there were sporadic talks between ETA and the Spanish government. There were initial talks between ETA político militar (a branch of ETA) and the government. These conversations were to conclude in a process of negotiation whereby ETA político militar would disband in September 1982, and its prisoners and exiles would be allowed to reintegrate into society. ETA militar was to continue its activity. There were no immediate results, but contacts were renewed in 1984–1985, although they failed to achieve any tangible results. In 1986, ETA and the Spanish government again held talks, a fact that was not made known until 1987 when Txomin Iturbe, the official representative of ETA in Algiers, died. The new representative, Eugenio Etxebeste ("Antxon"), picked up the contacts, which were only then publicly confirmed. Discernible results came two years later, in 1989, when ETA declared a fifteen-day unilateral cease-fire, followed by the first official meeting between the ETA delegation, headed by Antxon, and the Spanish government, represented by the secretary of state for security. The cease-fire was extended and during this period five meetings took place in Algiers. However, discrepancies on the content of the communiqués published by the two sides, which had previously been agreed, led to the breakup of the conversations and the collapse of the cease-fire.

Simultaneously, a political process was unfolding in Spain itself, resulting in the Pact of Ajuria-Enea. It was signed on 12 January 1988 by all the political parties with parliamentary representation, including all the Basque nationalist parties but except the pro-independence left. The document's full name is "Agreement for the Normalization and Pacification of Euskadi," but it became known as the Pact of Ajuria-Enea. The pact set out to establish a single strategy and give an image of unity and cohesion in the face of the violence of ETA, which was not involved in this process. It was based on the defense of the Statute of Autonomy, the need and the importance of police work in the eradication of violence, and the possibility of a solution through dialogue, provided that the will to abandon violence could be demonstrated. The pact also reflected the recognition that there was indeed an unresolved dispute between the Basque people and the Spanish state.

After the failure of the talks between ETA and the socialist government in Algiers in January 1989, the Spanish government deported six Basque exiles to the Dominican Republic, among them the three representatives in Algiers with whom it had been conducting a dialogue. The three were Eugenio Etxebeste, Belen González, and Ignacio Arakama, who are now in Spanish prisons and continue to be considered by ETA as their official interlocutors for any attempt at dialogue. But in the period between 1990 and 1992, both sides continued to sound each other out. These contacts once again passed into the political domain, with the restart of conversations between nationalist parties in the summer of 1992. However, these conversations did not achieve the hoped-for results.

In March 1992 the leadership of ETA was arrested in Bidart, the biggest setback ever for the organization. ETA's leadership was dismembered and it necessitated a radical change in the organization's negotiating strategy. The change became evident with the appearance of the so-called Democratic Alternative. This document contained a new proposal for negotiations that envisaged two different scenarios: one between ETA and the Spanish state, and the other among the political players in the Basque Country. The proposal stated that, once the first stage was passed (in which the Spanish state "should recognize the right to self-determination and the territorial unity of the Basque Country, and guarantee respect for what the Basque people decide democratically"), ETA would announce a "cease-fire." This would then clear the way for a "democratic process in which Basque citizens would decide on all aspects related to the organization and the future of the Basque Country."

But before any moves toward more dialogue or even an agreement were achieved, there was to be another violent phase in the conflict. In November 1993, the shooting of Joseba Goikoetxea, a sergeant in the Basque police force, was interpreted as another step in the strategy of ETA of attacking the Basque nationalist majority, which had stated it was against violence. These differences within the nationalist world, which had existed for as long as ETA, would increase with time. Other major events were the actions carried out in 1995 against the conservative Partido Popular (PP): the shooting of Gregorio Ordoñez, the president of the PP in Gipuzkoa, in January of that year and the failed attempt on the life of its president, Jose María Aznar. The assassination of the local councillor of the PP, Miguel Angel Blanco, brought thousands of citizens out onto the streets in protest. These events showed, yet again, that the majority of society (both nationalist and non-nationalist) rejected the use of violence as a means of political action. In 1995, representatives of ETA met Alfonso Pérez Esquivel, the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize winner, and asked him to act as interlocutor with the Spanish government. Esquivel accepted and exchanged messages with the deputy interior minister, Margarita Robles. The first tentative moves toward dialogue were again under way.

