Author	Kristoffel Lieten
Publication	Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia
Year	2002

Summary

For more than half a century the territory of Kashmir has been contested by India and Pakistan. In 1947 it was split between two countries that have been at loggerheads ever since. Since the late 1980s, the emergence of a violent militant movement has intensified internal strife, resulting in at least 30,000 deaths at the hands of the Indian army and the various terrorist organizations. The decision by India and Pakistan in 1999 to restart their bilateral dialogue has created the preconditions for a movement toward a political settlement, and developments within Pakistan under President Musharraf appeared to have reduced the support for a Muslim jihad in Kashmir. Over the last three years, periods of cease-fire declared by the insurgents or by the Indian government have alternated with an escalation in violence. The war against Afghanistan may once again have changed the equations in Jammu and Kashmir. In January 2002 Musharraf banned five extremist organizations that have been responsible for much of the violence in Kashmir and that brought the two countries to the brink of a new war after a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001.

The modern history of Kashmir can be traced to the Treaty of Amritsar, signed between the British government and Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846. According to Article 1 of the treaty, the British government transferred to the maharaja the mountainous country with its dependencies situated eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi. The descendants of the maharaja continued as sovereign princes until British colonial power left the Indian subcontinent in August 1947. The subcontinent was partitioned between India and Pakistan, and the more than 550 princely states, which had not been incorporated in British India and some of which were on the borderline between India and Pakistan, had to decide on their future allegiance.
The Hindu ruler Maharaja Hari Singh then held dominion over Jammu and Kashmir. Four actors staked their claim to political dominance over the princely state. The government of India wanted to include the Muslim-dominated territory as proof of the multireligious, secular character of India. It was supported by Sheikh Abdullah, who in 1932 had founded the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, and later, significantly had changed the name to All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC). The NC was fighting for a representative government within independent India and was supported by the Indian National Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru. The third actor, Pakistan, claimed to provide a nation-state to Muslims and thus to Kashmiri Muslims as well. The fourth actor was the autocratic ruler Maharaja Gulab Singh, who initially preferred to continue the autonomy of his princely state.
While the maharaja was deliberating on which option to take, Pushto (Pathan) tribesmen and other Pakistani armed intruders sought to capture Kashmir by force. They occupied Muzafarabad on 22 October 1947, and then headed for Srinagar. The maharaja appealed to India for help. The authorities in New Delhi decided that Indian troops could be sent only after Kashmir acceded to India. Around 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession. With the political support of the undisputed popular leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, the Indian army pushed the intruders back. India accused Pakistan of aiding the intruders and entered Pakistani territory in pursuit of the invaders. Full-scale fighting between the armies of both countries continued until December 1947, with one-third of the bigger Kashmir territory remaining under the control of Pakistan. The old princedom had been effectively bifurcated.
The Indian government decided to refer the case to the UN Security Council and lodged a complaint on 1 January 1948. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was established to investigate and mediate the dispute. A benchmark UNCIP decision on 13 August 1948 called for an immediate cease-fire and asked for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the disputed area. The withdrawal of troops was to take place in two stages. Only after the vacation of the Pakistani side was complete would India withdraw its own troops from the occupied territory, except for a minimum force needed to maintain law and order within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire. A third part of the resolution stated that the future of Kashmir would be decided "in accordance with the will of the people." Pakistan objected to withdrawing its forces ahead of an Indian pullout.
Except for the first phase envisaged by the resolution (the withdrawal of Pakistani forces), there has been no progress regarding the other two provisions of the 13 August resolution. The cease-fire was able to preserve the peace until 1965. Following the two Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, India and Pakistan reached two major agreements regarding Kashmir. The 1965 war resulted in an agreement in Tashkent in January 1966 reaffirming the commitment of both the countries to settle their disputes through peaceful means, and to respect the cease-fire lines. The 1972 Simla Declaration, which followed the 1971 war, was more specific. Both India and Pakistan agreed on the exact location of the Line of Control (LOC).
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the two countries refrained from open confrontation. As allies of the two antagonistic power blocs in the Cold War, India and Pakistan strengthened their armies and positioned their army divisions along the LOC. Occasional skirmishes and artillery exchanges have occurred, but usually of little significance. In the 1990s, conflicts tended to multiply, and in May 1999, the Indian army began a military offensive that came quite close to a new war. The offensive was said to be a reaction to what India called the incursion by "Pakistani irregulars and troops" in the high mountain ranges around Kargil, overlooking the Leh-Srinagar highway. Fighting, involving combat aircraft, continued for three months and ended with the withdrawal of the irregulars. Again, in October 2001, while the U.S. secretary of state was visiting both countries to shore up support for the "war on terrorism," Indian artillery pounded Pakistani positions along the LOC, and a serious exchange of fire followed. Both sides seemed intent on drawing the United States onto their side in tacit exchange for support, but by and large the LOC remains respected by both sides.
After the accession of the princely state to India, Sheikh Abdullah, often called the Sher-I-Kashmir (the "Lion of Kashmir"), and Jawaharlal Nehru negotiated the 1953 Delhi Agreement between the state and the Indian union. The government of India accorded Kashmir a special status, unlike the other Indian states, with the power to enact legislation on a residuary list of subjects, to elect its own governor, to have its own flag, to be outside the jurisdiction of the supreme court of India, and to have its own constitution. The union government in New Delhi soon thereafter, however, started retracting on its commitment and many of the special constitutional arrangements were suspended. For two long periods, Sheikh Abdullah was put in jail and when he was released from jail in 1975, he joined forces with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, accepting the constitutional changes.
Politically, Jammu and Kashmir thereafter appeared to have joined the mainstream of Indian politics. The National Conference struck opportunistic alliances with whatever political grouping currently formed the union government in New Delhi and appeared to have electoral and popular support in the valley. Elections, however, except possibly for the 1977 elections, were rigged and faith in the democratic process receded. Discontent with faltering development, lack of democracy, and widespread corruption from around 1990 onward formed a breeding ground for pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian forces and terrorist organizations. Because of this danger, sensing a pro-Pakistani pull among the Kashmiri electorate, the government of India has never really allowed genuine democracy to take root.

