Author	Reinoud Leenders
Publication	Searching for Peace in Africa
Year	2000

Summary

Bringing to an end the period of Spanish colonial rule in the Western Sahara which dated back to 1884, Spain began preparing a referendum for the inhabitants of the region to determine the final status of the territory in 1974. However, armed hostilities broke out a year later when Morocco sent 350,000 'volunteers' into the Western Sahara in advance of the Moroccan army, even before the Spanish withdrawal. As a result of this 'Green March', over 100,000 Sahrawis fled to neighbouring Algeria, taking refuge in camps hastily set up in Tindouf. A liberation movement, POLISARIO (Frente Popular Para La Liberacion De Saguia El Hamra Y Rio Do Oro), set up in 1973 to fight Spanish colonial rule, began a series of guerrilla attacks.
Smaller refugee communities are based in Mauritania, the Canarian Islands and Spain. Algeria supported POLISARIO mainly because of its continuing border disputes with Morocco elsewhere. Mauritania, a secondary party to the conflict, briefly occupied the south of the territory but following a coup in 1979 renounced all its claims to the Western Sahara.
Other secondary parties to the conflict include France and the United States who indirectly opposed the creation of a separate state in the territory by providing military support to Morocco. More generally, both Western powers have largely refrained from putting pressure on Morocco over the Western Sahara issue as Morocco is regarded as an important ally in the region. However, formally both France and the United States have expressed support for the UN-sponsored peace process and the holding of a referendum to enable Sahrawis to decide on the status of the disputed territory.
In spite of Morocco's effective control of the region through its heavy military presence, armed clashes escalated into a full-blown war, especially between 1982-85 during which POLISARIO guerrillas claimed to have killed 5,673 Moroccan soldiers. But a 2,500 kilometre wall of sand, electronic detectors and mines surrounding the Western Sahara prevented any further progress in POLISARIO's attempts to take control of the territory. In 1988, following the first direct contacts between the two parties, both Morocco and POLISARIO announced a cease-fire. POLISARIO, however, has pointedly left its options open and says that it will resume armed operations as soon as peaceful means are deemed to be exhausted and unable to help obtaining effective independence of its 'Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic', declared in 1976 and currently recognised by over 70 countries. Until 1992, Morocco was repeatedly accused by UN-observers of violating the cease-fire.
The conflict in the Western Sahara can be regarded as a classical post-colonial independence conflict. In this respect, the Western Sahara is Africa's last remaining colony for which a lasting settlement has so far failed to be achieved. Ethnic factors in the conflict can be recognised in POLISARIO's claim to represent a separate nation different from Morocco by its descent from three ethnically and culturally distinct peoples - the Sanhaja Berbers, Bedouin Arabs and Africans who were brought to the territory as slaves. The Sahrawis speak a unique dialect of the Arabic, Hassaniya.
Domestic complications lie in the fact that Hassan II, the late king of Morocco, has used his claim to the Western Sahara in a successful attempt to create unity and divert the attention of his Moroccan subjects from internal challenges to his regime which, especially in the 1970s, has experienced serious political instability. His successor and son Muhamad VI inherited this claim on the area and found that the legitimacy of the Kingdom has become tied to his father's project in the Western Sahara. Economically, the 260,000 square kilometres of seemingly barren territory is significant given the discovery and exploitation of its lucrative natural resources, including phosphates, iron and fertile and productive coastal fishing waters. Partly as a result of its control of West Sahrawi resources, Morocco has become one of the world's biggest exporters of phosphates. These are used mainly for the production of fertilisers. Recent oil discoveries in the Sahrawi desert around Tarfaya -for which concessions have been granted to American and European companies- have further added to the economic importance of the area.