Then, on 12 September 1998, an important political milestone was reached. Four Basque political parties, together with some trade unions and social movements, signed the Declaración de Lizarra in which they adopted a methodology to solve the conflict similar to that used in the Irish peace process. Immediately afterward, on 16 September, ETA declared a unilateral, unconditional, and indefinite cease-fire. These events opened up the process of change or transition in the Basque situation from one of chronic, violent conflict toward a possible situation of peace and consensus. After some initial months of confusion, contact was made between members of ETA and Spanish-government spokesmen.

However, there was strict political division over the Lizarra Declaration. There were two groups. One was represented by the parties that signed the declaration, the other by those who did not. These divisions basically persist until the present day. In broad terms, the first group thinks that the "Basque problem" is a political problem. The peace process should therefore be accompanied by another process of dialogue and agreements that would eventually provide a response to the conflict. In the final stage, the will of the majority of the Basques, expressed freely, clearly, and democratically, should be respected. This group has also reproached the Spanish government for its entrenched position and lack of a political agenda, which has not contributed anything to the peace process.

The second bloc, led by the government, is of the opinion that peace basically means a definitive surrender by ETA. For them, the conflict is nothing less than the very fact that ETA exists. Once this organization has disappeared, they believe, any other problems can and should be solved within the already existing political and institutional channels and within the limits of the Spanish constitution and the Statute of Autonomy. This group has criticized the first group for trying to obtain political advantages for nationalism in exchange for peace.

This political split around the peace process has been rendered more serious by the cancellation of the cease-fire in December 1999. ETA based its move on the "absence of political progress" and started a violent offensive against politicians, journalists, businesspersons, intellectuals, members of the judiciary and armed forces. This took the form of the killing of notable figures such as socialist leader Fernando Buesa and university professor Ernest Lluch. A climate of political noncommunication and "fronts" emerged, fed by continuous polarization and controversy. Anything to do with the Basque conflict, whether it be a central or secondary issue, has meant an intense, noisy, and bad-tempered controversy. Dialogue, previously quite common, is now almost nonexistent between the political forces of both tendencies.

Official Conflict Management

There have been attempts and strategies to bring this situation to an end. Basically, all of them come under one of the following three models: "the security solution," "force," and "nonviolence and dialogue." The first two have been dominant. In the last thirty years, the official stance of the different governments on the Basque problem has been to defend a law and order solution to the situation. However, this strategy has been inefficient in finishing off an organization that has proven able to regenerate itself. At the same time, the use of violence by ETA, apart from ignoring the desire for nonviolence expressed by most Basque citizens, prevents a normal dialogue on underlying political issues. As a result, the conflict is maintained within its present parameters.

The third way, nonviolence and dialogue, has hardly had a chance to succeed, and any attempt has always been partial and incomplete. The first example of this was the Ajuria-Enea Pact, in which all political parties, including the ruling party, took an active part. In recent years, however, the meetings arising out of this pact have resulted in a succession of arguments and disagreements as a result of the different interpretations the political parties have made of the pact. Some have emphasized political unity, support for security measures, and isolation of the nationalist left. Others have defended an interpretation of the pact that would allow dialogue to take place and bring about a political solution to the problem. A complicating factor is the lack of compliance on the part of the Madrid government with the Statute of Autonomy. For these reasons, the pact is currently unworkable.

The second and best example of this third model was the attempt at a peace process that began with ETA's cease-fire. It began in September 1998 and has shown a positive partial result: sixteen months without any political killings and an unprecedented expectation of peace. Enthusiasm and hope were clearly present in Basque and Spanish society. This opportunity, however, has been lost for the time being. In the words of a senior church figure very familiar with the conversations between the government and ETA, "the intransigence of one side and the impatience of the other" have conditioned any progress.