Conflict Dynamics

The UNCIP was initially more sympathetic to the position of India. It did not ask for a simultaneous withdrawal, but instructed Pakistan to withdraw its troops prior to the Indian withdrawal. At that time India was closer to the United States than Pakistan was: whereas Nehru in 1949 was invited to visit the United States by President Harry Truman, his Pakistani counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, accepted an offer to visit Moscow. However, the equations soon started changing: India moved closer to the Soviet Union and became an important leader of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries; Pakistan joined U.S.-led military organizations. This polarization, which followed in the wake of the intensification of the Cold War, was probably the reason behind the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the popular prime minister of Kashmir, who took a stronger position on independence than many of his cabinet colleagues. In 1953, after the visit of Adlai Stevenson, Sheikh Abdullah was arrested for his "subversive speeches."
Initially, in the early 1950s, India made a number of decisions that responded to the urge for autonomy in Kashmir. Kashmir was accorded an exceptional position, limiting the extent the union government could interfere with state legislation. Soon, however, the Indian government, when a section of the Kashmiri leadership called for further devolution of power, started victimizing the local leadership. Sher-I-Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah in August 1953 was put behind bars for his alleged conspiracy with the United States. When he was released in 1975 after three long terms of imprisonment, he agreed to officially sign an agreement in which a number of the exceptional regulations for Jammu and Kashmir were scrapped.
For thirty years after the mid-1950s, when gradually the exceptional status that Kashmir had been accorded was dissipated, the conflict had been lingering when toward the late 1980s, the first violent skirmishes, involving the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), took place. In late 1988 the JKLF started a campaign for independence that brought about a sudden and rapid escalation of violence, especially in the Kashmir Valley. Agitated mobs, carrying pictures of Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani military dictator, clashed with the police in Srinagar in February and March 1989. Strikes brought many cities to a standstill and in April of that year bands of militants for the first time confronted the police with AK-47 automatic weapons. The paradise on earth, as Kashmir was once called, was fast turning into a hell with bomb blasts, shoot-outs, and violent clashes involving angry mobs and the police. The situation dramatically returned to the conditions experienced in the period after Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in 1953 and when people took to the street in a similar wave of protest.
Two developments that led to the dramatic eruption of popular protest were internal to local politics and two were associated with national politics.
The absolute lack of democratic expression in Kashmir came into the open during the 1987 state assembly elections. Not only were the elections manipulated by the Abdullah family and the NC, this time in alliance with the Indian Congress Party, ruling at New Delhi, but in the aftermath of the elections, many leaders and activists of the opposition alliance were arrested on charges of antinational activities. The expression of anger against unemployment and corruption by decades of autocratic "family rule" was not allowed through the ballot box. The widespread alienation, especially among the unemployed youth, soon found expression in a more militant form. Abdul Ghani Lone, the charismatic leader of the People's Conference, was quoted as saying: "If people are not allowed to cast their votes where will their venom go except into expression of anti-national feelings?" The second development of an internal nature was the numerous human-rights violations by the administration and especially by the police and the Border Security Force (BSF). Various reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been discarded by the government as foreign-instigated propaganda. Indian media, however, have also reported numerous cases of discrediting behavior by the administration and by the BSF. When, for example, Jagmohan, a governor renowned for his toughness, was sent by New Delhi to Jammu and Kashmir for a second term in 1990, India Today reported (February 1990):

With Kashmir on fire, the new government has once again turned to Jagmohan. In Jammu, people danced on the streets to celebrate his appointment. But the euphoria was short-lived. Even before Jagmohan could reach Srinagar, hundreds of police and paramilitary forces fanned out into downtown ghettos and conducted brutal house-to-house searches, smashing electronic items, insulting women and children by parading them in the cold.