Conflict Dynamics

A meeting in Marrakech between late King Hassan and POLISARIO officials in 1989 marked the beginning of continuing negotiations about the territory's final status. A UN-plan for a referendum on self-determination to be held before 1992 was accepted by all parties and, accordingly, in April 1991 the UN established a special peace-keeping force, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) followed by a formal agreement on a cease-fire.
It was agreed that voter eligibility should be based on a Spanish census held in 1974. However, Morocco is reported to have sent thousands of Moroccans into the territory in order to shift the demographic balance, and thus the referendum, into its favour. Instructing these Moroccans in applying for registration as voters seems to have been a deliberate policy, as illustrated by a Moroccan government document dated January 1998 showing that local officials carefully co-ordinate and train fake applicants.
Moreover, the Moroccan authorities started hindering the deployment of MINURSO forces while they failed to withdraw half their own troops as stipulated in the cease-fire agreement. The peace process has been further frustrated by reports that Morocco had stepped up its intelligence presence in the territory, watching and arresting Sahrawis that spoke out for a fair referendum. Reports of torture, bans on demonstrations, mass arrests and 'disappearances' by Moroccan forces continued to have a negative effect on confidence-building processes between the two sides. On the other hand, in 1991, more than 300 'disappeared' Sahrawis were released. However, they received no compensation for their illegal incarceration nor was any information given on the fate of approximately 450 other Sahrawis that are still reported to be missing.
In spite of its stated commitment to the peace process and the high financial costs of its military deployment in the territory, Morocco seems to hold to its position that the Western Sahara is historically part of its territory while POLISARIO is seen as an illegitimate group of secessionist terrorists. Public statements by Moroccan officials, including King Muhamad VI, stressing that Morocco will never surrender the Western Sahara cast further doubts over the Kingdom's intention to let a referendum determine the final status of the territory. One explanation for this hawkish position lies in the fact that late King Hassan had directly tied his legitimacy as ruler of Morocco to the Western Sahara issue, as exemplified by his 'autobiography', significantly titled The Green March.
Consequently, POLISARIO has repeatedly stated its disappointment with the peace process and indirectly threatened to resume its armed struggle 'to defend [the Sahrawis'] right to self-determination and independence'. Meanwhile, disappointment within the ranks of POLISARIO has given way to some degree of disillusionment reflected in the defection of several Sahrawi top officials to Morocco. Some of them were included in a Moroccan negotiation team in 1993, leading to POLISARIO's refusal to attend a meeting planned in the US. Perhaps most importantly, 120,000 Sahrawi refugees remain trapped in the camps of Tindouf in Algeria where living conditions are extremely harsh with temperatures that can reach 50 degrees Celsius and with limited opportunities to generate minimum standards of health, shelter and sanitary conditions. Other victims of the conflict include Moroccan prisoners of war (POW) held in Sahrawi prisons. The International Red Cross recently estimated the number of POWs held by POLISARIO at 1,686. For years, Morocco refused to take them back, arguing that this would be tantamount to recognising POLISARIO. Morocco's attitude on this issue seemed to have been informed by political concerns that their return may negatively effect the Moroccan consensus on the Sahrawi issue. However, in January 2000, the Moroccan government declared it was prepared to welcome back all POWs held by POLISARIO. One month later, a first group of 186 Moroccan POWs arrived in Agadir.
Due to continuing disagreement between the parties regarding voter eligibility, the UN-sponsored peace process practically came to a halt and the voter registration process was formally suspended in May 1996. According to a former official within MINURSO, Frank Ruddy, these delays have cost the international community a considerable sum. Even with a reduced staff, UN presence in the territory costs some US$ 100,000 per day. In 1997, new peace talks between the two parties resulted in a series of agreements over criteria for voter eligibility and a new deadline for the referendum was set. The process of identifying 86,000 legible voters was finally completed by MINURSO in August 1999 following interviews with 147,350 applicants. However, the Houston Agreement allows the parties to appeal against the exclusion and/or inclusion of applicants. The process is now further held up by 130,000 appeals lodged by Morocco and 1,000 by POLISARIO.
The lack of progress in drawing up a voters' list for the referendum has resulted in widespread pessimism on the prospects of the peace process, both among the parties of the conflict and among those involved in managing the conflict. Morocco's continuing demands have been interpreted by independent observers as an indication of its lack of sincerity in its commitment to grant the original inhabitants of the Western Sahara the right to self-determination. POLISARIO officials have stated on several occasions their willingness to resume armed struggle should Morocco ultimately fail to carry out its commitments under the agreements it has signed.

