Author	Robert Stallaerts
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

The rise to the top of Milo Djukanovic as president of Montenegro, and the ensuing conflict with former president of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, led to increasing tension in the relationship between the Serbia and Montenegro. Although the immediate threat of military intervention has receded with the fall of Milosevic, the relationship between the two federal partners has never been repaired. Prolonged political uncertainty about Montenegro's future could further polarize and radicalize the different sides. There is also a danger that the continued domination of the political agenda by the status issue could result in a loss of momentum in government reform efforts. But these risks can be avoided and various initiatives are under way to break the deadlock.

The issue of independence is a source of great tension and potential conflict both within Montenegro itself and between Montenegro and Serbia as parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Much of the polarization of Montenegrin society can be ascribed to the problem of double identity. Related interests of economic and political power, status, and position are also undoubtedly factors in this conflict, but partisans of the conflict themselves refer to a recurrent pattern in Montenegrin history. Consequently, this history is relevant insofar as it feeds the people's need for an identity, even if ideology and the media use very selective devices when constructing stories about identity. We cannot simply dismiss this search for identity as an irrelevant process of mystification or a form of easy self-justification.

There are two traditions in Montenegrin history that provide the background and reference points for protagonists in today's conflicts. The first is the tradition of the native homeland that in its romantic vision extends back in time to Dioclea or Duklja, an Illyrian settlement that later fell under Byzantine influence. Much later, the center of Montenegrin ancestry and pride was located in the mountainous region of Cetinje, an area that more or less preserved its autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. As a result, an independent Montenegrin state was finally recognized at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. According to this view, the Montenegrin identity was formed around the idea of a state that had developed slowly by grouping together various autonomous local tribes. But this was also subject to a second interpretation. As the region around the center of Cetinje expanded, some tribes with strong ties to the Serbian lands were incorporated. As more and more elements of Serbian culture were integrated, Montenegrins increasingly identified themselves with Serbs and eventually even called themselves "the best of the Serbs." From then on, the two tendencies were always present in the political and cultural life of Montenegro.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, for example, King Nikola of Montenegro promoted a dynastic party called the True People's Party (pravasi). In fact, this was largely a reaction against the foundation of another party, the People's Party (klubasi) by deputies who were critical of the regime. The members of this last organization sympathized with Serbia, and even proposed renaming the Montenegrin assembly the "Serb National Assembly of the Principality of Montenegro" and relocating the capital from Cetinje to the interior.

A second expression of this dualism survives into the present. During World War I, King Nikola went into exile and in 1918 the Montenegrin lands fell under the control of pro-Serbian military forces. The Serbian politician Nikola Pasic intended incorporating Montenegro into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes by annexing Montenegro to Serbia. However, local Montenegrin forces, with little or no connection to King Nikola, joined together to resist the proposed annexation. They had the right to participate in elections for the deputies to the special Great National Assembly, the body that was to decide on the political future of Montenegro. Their list of candidates was printed on green paper, and henceforth they were known as the Greens (zelenasi). The pro-Serbians voted on white lists and became known as the Whites (bjelasi). In elections characterized by intimidation and fraud, the Greens were outvoted by the pro-Serbian Whites in 1918. For a while the Greens resorted to armed resistance but, lacking coordination and discipline, they were easily contained by the Serbian or Yugoslav progovernment forces, and the Greens soon turned into a reformist force, more or less harmless to the new rulers of Yugoslavia. During World War II, history would repeat itself. In fact, in each crisis of Montenegrin society, the same basic pattern of conflict appears.

The political attitudes of President Milo Djukanovic can also be partly explained with reference to this historical background. Though he began his political career in the Communist Party, he made an easy switch from the pro-Serbian camp and the so-called universal values of communism to a genuinely Montenegrin stance. Djukanovic's political choices once more reveal the basic contradiction that runs throughout Montenegrin history. The bipolar structure in politics was in fact revived in the 22 April 2001 elections, where the two main coalitions clearly represented the familiar historical positions. The problems of holding a referendum can be seen as the recurrence of a long historical process.

