Author	Mari Fitzduff and Liam O'Hagan
Publication	Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia - 2002
Year	2002

Summary

Northern Ireland, the northeastern section of the island of Ireland, was created in 1921 as a result of the partition of Ireland. Northern Ireland, which is also referred to by some as the six counties, the north of Ireland, or Ulster, has endured a period of civil conflict from 1969 until the present. In the main, unionists want Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom, and nationalists want to relocate Northern Ireland within the Republic of Ireland. Most unionists are Protestant, and most nationalists are Catholics. The situation has stabilized in recent years with a peace process resulting in the signing of the Belfast Agreement on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. Historic breakthroughs since then have been the birth in 1999 of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the long-awaited announcement of the IRA in October 2001 that it had started the process of disarmament.

The partition of Ireland that took place in 1921 was a logical outcome of the British attempts since the twelfth century to achieve dominance in Ireland. One key feature of these attempts was the use of "plantations" of settlers on the island as a means of control. Large tracts of Irish land were confiscated and then given to British soldiers who had fought in Ireland or to groups of people who wished to improve their lot, economically or religiously, by relocating to Ireland. Many of these people and their families eventually integrated their lives with the lives of the native Irish. Others, however, mostly those who came from Scotland and England to settle in the north of the island in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, retained their religious and political distinctiveness. These were Protestant farmers whose religion was the result of the recent Reformation, which had divided Christendom and in particular the British Isles, where only the island of Ireland remained loyal to Roman Catholicism.

Throughout the centuries, insurrections and rebellions by the native Irish against British rule had been common. Pressure on the British government to grant independence to the island continued to increase, and after World War I Britain agreed to limited independence. The pressure for Home Rule in Ireland had been firmly resisted by Protestants in the north who wanted to maintain the union with Britain. They feared their absorption into a united, mainly Catholic Ireland, where they believed their religious freedom would be restricted. Protestants also feared the poorer economic state of the rest of the island, compared to their own relatively prosperous region. Most Catholics living in the northern region, who were the descendants of the indigenous people who had been displaced by the settlers through the plantations, wanted independence from Britain and a united Ireland.

The unionists threatened to use force if they were coerced into a united Ireland and began to mobilize private armies against such an eventuality. In an effort at compromise, the then prime minister of Britain, Lloyd George, insisted that the island be partitioned into two sections: The six counties in the northeast would remain part of the United Kingdom while the other twenty-six counties would gain independence. Each state would have its own parliament. The decision to partition the island led to bitter civil conflict between those nationalists who accepted partition and those who rejected it.

At the time of partition in 1921, Protestants/unionists had a two-thirds majority in the region. The first prime minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig, described the state as having "a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people." This contrasted sharply with the Catholic ethos of the Republic of Ireland. The state effectively discriminated against Catholics in housing, jobs, and political representation. Membership of the Orange Order, a wholly Protestant society that was often essential for progress in politics and business, was forbidden to Catholics. Unionists dominated most local councils. Many unionists believe that such discrimination arose because many Catholics did not want to cooperate with the new state, and because unionists felt that the very existence of their state was threatened by what they saw as a subversive minority.

The ghettoization of society, wherein the two communities often had little contact with each other and discrimination prevailed, provided the main focus for the civil-rights campaigns of the late 1960s. These campaigns, which drew massive support from Catholics in Northern Ireland, were inspired by a worldwide nonviolent movement for civil rights to secure rights to votes, jobs, and services. The civil-rights movement drew a hostile response from the Protestant state, which saw it as a threat to its existence. The eruption of violence on the streets, and the full-scale movement of populations in urban areas into separate Protestant and Catholic communities, led to the formation of local vigilantes that in turn led to the resurgence of paramilitaries in local communities.