Official Conflict Management

The United Nations has been actively involved in attempts to settle the Western Sahara conflict since 1974 when Spain asked the international organisation to supervise a referendum to take place shortly after. In May 1975, the UN sent a fact-finding mission to the territory that found an overwhelming consensus in favour of independence and opposing integration within any neighbouring country. However, Morocco tried to forestall the referendum by referring the issue to the International Court of Justice. The Court advised in favour of the right of self-determination by the Sahrawi people in 1975.
In 1985, the UN initiated a joint mission of good offices with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the dispute. The resulting 'Settlement Proposals' of both organisations were accepted by Morocco and POLISARIO in 1988 and passed by the UN Security Council in 1991. A multinational peacekeeping force, MINURSO, was established to monitor a cease-fire, verify the reduction of Moroccan troops, ensure the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war, identify and register qualified voters and organise a free and fair referendum. In an attempt to break the deadlock over voter registration, former US Secretary of State, James Baker, was appointed the UN-Secretary General's Special Envoy in March 1997. He brokered a series of agreements that became known as the 'Houston Agreement', reached between July and September 1997. The agreements included issues such as the identification of voters, troop confinement, treatment of prisoners of war and measures to resume the identification process.
However, UN operations have been severely criticised for failing to uphold a minimum of impartiality and compromising the credibility of the peace process. Reports by Human Rights Watch and declarations by former MINURSO commander Frank Ruddy have set out in detail how MINURSO has given in to demands of the Moroccan authorities concerning the voters' registration process. MINURSO is also said to have tolerated Moroccan measures that restricted Sahrawis' freedom of expression and movement during the transitional phase. Moroccan troop withdrawals have also failed to take place as stipulated in the agreements. As an illustration of the atmosphere, in at least one incident MINURSO was banned from raising an UN-flag over its buildings in the territory by the Moroccan authorities. Instead of protesting against such aggression against the peace process, MINURSO complied. The Special UN Representative for the Western Sahara, Charles Dunbar, resigned in March 1999, reportedly out of frustration with the slow peace process. He has been replaced by the American diplomat William Eagleton. Following delays and numerous failures to meet the time-table, MINURSO's mandate has been extended 18 times by the UN Security Council, most recently until February 2001. No new date for the referendum has been set. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), a body established by the UN Commission on Human Rights, submitted 242 cases of 'disappearances' to the Moroccan authorities since the mid-1980s. Some of these cases concern Sahrawis. In response to a report issued by Amnesty International in June 1999, the Moroccan Consultative Council of Human Rights and the Ministry of Human Rights acknowledged for the first time that some of the 'disappeared' individuals referred to by the WGEID are still being held in detention as POWs. To date, this information could not be confirmed by independent sources.
The United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) main involvement in the Western Sahara has been to give legal protection and ensure the provision of material assistance to refugees in Tindouf, as well as to Sahrawis living in Mauritania and elsewhere. One project the UNHCR supported, has been the construction of small agricultural enterprises in the camps in Tindouf for local consumption and profit generating. With respect to the current peace process, the UNHCR has been given the task of facilitating the voluntary return of refugees to the territory by providing transport and establishing reception centres as soon as the referendum takes place. However, to facilitate its participation in the peace process, the UNHCR needs to conduct negotiations with both parties seperately. To date, Morocco has failed to grant the organisation free access to the area. Suggestions by the UNHCR to arrange family visits by Sahrawi refugees to the occupied territories -designed as a confidence building measure- have not been followed up as refugees are concerned about their security as long as Morocco continues to have a large military and security force operating in the area.