Conflict Dynamics

The roots of the present conflict can be traced to the moment when its main protagonists, Milo Djukanovic and Momir Bulatovic, came to power. At the end of 1989, Slobodan Milosevic instigated the so-called antibureaucratic revolutions in all the members of the Yugoslav federation. The governing communist cadres were lambasted and finally driven out of power by mass demonstrations. In Montenegro, the government was overthrown in January 1989. Following an extraordinary congress of the Communist Party, Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic were chosen president and general secretary of the party. This put them in a position to assume the posts of president and prime minister of the Republic of Montenegro after the communists were victorious in the first multiparty elections at the end of 1990.

Both leaders were strong supporters of Milosevic's policies during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia went for independence and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was declared to have been dissolved by the Arbitration or Badinter Commission, a body installed by the European Community at the Yugoslavia Peace Conference that started in mid-1991. The EC Arbitration Commission defined the criteria for recognizing the independence of the new successor states of the SFRY. The Montenegrin leaders agreed to form the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with Serbia in a decision that came into force on 27 April 1992. FRY was confirmed by a referendum in Montenegro.

In May 1992, the UN Security Council installed an economic embargo against the FRY, holding it responsible for the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In July 1993, a minor disagreement between the Montenegrin government and the FRY was made public when it distanced itself from the federal decision to ban Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors from further activity in Kosovo. In September 1993, President Momir Bulatovic was attacked by demonstrators favoring independence. The impact of the economic sanctions had clearly strengthened pro-independence groups and Bulatovic himself tried to acquire more equal relations and a clearer profile for Montenegro vis-à-vis Serbia.

The first real cracks in the Serb-Montenegrin front appeared during the Dayton Peace Conference at the end of 1995. Bulatovic disagreed with Milosevic on the position of Montenegro, but gave in at last. Then, however, Djukanovic took over the criticism, leading ultimately to a dispute between Djukanovic and Bulatovic. The dissent between the two Montenegrin leaders gradually increased and eventually resulted in a break. In 1997, Bulatovic left the leading Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS, the transformed Communist Party) to establish a new party. In the same year, Djukanovic marked a definitive break with the Milosevic regime when he characterized Milosevic as a throwback to an earlier political era. Djukanovic's "For a Better Life" coalition adopted a strong Western, reformist profile and won a convincing victory in the elections of 1998. This effectively forced Bulatovic to assume an even more pro-Serbian position and Milosevic consequently selected him as federal prime minister. Strains and difficulties further increased at the federal level. The delegation of the new Montenegrin deputies to the federal parliament was not ratified by Belgrade. Ratification was refused because the Montenegrin law had been changed and in place of proportional representation, a homogeneous representation of the new Montenegrin governing coalition had been sent to the federal parliament. The existing deputies, mainly supporters of Momir Bulatovic, remained in place.

On these grounds, Djukanovic rejected all further collaboration with the Yugoslav federation and ignored all the decisions of its organs. The conflict gradually developed into an economic war between Belgrade and Montenegro, and at times military intervention even seemed a possibility.

In order to reformulate Montenegro's relations to Serbia, in August 1999 the Montenegrin government adopted a platform proposing a loose confederation of two equal partners. The two republics as two sovereign states—without implying official international recognition of independence or a seat for each in the UN—would share some decisionmaking in areas as foreign policy, defense, and security. However, consultations with Belgrade about this confederation proposal yielded no significant results. An official answer to the proposals was never received.

A further reason for Djukanovic to maintain a noncooperative, if not to say obstructive, attitude toward the federation was Milosevic's decision to change the 1992 Constitution on 7 July 2000. Not only did Milosevic hereby clear a path to a possible further term as president, he also significantly reduced the competencies of the Montenegrin unit. The principle that both states were entitled to equality of treatment was seriously threatened and existing minority guarantees were abolished.