As far as the two main political parties are concerned, the Partido Popular, which is currently in power, or the Partido Socialista, which was in power at the time of the Ajuria-Enea Pact, share a fairly hard-line position. But there are some clear differences of approach: the Partido Socialista does not deny the political nature of the conflict, is not unwilling to undertake a bilateral or multilateral dialogue, and is in favor of introducing changes in penal policy, which the current Spanish government is not adopting. Although the official version has historically denied "the existence of a political problem and the possibility of dialogue with the terrorists," various attempts at dialogue or negotiation with ETA took place. It is clear that the Partido Popular is not prepared to go this far. When it came to power in 1996, the channels of communication that had been open thus far were closed, be it temporarily.

Multi Track Diplomacy

The Basque Country has an extensive network of associations working in the fields of peace and the promotion of human rights. International NGOs do not carry out specific programs in this area. The Basque conflict has been historically considered as an internal problem of the Spanish state, and has been analyzed exclusively from a security angle. As a result, the work done to transform the Basque conflict from a social and political perspective has not been able to garner support at the international level. Still, one of the main reasons for optimism is surely this great variety of associations, as well as the commitment by most Basque people, expressed in several demonstrations and reflected in almost all opinion polls, to find a democratic solution based on the end of violence and dialogue without limits or exclusions.

Gesture for Peace in the Basque Country
Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria (Gesture for Peace in the Basque Country) was born in 1986 with the aim of expressing Basque society's rejection of the use of violence as a political tool. Its main contribution lies in the area of the mobilization of society, characterized by silent demonstrations in many places in the Basque Country every time any death arising from the conflict occurs. At the beginning of the 1990s, it took on a high profile because it channeled the Basque people's call for nonviolence to a considerable extent. It now complements this work with specific contributions in areas related to the humanization of the conflict and Education for Peace.

Elkarri
Elkarri, the social movement for dialogue and agreement, was born on 20 December 1992. Its main activity lies in furthering the process of dialogue without exclusion to bring about the transformation of the Basque conflict, carrying out what it defines as "social mediation." Its work focuses on awareness campaigns, and greater knowledge and activity within society regarding the matters that sustain the conflict, and the search for its democratic transformation. Among its main initiatives, the following are worthy of mention: the Conference on the Future of Navarre, Local Forums for Dialogue and Agreement, and the Social Initiative for a Peace Conference for the Basque Country, whose main objective is to facilitate public and unofficial dialogue between the different political parties and civil society.

Gernika Gogoratuz
Gernika Gogoratuz (Center of Peace Studies) mainly works in the area of research and training in dealing with conflicts. Its mission consists of the recovery and dissemination of historical memory, and activities aimed at providing scientific backup for efforts made in search of peace. Its activities have mainly focused on the annual organization of the International Seminar of Culture and Peace of Gernika, and the promotion of its documentation center.

Denon Artean
Denon Artean is a group that works with victims of violence in the city of San Sebastián. It has various support and assistance programs for people affected by ETA's operations. It is one of the promoters of the Association of Victims of Terrorism in the Basque Country (Covite) and the Basta Ya ("We've had enough") platform.

Senideak
Senideak (the Association of Relatives of Basque Prisoners) focuses its work on support for people who have a relative in jail related to the conflict. Senideak condemns situations in which people's human rights have been infringed in prisons, works on the political level against the prisoner dispersal policy, and provides humanitarian aid for prisoners and their relatives.

Prospects

The Basque conflict is now in a transition period between the end of a cycle of confrontation and the start of a cycle of solution. Like any other transition period toward a peace process, it is contradictory. The old ways have not completely died out and the new ways have not been born yet. The best example to explain this apparent contradiction is the existence of a strongly structured civil society that demands nonviolence and political dialogue without exclusions. What is especially important is that this defense of dialogue occurs separately from political preferences and the feeling of identity. In comparison to similar conflict situations, analysts understand that society is ready for a peace process that involves the parties giving something up along the way. This reality represents the future, but at present it has to exist alongside elements from the past that can be seen in violence and the lack of communication at a political level.