The Organisation of African Unity began advocating a free referendum on the final status of the Western Sahara in the early 1970s. But as many of its members feared antagonising Western allies or weakening late King Hassan's position, the OAU refrained from taking a clear position on the issue until the late 1970s. In July 1980, POLISARIO requested membership of the OAU as a sovereign state. Although 26 of the 50 members then recognised the Sahrawi state, the application was delayed as a result of Moroccan pressure. Meanwhile, an OAU proposal for a cease-fire and a referendum was rejected by Morocco. In 1982 the Sahrawi state was accepted as member of the OAU, leading to serious divisions within the organisation. When POLISARIO continued to attend OAU meetings, Morocco resigned from the organisation. However, the OAU continued its role in the conflict, together with the UN-facilitated talks between the two parties in the late 1980s. Although the OAU became a co-sponsor of the 'Settlement Proposals', its offer to supply a contingent of troops to the multinational peace keeping forces was rejected by Morocco on grounds of partiality. The OAU continues to play a low-key observer role in the identification process. In May 2000, the organisation's African Commission for Human and People's Rights adopted a resolution calling for the immediate implementation of a fair referendum in the Western Sahara in accordance with the Houston Agreement.
The European Union has kept an extremely low profile with respect to the Western Sahara issue, undoubtedly due to internal differences among its members on the conflict. In spite of repeated calls by the European Parliament for greater involvement in the peace process, the EU has only passively supported the UN peace plan. In October 1995, the European Parliament adopted a resolution blaming Morocco for hampering the UN peace plan. A similar resolution was adopted in March 2000, following a visit of a delegation of the European Parliament to Morocco. A special gathering of members of the European Parliament (MEP), named Peace for the Sahrawi People, invited both Moroccans and Sahrawis to present their testimonies. They also visited the refugee camps of Tindouf, most recently in September 2000. But the EU at large refrained from putting pressure on either party of the conflict to carry out its commitments under the Houston Agreement. Most importantly, the EU-Marocco Association Agreement, in force since Spring 2000, does not refer to the UN settlement plan for the West Sahara. However, in March 2000, the president of the European Commission was reported as having offered unspecified forms of assistance to the implementation of the UN settlement plan. Meanwhile, the EU negotiated with Morocco an agreement over the fishing rights in Western Saharan territorial waters. Some MEPs objected to this agreement, arguing that it is tantamount to an indirect recognition of Morocco's claims to sovereignty over the area.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Domestic
NGOs have played a limited role in attempts to address the conflict. Locally, in Morocco, their role have been strictly confined due to the state's tight control on civil society generally in addition to a widespread consensus in Morocco that the Western Sahara is and should remain an integral part of Morocco. In the occupied territories NGOs are restricted in their freedom of access and movements. In the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, and abroad, Sahrawis have established an active movement for the defence of human rights with excellent relations with international counterparts. Many groupings in Europe, the United States and Australia have lobbied their governments to put pressure on Morocco to respect the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.