For this reason, Djukanovic refused to take part in the September 2000 federal elections. This again had the unfortunate consequence that the party of his opponent Bulatovic, supported by Milosevic, won nearly all the Montenegrin seats in the federal parliament. When Milosevic lost the elections in October 2000, his Montenegrin partner, the Socialist People's Party (SNP), was still firmly in power and even delivered the federal prime minister, Zoran Zizic. Even when Zizic had to resign on the coalition problems surrounding the cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, he was followed up by his party colleague Dragisa Pesic. The federal institutions remained within the hands of the Montenegrin opposition politicians. This is the main reason why Djukanovic and the ruling government parties of Montenegro wanted direct negotiations with the Serbian government and Yugoslav president Kostunica.

After several informal and official meetings, it was finally concluded on 26 October after an official meeting between Montenegrin partners and Kostunica that the short dialogue on the highest political level had not moved the parties from their respective standpoints, as laid down in their earlier platforms. Now, ultimately the citizens of Montenegro themselves had to decide in a referendum on the fate of the Yugoslav federation. Djukanovic officially declared the referendum should be held in April 2002.

There are at least four other potential conflict threats of major importance to Montenegrin society. First is the problem of the relation between Orthodox churches in Montenegro, which is in fact closely related to the main conflict. Second, there could be problems with the Muslims of the Sandzak, as they are divided over both the Serbian and Montenegrin parts of this region. The third major problem is the expected resistance of the oligarchic elites to economic reform and political democratization. Fourth, it is still a big matter of dispute—again largely along opposition and government lines—whether there is a problem of "Macedonization." Is there really a threat of an armed uprising of Albanians in Montenegro?

Official Conflict Management

Before the parliamentary elections of 22 April 2001, there was no official domestic conflict management beyond the unproductive dialogue about two radically different proposals of the Serbian and Montenegrin partners in the Yugoslav federation. International diplomacy was limited to close observation of the moves of the protagonists, and displayed little initiative beyond issuing some cautious warnings, especially to the Montenegrin president, Milo Djukanovic.

The latest Montenegrin proposal on the relations between Serbia and Montenegro advances nothing less than a loose cooperation between two independent and internationally recognized states. Recognition implies a seat in its own right at the UN General Assembly, according to the Montenegrin Independence Proposal of 29 December 2000. It also implies the establishment of its own army and the creation of autonomous republican decisionmaking power in matters where no common ground can be found at the level of the federation, in fields such as foreign policy, foreign trade, and common monetary policy. Institutionally, the proposal foresees only one chamber of parliament, which has to be composed on a strict parity basis. Moreover, one of the partners of the government coalition, the Social Democrat Party (SDP), even expressed reservations about creating the function of a president for the federation.

Federal president Vojislav Kostunica reacted to this statement of aspirations by proposing a minimal, functional federation in the Minimal Functional Federation Proposal of 10 January 2001. In his view, the following competencies are (if useful) to be commonly shared: defense and foreign security, foreign policy, and competencies regarding a common market and a convertible currency. In order to secure the equality of the two federal units, the Kostunica proposal refers to the establishment of a system of multiple balances and a bicameral adoption of all federal decisions, on the basis of an absolute majority in both chambers: the Chamber of Republics and the Chamber of Citizens. The first has an equal number of deputies from the federal units, the second represents the interests of citizens on the base of "one citizen, one vote." However, in order to secure representation of the smaller (Montenegrin) unit in all decisions and commissions, an exception can be adopted from the purely quantitative principle. Moreover, the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro should have a president and a federal court. The president should chair the Supreme Defense Council. The government should comprise, under the prime minister, five federal ministers: justice, defense, roreign relations, finance, and transportion.

Shortly before the 22 April elections, Kostunica rejected the offer of Djukanovic first to secede and then to reconstruct a loose union of independent states.

Given the divergence of the two proposals, it was no surprise when, on 17 January 2001 in Belgrade, a confrontation between Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic, Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic, and federal president Vojislav Kostunica only resulted in the conclusion that "there were high unbridgeable differences of opinion," offering no space for a compromise.