Even more serious human-rights violations by the Indian army created a fertile soil for opposition forces, even for organizations with a more fundamentalist Muslim character.
The mobilization of secessionist sentiment took place in the context of two external developments. A violent campaign, including gruesome terrorist attacks, had been going on in the neighboring state of Punjab where radical Sikhs claimed independence from India, and which led ultimately to the murder of Indira Gandhi. The other development was the jihad that was under way in Afghanistan against the communist infidels of the Soviet-backed regime. Fighters for Islamic purity, who had been trained in Pakistan for deployment in Afghanistan from 1992 onwards, when the mujahedeen were victorious in Kabul, were redirected toward Kashmir. The jihadi groups had little support on the ground, but could thrive in conditions where the state and central governments had failed to arrest institutional decay and improve socioeconomic conditions. In the years that followed, the anti-India militancy had access to sophisticated weapons and was maintained by a unending stream of suicide squads. It is difficult to judge how successful they were in enlisting the support of the people in the valley. They are possibly in the same position as the Indian security forces who are also blamed for excesses, custodial deaths, and extortion.
The eruption of violence is clearly illustrated by the enclosed graph (Figure 7.8.5.1), which is based on official figures and may understate the number of victims. Some accounts put the number of people killed during the 1990s at 60,000, around double the official figures. Whatever the magnitude, it is clear that before 1990 the Kashmir Valley was relatively free of violence. What is also clear is that many of the people killed were innocent Hindu and Muslim citizens. They were killed either as unlucky victims in encounters between armed forces or as targets of terrorist attacks. Moderate Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindu Brahmins have been targeted intentionally. Among the latter group, the so-called pundits, many families starting leaving their ancestral living places and migrated to the Jammu region and to other places, including New Delhi. Poor Kashmiri Muslims had nowhere to go and remained caught up in unsettled conditions.
By the end of 1998 it was clear to most analysts that the political and security situation inside Jammu and Kashmir had changed. Despite occasional violent events, life in Kashmir seemed to be returning to "normal" (see also the dip in the accompanying graph). Elections were conducted in 1996, the NC of Farooq Abdullah tied up with the National Democratic Alliance led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatya Jana Party (BJP). An economic and political package to strengthen the economy and security of the region was implemented. The indications were that the administration of civil supplies has somewhat improved and that security forces maintained a lower profile, improving living conditions in the state. Much of the opportunity, however, was lost with the eruption of the Kargil war in May 1999.
After the Kargil war, after the failure of the Vajpayee/Musharraf summit in Agra, and particularly after the allied offensive against Afghanistan, violent attacks appear to have escalated. Particularly, the attack on Afghanistan helped to inflame sentiments in Kashmir and some terrorist organizations went on a spree of violence. A bomb set off in October 2001 in front of the legislative assembly killed thirty-eight people in one of the most gruesome scenes that the state has ever witnessed. An even more significant attack was the assault by five armed men on the Indian parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001. The government of India was quick to point out that the terrorists were members of the Pakistani organizations and started preparing for military retaliation on Pakistani territory. The government of Pakistan, unlike the government in New Delhi, wanted to solve the conflict through the intervention of the UN, but in its efforts was repeatedly rebuffed by a belligerent attitude on the Indian side. The danger of a new war lasted for one month, until President Musharraf announced his decision to ban five extremist organizations.
The nature of militancy in Kashmir had greatly changed. It was calculated that in 1998–1999, the majority of militants came from outside the region rather than from inside. In the early 1990s, the JKLF, a Kashmiri youth force, dominated militancy. In the mid-1990s, the Hizbul mujahedeen, which included also many elements from Azad Kashmir and some Pakistani elements from elsewhere, was the dominant force. Since 1996, coinciding with the Taliban takeover in Kabul, the Lashkar and other militant Islamic groups from Pakistan and Afghanistan have taken over. The Kashmir youths have joined these terrorist organizations as subsidiary forces. The implication is also that political control has become more and more external to Kashmiri society, and that negotiations have become even more difficult. The militant groups operating inside Kashmir on the Indian side of the LOC are not necessarily pro-Pakistan, but because of the military and logistic support received from within Pakistan during the 1990s, pro-Pakistani groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul mujahedeen, and Jaish-e-Mohammad have become more powerful. Lashkar-e-Toiba is the militant wing of a religious organization (Markaz), founded in 1987 by Arabs and Pakistanis. The Lashkar has resources including iron and garment factories to generate its own income, and is fairly independent of the Pakistani secret service (ISI) and the Pakistani government. The Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen was earlier known as the Harkat-ul-Ansar, but changed its name after the United States declared it a terrorist group in 1997, following the kidnapping of five Western tourists in Kashmir in 1995. The Harkat belongs to the Deobandi-Wahabi faith and has close links with the Taliban. Its members are mostly Afghans and have been trained in weapons operation, including Stinger missiles, by the ISI and the CIA to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. When the Najibullah government was overrun by the mujahedeen, they were sent to other parts of the world, from Albania and Bosnia to Kashmir. Jaish-e-Mohammad was formed by Maulana Masood Azhar after he was released by India after negotiations following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft in December 1999. Maulana Masood Azar, a former member of the Harkat, has the support of a large number of Deobandi madrassas of Pakistan, and, like the Harkat, has close links with the Taliban. Finally, the Hizbul mujahedeen, founded in 1989, has strong links with the Jamiaat-i-Islami of Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. Though the Hizbul claims that its members are from Kashmir, there are a sizeable number of Afghans and Pakistanis in the outfit.
In a major address to the nation on 12 January 2002, President Musharraf made it clear that Pakistan would henceforth disassociate itself from terrorism and from the jihad culture. Five organizations (including the Lashkar and the Jaish) were banned and 2,000 known terrorists were arrested. After the crackdown by Pakistan, the Indian government has failed to reciprocate. It actually has intensified its repressive regime after the enactment of the Prevention of Terrorist Organizations (POTO) legislation in March 2002. The first "terrorist" to be arrested under POTO was the JKLF leader Yasin Malik, one of the more moderate leaders within the Kashmiri movement. At the time of his arrest, serious discussions were taking place on the issue of participating in the state assembly elections later in the year. Malik has a good public image and could give the National Conference a run for its money if he decided to take the plunge and contest elections. Many Kashmiri have regarded his arrest as a sign that the normal democratic process in the state remains to be scuttled.