A Sahrawi human rights organisation, AFAPREDESA, or Association of Sahrawi Families of Prisoners and Disappeared, set up by relatives of Sahrawi prisoners and registered in Spain, has continuously tried to sensitise the public through news bulletins and communiques concerning human rights and the peace process. It enjoys observer status at the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and made presentations to the UN Commission on Human Rights.
The National Union of Sahrawi Women (NUSW) was set up in 1979 on the initiative of POLISARIO. It represents Sahrawi female members based in and outside the camps of Tindouf and provides assistance to alleviate the suffering of women facing abductions, torture and imprisonment. Other main interests of the NUSW include improving the situation for children, the elderly and the handicapped.
Another NGO, the Union of Sahrawi Jurists (UJS), is a Sahrawi initiative, grouping both Sahrawi and international jurists with the aim of sensitising international public opinion by publishing legal studies on the conflict and helping to establish a free and independent judiciary in the camps and for a future Sahrawi state.
Until very recently, only one Moroccan human rights organisation, the Association marocaine des droits de l'homme (AMDH) had taken up Sahrawi cases of human rights violations, even though it refrained from commenting on the Sahrawi identity of the victims. Other Moroccan human rights groups, such as the Organisation marocaine des droits de l'homme (OMDH) which is affiliated to the ruling party USFP, have been more reluctant to defend the rights of Sahrawis who were subjected to government harrassment. However, in June 2000, the OMDH sent observers to the trial of three Sahrawi activists who were arrested on charges of endangering 'state security'. Increasing willingness of Morocco's human rights defenders to cooperate with their Sahrawi counterparts was shown by initiatives of both former Moroccan and Sahrawi 'disappeared' and their families. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1998, they issued a joint communique, calling for all outstanding issues related to 'disappearances' to be resolved. In August 2000, a Sahrawi branch was formed of the Moroccan Truth and Justice Forum, another Moroccan grouping of former prisoners and 'disappeared'.
Moroccan NGOs that advocate the Moroccan point of view on the conflict, are rare and include the Moroccan Committee for the Regrouping of Saharan Families (Corefasa) and the Association of the Moroccan Sahara. Such NGOs are probably in most, if not all cases, front organisations of the Moroccan state. They largely focus on alleged violations of human rights by POLISARIO. Recently, such groups also began to call for the inclusion of Moroccans -allegedly of Sahrawi descent- to the list of voters for the UN-sponsored referendum. The Association of the Moroccan Sahara held a demonstration to this effect in front of the UN offices in Rabat, in February 2000.
The Moroccan press has largely rehearsed the government's position on the conflict and generally shied away from printing critical accounts on the issue. Both journalists' own convictions and government censorship may account for this. However, in April 2000, the Moroccan journal Le Journal published an unprecedented interview with POLISARIO-leader Muhamad Abdel-Aziz, whilst calling for a peaceful solution of the conflict over the Western Sahara. The magazine was subsequently banned and its editor, Abou Bakr Jamai, received stern warnings from the Interior and Information Ministries.
Moroccan political parties have similary confirmed the government's view that regards the Western Sahara as an integral part of Morocco's national territory. But in January 2000, Abdassalam Yassine, the leader of the banned Islamist Justice and Benevolence Party, addressed the King with a memorandum in which he blamed 'repressive policies and humiliation' for the alienation of 'our Sahrawi brothers'. Two months later, three Moroccan parties (the ruling USFP, the PPS, and the OADP) issued a statement denouncing the excessive use of force employed by Moroccan police against Sahrawi demonstrators in Smara.