However, Kostunica later declared he would respect "the will of the people," meaning that if Montenegro held a referendum after the elections, he would not object to a peaceful separation. This of course contrasts to the threats of the Milosevic period, though even Milosevic himself once declared that he would not go so far as an armed intervention.

The radical formulation of the independence proposal had an unexpected side effect. It caused a deep rift in the Montenegrin governing coalition "For a Better Life." The National Party (NS, Narodna Stranka) left the government, which in turn led to the new elections of 22 April. In the talks with Serbia, the NS stuck to the August 1999 confederation proposal as a point of departure for the regulation of the relations between Serbia and Montenegro. This proposal prescribed an outcome without the need for the outright independence of Montenegro. According to the vice president of the NS, it was in fact Djukanovic who had stubbornly rejected any comprise on this point. Djukanovic's attitude was however approved by the direction of his own party, the DPS.

Thus, the Djukanovic government only made superficial attempts to come to terms with the new Serbian government. Probably the dynamics of the conflict had already forced the parties too far apart. On the one side, the isolation during the Milosevic period had strengthened the Montenegrin consciousness that the country could function effectively as an economically and politically autonomous state. Furthermore, Djukanovic and his party seemed convinced that their power base could be extended by the radicalization of the political scene. The role of Montenegrin emigrants is probably significant in this respect. Montenegrin organizations in both the United States and Australia strongly supported independence.

Of course, it is also true that the international community had always supported Djukanovic in his rebellion against Milosevic. But once this problem was tackled, international diplomacy preferred to restrain Djukanovic from initiatives that may have endangered the stability of the region.

With the results of the 22 April elections, the conflict entered a new phase. The pro-independence coalition, "Victory Belongs to Montenegro," of Djukanovic's own DPS, and the SDP gained a tense victory over the opposition bloc, "Together for Yugoslavia," containing the SNP, the NS, and the Serbian People's Party (SNS). The media and most politicians in Serbia—not least Kostunica—supported the defeated bloc, and especially the SNP. The federal minister of internal affairs, Zoran Zivkovic, remarked that Montenegrins would require passports in Serbia and that workers and students could have problems. In fact, the elections were seen as a first test for a referendum and, on the basis of most polls, much stronger support had been expected by the governing party. As a result of the elections, the Liberal Alliance assumed a decisive role, and as the Liberals were traditionally the staunchest defenders of Montenegrin independence, Djukanovic has no choice other than to further his initiative for independence, as he indeed announced immediately after the elections. He was in an uncomfortable position. The internal opposition had grown and both Belgrade and the international community are unanimous in rejecting unilateral steps and advising dialogue. As noted above, shortly before the elections, Kostunica had already rejected Djukanovic's offer "first to divorce and then to remarry" by creating a loose union of independent states. Some sources even reveal that his party materially supported the Montenegrin opposition, once Momir Bulatovic had left the SNP.

Before and after the April elections the EU sent delegations to Montenegro to support the dialogue between the two republics. They demanded that no unilateral steps be taken. The EU still advocated a "democratic Montenegro within a democratic FRY." Nevertheless, according to the EU it is ultimately up to the people of Montenegro to decide on their future. After the Montenegrin elections, Kostunica brought together a working group to rewrite the Yugoslav attitude toward the Montenegrin problem. However, the new document scarcely departed from the earlier Kostunica position of a functional federation. After some informal and some cancelled official meetings—at times conditioned by rather unreal demands of who should or who should not attend the meeting—and following a three-hour discussion, Kostunica and Djukanovic concluded on 26 October 2001 that their standpoints were not coming closer. A referendum in Montenegro was to decide ultimately on the fate of the Yugoslav Federation.

Multi Track Diplomacy

According to the Center for the Development of Nongovernmental Organizations, at the end of 2000 there were more than 800 registered nongovernmental organizations in Montenegro, although only 30–50 of these were active participants in civil-society development. In an analysis of the nongovernmental profit sector in Montenegro in December 1999, the center pointed to the danger of the government and political parties usurping NGO activity. Funding policies are even deemed essential under the new law on NGOs.