The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the descendant of the most forceful military group that had fought for independence for the whole of the island of Ireland in 1921. By the end of 1969, following the resistance by the unionist government to the civil-rights campaign, the IRA had begun to regroup, and by early 1970 its members were confronting British troops who had arrived on the island to assist with riot control. The violence of the IRA grew into extensive bombing campaigns directed against civilian, public-utility, and military targets. Support for the IRA increased in August 1971 when, in an attempt to curb the escalating violence, internment (imprisonment) without trial was introduced. Hundreds of Catholics were wrongly imprisoned and internment helped to increase significantly Catholic support for the republican paramilitaries. In January 1972 support for the IRA was further increased when British soldiers opened fire on a demonstration by nationalists in Derry, killing thirteen men, an event that was to become known as "Bloody Sunday." The official inquiry concluded that the shooting had "bordered on the reckless" and a new inquiry into this incident is presently taking place in the city of Derry/Londonderry.

The threat of the use of force by the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a Loyalist paramilitary group, in the early 1900s was a consistent factor in the opposition to home rule for Ireland. In the 1960s, a modern version of the UVF was formed. Loyalists were worried by the tentative civil-rights reforms for Catholics suggested by the prime minister of Northern Ireland and recruitment to the ranks of the Loyalist paramilitaries was substantially increased when violence erupted onto the streets in 1969. There was rioting between Catholic and Protestant areas of working-class Belfast almost every night. In the early 1970s, bombings by the IRA became a feature of daily life as businesses in the city center were targeted. There was frequent sniper fire from Protestant areas into Catholic areas and vice versa. Loyalist paramilitary tactics mainly consisted of bombing Catholic pubs and targeting Catholics for murder, and they often justified their killings on the basis that their targets were actively involved in the IRA, although these claims were rarely substantiated.

Throughout the state's history the actions of both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries have provided most of the horrific headlines in Northern Ireland through their use of bombings, shootings, racketeering, and community intimidation in order to secure political leverage for their cause. The attempt at political agreement in 1974, where there was a power-sharing executive, was destroyed by the actions of Loyalist paramilitaries. The campaign of violence by Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, with attempts at containment by both the police and army, lasted until the cease-fires of 1994 when the IRA announced "a complete cessation of military operations" followed by the announcement of a Loyalist cease-fire by the Combined Loyalist Military Command. By this stage, Republicans had developed an alternative way to fight for their political goals and Sinn Fein, widely acknowledged as being the political wing of Republicanism and the IRA, was crucially brought on board of the peace negotiations by leader Gerry Adams. In the 1990s, Loyalist paramilitary groups too began to develop their own political wings—the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP). These were eventually to play a significant and positive role in the discussions leading up to the Belfast Agreement.

In addition to the representatives of Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, these negotiations involved the other main political parties. The largest unionist political party in Northern Ireland is the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Led by David Trimble, the UUP is something of a broad church in terms of views but is generally seen as a representation of "mainstream unionism." The second main unionist party, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is presently led by Ian Paisley. The party have refused to "negotiate with terrorists" but have strategically remained involved in the process. They are critical of any perceived compromise by Trimble and the UUP.

The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is led by John Hume, although deputy leader Seamus Mallon was put forward as Northern Ireland's deputy first minister in 1999. The SDLP is a constitutional nationalist party and represents the middle ground in nationalist thinking. Although they want a united Ireland, they are committed to constitutional politics and nonviolence. Two other parties of note are the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), led by Sean Neeson, and the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC), led by Monica McWilliams. The APNI is a mainstream party that, although taking a pro-union stance, attempts to appeal to both sides of the community by encouraging cooperation and compromise within Northern Ireland. The NIWC is a relatively new party, having been formed in 1996, and has provided an important middle ground for dialogue among women and, just as importantly, for other political parties.