Official Conflict Management

The Kashmir question was taken to the UN when India lodged a complaint in the Security Council on 1 January 1948. The Security Council, after having called on India and Pakistan to return to normalcy, appointed the UNCIP to investigate the facts and to bring about a cessation of hostilities. On 13 August 1948, the UNCIP passed an important resolution, comprising three parts. Part 1 dealt with the establishment of a cease-fire; Part 2 with the truce agreement; and Part 3 with the determination of the future status of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people. The acceptance of this resolution of August 1948 by India and Pakistan resulted in a cease-fire agreement coming into force on 1 January 1949. An agreement was also reached between the two countries on the demarcation of the cease-fire line on 27 July 1949.
Thereafter, the United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan has continued to patrol the cease-fire line, but as a mediator, the role of the UN was progressively minimized after the 1950s. In the war that intervened (in 1965), the Security Council, however, brokered the cease-fire on 22 September 1965, and Soviet premier Kosygin thereafter persuaded both parties to send representatives to Tashkent. Outside mediation resulted in an agreement between India and Pakistan. This was one of the instances in which outside mediation was accepted by India and Pakistan in order to ameliorate their seemingly intransigent positions regarding conflict and confrontation. Thereafter, India has consistently refused to have a third party involved in its dealings with Pakistan. The offer by the UN to send international observers to Kashmir at the time of the Kargil war was summarily rejected by Indian prime minister Vajpayee. The offer by Pakistan to refer the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 to the UN was equally dismissed by the government of India.
The Pakistani government fiercely disputes the legitimacy of the act of accession and officially focuses on the plebiscite mandated by the UNCIP Resolution of 1948, omitting the fact that it has to withdraw all forces as the precondition for the plebiscite. Pakistan until recently has insisted on third-party mediation. Pakistan has repeatedly tried to raise the issue of Kashmir in various international organizations, but has been largely unsuccessful, with the exception of such organizations as the Islamic Conference Organization, which has consistently endorsed the Pakistani position. The Indian insistance on the bilateral mode has reduced the possible role not only of the UN, but also of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the South-Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC). The SAARC, which otherwise could have become a fruitful forum for economic cooperation, partly because of the conflict overhang, has remained an ineffective organization.
The bilateral talks between the two countries have only succeeded in issuing joint statements and expressing their commitments to resolve the issue through dialogue. But outside the conference rooms, the stances of both sides have hardened. Particularly, the government of India has reacted in an unresponsive way to a number of offers made by the president of Pakistan in recent years. The stalemate between both countries has prevented the stimulation of processes that could have built a higher level of mutual confidence and a healthier interaction between the populations of both countries and between the population of Kashmir and the rest of the population within both countries.
In July 1989, the two youthful leaders, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto, met amidst high expectations. It was the first summit between the leaders of Pakistan and India since the Simla Agreement. In a joint communiqué both the leaders expressed their desire to work toward a comprehensive settlement to reduce the chances of conflict and the use of force, but no tangible solutions were proposed. The next meeting, between newly elected prime ministers Chandrashekar and Nawaz Sharif, on 21–23 November 1990, did not come much further than establishing a hot line between the two leaders, and resuming the foreign secretary–level talks on issues of bilateral importance between the two countries. Meetings were also held at various international meetings where leaders from both countries happened to be present, but, as a consequence of the increase in militant activities, the opposition of the two countries grew even more entrenched. The promise of a breakthrough came when the Indian left-of-center prime minister Gujral met his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif during the SAARC meeting in Male in May 1997. They decided to reactivate the hot line, and to constitute working groups on various issues as part of an "integrated approach," instead of focusing merely on Kashmir. Joint working groups were to discuss issues such as Kashmir, peace and security, the Sir Creek contested territory near the coastal area, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic cooperation, and the promotion of friendly exchanges.
The installation of the new government led by Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Hindu chauvinist party BJP in 1998 initially led to a dramatic deterioration in the relationship. After India had exploded nuclear devices, Pakistan did the same. Less than one year later, in February 1999, Vajpayee met Nawaz Sharif in Lahore, the Pakistani city just across the border. In the Lahore Declaration, both sides agreed to "intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir." Both governments agreed to refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs and condemned terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations." They also agreed to work on confidence-building measures. The follow-up, however, was disappointing. Later in the year, the so-called Kargil war erupted. In late May, for the first time in twenty-seven years, the Indian army started to use air power across the high mountain ranges around Kargil in Kashmir, and in some other areas along the international border. On the Indian side, it was suggested that the Pakistani military was dissatisfied with the Lahore agreement, and that it therefore had provoked the Kargil war by pushing troops into Indian territory. The magnitude of the "infiltration," however, has never been made transparent in official documents and neither has the Indian government informed the UN or contacted the government of Pakistan before launching the strikes. The fact, however, is that when the military took over from the civil government in October 1999, the military leader General Pervez Musharraf appeared to make a number of conciliatory measures and proposed bilateral talks to solve all the issues. He, however, made it also clear that the unresolved Jammu and Kashmir dispute should form the central point of the discussions. The government of India thereupon invited the Pakistani leader for a peace summit, but the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit at Agra (14–16 July 2001) again failed in its objectives, because the Indian government continues to insist that Jammu and Kashmir is not a bilateral problem, and that the joint attack on terrorism should be the major point on the agenda.
Official conflict management in Jammu and Kashmir itself is also in a stalemate. The government of India continues to hold that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and that Pakistan should vacate the territory it has illegally occupied in "Azad Kashmir" and the Northern Areas. Any discussion on Kashmir with Pakistan will only be held strictly within the Shimla Agreement, which envisages a bilateral negotiating framework. In the meantime, the government of India hopes to bring back "normalcy" in Jammu and Kashmir and to slice off moderate elements for a separate deal with New Delhi. At the political level, presidential rule over the state was revoked in October 1996 and elections were conducted to the state assembly, which resulted in the National Conference of Farooq Abdullah coming to power.
The state government run by the NC favors continued association with India, albeit with more autonomy. After it won a two-third majority in the 1996 assembly elections, the government of Farooq Abdullah appointed two committees to make recommendations on the issues of state autonomy and regional autonomy. The "State Autonomy Report" was tabled in the state legislative assembly and was approved in June 2000. It stated that after 1953, forty-two constitutional amendments have undermined the powers of the state and have seriously affected the special status that Jammu and Kashmir once had. It is a very significant document, with a detailed list of complaints and remedies, but it has been rejected summarily in government circles in New Delhi. Only the left-wing parties showed some appreciation for the report. They have argued that the overcentralization and increasing authoritarianism in India is a dangerous development that weakens the unity of the country, and regard greater autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir as an example of a more federal and decentralized Indian state. Government parties and the Congress opposition have condemned the "State Autonomy Report" outright as bordering on secession, and as setting a bad example that could encourage other movements in India to likewise seek autonomy. The report recommends a return to the constitutional relationship of the early 1950s, based on Article 370, which effectively means that, apart from defense, external affairs, and communications, other subjects could be negotiated between the state and the Indian union. The strong terms with which the union government has reacted to the report of the state assembly does not augur well for the demand of more autonomy within a strict parliamentarian approach.