Among the positive elements, three factors stand out. First, the hope and willingness of the Basque people are exemplary. The extreme tension observed at the political level is not reflected at the grass-roots level. People have a reconciliatory attitude toward the future and are showing signs of disappointment at the strained political climate. This is shown time and again in the mass demonstrations that follow each political murder. It was also reflected in the results of the 2001 elections in the Basque Autonomous Community, which were focused on the debate for dialogue as a means of transforming the conflict. Moderate nationalism (antiviolence) emerged on top and electoral support for ETA's ideas diminished considerably. Social, economic, church, and civic figures are raising critical voices in representation of society, which is actively showing itself to be in favor of nonviolence and dialogue.

The second positive factor is the idea of all-party talks. It does not seem likely that this forum will be constituted in the short term, mainly as a result of ETA's operations and the denial of political dialogue by the Madrid government. Nevertheless, it offers hope for the future in that it provides an opportunity for transformation. In this respect, the Social Initiative for a Peace Process, presented in 2001, stands out. It has received the support of over 50,000 people in Basque society, in the form of signatures and a financial contribution. The objective of this conference is to set up a forum of political parties to reach basic agreement on the principles and procedures for dialogue.

There is a third, very important element that is having a great impact on the Basque conflict in its current form. Many people in the Basque Country are aware of the international trend toward solutions to violent conflicts through dialogue (e.g., South Africa and Northern Ireland). The peace process in Ireland has without any doubt had the greatest effect on this conflict. It is a conflict within the European Union and has similar elements to the Basque conflict: the search for a suitable legal and political framework for a society that is complex in terms of its expression of identity, the effects of violence, the relationship between community and territory, the problems of the victims and political prisoners, etc. This reality, and the close relationship that some political forces have maintained with the main protagonists of the Good Friday Agreement, mean that the Irish peace process is the one factor that has most accelerated the change of attitude of Basque political parties toward a willingness to find a solution through dialogue.

Administrative problems remain. Twenty years after the Statute of Autonomy was approved, its application and development are still subjects of political controversy. More than thirty powers (or "competences") are still claimed by the Basque government and parliament. They have not been transferred. Among them is the management of social-security contributions. In this context, laws that were aimed at creating an opportunity for social peace through the consolidation of the self-government of the Basque Country have not achieved the objective of transforming the conflict.

The Basque peace process is faced with two major obstacles to its progress. One is ETA, whose continuing operations do not respect the majority will of Basque society for nonviolence. The other is the lack of a political agenda from the Spanish government. ETA's activities represent an offensive against human rights and normal coexistence. This is met head on by the other side, which persists in its refusal to enter political dialogue on underlying matters and the basic rules of coexistence that could be accepted by people of different opinions within the Basque Country.

The spiral of violence and noncommunication feeds itself continuously. Violent attacks and police operations take place in succession. The former will never succeed in gaining the stated objective (independence) because of the overwhelming imbalance of forces and the lack of majority support from the people. The latter are insufficient in themselves to prevent further violent actions and are incapable of bringing about a lasting peace. Given that this is a conflict with deep political roots, a law-and-order approach does not offer definitive results. The short-term outlook is, therefore, one of indefinite impasse, unless new political initiatives can rescue the process from its present stagnation. The challenge lies in achieving a negotiation phase; otherwise, the current deadlock could take the process to a situation in which violence spirals, creating a risk of irremediable social division.