Conflict Dynamics

It is generally agreed that the paramilitary cease-fires and the current peace process were developed from a combination of factors. First, there was the realization by both the IRA and the British army that the war could not be won militarily, and the decision by the IRA to develop politics, through its political party Sinn Fein, as an alternative way to fight for its political goals. The SDLP played an important role in bringing Sinn Fein into the political process by engaging with them in pursuing common nationalist political goals by peaceful means. The cease-fires were developed through a combination of political dialogue processes that included British government secret contacts with the IRA, SDLP dialogue with Sinn Fein to see if common nationalist goals could be pursued together peacefully, and Sinn Fein and Loyalist contacts with the Dublin government.

Another important factor was the changing social and economic context in which many of the discriminations against Catholics were addressed, and in which a legal and social infrastructure to address issues of inequality, equality, and respect for diversity began to be developed. Alongside this there was an increased willingness by many within civic society—for example, among business, trade union, and community groups—to actively engage in the process of contact and political leverage for peace. As the process began to gain momentum, the development of some new (albeit small) political parties by the Loyalists, and by the NIWC, enabled some new thinking on the political landscape. Finally, a changing international context was an important factor in helping to facilitate the peace process. The proactive involvement from the U.S. government, and many U.S. businessmen and politicians, as well as assistance with developing peace processes from South Africa, are all cited as being important.

After almost two years of political talks, the negotiations that resulted in the Belfast Agreement were finally concluded on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. The agreement was approved by Northern Ireland's main nationalist political parties and most of the unionist parties. At the same time, the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland signed an international agreement. The Belfast Agreement involved constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland resulting in the ending of its territorial claim to Northern Ireland. At the same time, it recognized the right of self-determination on the basis of consent, north and south, to bring about a united Ireland, subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The agreement also involved the setting up of cross-border bodies with executive powers, the establishment of a Northern Ireland Assembly based on power sharing, and the early release of paramilitary prisoners. The agreement was subsequently endorsed by referenda in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland on Friday, 22 May 1998. In December 1999 a legislative assembly of both unionist and nationalist politicians was finally set up to share power in Northern Ireland, with ministers and committee members drawn from both sides of the political divide.

Thirty years of conflict have left deep scars in the community. In total there were over 3,600 deaths as a result of the conflict, most of which occurred in the early and mid-1970s. Civilians accounted for more than half of the fatalities. Most of those killed, 91 percent, were male and a majority of deaths, 53 percent, were of people under thirty years of age. Catholics were the majority of those killed (43 percent), as opposed to approximately 30 percent who were Protestant. Most of the fatalities, 59 percent, were inflicted by Republican paramilitaries, 28 percent were killed by Loyalist paramilitaries, and 11 percent by the security forces. In the majority of these killings, no one was convicted. Given the population of Northern Ireland—1.5 million people—it has been estimated that the number of people closely associated to those who were killed or injured is about half the population. It has been a huge price to pay for the inability of the people of Northern Ireland to resolve their differences peacefully.

Official Conflict Management

The governments of Britain and Ireland have been the most important international players in the Northern Ireland context. Direct rule was imposed on Northern Ireland by the British government in March 1972. The intensity of sectarian violence resulted in the deployment of the British army on the streets in Northern Ireland, where they have remained to this day. Throughout this period successive British governments have adopted varying means to manage the conflict. Among these, the British government has developed secret contacts with the IRA, while Sinn Fein and Loyalists have also done likewise with the Dublin government.

Dialogue between the British and Irish governments has often been seen as contentious, particularly by unionists. The dialogue was significantly helped by the fact that the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 afforded the Republic of Ireland a consultative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland for the first time. It was also helped by the Framework Document of 1995 that committed both governments to addressing the internal relationship between the Northern Irish parties, a new all-Ireland relationship, and a review of the relationship between Britain and Ireland. Cementing a formal role for the Republic of Ireland has been an important factor in the current peace process.

The persuasion and support of both the British and Irish government was an important factor in the eventual establishment of the Belfast Agreement.