Multi Track Diplomacy

The government of India has always insisted on bilateral discussions with the government of Pakistan. As mentioned earlier, these contacts have not been fruitful. The most palpable breakthrough thus far has been the Tashkent Declaration, brokered by a third party (the president of the Soviet Union), when an agreement was reached on the LOC. Within India, negotiations involve many organizations, mainly political parties and militant groups. There are no other civil-society institutions that could provide a movement for an alternative solution. There is even a conspicuous absence of a peace movement. Some NGOs are active in rehabilitation work, but even their resources are limited and a number of them have given way to organizations that, if not directly militant, function as front organizations of a polarized political field.
The National Conference has played a major role in de-escalating the conflict and in defending the political and economic rights of the people of the Kashmir Valley, but on too many occasions the party has proved to be corrupt and vindictive and to observe an opportunistic relationship with New Delhi. Also internally, the absence of democratic procedures prevents a committed and independent leadership from standing up against the entrenched interests of the Abdullah family. Two other political parties are in a position to draw substantial support away from secessionist politics. They are the left-of-center People's Democratic Party (PDP) led by former home office minister of the union government, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led by its state secretary, Tarigami. Both parties have been trying to mobilize secular and democratic forces in civil society. Together with Saifuddin Soz, the influential member of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house in New Delhi), they are forming an anti-NC coalition. Tarigami reaffirms the party's stand that there can be no military solution to the problem and that only the process of dialogue can bring about a peaceful resolution. The summary rejection by the government of India of the unanimous resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly on state autonomy is an indication that such dialogue remains a distant prospect.
Much depends on whether politicians from the secessionist platform of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) are willing to join forces with the secular parties. The APHC is a fractious coalition of various political, religious, and secessionist groups that are both overground and underground. Professor Abdul Ghani Bhat of the Muslim Conference acts as the chairman. The People's Conference, the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen, the Awami Action Committee, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, and the People's League are among its members. Most of them are pro-Pakistani. Formed in 1993, the APHC wants to resolve the problem in Kashmir through a dialogue involving the parties to the dispute—India, Pakistan, and the "genuine representatives" of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It calls for the immediate and complete cessation of (Indian) military action and the reintroduction of the rule of law, inclusive of an end to custodial torture and killings. The alliance largely functions as a cooperative body with an executive council comprising seven members drawn from the main constituent outfits. The alliance claims to be the sole representative of the Kashmiri people. This claim has predictably been challenged by the NC and by established parliamentary parties such as the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPI–M), and the PDP. It has also come under challenge from Pakistan-based militant outfits, which after the APHC's and Hizbul's positive response to the prime minister's cease-fire offer have questioned the Hurriyat's credentials. The terrorist activities of organizations such as Jaish-I-Mohammadi, Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, and Lashkar-e-Toiba have intensified in the second half of 2001. The attack on the state
assembly building in October 2001, the threat to attack women who do not wear veils, and the strike in support of the Taliban enforced on 21 September were all instances of terrorist activities that did not have mass support and actually were in defiance of the APHC.
The JKLF, although divided in at least two major factions (headed by Amanullah Khan and Yasin Malik respectively) was the most indigenous secessionist organization in Kashmir during 1989–1995. Both factions regard Kashmir as a question of national independence for around 15 million people in India and Pakistan, and not as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. Jammu-Kashmir (including all areas that were part of the territory just before independence in August 1947) is regarded as an indivisible political entity. Only the Kashmiri people, or their representatives duly elected for this purpose, have the right to decide about the future constitutional, political, social, and economic systems for the country and its relationship with foreign countries. Amanullah Khan, chairman of the JKLF based in Pakistan, firmly believes that the "third option," involving an independent and unified Kashmir, should be given serious thought by India and Pakistan. Also, former Jammu and Kashmir chief minister and leader of the Awami National Council, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, tends to support this position.
The main political tendency among non-Muslim political organizations in Jammu (such as the Gujjars United Front, the Dogra Sadar Sabha, and the Panthers Party) is for the separate statehood of the Jammu region within the Indian union. The Panun Kashmir is an organization of the Kashmiri Brahmins. Its objectives include the establishment of a "homeland" for Kashmiri Hindus in the Kashmir Valley. This homeland, to be placed under the central administration with a union territory status, is to comprise the southern region of the state to the north and east of the Jhelum River.
As mentioned earlier, civil society in Jammu and Kashmir is weakly developed. Among the more active organizations are involved with rehabilitation, relief, and social welfare. The more important ones are:
Society for Human Welfare and Education. This society was set up in 1941, and is one of the oldest social-welfare organizations in Kashmir. Its primary objective is providing education to children from poorer families.
Jammu and Kashmir Hussaini Relief Committee. This committee was established in 1972, and has a long record of serving the needy irrespective of caste and creed. It has some eight hundred volunteers in different parts of Kashmir, through whom it implements its relief programs. It regularly organizes blood-donation camps throughout Kashmir, the blood being provided to victims of violence and the injured.
Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons. Established in 1994 by human-rights activist Pervez Imroze, the APDP investigates cases of people who have gone "missing" (generally supposed to have been killed) in the current turmoil in Kashmir. It also investigates human-rights abuses.
Kashmir Foundation for Peace and Development Studies (KFPDS). Established in 1999, this organization aims at restoring peace in Kashmir, investigating human-rights abuses, arranging for relief to victims of violence, strengthening democratic institutions in the state, and bringing people from the three regions of Jammu and Kashmir, representing various different ideologies, into dialogue with each other.

Prospects

After half a century of conflict and stalemate, the two countries that hold the key to the solution in Kashmir have not budged an inch from the positions they first assumed around 1950. The government of India, moreover, has not indicated that it is willing to reconsider the special status within the Indian union that Kashmir had in the early 1950s, and which gradually has been amended. Unless in both respects some reconsideration of the old positions takes place, the prospect for a solution of the problem remains bleak. On the other hand, terrorism may be reduced. The end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been followed by a curb of the more fundamentalist Islamic groups operating in Kashmir from Pakistani territory. In April 2002, President Musharraf has been confirmed for a five-year term on the platform of economic and political reforms, which included the elimination religious intolerance and terrorism. The scale of violence witnessed in Kashmir during the 1990s is likely to drop to normal levels, but Pakistan will not possibly renounce its claims on the autonomy of the people in Kashmir. Concessions from the Indian side will increase the maneuverability on the Pakistani side. Such concessions will also help to assuage the feelings of alienation and mistreatment within the Indian union, which affect many Kashmiri. Unless the government of India enters into a dialogue with the leaders who have organized the resistance from Kashmiri soil, not much headway can be expected. The militant groups continue to call for the independence of Kashmir, and in the absence of any movement on the political front negotiations may prove elusive.

Recommendations

The role of the United Nations has been progressively minimized since the 1950s. After the first cease-fire in 1948, both India and Pakistan have not budged from their position. While the entire world has been in the process of rapid change, both countries still adhere to their maximalist positions.

1. The first step toward a solution is that the bifurcation, which exists now at all levels and in all spheres, be breached by minimal measures. Such measures could include:
   • Facilitation of contacts between families divided by the LOC: Kashmir is possibly the last region in the world where even kith and kin remain separated by a border conflict.
   • The borders of Kashmir with India and Pakistan should gradually be opened for the transit of people, goods, and services after working out the formalities.
   • While the present Line of Control would remain in place until such time as both India and Pakistan decide to alter it in their mutual interest, both the countries should demilitarize the area included in the Kashmir entity; such a measure could be arranged on a bilateral basis or with regional (SAARC) or international (UN) supervision.
2. A political solution within the state of Jammu and Kashmir will require bold initiatives by the governments of both India and of Pakistan. The third option that has been proposed by certain groups in Kashmir, particularly by the JKLF, may not be a realistic option: one cannot expect both governments to sign away part of their territory. The plebiscite giving Kashmiri on both sides of the LOC a choice among accession to India, accession to Pakistan, or full sovereignty, is a long-term option only. It may by then have lost its urgency if the presently sealed borders between both areas of Kashmir have been opened so that Kashmiri have access to each other, even if living in two countries.
   