Here, some NGOs are described that have attempted to find a solution for the future status of Montenegro.

The Montenegrin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
This committee has recorded its opinion in two recent documents. In a supplement to the OSCE report of 2000, its president, Slobodan Franovic, analyzes the development of the relations between Montenegro and Serbia and criticizes denial of rights to Montenegrins. A second document concentrates more specifically on the actual relations between Serbia and Montenegro. This is a joint declaration of the Serbian and Montenegrin, as well as the international section, of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. The earlier statements are reformulated in two recommendations to the international community: respect strict neutrality and the will of the majority of the people of Montenegro.

Youth Cultural Center Juventas
From 22 to 24 January 2001, a conference titled "Montenegrin-Serbian Dialogue—How to Go On" was organized by the Youth Cultural Center (Omladinski Kulturni Centar) Juventas in Podgorica. This continued a conference called "Dialogue as a Method for a Nonviolent Conflict Resolution Between Montenegro and Serbia," which was held in November 1999 and organized in cooperation with the Open Society Institute of Montenegro and international partners. The conference brought together politicians and law professors from both Serbia and Montenegro before an NGO public. Despite the divergent political standpoints, at the end a declaration was issued on the "minimum conditions that must be met in order to have the crisis in relations between Montenegro and Serbia resolved in a nonviolent and democratic procedure." Only this, it said, will contribute to the stabilization of the region. The seven-point declaration expresses the opinion of the representatives of some twenty-five NGOs.

ANIMA-Kotor, Group Most, and the Nansen Dialogue Center
In cooperation with the Danish Center for Conflict Resolution, ANIMA-Kotor and Group Most of Belgrade have set up the dialogue workshops "Let's Talk Together" since 1999. Their aim is to revive the NGO network in Serbia and Montenegro.
The Montenegro arm of the Nansen Dialogue Center has also offered programs to develop a dialogue between communities. It is incorporated in a network that encompasses centers all over the former Yugoslavia, including Belgrade. From 21 to 24 June 2000, it organized a seminar in cooperation with its Belgrade equivalent and the Norwegian Nansen Academy on "Dialogue in the Relations Between Montenegro and Serbia." A round table on "The Attitudes of Young People About the Juridical Status of Montenegro" was held in February 2001.

The Democratic Forum for Human Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations
The Democratic Forum for Human Rights and Inter-Ethnic Relations has also dealt with Montenegrin and Serbian relations. It has organized round tables gathering together a number of Montenegrin and Serbian academics to discuss the future of these relations.

The Center of Human Rights of Belgrade
Formed as an expert team for the reformulation of the relations between Serbia and Montenegro, the Center of Human Rights of Belgrade has subsequently found that the cooperation of some Montenegrin experts could not be obtained, as their Serbian partners would not abandon their preconceptions.

Reflections on the NGOs' Initiatives
The primary intentions of these initiatives appear excellent, but again no practical ways to resolve the conflict are really devised. While some initiatives propose radical (but contrasting) propositions, most NGO initiatives seem only to foster dialogue at a more or less preliminary and nonbinding level.
Of course, the primary decisionmakers in these matters are politicians and the electorate, albeit somewhat monitored by international diplomacy. While NGOs can do much to influence the atmosphere and the thinking about the problem, they mostly reach only a very restricted group of people. So far, in their opposition to the Milosevic regime, NGOs have stressed the basic right of Montenegrins to decide on their own fate and the need to develop the rule of law with a full guarantee of human rights. This is clearly reflected in the Montenegrin Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. However, a more complex and consensual strategy is perhaps in order. A first step toward this was taken by the Juventas conference. But is this enough? Can this attitude be made operational?

Prospects

Montenegrin authorities remain committed to independence. However, the hopes of the republic's ruling parties that the election of April 2001 would bring a comfortable victory, followed swiftly by a referendum and independence, were not realized. The narrow victory for the pro-independence parties only confirmed the depth of divisions over the republic's status. Plans for a referendum have been postponed until early 2002. With some difficulty, the pro-independence ruling parties formed a minority government. However, the lack of a broad consensus on the status issues or on the rules and conditions for a referendum make it difficult to press ahead with plans for independence under current circumstances.