The United States has been an important player at various times in the conflict. During the 1990s, the United States was of substantial assistance in helping to develop and secure dialogue and peace. The United States had gradually developed a perspective that was able to take account of the needs and fears of unionists as well as nationalists. In the 1990s, spurred by the interests of the Irish vote in the United States, politicians began to focus on ways of ending the violence. U.S. congressmen and people from the business community visited Ireland to persuade the IRA of the need to end the military campaign, and to engage with the unionist community. Such assistance was particularly exemplified by the assistance of Senator George Mitchell, who acted as chair of the talks process for almost two years and whose efforts were invaluable to its success.

Developments in Northern Ireland must also be understood within an increasingly important European context. The continued expansion and development of the European Union have been used by some—for example, John Hume of the SDLP—as a means of recontextualizing the situation in order to envisage a so-called postnationialist society. External assistance offered by the EU was also of significance. When the cease-fires were declared in 1994, the EU decided to help to underpin the peace by allocating £250 million to help build upon the economy and establish peace. Such funds have been useful, as their criteria for distribution included in many cases the need for communities to work together on funding decisions. Such processes ensure that communities can no longer continue to be unaware of each other's social and economic needs, and have in many cases provided very useful training for future collaborative government at both local and regional levels.

In addition, many people have looked to the example of South Africa, and from the mid-1990s there were many initiatives that helped civil society and politicians to learn from the lessons of South Africa.

Multi Track Diplomacy

Community Relations Commission and Council
When civil violence broke out in 1969 in Northern Ireland, the British government set up a ministry for community relations and a Community Relations Commission, charged with the promotion of policies that would improve community relations. The commission decided to adopt as its main strategy the initiation of local community-development programs across Northern Ireland, based on the belief that communities that lacked self-confidence were more likely to relate aggressively to one another. Although the commission only survived a few years, the process of community development remained an important method of facilitating communication within communities, and between government and communities, and this process continued to underpin many programs that were initiated and funded in the decades that followed.

Subsequently, in 1987, a Central Community Relations Unit was set up, which was located at the heart of government, and in 1990 an independent body, the Community Relations Council, was established to address issues of policy, training, and funding for community-relations work. Consequently, there was a significant expansion of the number of groups working at peacebuilding, which was facilitated by a hugely increased financial investment in such work. By 1998, the number of civic groups engaging in contact work and developing programs and training to address issues of cultural diversity, justice work, cooperation on social and economic issues, single-identity work, "neutral" venue work, education work, anti-sectarian and anti-intimidation work, trade union work, political dialogue, and mediation work had increased significantly (from 40 in 1986 to 150 in 2000).¹

Mediators
Throughout the conflict there have been many hundreds of initiatives aimed at achieving contact, or shuttle diplomacy between the participants to the conflict. Shuttle diplomacy is where a mediator tries to increase understanding of differing perspectives through sequential conversations with the participants, rather than through contact between them. Indigenous mediators undertook most of these initiatives, although there were some very useful interventions by people from outside of Northern Ireland and particularly by some who came from a Quaker or Mennonite tradition. Such mediators tried to provide safe and unthreatening opportunities for politicians to look at issues of mutual concern such as social issues, or the economy, the conflict in Northern Ireland, or conflicts elsewhere. Training for such mediation was developed by many civic organizations, and such training provided a pool of people, many from difficult local communities, who were capable of defusing many social and political hostilities, and seeking agreements on many contentious issues.

Initiative 92: Community Consultation
In 1992 a major civil-society program, called Initiative 92, asked local communities and other interested bodies and individuals to express their views about ways forward for the future for Northern Ireland on a political, economic, and social level. Although condemned by most politicians (who initially saw it as irrelevant or threatening), the initiative was a significant success in achieving its objective of stimulating discussion. It received over five hundred submissions from people and groups in Northern Ireland, many of which had been developed on a cross-community basis, and it held public workshops at which various contributors were given an opportunity to expand on their ideas. The submissions were eventually contained in a huge ideas book for Northern Ireland called the Opsahl Report. Many of these ideas were to prove fruitful in eventually generating the Belfast Agreement.