International
Strategies of advocacy on behalf of POLISARIO or the Sahrawi people at large have been undertaken by many European solidarity groups and one major Sahrawi human rights organisation. Strategies of capacity-building, by way of briefing Canadian armed forces for their participation in MINURSO, were undertaken by a Canadian human rights organisation that is sympathetic to the Sahrawi cause. Fact-finding missions, undertaken by three international human rights organisations, have undoubtedly contributed greatly to conflict resolution. Lastly, humanitarian aid and technical support for the refugees in Tindouf has been provided mainly by Spanish NGOs and the International Red Cross. Dozens of solidarity groups based in Europe, the US, Canada and Australia have carried out public awareness-raising campaigns, lobbied their governments, and drawn attention to the plight of the Sahrawi people. Examples of such initiatives include the British Western Sahara Campaign, the US-based Defense Forum Foundation, the French Collectif d'initiatives pour la reconnaissance du Sahara Occidental, the France-based Association internationale des juristes pour le Sahara Occidental and several pro-POLISARIO solidarity committees in Spain and joint efforts of several European workers' unions. In June 2000, a manifestation organized bythe Australian Association of Friendship with the Sahrawi People was attended by Peace Nobel Prize laureate and East-Timorese independence leader Jose Ramos Horta. He called upon the international community to learn from its mistakes in East-Timor and safeguard a fair and safe referendum in the Western Sahara.
Perhaps the most active organsations in the field of advocacy are the Association de soutien a un referendum libre et regulier au Sahara Occidental (ARSO), which has a web-site containing a well-documented history of the conflict, regular updates, bibliographies and major documents concerning the conflict, and the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR), that in 1994 started its 'Western Sahara Initiative', mainly to provide information on the existing legal machinery concerning the referendum. The latter organisation has also offered its expertise, in an example of capacity-building, to MINURSO by twice briefing officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who were sent to the territory.
Fact-finding missions were undertaken by international NGOs including Human Rights Watch, resulting in a report in 1995, Amnesty International, resulting in a report one year later, and CLAIHR in 1997 and 1999. On a more regular basis, Afapredesa has used its extensive contacts within the occupied territory to constantly warn other human rights organisations of cases where Sahrawis 'disappeared' or were arrested by Moroccan authorities. However, only Human Rights Watch has been able to actually enter the occupied territories and interview UN-staff and Sahrawi victims of human rights violations. Amnesty International also recorded human rights violations by POLISARIO within Tindouf at the end of the 1980s. This encouraged the local Sahrawi authorities in the camps of Tindouf to take measures in order to guarantee an independent judiciary, as laid down in the new Sahrawi Constitution of 1995. However, those responsible for human rights violations in the camps of Tindouf have not been brought to trial and some of them remain in positions of authority.
Humanitarian aid, mainly to the refugees in Tindouf, has been provided by some of the solidarity groups mentioned above, the Spanish section of Engineers without Borders, established in 1991, and the International Red Cross. The latter organisation gives support to health institutions in Tindouf, allocates and distributes food in the camps, keeps detailed demographic statistics in order to determine the needs of each camp, and regularly visits Moroccan POWs held by POLISARIO. Since February 2000, it began to play a key-role in the release and handing-over of POWs, in accordance with the Houston Agreement. Major providers of food to Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf are the World Food Program of the UN and various humanitarian agencies of the European Union.
The direct results of the initiatives of the NGOs mentioned here are difficult to assess. Generally, advocacy strategies by solidarity groups are said as well as to have contributed to the recognition of the Sahrawi state by 76 states the fact that it has received sympathy from many others; this contrasts with the fact that, to date, no state has recognised Morocco's claim to the territory. Naturally, humanitarian aid has been indispensable for Sahrawi refugees who have few alternative means of support. Efforts by the International Red Cross to facilitate an exchange of POWs recently began to pay off, as witnessed by the return of the first group of Moroccan POWs to their homeland. Fact-finding missions have had the most impressive impact on the peace process. Amnesty International put considerable pressure on the Moroccan government by publicising several cases of 'disappeared' or arrested Sahrawis. In 1996, Amnesty publicised the case of a group of Sahrawis, including 'prisoner of conscience' Kelthoum Ahmed Labid El-Ouanat, who as a consequence saw their sentences reduced and were released. According to CLAIHR and other observers, especially the report by Human Rights Watch wherein the organisation accused MINURSO of being biased towards Morocco have contributed to the decision of the UN-Secretary General to revive the peace process by appointing a new Special Representative to formalise voters' registration and broker other agreements on issues that obstruct the peace process.