The OSCE-ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) was mildly critical of the technicalities of the April elections, and reflection on the February 2001 referendum law made some suggestions about ways the referendum could be made more reliable and public.

More important politically were the critical remarks of the Yugoslav Constitutional Court on the Montenegrin referendum law. The court's main criticism relates to voting eligibility. Some form of local "Montenegrin nationhood" is required. At present, only persons resident in Montenegro for more than two years can vote. This excludes a lot of refugees temporarily resident in Montenegro, but more importantly it also excludes the Montenegrins living in Serbia. Especially these votes—given that U.S. and Australian Montenegrin emigrants are generally in favor of independence—would support the political option of parties who defend a stronger common bond with Yugoslavia. Eliminating these voters would create a strong bias in favor of the independence option. Additionally, there is the problem of whether a simple minority may decide the question. Of course, there are other guarantees. In order to accept the results of the referendum and change the constitution, parliament requires a two-thirds majority. The election results showing the complete polarization of the country have probably destroyed any temptation to ignore these requirements on the grounds that all this legislation was created under illegitimate political conditions. A new referendum law proposal, mainly worked out by the Liberals and Social Democrats, was presented in November 2001 to the parliament. OSCE-ODIHR earlier interpreted the new law proposal as a regression in comparison to the February 2001 Montenegrin referendum law, as the propositions on a qualified minority had here disappeared. In fact, only 50 percent plus one of the effective votes would be sufficient in this new proposal, while in the February law, 50 percent plus one of the registered voters was needed.

While in the short run there is little risk of serious conflict in Montenegro, prolonged political uncertainty could further polarize and radicalize the different sides. There is also a danger that the continued domination of the political agenda by the status issue could result in a loss of momentum in government reform efforts. But these risks can be avoided and various initiatives are under way to break the deadlock. Serbian government officials have stated that Montenegrins should decide on their future as soon as possible, so that Serbia's own development will not be held hostage to the indecision of its federal partner. Belgrade's impatience has been heightened by difficulties with its Montenegrin coalition partner at the federal level, the Pro-Yugoslav SNP, particularly over cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, which the SNP opposes. The view increasingly gaining ground in Serbia is that a federation that is boycotted by the ruling Montenegrin parties and whose survival hinges on an alliance with Milosevic's recent allies, the SNP, is not worth preserving.

Western intervention to ease the economic conditions both in Serbia and Montenegro should, however, soften positions and increase the chances of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the middle of October 2001, the Europeans once more confirmed this position. Kristina Galjak reiterated in the name of Javier Solana, the European Council's high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, that no sanctions or pressure were to be imposed on the Montenegrin government in its way to independence, on condition that all processes would proceed democratically and in full dialogue with all concerned partners.

Recommendations

In one of its recommendations during a Montenegro discussion meeting on 12 February 2001, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) tried to deconstruct the domino theory. The independence of Montenegro need not automatically lead to drastic changes in the other parts of the federation and could even contribute to the stability of the Balkan region. If the principal external actor, the European Union—in transatlantic consensus with the United States—simply rejects the independence idea, it would probably only defer the question and the outcome could be the same, though more acrimonious.

In another recommendation, the ESI suggested shifting attention from the independence question to substantive content discussions and how to make proposals operational. As a starting point, the European Commission could propose the creation of a genuine single market on the European Union model.

A third recommendation further emphasizes the need to convince Montenegrins to study the functional links of such a proposal on the independence decision. A final recommendation points to the possibility of supranational institutions that could link the countries to the European Union.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) states in its different reports that the independence of Montenegro should no longer be discouraged, as it has been by the international community. Instead, the international community should make a long-term commitment to assisting reforms in Montenegro, emphasizing the work of building the capacity of Montenegrin institutions to implement reforms, especially in areas concerning more transparent government. The Montenegrin authorities, on the other hand, should seek a resolution to the status issue through dialogue within Montenegrin society, among the political parties, as well as with Belgrade. To overcome the political deadlock, the equal rights of all citizens, including members of ethnic minorities, should be respected by all political parties, institutions, and the media.