Academics
During the 1990s, academics and others who were committed to constructive dialogue processes were very useful in organizing workshops for politicians and others to meet in places like the United States or South Africa in order to address issues of conflict resolution. These conferences often provided opportunities for relationships to form between the politicians, which were difficult to form at home in Northern Ireland given the restricted nature of society and the watchful eyes of the media. In addition, they also provided many opportunities for participants to learn from others elsewhere about what had been useful in constructing peace.

Churches
Although the churches themselves had in the main contributed little to dialogue processes, there were some exceptions. In addition to the work by some members of the Catholic clergy in opening up and developing dialogue with Sinn Fein in order to end violence, confidential workshops were held over a period of several years in the mid-1990s between Sinn Fein and members of the Protestant/unionist clergy. These were very useful in developing understanding between the parties. In addition, there were some Christian groups such as Corrymeela and Cornerstone who were very involved in facilitating contact and dialogue between opposing communities even during very difficult times of the conflict.

District Councils
Northern Ireland has twenty-six local councils that have, with varying degrees, exemplified the hostility that has pervaded much of Northern Ireland's public life. However, in 1990, a district council community-relations program was developed that was eventually established within all councils, despite resistance by many of them. Each of the twenty-six district councils now has at least one full-time community-relations worker addressing coexistence needs in its local area. As their programs have had to ensure an overall commitment from what are often very divided councils, their existence has marked a substantial sign of progress in the field. Such programs involved contact work, cooperative economic development programs between the communities, cultural events that exemplified cultural diversity, mediation, problem solving, and political discussion workshops.

Business Community
A late, but effective, newcomer to the peace process was the business community, who began, in the mid-1990s, to cooperate with each other and with the trade unions to see if a more strategic approach could be put in place that would put pressure on both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries to end their campaign of violence. They also publicly encouraged all parties to get involved in political negotiations. Groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors, and the trade unions involved themselves in dialogue with Sinn Fein and the Loyalist parties, often on issues of the economy. Their influence was very helpful, particularly as it also put pressure on the political parties to enter into serious dialogue.

Cultural Traditions Group
For the entire period of the existence of Northern Ireland, expressions of cultural and political identity have been contentious. However, much of this has now changed—mainly due to the work of the Cultural Traditions Group, a group of academics, practitioners, and policymakers drawn from both the nationalist and unionist communities, which was set up in 1989 to address issues of culture and division. Together they addressed the hostility about the use of the Irish language, which was illegal in certain circumstances, ensured that broadcasters diversified their programs to represent all cultures, and undertook very extensive programs to ensure that the varying aspects of music and symbolism became much less contentious.

Policing
A particular area where issues of diversity were exceptionally critical was in the area of policing. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) has been a largely Protestant force, with a participation rate of only 6 percent of Catholics by 1994. In 1993, the RUC, in cooperation with the Community Relations Council and various NGOs such as Mediation Network and the Understanding Conflict Trusts, began to develop programs to deal with issues of sectarianism among the force, and to encourage a greater respect and understanding for the differing cultural and political traditions in Northern Ireland. Such training is now an integral part of the initial training of all recruits entering the force, and has also been introduced as part of the in-service training of established police personnel.

Civil Society and New Leaders
The program of community development that began in the 1970s began to pay significant political dividends in the 1990s. In the absence of local democracy, such work had provided for community participation in governmental consultation processes about social, economic, and political issues. By the 1990s, however, it had also helped to generate a new breed of "community" politicians. They developed Loyalist, Republican, and feminist thinking in a way that significantly enriched the political mix of parties who were eventually able to sign the Belfast Agreement. Parties such as the PUP, the NIWC, and Sinn Fein all have considerable experience at community and social politics. Such work also provided them with fruitful contacts gained from their collective experience in addressing local social issues together, and such experience will be useful for the social and economic tasks that face them as representatives in the new Assembly.