3. The demand of Kashmiris for greater autonomy has always been understood by the government of India as subversive. The accession of Kashmir to India has been on the basis of a separate constitutional agreement. It seems to be the overwhelming desire of the people of Kashmir to recapture some of the autonomy that has been usurped by the government. The absolute unwillingness of the Indian government, as again expressed in its reaction to the 2000 state assembly report, only helps to convince more and more Kashmiri people that normal parliamentary means do not work. The government should be prepared to sit down with the political and civil-society representatives of Kashmir and discuss what the special status of Kashmir within India could mean. This would go a long way in emotionally reintegrating the people in Kashmir with the Indian union.
   
4. The effective monitoring of human-rights violations and redress of the grievances of the people of Jammu and Kashmir should be put high on the agenda. The end of the Cold War may make the Indian government less jittery when it is confronted by (foreign) reports on human-rights abuse. It would be advisable to opt for a transparent policy and make it possible for all human-rights abuses, both by government organizations and by Kashmiri militants, to be investigated. This will be the surest way of convincing the people in Kashmir that the rule of law is paramount, also for them.
   
5. Other measures, such as stimulating economic development in the region, will be helpful. This, however, may not be the best policy to start with. As long as corruption is rampant in the state, it will rather lead to further polarization between the haves and the have-nots, and thus to more pent-up feelings of frustration.
   
6. Given the fact that neither country operating on its own has been able to inch closer to a solution for more than half a century, the governments of India and Pakistan could well benefit from a third party that facilitates the discussions and the agreements on confidence-building measures as a first step toward a more general solution.

Miscellaneous

1. The writing of this chapter was supported by reports supplied by Karan R. Sawhny, Suba Chandran, and Nidhi Narain of the International Centre for Peace Initiatives, New Delhi.