Stojan Cerovic, writing for the U.S. Institute of Peace, likewise concludes that because of the broader interregional consequences, international concern, if not mediation, is needed. Much more than the viability of Montenegro or the FRY (e.g., the foreclosing of the possibility of Kosovo functioning as a third republic) is at stake, he says.

Of course, these recommendations should not be accepted unconditionally, but must be validated and reevaluated in the light of the actual processes in Montenegro and Serbia and between them.

Service Information

REPORTS:	Center for European Policy Studies, "President Kostunica's Proposal for the Reconstruction of Yugoslavia," Brussels, Europa South-East Monitor issue 19, January 2001 (www.ceps.be). European Stability Initiative, Montenegro Discussion Meeting: Sovereignty, Europe and the Future of Serbia and Montenegro—A Proposal for International Mediation, Discussion Paper, 12 February 2001, Berlin (www.esiweb.org) "Montenegro Should Clarify Its Relations with the Republic of Serbia," Vienna, 2001 (www.ihf-hr.org). Rhetoric and Reform. A Case Study of Institution Building in Montenegro 1998–2001, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (www.esiweb.org). International Crisis Group, After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkan Peace, Brussels, ICG Balkans Report No. 108, 2001. Montenegro: Settling for Independence? ICG Balkans Report No. 107, 28 March 2001. Resolving the Independence Deadlock, ICG Balkans Report No. 114, 1 August 2001. United States Institute of Peace, Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce or Something Else? Special Report, April 2001.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	Analyses: Non-Governmental Non-Profit Sector in Montenegro Today, December 1999, CDNGO (www.crnovo.cg.yi/analize.1uk.htm). Assessment of the Draft Referendum Law for Conducting Elections in the Republic of Montenegro, Warsaw, OSCE-ODIHR, 22 January 2001. Montenegro: La Rebellion Albanaise, Theme Fetiche des Antidependantistes, Sead Sadikovic, Le Courrier des Balkans, 4 October 2001. "Referendum Law on the State Status of the Republic of Montenegro" (draft), OSCE-ODIHR, Warsaw, 5 November 2001. Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce or Something Else? by Stojan Cerovic. Washington, DC, U.S. Institute for Peace, 2 April 2001. The Case for Montenegro's Independence, U.S.-Montenegrin Policy Forum Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 July 2001. The Union of Serbia and Montenegro: Proposal for the Constitutional Reconstruction of FRY, by Bosko Mijatovic, Dragobljub Popovic, and Slobodan Samardzic. Belgrade, Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies, 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES:	www.incore.ulst.ac.uk (INCORE guide to Internet sources on conflict and ethnicity in Serbia and Montenegro) www.iwpr.net (Institute for War and Peace Reporting) www.montenafax.com (Montenafax) www.montenegro.rog/religion.html (Montenegrin church and religion site) www.usip.org/library/regions/montengro.html (U.S. Institute of Peace Library, Montenegro Web Links)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Raymond Detrez, State University, Ghent, e-mail: Raymond.Detrez@rug.ac.be Jelica Novakovic, University of Belgrade, e-mail: jnovlop@EUnet.yu Daliborka Uljarevic, Nansen Dialogue Centre, Montenegro, e-mail: dali2003@hotmail.com
ORGANIZATIONS:	DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Association for Culture of Peace and Nonviolence; Center for Democracy and Human Rights

About the author

Robert Stallaerts studied at the Economic Institute of Belgrade and presented a doctoral dissertation on the economy of the former Yugoslavia at the University of Ghent, Belgium. He is the author of several Dutch-language publications on former Yugoslavia (on the collapse of the state, and on poetry and literature) and the Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Croatia (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1995).