"YES" Campaign
Politicians often find it hard to deliver on political agreements because politicians are usually the people who find it the hardest to develop policies of diversity in the face of the fears of their electorates. Thus there is often a need for a constituency for such validation to be developed by their electorates. This can enable or permit them to move with energy on such policies, and here NGOs and others can play a crucial part. Such was the case in Northern Ireland where the work of the NGOs was crucial in developing processes of dialogue, models of training, and constituencies for political agreement both during the pre-agreement phase of the peace process and afterward. The "YES" campaign was a cross-community, cross-party campaign organized by civil-society leaders to secure its endorsement of the Good Friday agreement reached by the politicians in 1998.

Prospects

Northern Ireland is still very much in a state of transition. There is hope, as witnessed through the development and working of the various mechanisms of government. Local politicians have been given opportunities to deal with everyday political issues. The majority of people within Northern Ireland are still supportive of the peace process and there remains much goodwill. There are, however, a number of difficult issues that remain crucial to the future of Northern Ireland. The most difficult of these has proved to be the decommissioning of arms by the paramilitaries. Although agreed as part of the process in the Good Friday agreement, the modalities for such have proved to be the most difficult stumbling block in implementing the agreement. Linked to decommissioning is the issue of the demilitarization of British armed forces, which is of particular importance for Republicans.

The reform of policing was to prove almost equally difficult. From the time of its creation in Northern Ireland, the RUC police force has been seen as not only consolidating the divisions, but as largely representing and supporting the unionist, Protestant majority. The figure for Catholic participation in 1994 was 7 percent. The Patten Report of 1999 (commissioned under the terms of the Belfast Agreement to make recommendations for future policing within Northern Ireland) made many recommendations about the need to change the nature of the composition of the police force so as to ensure the inclusion of more Catholics. It also recommended many changes to the structures of accountability of the police so as to ensure more overall community responsibility for policing strategy, as well as making recommendation about changing the name and symbols of the police force so that they could be seen as neutral. In addition, a new independent Police Ombudsman has been appointed to oversee complaints about policing. Many of these changes were to prove difficult for many unionists, and agreement on their implementation has taken far longer than expected. However, in autumn 2001, the main nationalist party, the SDLP, agreed, for the first time in history, to take up their positions on the newly formed Policing Board. This agreement should significantly advance the capacity of the police to become a much more representative body, with a capacity to be seen to be serving all communities equally.

Significant advances have been made in housing, employment, and other areas, but much remains to be achieved. There is a problem of long-term unemployment, particularly among Catholics (who are still twice as likely to be unemployed as Protestants), and in ensuring Catholic equality at the most senior levels of the civil service. The danger is that advances for the Catholic community can be perceived as deficits for the Protestant community in a "zero sum" game that does little to foster cooperation. At some point, Northern Ireland also has to deal with its past and the grievances of those who have suffered have to be acknowledged. It is a difficult balance, for while Northern Ireland has to deal with its past it has too often been held hostage to this past.

Finally, parades have been an important feature in Northern Ireland society since the eighteenth century as a means of commemorating and celebrating key historical events, particularly in the Protestant community. For many, they fulfill a social, political, and religious role. The actual number of annual parades has been increasing steadily and substantially over the past ten years, with 1995 seeing a total of 3,500 parades throughout Northern Ireland (an increase of 43 percent from 1986). Opposition to Loyalist parades from Catholic residents' groups has also increased and the "Drumcree" parade has been a focal point for varying degrees of civil unrest in recent years.

Should the Belfast Agreement and the institutions of government fail, the likelihood is that some type of informal joint authority between the British and Irish governments will be established. Relations between the British and Irish governments have improved to the extent that such an eventuality is not inconceivable, and their continuing cooperation is likely to be the most positive force that will sustain and develop peace in the future.