Prospects

Most observers committed to the peace process have expressed little optimism about the future of the current negotiations over the Western Sahara. In May 2000, the Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, pointed in his report to the Security Council at the little progress achieved over the last few years, even suggesting that the parties should be 'prepared to consider other ways of achieving an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute'. UN officials and third countries seem to be particularly concerned that a UN-sponsored but ill-enforced referendum in the Western Sahara may trigger off events not unlike those in East-Timor.
Unsurpisingly, POLISARIO has fervently objected to considering alternatives to the current peace process, which include holding direct negotiations with Morocco on a status of limited autonomy for the area. The Sahrawi movement fears that any diversion from the Houston Agreement will further enable Morocco to refrain from making any concessions towards the original inhabitants' right of self-determination. The most important obstacle to the referendum seems to be the fact that late King Hassan II made the territory into one of the ideological bases of his popularity in Morocco. Given his successor's repeated public statements confirming Morocco's claim on the area, it seems that King Muhamad VI is unwilling or incapable to break with this ideological legacy.
For Morocco, participation in the peace process seems to have become a way of appeasing international criticisms of its handling of the territory but the actual implementation of a referendum may only materialise when Morocco is certain the result will be in its favour. Human Rights Watch has noted that when MINURSO's authority is undermined by refusing to provide it with the necessary tools to organise a referendum in the near future, there is a danger that it will be forced to withdraw. The region's future, the organisation warns, may then be determined by a 'misdirected UN operation', not by a fair referendum. This could lead to a resumption of armed conflict.
CLAIHR, on the other hand, has noted that the people of the Western Sahara have never been so close to being able to exercise their right to self-determination. But delays and even suspension of the voters registration process may eventually halt the peace process altogether. POLISARIO has on several occasions stated that in such a scenario it would reconsider its military options. However, reduced Algerian military and financial support, in addition to an apparent problem of morale given recent defections, may prevent POLISARIO from immediately carrying out these threats. An unresolved but potentially violent conflict may then continue to exist.

Recommendations

There is a general consensus within the international NGO community that the only way out of the impasse is for the people of the Western Sahara to be allowed to vote in a fair and transparent referendum on self-determination. Most recommendations by independent observers have concentrated on improving MINURSO's handling of the conflict in general and the voters registration process in particular. Member states and the Security Council must ensure compliance with the Settlement proposals through direct, active and sustained engagement. The UN is also advised to keep employing James Baker to ensure that the Houston Agreement retains its authority and credibility.
Although internal accountability within MINURSO has been increased by periodic reports by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, the UN is seen as lacking an objective assessment from third parties. In this context, CLAIHR recommended the involvement of NGOs providing objective, impartial analysis as being essential in promoting transparency in the peace process which, in turn, may ensure greater compliance with the agreements.
Human Rights Watch has recommended that the UN re-examine and modify the powers of MINURSO in order to ensure a fair referendum is carried out without delay. Concrete proposals include making explicit MINURSO's mandate to protect human rights (a recommendation shared by Amnesty International); ordering an independent review of the identification process to ensure the impartiality of the process and increase transparency; calling publicly for Morocco to end the obstruction of the UN operation; ordering an investigation into allegations of MINURSO staff siding with Morocco in the identification process; and setting up clearer guidelines for the registration of voters.