Recommendations

The thinking about conflicts in general has, over time, produced very clear results. There is detailed knowledge of which factors and actions prolong, worsen, and stagnate the problem: violence and the refusal to enter into dialogue. There is also a conviction about which factors can transform the situation and stimulate its positive development: nonviolence and political dialogue without exclusion. In the Basque case, it is a matter of attempting a political process similar to the one that led to the Good Friday agreements in Stormont-Belfast, in the Northern Ireland case. As regards the future, there are several priorities on which efforts should be concentrated to overcome the present state of affairs in the Basque process toward peace:

General

1. Dialogue. It is essential to promote dialogues from this moment on, with the aim of comparing the different points of view. Inclusive talks are considered fundamental to bringing about convergence and solutions to the underlying problems. We talk of a forum, although it should be situated within a flexible methodology in which, for example, there would be a specific talking circle for the Basque Autonomous Community, another for Navarre, and so on. Other appropriate forms of dialogue could be attempted, provided they do not exclude any political current.
   
2. Promote a culture of reconciliation and participation. The peace process requires that the search for dialogue and agreement should not only take place among the political elite but also in society at large. It is therefore essential to preach and practice a culture of reconciliation, understood as the development of abilities and skills in society to solve its conflicts in a positive way, without violence but through dialogue and respect for the various sensitivities and opinions. Moreover, the network of associations in the country can encourage people to participate and get social consensus that already exists at the grass-roots level across to the politicians, something the present political debate does not reflect.
   
3. Reaching an agreement on the definition of the conflict. It is necessary to make progress toward a convergent definition of the nature of the Basque conflict. Work should be done on establishing a "bridging" definition that expresses the antagonistic visions of the conflict. There is, at present, no basic agreement on the political rules of the game or, to be more specific, on the area and framework of decision. This basic consensus is the basic constituent of an integrated coexistence and a prerequisite in order to guarantee the normal opposition of the plurality of identities, projects, and political expressions. To achieve this, an extra effort at political dialogue and consensus on everyone's part is required in order to correct the lack of legitimacy that the current political framework presents.
   
4. Humanization. The consolidation of this process requires measures that will humanize the conflict. In addition to being imperative from the humanitarian and justice angles, these measures would contribute toward generating the climate of trust and tranquillity essential for the success of a peace process. There are three priority fields in which these measures can be implemented: dialogue and consensus around the treatment of victims in the peace process, the modification of the penitentiary policy so that the dispersion of prisoners is brought to an end, and finally an end to violent acts and sabotage in the streets.
   
5. Making an intellectual effort to explore new and emerging concepts. Sovereignty, interdependence, self-government, or self-determination are controversial concepts that are arising from different experiences and events in the world, and that can be approached from the angle of the transformation of conflicts. Many intellectuals and experts feel that it is possible to find new readings, interpretations, and applications of the ideas and concepts found in various constitutional frameworks. This involves proposing a new, shared starting point. Taking legal instruments in current codes as a basis, formulas can be found that refer the process of dialogue to the will of citizens, expressed freely and democratically.

Government
The government in Madrid could make a stronger contribution to the progress and consolidation of a peace process through support for the two driving forces that could consolidate it most effectively: (1) inclusive talks and (2) the humanization of the conflict. It should be involved in establishing a political agenda on the matter. Many observers regret the absence of an active, positive policy by the Spanish government. In this sense, the peace process in North Ireland is a point of reference that should be followed very closely.

The European Union
The transformation of a process such as the one in the Basque Country requires help and facilitation from the outside. The international community, governments, and institutions can help in bringing the Basque conflict into the realm of a peace process and democratic solution. Various peace movements in the Basque Country have emerged with the following proposals:

• Approach the Basque problem as a European matter. The Basque case is a European problem. The priority of the citizens of this part of Europe is pacification and normalization. Europe is asked to do something about it, if only for this reason.
  
• Prepare a European, suprastate position on pacification. This requires a critical and constructive look at the problem and the possible solutions to it. The vision of the Spanish state, as a direct part of the problem, is very important, but it should not be the only one. Its information and proposals are surely biased and based on its own past experience. Other points of view, both popular and political, should complete the European definition of the Basque case.
  