Recommendations

The current peace process, for all its flaws, needs to be supported and nurtured if it is to achieve longevity and lead to a stable future for Northern Ireland. In many ways its very contradictions are a representation of the problems of Northern Ireland society.

The international context has been cited previously. This support is important in the future but at the same time Northern Ireland has to take responsibility for its own future. A situation where all sides have equality of opportunity and a real stake in society is to be encouraged. In this regard it is important that "gains" for one section of the community are not equated as "losses" by the other. This is important if it is to achieve the legitimacy, both internally and internationally, that can see it prosper in the medium to long term.

The money that has come to Northern Ireland through the European Union Special Development Programme for Peace and Reconciliation has been important in helping to stabilize the situation in Northern Ireland. Community work, prisoners' groups, and victims' groups have all been developed through this input. There is a danger that much of this work will be lost as the money dries up. It is important that this does not happen, as grass-roots work from the bottom up is a significant engine for change. Of course, such work is not sufficient on its own and sectarianism retains a grip on large sections of the community. Distrust has been reinforced by the fact that it was possible for many people from one side of the religious-political divide to live, study, pray, work, and socialize almost completely apart from people of the other side of the divide. This situation will not be changed overnight, and it is only by a series of painstakingly slow and small steps that change can come about.

Miscellaneous

1. Single-identity work is done within a community to increase confidence building prior to contact/cooperative work. Neutral venue work addresses the need to develop physical meeting places that are acceptable to both communities, and is much needed in Northern Ireland where most local venues are sectarian. Anti-sectarian work examines exclusion and discriminatory processes by groups and individuals against other groups, and develops programs to address these phenomena, i.e., reviewing the cross-community nature of staff and management, patrons, choices of holidays, and cultural practices within institutions that are alienated from one or another community. Anti-intimidation work includes addressing the difficulties of divided workplaces where contentious issues of flag flying and discrimination have frequently resulted in violence and sometimes in murder, and furthers the implementation of staff policies and training to deal with such intimidation.