Service Information

Newsletters and periodicals:	L'echo du POLISARIO (POLISARIO newsletter, Paris/France); Sahara Info (pro-POLISARIO newsletter, Paris/France); Newsletter Western Sahara Campaign (pro-POLISARIO, Leeds/UK); Nouvelles Sahraouies (newsletter of Comite suisse-romand de soutien au peuple sahraoui); Jeune Afrique (contains detailed information on peace process in Western Sahara); Liberation (Moroccan daily in French with regular updates on Moroccan position on Western Sahara); Middle East International (bi-monthly with news coverage on Morocco/Western Sahara)
Reports:	Human Rights Watch;? Keeping it Secret - The United Nations Operation in the Western Sahara, October 1995;Amnesty International;? Morocco/Western Sahara Addendum to 'Turning the Page': Achievements and Obstacles, August 1999;? Morocco and Western Sahara, Turning the Page - Achievements and Obstacles, June 1999;? Human Rights Violations in Western Sahara, April 1996;? Morocco - The Pattern of Political Imprisonment Must End, May 1994;AFAPREDESA;? From the Heart of Darkness - Testimonies of Former Sahrawi prisoners of Moroccan Jails, Tindouf, May 20 1993;CLAIHR - Western Sahara Initiative;? Western Sahara Initiative Phase II Report, Fact-finding Mission to Morocco and the Western Sahara, June 1999;? The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in Contributing to Peace in the Western Sahara, June 17-19, 1998.;? Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Algiers and the Refugee Camps, June 1997;Michael Bhatia;? Statement Regarding the Issue of the Western Sahara before the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 9 October 1998;United Nations;? The Secretary General's Reports on the Situation Concerning the Western Sahara
Other Publications:	Sahara occidental 1991-1999: l'enjeu du referendum d'autodetermination, by Thomas de Saint Maurice. Editions l'Harmattan 2000;United Nations Efforts to resolve the Western Sahara Conflict Appear Bleak, by Natalie Reid, Salim Fakirani and Michael Bhatia, in: Human Rights Tribune, September 2000;Les Sahraouis, by Ismail ould Sayeh. Editions l'Harmattan 1998;Western Sahara at the Turn of the Millenium, by Seddon David. In: Review of African Political Economy, 26, 82, December 1999;Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, by Anthony G. Pazzanita & Tony Hodges. Scarecrown Press, 1994;International Dimensions of the Western Sahara Conflict, by Yahia H. Zoubir (ed). Praeger Publishers, 1993;The United Nations Failure in Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict, by Yahia H. Zoubir & Anthony G. Pazzanita. In: Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no 4, 1995;Sahara Occidental - La Confiance Perdue, by Martine de Froberville. 1996;Sahara Occidental - Les enjeux d'un conflit regional, by Khadija Mohsen-Finan. CNRS 1997;Breaking the Stalemate in the Western Sahara, by Jarat Chopra. In: International Peacekeeping, vol. 1, no 3, 1994;The United States and the Western Sahara Peace Process, by Stephen Zunes. In Mideast Policy, vol. 5, no 4, 1998
Selected Internet Sites:	http://north-Africa.com (Maghreb Weekly Monitor);http://arso.org/index.htm (comprehensive database of news and documents, Association de soutien a un referendum libre et regulier au Sahara Occidental);http://sahara-occidental.com (Collectif d'initiatives pour la connaissance du Sahara Occidental);http://infoweb.magi.com/~morocco/sahara.html (Moroccan government sponsored site on Western Sahara);http://www.derechos.org/Afapredesa/doc/ (Afapredesa site in Spanish);http://www.web.net/~claihr/ (Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights - Western Sahara Initiative)
Resource Contacts:	Michael Bhatia - Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Fax +1 401 863 1270, Email iss@brown.edu;Yves Del Monaco - human rights activist on Western Sahara yves_monaco@hotmail.com;Robert Young - project leader Western Sahara Initiative CLAIHR, Canada. Tel. +1 613 233 0398;Andy Rutherford - One World Action, London UK. Tel. +44 113 245 4786;Abdeslam Omar El-Hassan - AFRAPREDESA;Suzanne Scholte, President of the Defense Forum Foundation, Email Skswm@aol.com
Organisations:	AFAPREDESA;BP DZ-Tindouf;Algerie;Tel. +213 7 932 332;Fax +213 7 931 568;Bureau de l'AFAPREDESA pour L'Europe;Paris, France;Tel/fax: +33 1 4585 1979;Email afapresa@derechos.org; CLAIHR;575 King Edward Avenue;Ottawa, Ontario KIN 6N5;Canada;Tel. +1-613-233 0398;Fax +1-613-233-0671;Email: claihr@web.net;http://www.web.net/~claihr/contact

About the author

Reinoud Leenders is based in Beirut where he is affiliated to the American University as an associate researcher in Political Economy. He reports on Lebanese current affairs for Middle East International. He also writes for a Dutch newspaper and the Lebanese daily An-Nahar on Middle Eastern politics. He is preparing a PhD thesis on the Political Economy of Lebanon for the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). In 1996 and 1997 he worked as a researcher in the North Africa team of Amnesty International in London.