• Promote anything that can change things democratically, that is, initiatives based on nonviolence and dialogue without exclusions. The intervention of the European Community in the Basque peace process should be made specific, either publicly or privately. It should consist of the commitment of political resources that would be compatible and establish a synergy with the most constructive dynamics of the sociopolitical players who are directly involved.

Service Information

PUBLICATIONS:	Basque Politics and Nationalism on the Eve of the Millennium, by W. Douglass, C. Urza, L. White, and J. Zulaika. Basque Studies Program Occasional Papers Series No 6, University of Nevada, Reno. Basque Politics: A Case Study in Ethnic Nationalism, by W. Douglass. Basque Studies Program, University of Nevada, Reno. Dirty War, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy, by Paddy Woodworth. Cork: Cork University Press, 2000. Militar en ETA, edited by Moneo Alcedo and Miren Hamburu. San Sebastian: Haranburu Editors, 1996. Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988, by Robert P. Clark. Reno, University of Nevada Press, 1990. "Political Autonomy and Conflict Resolution: The Basque Case," by Jose Manuel Castell and Gurutz Jauregui. In Kumar Rupesinghe and Valery A. Tiskhov (eds.), Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1996. The Basque History of the World, by Mark Kurlansky, New York, Walter & Company, 1999. The Making of the Basque Nation, by Marianne Heiberg. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.cities.com/bastayaonline (Basta Ya) www.elkarri.org/aldizkaria.html (Elkarri magazine) www.euskadi.net/estudiossociológicos (Sociology Studies Group of the Basque Government) www.euskadi.net/pakea (Peace Initiatives of the Basque Government) www.eustat.es (Eustat. Servicio de Estadística del Gobierno Vasco) www.ibs.lgu.ac.uk/forum/newtimes.htm (online access to a selection of articles) www.incore.ulst.ac.uk (INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict in the Basque Country) www.lizarra-garazi.org (Lizarra Agreement) www.manos-blancas.uam.es (Manos Blancas) www.nodo50.org/pazeh (documents of interest on the Basque conflict) www.unr.edu (University of Reno, Nevada) www.usuarios.tripod.es/FOROERMUA (Foro de Ermua)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Jesus Herrero Arranz, Gesto por la Paz, e-mail: gesto@kender.es Juan Gutierrez, Gernika Gogoratuz, e-mail: gernikag@sarenet.es Gorka Espiau Idoyaga, Elkarri, e-mail: bizkaia@elkarri.org Mario N. López Martínez, Subdirección del Instituto de la Paz y los Conflictos, e-mail: mariol@ugr.es Christopher Mitchell, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, e-mail: cmitchel@gmu.edu
ORGANIZATIONS:	Denon Artean Zabaleta 1 2º Donostia 20002 Tel.: +34 (94) 342 7200 Fax: +34 (94) 329 2188, Senideak Plazaberri 2 Hernani 20120 Tel.: +34 (94) 333 5900 Fax: +34 (94) 333 5901 DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Assembly of Cooperation for Peace, Campus for Peace, Centro de Investigacion para la Paz, Gernika Gogoratuz, Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria, Instituto de la Paz y Los Conflictos, Justiticia i Pau, Movimiento social por el diálogo y el acuerdo, Elkarri, Seminario de Investigacion para la Paz,

About the author

Gorka Espiau Idoyaga is the International Affairs Coordinator of the Social Movement for Dialogue and Agreement in the Basque Country, Elkarri. A graduate in social sciences and media studies from the University of the Basque Country, he is currently preparing his doctoral thesis on the subject, entitled "New Formulas of Sovereignty as a Method of Transforming Conflicts: The Basque and Irish Cases." He works as an international analyst for several Basque, Spanish, and international media, and has participated as a speaker in the main universities that study the Basque conflict. At present he is a senior member of the management team for the Peace Conference for the Basque Country.