Service Information

REPORTS:	Central Community Relations Unit, Northern Ireland Office, Training for Community Relations Work, by Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, 1998. Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster Clashing Symbols? by Clem McCartney, Belfast, 1994. Community Relations and Local Government, by Colin Knox and John Hughes, Coleraine, Institute of Irish Studies, Queen's University, 1997. Community Relations Council, Annual Reports 1990–99, by Community Relations Council, Belfast, 1997. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, "Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of a Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland," Cameron Report, Belfast, 1969. INCORE, University of Ulster Mapping Troubles Related Deaths, by Mari Fitzduff, Derry Londonderry, 1989. Past Imperfect: Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition, edited by Brandon Hamber, Derry Londonderry, 1998. Policy and Planning Unit, Northern Ireland Office, A Typology of Community Relations Work and Contextual Necessities, Belfast.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS:	A Citizens' Inquiry: The Opsahl Report, by Andy Pollak. Dublin, Lilliput Press, 1993. A Farewell to Arms? From "Long War" to Long Peace in Northern Ireland, by Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000. Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Processes in Northern Ireland, by Mari Fitzduff. Tokyo, United Nations University, 1996. In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland, by Finnoula O'Connor. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1993. Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women, and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, by David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, and Chris Thorton. Edinburgh, Mainstream Publishing, 1999. Multiparty Mediation: Northern Ireland as a Case Study, by Paul Arthur. In Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Paula Aal P (eds.), Herding Cats: The Management of Complex Mediation, Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace, 1992. Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968–1999, by Sydney Elliott and W. D. Flackes with John Coulter. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1999. Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs, by Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth. London, Pluto Press, 1999. Northern Protestants: An Unsettled People, by Susan McKay. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 2000. Paths to a Settlement in Northern Ireland, by Sean Farren and Robert F. Mulvihill. Buckinghamshire, Colin Smythe Limited Publishers, 2000. Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland. Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory, by David Bloomfield. London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997. Rethinking Unionism: An Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland, by Norman Porter. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1998. Scorpions in a Bottle—Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland, by John Darby. London, Minority Rights Publications, 1997. "Striking a Balance: The Northern Ireland Peace Process," by Clem McCartney. Accord, An International Review of Peace Initiatives, Issue 8, Conciliation Resources, 1999. The Churches and Inter Community Relationships, by Duncan Morrow. Coleraine, Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster, 1994. The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland, by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 2000.
SELECTED INTERNET SITES	www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/cds/countries/nireland.html (the INCORE Conflict Data Service: Country Guide for Northern Ireland) www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/ (the Conflict Archive on the Internet [CAIN] site) www.northernireland.gov.uk/ (government of Northern Ireland) www.nio.gov.uk/ (Northern Ireland Office) www.paradescommission.org/ (Northern Ireland Parades Commission) www.community-relations.org.uk/community-relations/ (Community Relations Council)
RESOURCE CONTACTS:	Paul Arthur, University of Ulster, e-mail: paul@incore.ulst.ac.uk Maggie Bierne, Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast, e-mail: webmaster@caj.org.uk Richard English, Queen's University of Belfast, e-mail: politics@qub.ac.uk Tanya Gallagher, Peace and Reconciliation Group, Derry Londonderry, fax: +44 (0) 28 71 377009 Bronagh Hynds, Ulster People's College, Belfast, e-mail: upc@cinni.org Neil Jarman, Community Development Centre, Belfast, e-mail: info@cdcnb.org Avila Kilmurry, Northern Voluntary Trust, Belfast, e-mail: info@nivt.org Paul O'Connor, the Pat Finucane Centre, Derry Londonderry, e-mail: pfc@www.serve.com Chris O'Halloran, Belfast Interface Project, e-mail: bip@cinni.org
ORGANIZATIONS:	Equality Commission for Northern Ireland Andras House 60 Great Victoria Street Belfast BT2 7BB Tel.: +44 (28) 90 500600 Fax: +44 (28) 90 331544 Email: cbradley@equalityni.org www.equalityni.org/, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Temple Court 39 North Street Belfast BT1 1NA Tele.: +44 (28) 9024 3987 Fax: +44 (28) 9024 7844 Email: nihrc@belfast.org.uk www.nihrc.org/ DATA ON THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE DIRECTORY SECTION: Committee on the Administration of Justice, Community Development Center, Community Relations Council, Co-operation Ireland, The Corrymeela Community, Democratic Dialogue, The Glencree Centre for Reconciliation, Horizon Project, INCORE, Irish Peace and Reconciliation Platform, Kilcranny House, Meath Peace Group, Mediation Network, Nonviolent Action Training Project, Peace and Reconciliation Group, Peace Pledge Ireland Campaign

About the author

Mari Fitzduff is currently professor of Conflict Studies, and director of INCORE (Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity). From 1990–1997 she was director of the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland. The Council works with government, statutory bodies, trade unions, the media, businesses, and community groups developing policy, programs and training to address issues of conflict in Northern Ireland. In addition to her work in Northern Ireland, Mari Fitzduff has also worked as a program consultant on projects addressing conflict in the Middle East, Sri Lanka, the Basque country, and the CIS States. Her publications include Beyond Violence—Conflict Resolution Processes in Northern Ireland, published as part of the United Nations series on Conflict and Governance, and Community Conflict Skills, a source book of theory and skills for program development in conflict resolution. Liam O'Hagan is the research development officer at INCORE. Among his roles at INCORE, he is responsible for the Internet service The Conflict Data Service and he edits Ethnic Conflict Research Digest. He is also researching a project on demilitarization in Northern Ireland that is being carried out by INCORE and the Bonn International Center for Conversion. He is a graduate of the Queen's University of Belfast and the University of Wales at Aberystwyth.