Service Information

NEWSLETTERS AND PERIODICALS:	Faultlines, Institute for Conflict Management; Informative Missive, Public Commission on Human Rights; Kashmir Quarterly, Kashmiri-Canadian Council; Kashmir Trends, Centre for Peace Studies; Peace Initiatives, International Centre for Peace Inititiaves;
REPORTS:	Amnesty International: 'India: Call for Restraint in Kashmir', London, 3 October 2001. 'India: Civilian Deaths in Kashmir Are Unacceptable', London, 11 December 2001. 'India: Use of the Public Security Act in Jammu and Kashmir', London, 18 June 2001. 'India: Welcome Steps to End Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir', London, 2 November 2000. 'Indo-Pakistan Summit: Plea to Put Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir Firmly on the Agenda', London, 12 July 2001. Centre for Policy Research, Kashmir Question Revisited, by A. G. Noorani, New Delhi, 1991. Delhi Policy Group, Jammu and Kashmir: An Agenda for the Future, by Kanti Bajpai et al., New Delhi, mimeo, 1999. Gandhi Peace Foundation, Jammu and Kashmir: The Way Out, New Delhi, 1996. Human Rights Watch: 'Behind the Kashmir Conflict: Abuses by Indian Security Forces and Militant Groups Continue', 1 July 1999. 'Cycle of Killings in Kashmir Fuels Conflict', New York, 1 July 1999. 'India/Pakistan Summit: Call to Address Human Rights in Kashmir', New York, 14 July 2001. 'Kashmir: Wave of Attacks on Civilians Condemned, All Parties Must Respect Civilians' Rights', New York, 21 August 2000. 'Rights Abuses Behind Kashmir Fighting: India, Pakistan Both Guilty', New York, 16 July 1999. Institute of Policy Studies, Kashmir Problem: Challenge and Response, by Tarik Jan and Ghulam Sarwar, 1990. International Center for Peace Initiatives, Next Steps in Kashmir: Give Peace a Chance, Peace Initiatives, vol. 6, nos. 4-5, 2000. Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, Kashmir and 'The War on Terrorism', by Cynthia Mahmood, 2001, online: www.nd.edu/~krocinst/polbriefs/pbrief8.html; Kashmir Study Group: '1947-1997, The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting Paths to Peace: Report on the Visit of an Independent Study Team to India and Pakistan', New York, 1997. 'Kashmir: A Way Forward', New York, 2000. Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy, Proceedings, Recommendations and Declaration of the Third Joint Convention, Calcutta, 28-31 December 1996. Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, The Road to Peace in South Asia: Lessons for India and Pakistan from the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, by Moonis Ahmar, ACDIS Occasional Papers, online: www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_doc/PDF_Files/Ahmar.pdf; South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Ten Week War in Kargil: From the News Files, by Sabyasachi Basu Chaudhury, and Shahids Fiaz, SAFHR paper series No. 7, 1999. University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Muzzafarabad, Fifty Years of the Kashmir Dispute, edited by Suroosh Irfani (based on the proceedings of the International Seminar held at Muzaffarabad, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 24–25 August 1997), 1997.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Breaking the Silence: Women and Kashmir, by Sumona DasGupta. New Delhi, Foundation for Universal Responsibility, 2000. The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace, by Sumantra Bose. New Delhi/London, Sage Publications, 1997. Constitutional Autonomy. A Case of J&K, by K. K. Wadhawa. New Delhi, Bhawana Books, 2001. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, by Robert G. Wirsing. New York, St. Martin's, 1998. Jammu and Kashmir: The Way Out, edited by Gandhi Peace Foundation. New Delhi, Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1996. Kargil: The Tables Turned, edited by Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P. R. Chari. New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2001. Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan Relations, by Ravi Nanda. New Delhi, Lancer Books, 2001. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, by Alistair Lamb. Herfordshire, Roxford Books, 1991. Kashmir: Behind the Veil, by M. J. Akbar. New Delhi, Penguin Books, 1991. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War, by Victoria Schofield. London/New York, I. B. Tauris, 2000. Kashmir in the Crossfire, by Victoria Schofield. London/New York, I. B. Tauris, 1996. Political Development in Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, by Usha Sharma. New Delhi, Radha Publications, 2001. Reclaiming the Past: The Search for Political and Cultural Unity in Contemporary Kashmir, by Vernon Marston Hewitt. London, Portland Books, 1995. State, Identity and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, by Navitna Chadha Behera. New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2000. The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, by Sumit Ganguly. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977. War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-8, by C. Dasgupta. New Delhi, Sage, 2002. War at the Top of the World : The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir and Tibet, by Eric S. Margolis. New York, Routledge, 2001.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	jammukashmir.nic.in/ (Official web site of the Jammu and Kashmir government, India); users.online.be/basjak/ (Belgian Association for Solidarity with Jammu and Kashmir); www.imtd.org/initiatives-kashmir.htm (Kashmir initiatives of the IMTD); www.ipcs.org (Web site of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, on various countries); www.jammukashmir.net/ (Independent web-based project providing research papers and documents); www.jammukashmir.nic.in (The official web site of the state of Jammu and Kashmir); www.kashmiri.com/ (Kashmir-American Council); www.kic.org.pk/ (Kashmir Information Center) ; www.krrc.org (Kashmir Record and Research Council, a network of research scholars basically supportive of the liberation of Kashmir) www.mha.nic.in (The official web site of the Ministry of Home Affairs, India); www.pak.gov.pk/public/kashmir/ (An excellent window on the official Pakistani position on Kashmir, with news from the non-Indian perspective); www.pakistannews.org/ (A daily source of Pakistani newspaper articles); www.satp.org (South Asia Terrorism Portal, a rich source of information on all ethnically based conflicts in South Asia); www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmogip.htm (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan);
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Naeem Ahmed, Department of International Relations, Karachi University, e-mail: naeemifti@hotmail.com; Paul Beersmans, Belgian Association for Solidarity with Jammu and Kashmir, basjak@glo.be; Nayana Bose, e-mail: nayanabose@hotmail.com; Alexander Evans, Centre for Defense Studies, e-mail: aevans@jammukashmir.net; Amitabh Mattoo, Jawaharlal Nehru University, e-mail: mattoo@jnuiv.ernet.in; John McDonald, Institue for Multi-Track Diplomacy, e-mail: imtd@imtd.org; K. N. Pandita, Friends of Kashmir International, e-mail: knpandita@hotmail.com; M. A. Raina, Jammu Kashmir National Awareness Campaign, e-mail: srinagar2000@yahoo.com; Karan Sawhny, International Center for Peace Initiatives, e-mail: karansawhny@bol.net.in; Farhan H. Siddiqi, Department of International Relations, Karachi University, e-mail: Farhan_74@hotmail.com;
ORGANIZATIONS:	Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons, C/o Advocate Pervez Imroze, Lal Chowk, Srinagar, Kashmir; Jammu and Kashmir Hussaini Relief Committee, Alamgiri Bazaar, Srinagar 190001, Kashmir; Public Commission on Human Rights, The Bund, Amira Kadal,Srinagar, Kashmir, Tel/Fax +91-194-456381 E-mail: p_imroz@usa.net; Society for Human Welfare and Education Silk Factory Road, Solina, Srinagar, Kashmir-190009 DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: In India: Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation; Centre for Policy Research; Centre for Study of Society and Secularism; Coordination Committee on Kashmir; Delhi Policy Group; Gandhi Peace Foundation; Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament & Environmental Protection; Institute for Conflict Management; Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies; International Centre for Peace Initiatives; International Centre for Peace Studies; Kashmir Foundation for Peace and Development Studies; Pakistan-India People Forum for Peace and Democracy; Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace; Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia; In Pakistan: Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; Pakistan-India People Forum for Peace and Democracy—Pakistan chapter; Program on Peace Studies & Conflict Resolution; Outside India/Pakistan: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy; Kashmiri-Canadian Council; Kashmir Council for Human Rights/Organisation for South Asian Peace.

About the author

Kristoffel Lieten (Belgium, 1946) is an associate professor at the Amsterdam School of Social Sciences of the University of Amsterdam (lieten@pscw.uva.nl). Since his studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi in the early 1970s, he has done extensive research on political and social developments in South Asia. He has worked as the South Asia correspondent of the Dutch and Belgian Radio and has become a regular media commentator. He has cofounded the Dutch National India Committee and has written several books on various aspects of politics, history, and rural development in India.